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1 VENDETTA IN KOPER 1686
Koper (Capodistria). Republic of Venice. Sunday, 5 September 1683. An assembly of 
Maggior consiglio in the presence of 118 councillors. The respected podestà also attended 
the meeting and the following resolutions were conﬁ rmed in a vote: 
Proveditori alli Viveri:
Michiel Gavardo P. 97, C. 14
Zannetto Almerigotto P. 94, C. 18
Dr. Francesco Petronio P. 100, C. 16
Deputati al Conciero delle Strade:
Dr. Bortolo Petronio P. 74, C. 33
Co: Marin Borisi P. 65, C 45
Dr. Nicolò del Tacco P. 62, C. 34
Zuanne Ingaldeo P. 63, C. 27
Dr Olimpo Gavardo P. 56, C. 34
Dr. Elio Belgramoni P. 55, C. 32
Fabio Almerigotto P. 65, C. 38
This is the record of a meeting of Koper’s city council (Maggior Consiglio; AAMC, 
559, 195) that took place in the Praetorian Palace: nothing unusual. The city councillors 
divided the city’s functions that served as a vital source of income for all Koper’s noble-
men among the members of aristocracy in accordance with the customary procedure that 
had been common practice in the city’s government for at least ﬁ ve centuries. 
However, this meeting was not at all as common as it seems from this scarce report. A 
harsh verbal altercation took place during the meeting between Dr. Nicolò del Tacco and 
Dr. Giuliano del Bello, who at the time held the important function of the city’s mayor 
(Sindaco Proveditore), the supreme function of the autonomous city government. The 
only higher function was held by the podestà and captain of Koper, who was elected by 
the Great Council of Venice every 16 months and sent to Koper as the supreme judge and 
military and administrative governor. 
Both were also representatives of Koper’s ancient families (at least from the 15th 
century; de Totto, 1937; Stancovich, 1829) and holders of the title Ser, although there 
were approximately 15 families with the title of counts and only one family, the Gravisi, 
held the title of marquise. Both graduated at the University of Padua (Sitran Rea, 1995) 
and therefore proudly held the academic title Dr. (this was common for graduates of law 
and medicine). 
The dispute expanded upon the interference of Domenico del Bello, Giuliano‘s older 
uncle, who was otherwise known as a calm and wise citizen. The core of the dispute was 
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the division of the communal jobs, the entire situation ultimately tilted when the Sindaco 
Giuliano del Bello suggested a new project for the commune. Perhaps the fruit of the 
several hour-long dispute was ultimately giving the function of the Deputat al Conciero 
delle Strade to Nicolò del Tacco. This function brought substantial income, as there were 
seven councillors holding this position. 
However, the rivalry for communal functions was not fatal for the following events. 
There was enmity1 between families del Tacco and del Bello brewing in the background. 
Ottavio del Bello married Cecilia, daughter of late Carlo del Tacco (Venturini, 1906, 
329). Can we call this a forbidden love, Koper’s Romeo and Juliet? Or was it rather 
the case of complications regarding payment of the dowry? Was it a case of a violated 
prenuptial agreement?2 At this point, the questions remain hypothetical, as corresponding 
documents about the faith of Ottavio and Cecilia have not yet been found. However, a 
number of other documents regarding the vendetta in 1686 Koper that emerged from the 
quarrel will be presented in this study according to its main goal – to portray feud in the 
interrelationships between customary law and legal process. Therefore, let us proceed 
step by step.
HOMICIDE
When the tense meeting came to an end, just before eleven o’clock in the evening, 118 
councillors and the podestà with their escorts began to head to their homes.
However, the tension did not cease. The del Bello were departing down the stairs of 
the Praetorian Palace in Koper, including uncle Domenico, the sindaco Giuliano, and 
young Alvise del Bello, brother of Giuliano, when they suddenly received the company 
of a group led by Nicolò del Tacco. Again a dispute arose; heavy words were spoken and 
rage overcame all who were present. 
When they stepped through the main entrance of the Praetorian Palace onto the 
square,3 the sindaco Giuliano snapped at Nicolò del Tacco, who made a shooting gesture 
1 Venturini, 1906, 329: “[…] ingrossato il sangue dei parenti, divinimo inimici […]”. Inimicizia is a syn-
onym for feud ( Darovec et al., 2017). The ﬁ rst to call attention to this event was Venturini, back in his 
work Il casato dei marchesi Gravisi (1906). This is the most extensive historical work ever written about 
the Marquis family from Koper, but for this case he only had at his disposal documents from the PAK 
archive (Doc. 1, 24, 26, 38, 42, 43, 45). The source of the cited Doc. 41 for now remains unknown, since 
Venturini did not cite the origin of individual documents, explaining only that it belonged to the archive 
of the Gravisi family. Venturini, thus, summarized the essence of the story from the difesa, the defense of 
Nicolò Gravisi, which at that time he had at disposal from the Gravisi family archive and is now kept in 
PAK archive. He did not publish the Doc. 38, the so-called difesa, in full. The full text is provided in the 
present publication. In addition to that, the Annex has transcriptions of the other 37 documents regarding 
this case’s investigation, originating from the State Archives of Venice. Therefore, he was not aware of 
the other circumstances and, in particular, he did not interpret the issue from the viewpoint of changes 
in the judicial systems of conﬂ ict resolution during the transition from the Middle Ages to the Modern 
period, as it is provided in this study.
2 The archival material, preserved in PAK, holds a substantial number of prenuptial agreements (dote or 
matrimoniali), cf.  Darovec, 1996.
3 “ […] escivano dalla porta del Corpo di Guardia del Palazzo […]” (Venturini, 1906, 329; Doc. 41).
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at the uncle Domenico del Bello, after which the young Alvise del Bello drew a pistol and 
shot Nicolò del Tacco. 
He died instantly. Alvise began to run. The men from Nicolò’s escort, his relatives 
and friends, were in shock at ﬁ rst, but soon some of them drew their swords from 
their sheaths and one of them even managed to injure Alvise on the neck, although 
the wound was not severe, as Alvise continued to run through the chambers of the 
Praetorian Palace. All covered in blood, he broke into the chambers of Koper’s podestà 
and captain, Bernardino Michiel, precisely when podestà was taking oﬀ  his formal 
cape.4 Michiel stared at what was about to happen open-mouthed. Behind Alvise, a 
group of men with their swords were running into the chamber, but Alvise jumped out 
the chamber’s window and landed in the gardens of the Praetorian Palace, where they 
lost all trace of him in Koper’s dark alleys, which he had known like the back of his 
hand since his early youth. 
In the next instance Koper’s podestà and captain ordered an investigation, however 
around two o’clock in the morning he received a report from Ser Cristoﬀ oro Brutti that 
4 “Ducale”. The cape of the Podestà is also nicely depicted in a painting by Vittore Carpaccio dated in 1516 
(remake on the front page). The description of events according to the letter of Koper’s Podestà (CCX, LR, 
b. 258, n.o. 187, 1683.9.6.; Doc. 2) and Venturini (1906, 329; Doc. 41).
Fig. 1: Koper. Praetorian Palace in 1913. On the right side the gate of the Guardpost. 
Wikimedia Commons.
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the fugitive was not to be found. Numerous persecutors remained empty-handed on that 
scandalous night.5
Koper’s podestà and captain Bernardin Michiel instantly knew what he needed to do 
in order to prevent bloodshed in the future: he ordered the representatives of the feuding 
families to be sequestrated (sequestro); however, the main potential avenger, the brother 
of the killed, Francesco del Bello, had already gone missing. 
On the very same day, 6 September 1683, Koper’s podestà and captain Bernardin 
Michiel reported the event to the Capi of the Council of Ten and asked for further instruc-
tion. The Capi replied after three days. They ﬁ rmly instructed that the criminal procedure, 
“servatis servandis”, which meant that the podestà could take even more severe repercus-
sions when regarding the prosecution of the perpetrator than was indicated in the local 
customary legal practice (Povolo, 2015b). 
The Capi also stressed that this occurrence was regarded as extremely severe crime, 
due to the use of ﬁ rearms, which was forbidden by the law, and also due to the fact 
that Alvise del Bello shot Dr. Nicolò del Tacco in front of the gate of the Guardpost of 
the Pretorian palace (sopra la Porta del Corpo di Guardia di cotesto Palazzo), meaning 
directly in front of the central security service of the city (Doc. 3). 
Nonetheless, it is not surprising that the Capi of the Council of Ten did not order 
the inquisitorial trial rite (rito inquisitorio), as they would commonly do in almost all 
homicide cases of that time. Especially after the passing of series of laws between 1680 
and 1682 (a year before the event we are discussing), which stated that all cases of such 
homicides from all areas of the Republic of Venice should be directly communicated 
to the Council of Ten, who then, for the most part, delegated servatis servandis to the 
rectors of the cities. This law enforced the supreme central judicial authority of the central 
judicial body of the Republic of Venice.6 
Although we managed to gather 45 documents from the Archives of Venice and Koper 
(see Annex) to support this case, the extant and found documents7 show that there was 
5 Alvise del Bello managed to ﬂ ee; he ﬁ rst found his sanctuary with the Provveditore generale da Mar, 
Gerolamo Cornaro, who was a tragic character of the Morean war (1684–1699), and after that with the 
Archduke Cosimo III of Tuscany, where he reached the rank of alﬁ er and received a salary of 8 scudo per 
month (Venturini, 1906, 329). “Alﬁ ere riformato è quel Soldato che dopo un lungo esercizio dell’armi in 
alcuno di questi gradi, fatto chiaro per segnalate prove di valore e d’esperienza, militava per elezione, e 
fuori delle compagnie, con grosso soldo, assumendo le fazioni piu arrischiate, ed assistendo nelle battaglie 
alla persona del Capitan generale, o all’insegna principale.” (Grassi, 1833, 341).
6 About the gradual overtake of the central and all-deciding judicial authority in the Republic until the end 
of the 15th Century onwards see Povolo, 2017, especially regarding the role of deliberating and central 
regulation over the penalty of exile, which was one of the most severe punishments of that particular era 
(besides the rowing on a galley). See Povolo (2015b) also in light of the structure of judicial ceremonies as 
they developed through accusatorial and later through inquisitorial trial rites.
7 At the Archivio di Stato di Venezia, I searched through all archival sources that regarded criminal justice, 
including numerous subseries, as they are evident from the published inventories and lists ( http://www.
archiviodistatovenezia.it), primarily the archival records of Council of Ten, Capi of the Council of Ten, 
Camerlengo of the Council of Ten, Collegio (Minor consiglio, Signoria, Pien collegio), Senato, Avvogaria 
di Comun, Quarantia Criminal etc. However, the Venetian archival records are immense and show broadly 
branched administration that frequently exchanged individual cases or jurisdiction; accordingly, we can-
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even more correspondence regarding this case between the local government and central 
governmental bodies. 
It is also evident from the documents that the local and the central judicial bodies 
of the Republic of Venice aimed towards peaceful customary reconciliation among the 
feuding parties; in ﬁ rst place the victim’s brother, Francesco del Tacco, with the main 
actors in the feud, with Dr. Giuliano, the brother of the killer Alvise del Bello, and their 
uncle Domenico del Bello. 
Due to the fact that also other of Koper’s families shared family ties, this feud soon 
drew in also the marquises of Gravisi, since the killed Dr. Nicolò del Tacco was a maternal 
nephew of the brothers Nicolò Gravisi, Giovanni Battista Gravisi, and Leandro Gravisi. 
The support on the part of the del Bello family included also one of Koper’s ancient noble 
families Belgramoni, with Dr. Elio as its representative (Doc. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 19).
RECONCILIATION
How did the negotiation on both feuding parties take place? What were the agreements 
and the pressure from the local community and the central government? We could say that 
they were entirely according to the custom as it was in practice in the middle ages, with 
however one substantial diﬀ erence: instead of pressure from the local community the 
main pressure towards reconciliation was exerted by the central Venetian judicial organ, 
the Council of Ten. 
The mandate for preparing the judicial process servatis servandis that was delegated 
by the Capi of the Council of Ten and was to be enforced by Koper’s podestà as early as 
four days after the homicide, on 10 September 1683 (Doc. 3), enabled the podestà to take 
strict repercussions, the so called sequestration (sequestro), which signiﬁ ed either house 
arrest or conﬁ scation of the real estate and movable property of the feuding parties. 
As mentioned prior, Koper’s podestà on the very night of the homicide ordered 
sequestration for Francesco del Tacco, which was also expected by del Tacco and which 
contributed to his disappearing from Koper. From a secret hiding place he threatened 
the killer’s family with vendetta. This was also the reason why  on October 23rd Koper’s 
podestà also ordered sequestro for other previously-mentioned protagonists (Doc. 9), 
except for Leandro Gravisi, who was at the time still in exile due to the ﬁ rearm homicide 
of Domenico di Valle, “povero opperario mentre di nottetempo da luoco a luoco traspor-
tava un sacco di olive”, as it was picturesquely expressed by the devastated mother of 
Giuliano del Bello less than three years later (Doc. 1, 27). These sequestrations, on one 
hand, caused even greater enmity between the feuding parties, but, on the other hand, they 
forced the parties to ﬁ nd a solution. 
not exclude that some vital documents regarding this case might not emerge in some other source. At 
least 10 so-called ﬁ lze of archival record ASV. Cons X – Parti Comuni, which includes documents for the 
occurences after this case of vendetta 1686, are in severely bad condition, and many of the documents are 
completely illegible. I nonetheless estimate that there is enough material so as to gain an understaning of 
the modern-age social processes and the work of the legislation, which are interpreted, cited, and published 
in the Annex of this monograph.
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A breakup between the two families followed and the disputing parties chose a 
mediator to achieve the none-too-easy task of achieving peace. Meanwhile, while the 
negotiations were pending, the injured party, as it considered itself, could oppress the 
enemy with all sorts of persecutions, like seizures, long and harsh preventive arrests, 
etc. Neither did the Venetian justice system give rest to the guilty, or the presumed one: 
frequent interrogations here and in Venice ruthlessly tortured the killer’s relatives; since 
the killer usually placed himself in safety by escaping.
After the composition the opponents, when meeting in the street, greeted each other 
by tipping their hat. The omission of this elementary act of good manners and courtesy 
led, as a logical consequence, to the annulment of the role of the mediator, whose inter-
vention was further rendered meaningless when the killer or his relatives refused to bless 
the body of the killed.
These provocations with threats and damage were in accordance with the customary 
system of conﬂ ict resolution, which can be marked as faida or vendetta or osveta in the 
Balkan areas, and completely customary. The fundamental aim was to reach an honorary 
settlement and reconciliation between the parties in conﬂ ict, meaning peace, which is 
often mentioned in documents from Koper’s podestàs during the time of the feud in ques-
tion, as well as at the central Venetian judicial body the Council of Ten (Doc. 8, 9, 10, 11, 
13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23, 27, 29, 36, 37, 40). 
Fig. 2: The Doge’s Palace, residence of the Venetian Government. Wikimedia Commons.
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The pressure and the threats received a response by intervention of local mediators. 
Initially Pietro Gavardo, a member of an ancient noble family from Koper who held the 
function of Governatore dell’Armi, took the role of the mediator upon himself, and the 
parties reached a truce in March 1684. The truce, which usually lasted up to one year, 
was one of the most important phases in the ritual of conﬂ ict resolution, as it enabled the 
negotiations necessary to reach composition and peace within the community (Darovec, 
2016, 2017; Darovec et al., 2017).
However, formally written documents with promises and an oath not to harm one 
another and to forge true friendship8 were written in front of the mediator Pietro Gavardo 
only with the presence of Domenico and Giuliano del Bello on one side and Giovanni 
Battista Gravisi on the other and furthermore between Francesco del Tacco and Elio 
Belgramoni, and between Elio Belgramoni and Giovanni Battista Gravisi. 
Apparently the truce between Francesco del Tacco and Domenico and Giuliano del 
Bello, who was a formal representative of the victim, had not yet taken place. This is also 
testiﬁ ed in a subscription that the sequestration was pardoned just for Giovani Battista 
Gravisi and Elio Belgramoni (Doc. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 19). 
Perhaps it was expected that a similar “friendship” would also be conﬁ rmed by Gi-
uliano del Bello and Francesco del Tacco. However, this did not take place and in June 
1684 new discordances arose between unreconciled parties (Doc. 8–13). 
The Capi of the Council of Ten reacted ﬁ rmly to these events and demanded that 
Koper’s podestà was to establish tranquillity and peace within ﬁ fteen days and report all 
those who destabilized it so they could take the necessary measures to coerce them to 
obedience.9 
It seems this threat had the opposite eﬀ ect. Giuliano del Bello used the pretext that he 
wanted to go in front of the Council of Ten to explain how all the disputes between the 
families were rooted in the marriage between his brother Ottavio and Cecilia del Tacco in 
order to escape his sequestration without the permission of Koper’s podestà, which was 
deemed as completely scandalous. The podestà for the ﬁ rst time took sides with Francesco 
del Tacco, who was prone to accept the reconciliation (Doc. 9). The Capi of the Council of 
Ten made it quite clear that Giuliano del Bello would not be accepted before their audience 
and that the podestà was to punish him with additional sequestration (Doc. 10).
It is indicated that a higher level of interest for the reconciliation was expressed by 
Francesco del Tacco, the representative of the victim, who was in fact the ﬁ rst in line that 
had a right to wage vendetta according to the custom. 
Perhaps this was the reason why Koper’s podestà Nicolò Barbarigo permitted Fran-
cesco del Tacco, who was in sequestration, to travel to Venice to meet the Council of Ten 
8 “Dichiaro io Domenico del Bello […] che il Signor Compare Marchese Gio Battista Gravise è stato sempre 
da me riverito per signore et amico singolare, non havendo mai concepito contro il medesimo alcun senti-
mento diverso et che l’espressioni nel mio constituto […]” (Doc. 6). The notion of constituto, an important 
part of the ceremonial trial rite, which will be thoroughly explained later on in text, within this oath of truce 
(friendship and respect) testiﬁ es that there had been mutual accusations and lawsuits. 
9 “[…] mentre col Consiglio di X:ci sarano prese quelle vigorose deliberationi nel a’ ridurli alla dovuta 
obedienza […]” ( Doc. 8).
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and stay there until they saw ﬁ t and take time to present his case in declining the oﬀ er 
of truce (Doc. 11). On 14 July 1684 the Capi allowed the arrival of Francesco del Tacco 
in Venice (Doc. 12), and Koper’s podestà on July 22nd 1684 reported to have granted 
permission for his departure (Doc. 13).
Within the letter that was sent to the Capi of the Council of Ten in November, Koper’s 
podestà and captain clearly took sides with Francesco as he summed up his reasons that 
testify about another characteristic aspect of similar quarrels. 
He stated that at ﬁ rst he thought that Francesco del Tacco kept refusing to come to 
an agreement with the del Bello family until they oﬀ ered very prosperous (communal) 
oﬃ  ce, to which they thereafter opposed as they did not feel any responsibility in the case 
of his brother’s murder, and the feud regained its hostility (Doc. 11, 14). 
The success of the Francesco’s summer visit to the Council of Ten cannot be deter-
mined; however, the fact is that the crucial people involved in the feud were at the beginning 
of November 1684 “more than a year and some months” in sequestration, as reported by 
Koper’s podestà. He also stated that it was his sincere endeavour “di veder stabilita la quiete 
a questa Città, e la pace tra lui [Francesco del Tacco] da una et Dominus Domenico, e Dr 
Giulian del Bello dall’altra” and that he has “subito rinovate le più eﬃ  caci insinuationi a 
medemi anco col mezo de mediatori” however it did not come to fruition. 
Fig. 3: Pietro Coppo’s map Histriae Tabula. Produced in 1525, published as part of 
Ortelius’s Theatrum Orbis Terrarum in 1573. Wikimedia Commons.
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Although Koper’s podestà gave favour to the opinion of del Bello and acted in ac-
cordance with philosophy and the policy of punitive law that individualized the crime and 
punishment, quite contrary to the custom that deemed the community of the perpetrator 
liable for the crime, the following writing from the podestà shows great disappointment 
regarding his actions and his inability to reach truce in the community. This is also the 
reason why the podestà took initiative and suggested to the Council of Ten to take all the 
measures necessary to ensure the tranquillity and peace within the community (Doc. 14).
Capi of the Council of Ten ﬁ rmly responded in fourteen days, on 17 November 1684, 
and demanded that all three protagonists involved, namely Francesco del Tacco and Do-
menico and Giuliano del Bello, immediately come to their presence in Venice, where the 
Capi would take care of the tranquillity and peace among their serfs (la quiete, e la pace 
tra sudditi) (Doc. 15, 16). It was commonly known what this signiﬁ ed for the summoned: 
the arrested were ﬁ rst kept in a dungeon with no light, then for several days in a prison 
with light, however simultaneously subjected to strict inquisitorial trial rites, including 
torture (Povolo, 2015b). This took place also in this case, as it is evident from some of the 
documents (Doc. 27, 29, 38).
First, they summoned Giuliano del Bello and Francesco del Tacco, and based on their 
testimonials the Capi on 30 December 1684 decided that Domenico del Bello also had to 
come before them (this time with la remmissione fattale con procura); however, this was 
also the case for Giovanni Batista and Nicolò Gravisi (Doc. 17). Despite the strictness of 
the messages, the Council of Ten (Tribunal nostro) was still aiming towards the easing 
of the discordance between the families (Doc. 18) or houses (Casa), as the sources report 
the term for kinship clans. 
How unpleasant could this form of summons be and what measures were taken to 
avoid it being presented in some of the following documents? Domenico del Bello was 
summoned on 11 November 1684, but he did not respond to this summons, nor did he to 
the following summons of 15 January 1685 (Doc. 18), nor did he respond to the summons 
of Koper’s podestà on 28 January 1685 (Doc. 20). 
His perpetual excuse was his illness and old age.10 As the summons did not bring 
results, the Capi on 19 February 1685 ordered Koper’s podestà to imprison him (Doc. 21). 
About ten days of imprisonment in Koper were enough for Domenico del Bello to opt for 
the diﬃ  cult trip to Venice, where he ﬁ nally arrived on March 3rd 1685 on the horse of the 
podestà himself in the escort of at least two of the podestà’s caps.
Nicolò Gravisi could not attend the truce treaty that took place in March 1684, due 
to his study obligations at the University of Padua (Doc. 19), and he also successfully 
avoided the summons of the court from 30 December 1684 until 8 March 1685, when 
he was seized by command of the Capi of the Council of Ten in the Sestier di Castello 
in Venice and brought before the podestà of Padua (Doc. 23), where there was also a 
notorious court (Povolo, 1997). 
Until that time, the authorities were unable to arrest Giovanni Battista Gravisi; how-
ever they managed to do so by March 31st 1685. This was when the Capi ordered Koper’s 
10 “[…] a causa delle sue indispositioni, e decrepita età […]” (Doc. 17).
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podestà to return all the conﬁ scated movable property from the house of Domenico del 
Bello (Doc. 25). 
We can assume that this would only occur if the feuding parties had reached concord 
and, particularly at that time (between 8 and 28March 1685), an oﬃ  cial ceremony of a 
peace treaty, which is mentioned by Nicolò Gravisi in his later defence11 (Doc. 38) it is also 
mentioned by Giulia, mother of Giuliano del Bello, in her ﬁ rst letter, dated 17 June 1686.12 
The conclusion of the solemn peace in the presence of the Council of Ten shows 
the ritual form, which included having the oﬀ ender and his kin express humiliation by 
compliments and pleas for forgiveness in order to gain pardon from the injured party 
that had reached satisfaction. After the acceptance of the pardon the oath of friendship 
followed, supported by the gestures of handshake, embrace, and the kiss of peace, which 
signiﬁ ed perpetual peace between the representatives of the feuding parties. 
The ritual, already described by the Bolognian notary, judge, and university professor 
Rolandino in the middle of 13th century in a manual for notaries, can be seen in practi-
cally all European medieval and Early modern Age documents (Darovec, 2016, 2017). 
And this ritual of reconciliation was, at least until the late 19th century, preserved in the 
customary legal tradition in the lands of Montenegro, Herzegovina and Albania (Bogišić, 
1999; Ergaver 2016, 2017).
Unfortunately, I have not been able to ﬁ nd the mentioned document of the peace 
treaty, as it must have been written. However, if the reconciliation took place according 
to the custom, the written act was not entirely necessary: a public ritual in front of all the 
main actors suﬃ  ced for the peace treaty to be valid and conﬁ rmed. 
Nonetheless, the discussed documents explicitly show that, after almost a year and 
a half long unsuccessful conﬂ ict resolution on local level, all those principally involved 
in the family conﬂ ict between Koper’s protagonists from noble families (Francesco del 
Tacco, Giuliano del Bello, Domenico del Bello, Nicolò Gravisi, Gio: Battista Gravisi), 
on accounts of the murder of Nicolò del Tacco, committed by Alvise del Bello in 1683, 
were forcefully brought before the Capi of the Council of Ten, arrested, and put in prison 
until they were forced to make peace in March 1685. The peace was made with clanged 
teeth (Doc. 38).
The Gravisi especially held a grudge against the del Bello, as they again became 
involved in the feud that they themselves wanted to end. They had been oﬀ ended with 
numerous limitations due to sequestrations; the biggest grudge they held was due to the 
fact that they wanted Giovanni Battista Gravisi in front of the Council of Ten after the 
reconciliation had already taken place,13 and due to arrest and imprisonment of Nicolò 
Gravisi,14 who studied in Padua and frequently visited Venice. He was arrested in Sestier 
11 It regards the so-called difesa that was presented in the second stage of the trial rite, called the processo 
difensivo (cf.  Povolo, 2015b, 217–219) by the defendant to defend his case. 
12 “[…] fu stabilita la pace et rattiﬃ  cata alla presenza dell’Eccelso Tribunale, con le dovute solenni formali-
tà” (Doc. 27).
13 “Giunto poi il Signor Domenico a Venetia non venne voglia agli Aversarii di far chiamare ivi anco 
Gio:Battista mio Fratello, benchè in Capodistria già paciﬁ cato?” (Doc. 38).
14 “gli assedii de’ sequestri, i dispendii de Venetia” (Doc. 38).
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Castello and given to the mercy of the rector of Padua, where there was a court with 
special authorisation and where several trials against the noblemen of the Republic of 
Venice took place (Povolo, 1997).
It is thus perhaps not a coincidence that Nicolò Gravisi on 28 March 1685, prob-
ably immediately after the (forcefully) concluded peace treaty, wrote a plea to the Doge 
of Venice to accept his brother Leandro Gravisi (1640–1721) into the Venetian army 
(Doc. 24). Leandro was namely in exile from the Republic of Venice due to having killed 
Domenico di Valle in 1673 (Doc 1, 27); however, he had shown his military skills in 
several mercenary armies. In the twenty years before that he had gained his experience 
in the Imperial army in Milan; his ﬁ rst experience, however, was in the Venetian Army 
as alﬁ ere and later as captain of oltramontans. As a mercenary soldier, he participated in 
battles in Hungary, at the siege of Bon, in the battle at Treveries. Due to his courage he 
was dispatched as a captain to Sicily, where he became Governatore delle Piazze in the 
Kingdom of Sicily. Therefore, the plea for Leandro was granted. 
The Morean war between the Venetians and the Ottomans was waged between 1684 
and 1699 for power over Peloponnesus, which the Venetians gradually took over and 
Fig. 4: Negotiation_of_the_peace_of_Karlowitz. The peace conference in Karlowitz 
(present-day Sremski Karlovci in Serbia) in 1699. (Treaty of Karlowitz) Engraving of 
unknown German artist from the Low Countries. Wikimedia Commons.
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where they conﬁ rmed their authority with the Treaty of Karlowitz.15 The same treaty 
also marked the end of the Austro-Ottoman war (1683–1697), which had begun with the 
second siege of Vienna. After these events the Ottoman Empire gradually began losing 
their acquisitions in Europe. 
Wars were an ideal opportunity for all exiles (bandits), who were able to ask for 
acceptance into military service, and were granted pardon for their sentences upon ac-
ceptance into service.16 This was good news to numerous marginalized bandits who were 
hiding in dangerous forests and prairies, where they were subject to unpunished killing 
by anyone who was additionally given a prize for the bounty. However, Leandro was well 
situated and safe within the Imperial Army in Milan in this regard. Was he driven to return 
home on his brother Nicolò’s and uncle Count Almerico Sabini’s request only due to his 
desire to defend his homeland? Or solely due to the fact that he was the only one who did 
not make peace?
VENDETTA
Koper, June 6th 1686. Sunday. 
The main square, Piazza (Platea Communis). 
On that early summer morning there was a crowd of Koper’s citizens from all class-
es.17 Suddenly, they heard the sound of two gunshots and a furious scream “A te!”, which 
came from the entrance of the Praetorian palace, the same spot where a homicide took 
place in 1683.
As it appears from the self-defence of Giovanni Nicolò Gravisi, at ﬁ rst it was believed 
that a pigeon in the square was killed, then that the doctor Giuliano del Bello was mur-
dered. After killing his enemy in front of Vice Podestà Balbi and the crowd, the avenger, 
the marquis Leandro Gravisi, ﬁ rstly invited the captain Paulazzi, who was in the main 
square near the event, to come forward, and immediately after this he escaped, crossing 
Carmini street towards Brolo square and entered the tight street cale de’ signori Petronii 
towards the Porta Isolana, chased by the cops. There the murderer had readier a boat with 
six oars, a servant, and several weapons: an evident sign that the crime had been planned. 
When the cops arrived at Porta Isolana, Leandro Gravisi had already taken oﬀ , turning the 
boat towards Trieste. (Doc. 27, 38; Venturini, 1906, 330). 
15 The conﬂ ict of 1684–1699, the only one declared by Venice to the Sublime port, led to the Venetian con-
quest of Morea; it was during this war that the Parthenon was destroyed in Athens by the Venetians, as the 
Ottomans had been using it as a deposit for the ammunition of the canons.
16 Cf. the story about Zanzanú, the bandit from Lago di Garda (Povolo, 2011), or about the Catalan bandit 
Perot Rocaguinarda, mentioned in Cervantes’s Don Quixote, who received a winning pardon in 1614 (cf. 
Povolo, 2017).
17 “6°: Che la mattina 5 giugno, che morse il dr. Giulian del Bello, il Mezà Ruﬁ ni era ripieno di Cittadini di 
tutte le sorti, tanto Parenti di una parte che dell’altra.” (Doc. 38).
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The next day, on 7 June 1686, Leandro Gravisi wrote a Manifestum from Trieste18 to 
the Principe (Doge of Venice). 
He explains why as the uncle of the killed (in 1683) he went to the Doctor Giuliano 
del Bello to claim from him the blood count for the spilled blood of his kin. In his words 
from Manifestum19 (Doc. 26):
[…] I then returned to the Fatherland after fourteen years and, instead of apologizing 
in some way for the oﬀ enses inﬂ icted to my blood, and to act civilized with me, he 
mocked me by touching my mustache with disdain,20 and thus, in the end, provoked me 
to kill him the same way and at the same place where my nephew was. Those causes 
18 Trieste in 1382 dedicates for the Habsburgs, so it was another state, but just 7 nautical miles (1=1852 m) 
away from Koper.
19 Manifestum was the recognition of guilt in court (Marchesi, 1897, 10).
20 “ […] più tosto mostró di beﬀ arsi anco di me col passegiarmi con sprezzo sul mustachio […]”. With this 
Leandro undoubtedly wanted to say that the murder was committed in self-defense and in fury over the 
opponent’s behavior. Cf.  Povolo, 2015c.
Fig. 5: Ground plan of Koper’s Piazza, 18th century. Regional Museum of Koper.
14
VENDETTA IN KOPER 1686
are known to everyone, and thus I presume my resolution will be estimated rightly; If 
there was someone, conducted by passion or ignorance, who has diﬀ erent feelings, 
I am ready to defend it with a sword in my hand or in some other knightly way, up 
to the last spirit that lies; because what I have done was just, and it was done in a 
honourable way. […].21
To express his respect towards the Principe, sums up Leandro, he immediately moved 
from his state in Trieste, where he would stay for a couple more days “if someone came 
about to challenge him,” 22 and that by his action he did not want to oﬀ end the most serene 
21 “Ma se a caso ritrovasse alcuno che, portato da passione o condoto d’ignoranza, avesse sentimento diver-
so, son pronto di mantenerlo con la spada alla mano o con altra forma da cavalliero sino all’ultimo spirito 
che mente, perché quello ho fatto è giustamente e fu fatto onorevolmente.” (Doc. 26).
22 “per sapere l’intentione di qual se sia contrario per darli nella forma sudetta tutte le sodisfacioni” (Doc. 26).
Fig. 6: Leandro Gravisi. G. Caprin, Istria Nobilissima, Trieste, F. H. Schimpﬀ , 1905-
1907, vol. II.
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Principe by any means, and especially not the city of Koper, to which he expresses his 
deepest respect and honour.23 
This time the Council of Ten, on 19 June 1686, ordered Processo col rito (Doc. 27, 
28), which signiﬁ ed the inquisitorial trial rite (Povolo, 2015b). They decided to do so 
based on the report of Koper’s podestà and captain Vettor da Mosto and the letter written 
by Giulia, the mother of killed Giuliano del Bello. 
To conduct the trial rite, including the deliberation of punishment, the Council of 
Ten authorised Koper’s Regiment, that is Koper’s podestà and captain, who was also 
speciﬁ cally instructed to make sure his councillor (Cancelliere) diligently recorded the 
entire process.24 
In accordance with the fundamental characteristics of inquisitorial trial rite, the po-
destà was given the right to grant witnesses their anonymity in exchange for an adequate 
amount of information, and an accomplice could be granted pardon, if he was not the main 
conspirator or actor. Furthermore, the podestà was granted the right to punish the injustice 
in the name of Council of Ten “nelle pene di vita, bando perpetuo e deﬃ  nitivo da questa 
Città di Venetia e Dogado e da tutte le altre Città, Terre, e luoghi del Dominio Nostro, 
terrestri e maritimi navilii armati e disarmati, priggion, galea, relegation, conﬁ scation de 
Beni, e colle taglie, che vi pareranno.” (Doc. 27, 28).
There is a letter from Giuliano’s mother as an Annex to Doc. 27. In the letter she 
speaks on behalf of her innocently deceased son, who believed that the conclusion of a 
peace treaty resulted in a pardon and dismissal of plans to exact vendetta. He also beli-
eved in public safety and protection that should ensure the “growth of numerous fertile 
and peaceful olive trees and not funeral cypresses”, as it was poetically expressed by the 
deceased’s mother.25 
Guliano’s mother does not mention the fundamental background of the feud; she does 
however reveal some interesting details regarding the alleged organization and the act of 
vendetta (Doc. 27).
Qui gionto [Leandro Gravisi] per un mese incirca fu sempre accompagnato ad ogni 
momento dalli predetti et altri suoi congionti ﬁ nché, maturato il concerto, e preveduta 
vicina l’opportunità di coglier l’infelice ﬁ gliolo, allestita prima barca espedita a sei 
remi, tre giorni trattenuta otiosa e ferma et in questi tre giorni aponto lasciato sempre 
solo abbandonato dalli predetti suoi congionti [Francesco e Iseppo del Taco et Nicolò 
23 “[…] una Città tanto riguardevole a quale io professo tutta la riverenza, et onore […]” (Doc. 26).
24  The cancelliere had to have appropriate legal education, mostly notarial. They were the holders of the 
entire legal order in the commune. Any replacement of the podestà (mandates usually lasted 16 months), 
which was elected in the Venetian Maggior Consiglio, also brought about the replacement of the can-
celliere, which was selected by the respective Venetian podestà. They were therefore the only supreme 
representatives of the Republic of Venice in Koper. Later another two representatives, Consiglieres, were 
added, and these were given the function of the vice-podestà, as is evident also from our case (Doc. 27). 
The administration however consisted of some permanent local oﬃ  cials (Darovec, 2002), and aside from 
those the city itself was quite full of local notaries (Darovec, 2015).
25  “[…] sperava che accompagnato dall’ombra della publica protezione havessero a crescere copiosi e 
fecondi gli olivi paciﬁ ci e non funesti cipressi […]” (Doc. 27).
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Gravisi] esso Liandro benché alla larga non lo perdessere di vista come da molti fu 
ben osservati, la mattina sei corrente ﬁ nalmente gionta l’hora fatale, incontrato il 
misero ﬁ gliolo ce lo salutò profondamente com’era solito fare e corrisposto sempre 
dall’omicida, invece della corrispondenza all’ultimo saluto, posta mano ad una 
Pistola gliela scaricò con dirgli con voce arabiata ‘A te’; e così traﬁ tto spirò sotto 
l’occhio dell’Illustrissimo signor Consigliere Vice  Podestà e nella publica Piazza.
She continues with a description that later became the main part of the indictment in 
the process against Nicolò Gravisi as the main accomplice and conspirator of vendetta: 
Immediate fatto cenno del predetto Liandro alli sopradeti che stavano in osservatione 
del fatto d’unirsi seco lui, non solo lo feccero, ma lo scortorono alla barca in puoca 
distanza et in quell’intervallo uniti gli oﬃ  ziali per ordine di quell’Illustrissimo Consi-
gliere per inseguir l’ommicida, posero mano alle spade contro di loro per trattenerli et 
assicurare allo stesso l’imbarco che seguito anco felicemente fu trasportato a Trieste.
The last part of this testimony, stating that some of the followers of Leandro Gravisi 
who used swords against the cap to enable the escape of Gravisi in Trieste and that they 
had visited him in Venice beforehand and plotted the vendetta, were the basis for the 
ﬁ rst phase of the inquisitorial trial rite, meaning the processo informativo and processo 
oﬀ ensivo (Doc. 30, 31, 32). 
The inquisitorial trial rite included questioning the defendant(s), inter alia using 
torture. However, the defendant was not acquainted with the content of their testimonies 
Fig. 7: A boat “Vipera”. About 10 meters long, it was led by a crew of six rowers and 
could therefore, if necessary, go very fast. http://digilander.libero.it/andrelisa/Barche%20
a%20Venezia.htm
17
VENDETTA IN KOPER 1686
nor with the witnesses’ identities. The results of the hearing led toward forming the indict-
ment, i.e. to the costituto opposizionale. This was also the basis for the transition into 
the second part of the trial rite, the so-called processo difensivo, in which the defendant 
used self-defence to defend himself against the accusations listed in the costituto oppo-
sizionale. The third, ﬁ nal part of the trial rite, was the deliberation of verdict (sentenza) 
(Povolo, 2015b, 217–233). The sentence concluded the complicated trial procedures, 
even though an act of peace made in the meantime by the parties could interrupt the trial 
during preceding phases, or in any case sensibly aﬀ ect the tenor of the sentence.26 
This form of trial rite was also conducted in Nicolò Gravisi’s case. His difesa reveals 
his standpoint in the matter and other curiosities regarding the feud, which explicitly 
bring to light the characteristics of trial rites and new forms of criminal trials. 
Initially, we can notice that Nicolò’s defence, besides the introductory and concluding 
part, contains 20 chapters (capitoli) of precise answers according to the chapters of the 
indictment in costituto opposizionale. Undoubtedly, there was a legal expert (avvocato di 
penna) who was helped write down the self-defence who always remained anonymous: 
the defence attorney was not formally present, even if in fact there was one. Self-defences 
were written in the ﬁ rst person singular, but were “formally drawn up by a defence at-
torney who had to remain behind scenes” (Povolo, 2015b, 224).
In the characteristic and juicy legal vocabulary of that time, which did not lack literary 
input, jest, and witty remarks, references to the opinions of contemporary legal experts,27 
excerpts from religious scripts, and also humility and calling for God’s presence, mercy, 
and truth, Nicolò Gravisi denied all the statements of the indictment (costituto). For 
each statement he also lists witnesses, some of whom are more or less the same people 
throughout the script, some not, mostly from the local noble class, but also from other 
social classes. 
The complete document is published in the Annex (Doc. 38), and it is important to 
highlight the following: he denounced a peculiar argument (un cosi sinistro argomento), 
namely that someone can become a suspect in a crime due to the insult (oﬀ eso) suﬀ ered 
by the death of one’s nephew. 
“The enmity must be alive, mine died out when the peace was made”,28 adds Nicolò. In 
several places in his difesa, especially in the introduction, he stresses that the perpetrator 
was well known, that the homicide took place during the daytime, in a public place, and 
therefore no one has the right to prosecute him. 
He deemed the accusation from the ﬁ rst part of the Constituto29, namely that he resi-
sted making peace, as completely unjust (così iniqua imputatione). 
26 Before reaching a sentence the judge could decide to use torture, obviously in cases marked by the atrocity 
of the crime and lack of suﬃ  cient evidence. The decisive role attributed to confession and to torture clearly 
shows the importance assigned to the truth that was in the mind and personality of the defendant. Only here 
can we identify a real interrogation, but the position in which it was placed (i.e., at the end of trial proceed-
ings) clearly excludes the possibility of considering the judge’s activity as inquiry (Povolo, 2015b, 219). 
27 So-called trattatisti, cf.  Povolo, 1997; Carroll, 2016.
28 “[…] la inimicitia deve esser viva, e la mia è stata estinta con la pace […]” (Doc. 38).
29 “Così veggo essermi opposto nel primo ingresso del Costituto.” (Doc. 38).
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He also asks in his self-defense: “If I had not wanted to assert peace, would I have 
agreed to the election of the Mediator so soon? After the establishment of the conditions 
by the Mediator, would I have been so ready to embrace them?”
However, somewhere else he states: “Se la pace fosse stata conclusa più presto, non 
sarebbe detto che fu a ﬁ ne di prevenir più facilmente alla vendetta?”. And he furthermore 
asks: “Was the opposing party ready to accept any type of satisfaction as it was expected 
from them? This cannot be deemed as opposing peace but as diﬀ erence in standpoints 
and conditions and these diﬀ erences cannot be solely one or the other’s party’s responsi-
bility.” He furthermore added: “Ma poi, la ventilation della pace non denota intenzione 
di coltivarla?” 
His discussion actually shows the process of negotiation: with mediators who reported 
to one another all the proposals regarding the conditions for paciﬁ cation, which were ad-
ditionally evaluated by each of the feuding parties. After that they came to an agreement, 
and they could discuss and accept the decisions that formed the agreement (trattati). 
The introductory part of the charge (costituto opposizionale) thus intended to prove 
that Nicolò Gravisi was an enemy (inimico) of del Bello. In contemporary understanding 
we could state that the aim was to prove the motive for the criminal act, in the past 
however the same motive was a cause for the feud. This is proven in the next two charges, 
which are also interesting from the stand point of customary conﬂ ict resolution system. 
 “Mi si è opposto in secondo luoco del Costituto che mai cavassi il Cappello al d:r 
Giuliano, se ben da lui provocato.” Not slightly tipping your hat when greeting one 
another in public was considered a gesture that expressed enmity. 
Perhaps an even greater expression of enmity and opposition to the peace treaty, ac-
cording to the custom, would be the absence of the perpetrator at the victim’s funeral: “Mi 
è stato rinfaciato il non esser andato sopra il Cadavero.”30
The comment given in the 11th chapter clearly conﬁ rms this: “But did Francesco del 
Tacco beneﬁ t anything from going there?”,31 which evidently signiﬁ es that Francesco was 
also under charges in this matter. Both charges were dropped due to Nicolò’s explanations. 
It is interesting how he denounced all the charges, again with speciﬁ cally formed 
(rhetorical) questions about how could he have been so foolish to publicly express enmity 
and declare vendetta on his own. Lastly, he concludes: “La dottrina, che si possino far 
vendette contro i Congionti dell’oﬀ ensore non caderebbe contro di me, che sono Fratello 
dell’uccisore?”.  
The central part of the self-defence is composed of 16 out of 20 chapters (capitoli) 
and aims towards renouncing charges about Nicolò being an accomplice in the vengeful 
murder of Giuliano del Bello. They assist in composing a complete picture based on the 
details that were missing from two convicting letters written by the mother, Giulia del 
Bello (Doc. 27, 29). 
30 This custom is also seen fairly regularly in medieval and early modern age documents in all European coun-
tries. The areas where the custom was preserved for the longest period of time are undoubtedly Montenegro 
and Albania ( Ergaver 2016, 2017).
31 “Ma a Francesco del Tacco ha giovato niente l’andarvi?” (Doc. 38, cap. 11).
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After a granted plea for acceptance in Venetian army for the Morean War (Pelopon-
nese), Leandro Gravisi came to Venice with some of his mates in February 1686. Before 
leaving for battle he expressed some intention to visit his birthplace, Koper. 
However, he suddenly became ill and Nicolò came to visit him in Venice where he 
stayed for at least one month. Within that period Francesco and Iseppo del Tacco also 
visited Venice. “Me and him were staying in the house of Monsù Verdura and when the 
Tacchi came to Venice, they took lodging in Cà Michieli.” This was supposed to prove 
they were plotting a homicide together. He thus denounced all insinuations, including the 
following: “I was therefore drawn to Venetia from the love of my Brother, not from the 
hatred of any person”. 32
It is interesting that in the difesa he never mentioned the month that Leandro spent in 
Koper and other allegations regarding the boat that can be found in the mother’s letter.
Three days before the fatal day of 6 June 1686, a vessel with 6 paddles arrived at the 
port of Koper, entering at the Porta of Isola. At that time Leandro Gravisi had already 
been in Koper for a month and was always accompanied by relatives and friends.33 
They were still upset about the shameful peace that they were forced to accept. What 
32 “Io fui tratto dunque a Venetia dall’amor del Fratello, non dall’odio di alcuna persona.” (Doc. 38, cap. 4).
33 “sempre accompagnato ad ogni momento dalli predetti, et altri suoi Congionti” (Doc. 27).
Fig. 8: The Entrance to the Grand Canal, Venice (Canaletto, 1697-1768). Wikimedia 
Commons.
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was the composition for the oﬀ ence, if it was ever determined, we cannot know. However, 
in any case, the del Tacco and marquises Gravisi felt left out. Perhaps they were expect-
ing that the party of del Bello would understand their hints and proceed with customary 
conﬂ ict resolution with mediators and come to an agreement regarding the sum of the 
composition and, in this way, achieve an honorary solution for both parties.34 However, 
this initiative never came from del Bello. 
During those three days Leandro was seen walking on a pier next to the vessel by 
himself. Only on the last evening was he supposedly escorted by Nicolò, when they, 
according to a witness, said their farewells and promised to enact vendetta.35
Already in the introductory part he refers to the ﬁ les, the so-called Giureconsulti,36 
saying that the perpetrator was known and therefore he cannot be persecuted. 
Si vuole che la oﬀ esa habbia potuto in me tanto, benché paciﬁ cato; e non si vuole che 
habbia potuto niente in mio Fratello, che non haveva ritegno di pace, non lacci di 
Patria, e che si stimava aggravato da nuove ingiurie?
“When the fatal moment took place, I was in Mezà Ruﬁ ni, outside the Piazza, moving 
towards Brolo, where there were a lot of people which prevented Leandro to wave at me as 
he did not see me, he did, however, waved at capitan Paulazzi, who was also nearby,” were 
the words of the defence by Nicolò Gravisi. He insinuated that he and some relatives had 
assisted Leandro in his escape by forming a shield with their bodies and swords to prevent 
the caps from pursuing the vindicator. “Namely, as soon as I came to Brolo, my brother 
Leandro came running down the calle de‘ Carmini towards Brolo and took a turn onto cale 
de‘ signori Petronii that led towards the gate of Isola.”37 When the caps came to the gate of 
Isola, the vessel with Leandro Gravisi on board was already far away from the shore. 
Soon after the caps, who in the meantime already closed and reopened the city gate, a 
group of citizens came to the scene, including Nicolò Gravisi, and asked the caps who is 
the man who’s vessel they could still see in the horizon. They responded that it must have 
been a foreigner, unknown to them (“che era un forestiero che essi non conoscevano”). 
This was used by Nicolò to argue that it would have been impossible for him to help 
his brother by stopping the caps, since he arrived on the scene later, with the crowd, and 
also left thereafter. 
At the end of the response to the charges he stated and proved with three witnesses 
(Il Signor Cavallier Olimpo Gavardo, il Signor Dr. Bortolo Manzioli, il Signor Capitan 
Antonio Gavardo) that he had spent the entire morning of the day of Dr. del Bello’s 
34 Nicolò Gravisi made a cynical remark in his difesa: “Se la corrispondenza co’ Belli fosse stata più stretta, 
non sarebbe stato aﬀ ermato che fu più insidiosa?” (Doc. 38, cap. 16)
35 “Il sprezzo de saluti, le dichiaration di vendetta, la separation del Fratello, l’atto della sera precedente 
puono essere più male fondati?” (Doc. 38, cap. 16).
36 Cf. the meaning and role of the so-called treatisers in the legal ﬁ eld (giureconsulti): Carroll, 2016; Povolo, 
1997.
37 “Che quando spuntai da Piazza verso il Brolo, Leandro mio Fratello haveva di già passato il Brolo mede-
mo, et era entrato nella cale de’ signori Petronii, che conduce a Porta Isolana.” (Doc. 38, cap. 10).
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death without tabaro, a wide and long cape under which he could have hidden a sword or 
similar arms.38 
This was followed by summing up the senselessness of the charges against him, which 
he marked with an emotional exclamation: “Oh, this is a plot of evil, envy, enmity and 
passion.”39
In the last four concluding chapters of his difesa, Nicolò Gravisi denies the lawfulness 
of the witnesses and thus also of the entire trial rite. In the text itself he pointed out several 
times that the individual parts of charges were formed based on only one witness under 
oath and one not under oath. 
Since, in accordance to the inquisitorial trial rite, the witnesses remain anonymous, 
Nicolò openly speculated who the witness could have been and attempted to discredit 
the person. Through this he also admitted to other nefarious things going on behind the 
scenes among Koper’s social elite. 
38 “Mi si dirà che ero intabarato e con armi.” (Doc. 38, cap. 16).
39 “Ah che tutto è opera della malignità, del livore, dell’odio, della passione.” (Doc. 38, cap. 16).
Fig. 9: Koper in 16th century. Regional Museum of Koper.
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He speculates that the witness who was not under oath was the cap, discredited in the 
very beginning due to the bad reputation of his service in public and that the content of 
the cap’s statements must be in accordance with orders from his chieftains. 
If the witnesses under oath were either Signor Rizzardo Vida or Dr. Agostin Vida, 
Nicolò Gravisi comments: “then may it be known that both of them are relatives of his 
opponents (Avversarii), and although his comment might harm him in this case, he still 
expresses his dismissal” (Doc. 38): 
17o: Che il Padre del Signor D:r Agostin Vida è stato ammazzato nelle inimicitie che 
haveva contro il Nono e Zij Materni di me Gio:Nicolò Gravisi.
18o: Che il Padre di detto Signor D:r Vida era zio del Signor Rizzardo Vida.
19o: Che il Signor D:r Agostin Vida era stretto Parente del dr Giulian del Bello.
20°: Che il Signor Rizzardo Vida è Nepote così del Signor Domenico del Bello, come 
del Capitan Paolazzi.
These witnesses cannot claim the validity of their statements against him, argued 
Nicolò, although they present the main evidence in the charges,40 wherefore he asked the 
court to take his explanation into account. As he was certain that one of the witnesses was 
the cap, he managed to discredit the captain Paolazzi. 
To conclude his difesa, he expressed his picturesque and emotional regret and asked 
for pardon. Precisely this concluding part shows all the dimensions of inquisitorial trial 
rite, wherefore I cite it in its complete form: 
Questi, che ho accennati, prestantissimo Giudice, e quei che saranno da’ Tacchi più 
espressamente additati sono li Scogli palesi e scoperti, dove forse si è procurato 
di mandar a rompere la mia Innocenza. Ma chi mi puo assicurare da gli occulti e 
nascosti? Il Processo formato col Rito è per me un Mare pieno di Sirti, per li Malevoli 
è stato un Campo libero agli spergiuri. Dio Benedetto gli scopra tutti agli occhi della 
Giustitia e si faccia Protettore della mia Causa, come è stato Testimonio delle mie 
attioni. Non è già l’amor della vita quello che mi fa tremare sì horribilmente al solo 
nome di condanna. Troppo ella mi è grave doppo il trucidamento del Nepote, gli 
assedii de’ sequestri, i dispendii de Venetia, le fulminationi del Fratello, la Morte 
addolorata della Sorella, gli aﬀ anni mortali della Madre e le lunghe aﬄ  ittioni della 
mia prigionia. La consegno però di buon cuore al Sepolcro, ma solo mi preme di 
restituirla così pure da’ sospetti d’infedeltà al mio Prencipe, qual’io la ricevei dalle 
viscere de miei Genitori zelanti.
“Il Processo formato col Rito è per me un Mare pieno di Sirti, […] e le lunghe aﬄ  it-
tioni della mia prigionia.” These narrations reveal some additional dimensions of feuds 
at the local level between Koper’s noble families. 
40 “[…] non possono neanco meritar fede contro di me, onde se gli intenderanno fatte in tutto per tutto le 
medesime Oppositioni […]” (Doc. 38, cap.20).
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The Gravisi apparently also waged a feud with the noble family Vida, due to the 
murder of their father; the del Bello were, however, related to Vida. 
Precisely these kinship ties among the nobility of Koper were also fundamental for 
forming various types of alliances and coalitions. These changed, transformed, and 
shifted throughout the centuries due to feuds and/or marriages. 
Coincidental events often brought about fatal changes in alliances, which is evident 
in another case from 1541 Koper, which I use here only to gain brighter perspective, 
comparison and connection to Koper’s several centuries-long social relationships, which 
are undoubtedly comparable to other similar realities throughout modern age Europe.41
In a house of some poor people from Koper there was a wedding on the last day of 
March 1541, when around three o’clock in the morning a dispute between Alvise de Verzi 
and Ziulian del Bello took place. “They were from the most prominent families in the 
city” (“quali sono delle primarie famiglie di questa Città”), as was stated in the report of 
Koper’s then podestà and captain, Philippus Donato (CX. LR, 256, 251/v.). 
41 Similar cases were the subject of numerous studies, just to mention Carroll, 2003; 2007; Muir, 1998; Po-
volo, 1997.  
Fig. 10: Venice, New prisons (Prigioni nuove) or the Bridge of Sighs (Ponte dei sospiri), 
which is erroneously believed to be the bridge of lovers, however the sighs pertained to 
the prisoners. (Wikimedia Commons)
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As Alvise said some oﬀ ensive words, Zulian swung his sword towards him, but he 
was stopped by some Antonio de Bianchi Padovano, who was staying in the city for a 
longer period of time in the house of Alvise’s brother, Zaneto de Verzi. Then a ﬁ ght broke 
out and Zuliano or Giuliano del Bello lost his life. 
The podestà of Koper formed a trial which brought about fairly quick customary 
reconciliation of the feuding parties and the heads of the households reported that they 
made good peace (essi padri come loro mi aﬁ rmorno ora fu fatta bona pace). 
However, the podestà reports that this peace led to more severe bouts of combat with 
mutual exchange of assaults and homicides when the Grisoni family interfered with the feud, 
as they had had a long-lasting enmity and hatred with the Verzi (Inimicizie et odij vechij). 
The podestà of Koper apparently lost control in this case and he asked the Council of 
Ten for further instructions and authorisations. 
Furthermore, this case shows how and why the supreme judicial jurisdiction was 
gradually passed to the Council of Ten. Koper’s podestà did not report about this 1541 
case at the same time, but rather tried to resolve the conﬂ ict on the local level and he 
would have succeeded on his own had the feud not became unmanageable. Only thereaf-
ter did he consult the central judicial body. 
As is evident from the case of homicide in 1683 and vendetta in 1686, the podestà was 
obliged to immediately report to the Council of Ten to gain further instructions and au-
thorisations by which he had to oblige. Initially individual cases of consulting the Council 
of Ten for help gradually led to this being established as a common judicial practice.
THE END OF THE CONFLICT?
We cannot be certain when exactly Nicolò’s difesa was written and given to the judge, 
Koper’s podestà, and captain, as the document is not dated. We can assume this took place 
between September and November 1686, as the last concrete document in this case holds 
the date of 12 November 1686 (Doc. 36, 37). 
It all seems that the feud itself was transferred to the Council of Ten. Namely, after 
the Capi of the Council of Ten ordered an inquisitorial trial rite (Processo con Rito) on 19 
June 1686 and delegated it to Koper’s podestà and captain (Doc. 27, 28), they annulled 
the decree on 9 July  and ordered that Koper’s podestà conduct the trial rite only up to 
the stage of lawsuit (sino ad oﬀ esa),42 meaning he was authorised only to conduct the 
processo informativo, the ﬁ rst stage of the trial rite, in which evidence was gathered, 
mainly by questioning witnesses (Doc. 29, 30).
This decision was most likely encouraged by the second letter of Giulia del Bello, 
mother of the killed Giuliano (Doc. 29). She insisted that the entire case should be taken 
over by the Council of Ten, as she was afraid that the interest of the leading inﬂ uential 
families would prevail at the local level.43 
42 “Perfettionato il processo sino ad oﬀ esa, ce ne porterete del suo contenuto distinta informatione per quelle 
deliberationi, che fossero contentanee a servitio della Giustitia.” (Doc. 29, 30).
43  “[…] che havendo commandato l’Eccelso Consiglio per la gravità del caso […] la formazione del processo 
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Koper’s podestà and captain Vettor da Mosto gathered some testimonies on 24 July; 
however, he realised that some potential witnesses resided in Venice, wherefore he asked 
the Capi of the Council of Ten to conduct the hearings (Doc 31), which were held by 17 
August (Doc. 32). Extant documents do not list the witnesses’ names. 
Meanwhile, the mandate of Koper’s podestà ended and his function was taken over by 
Francesco Sanudo (AAMC, 718; Doc. 33, 34). The Council of Ten received all the neces-
sary information (about the witness questioning) from his predecessor, the councillors 
deliberated about accepting this case on 30 August. 
However the proposal regarding the forwarding all the documentation44 from the part 
of Koper’s Podestà to the Council of Ten to be able to resolve the case directly was 
rejected. This case was also discussed on the following day, but the proposal was rejected 
again (Doc. 33). 
The Council of Ten thus wrote to Koper’s podestà on September 2nd to authorise 
him to conduct the complete trial rite (Doc. 34, 35). Apparently, this was a result of 
intense lobbying activity with the councillors of the Council of Ten, who testify about the 
substantially powerful inﬂ uence of Koper’s nobility. This could not have occurred if the 
perpetrator had been of lower class. 
What determined the diﬀ erent procedures utilized were obviously both the type of 
crime and the social signiﬁ cance of the conﬂ ict and its protagonists. Namely, there was 
still a widespread type of justice strongly characterized by the feud and the defence 
of community values. The punishments inﬂ icted were clearly aimed at stressing the 
dangerousness of the culprit, rather than the crime committed; the death penalty was 
rarely applied, and only in cases where fundamental community values were involved. 
The proxies obviously subtracted from the ordinary jurisdiction the more politically and 
socially important cases, which were handled with inquisitorial procedures, which ex-
cluded local notaries and jurists. The procedures, allowing the parties very wide margins 
of action, in which feud and the protagonists’ status drove the typology of conﬂ ict, were 
very common.45 But the inquisitorial rite of the Council of Ten, when delegated to the 
city court, signiﬁ ed the exclusion of ancient privileges that gave the local ruling class 
a determining role in both the management of the trial and the inﬂ iction of the penalty 
(Povolo, 2015b, 228).
We have to be aware of another specialty in this case: it was a feud among relatives, 
which was stressed by both parties on several occasions. 
coll’auttorità e rito suo e susseguente dellegatione a quell’Eccellentissimo Reggimento, porta osservatione 
[…]  e ramarico inﬁ nito a me infelice il dubio […]  che la prepotenza de’ rei e il terrore in che tengono per 
questa et altre delinquenze […]  come anco perché fosse con proportione adequata di castigo Vendicato 
l’assassinio di tanto tempo machinato […]  (Doc. 29).
44 “[…]  è devenuto in risolutione d›assumerlo e però col medesimo Consiglio vi commettemo di mandarci il 
processo accompagnato dalle vostre lettere e sigilo per li dovuti eﬀ etti di Giustitia.” (Doc. 33).
45 For instance, the practice of presentation at the start of the trial only for premeditation was still widespread. 
The accused could thus introduce the question of legitimate defence or frenzy in the trial. This practice 
clearly tended to the legitimate the use of vendetta, even in this judicial context, where the need to limit 
violence through the adaption of more severe penalties and procedures was felt. An example can be found 
in Povolo, 2014a, 179-195. 
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The dispute resolution among relatives, including cases of homicide, was regarded 
in the sense of private law within the realms of customary law and was thus left for the 
parties to resolve the dispute on their own. 
In the majority of European countries from 16th century onwards the state gradually 
took over jurisdiction in cases of more severe trespasses within private law, especially 
cases of homicides. The case we are discussing thus shows that the process of transmit-
ting the judicial jurisdiction onto the central bodies of the state was gradual and long 
lasting, although it was proscribed by law itself, which is due to the custom of dispute 
resolution being so deeply rooted in the social interaction. 
We cannot state that the deliberation was based only on the social status of the feuding 
parties. To present this let us shortly distract ourselves with a case of murder from the 
mid-15th century, that the daring and uncompromising warriors of the family Gravisi 
was involved in.It was a summer day in 1456 near the Istrian village Mlun of Buzet’s 
district, on the border of the marquisate Pietrapelosa.46 Iacobus Fergouich, a habitator 
of the commune, received two wagons of wheat, but he decided to steal one cart and 
pay taxes only for one plaustrum. As he was carrying the wagon to his lands in Mlun, he 
was, much to his chagrin, spotted by some noble gentlemen. Vanto Gravisi, accompanied 
by his older brother, the ﬁ rstborn Michele, and a nobleman from Koper Antonius de 
Tobra, called Iacobus to come before them. “Va zo de quello caro,” (Get down from this 
cart) ordered Vanto. Having jumped from the cart, shaking with fear, the peasant caught 
stealing from his lord saw Vanto extracting a long knife from his pocket. The scene was 
enough for Iacobus to start running for his life. Unfortunately, he was not quick enough. 
The publicly pronounced sentence is very graphic in describing the many wounds poor 
Iacobus suﬀ ered at the hands of Vanto. The noble split his right ear in two, and cut into 
his jaw and right thigh, causing intense bleeding. Iacobus fell to the ground as Michele 
shouted “traitor”, urging his brother to continue his assault. While on the ground, Vanto 
cut into his left leg all the way to the bone and into his left arm. The other nobles joined 
the party. Antonius pierced the dying peasant with a spear no less than three times. Finally, 
Iacobus Fergouich died.
This heinous crime went unpunished for almost two years before it was sentenced by 
the new, braver rector of Buzet Simone Ferro in April of 1458. 
All three nobles were summoned in Buzet’s main square, in front of the entire com-
munity, to present themselves before the new Venetian rector. Stretching the word of 
law of the communal statute, the accused were given one month to present their defence 
instead of the usual eight days. They never showed up.
Consequently, Simone Ferro followed the statute of Buzet to the letter, quoting it 
directly in his verdict, and sentenced the murderers to perpetual banishment from the 
46 The Gravisi family, originally from the Istrian commune of Piran, was granted nobility following Nicolò’s 
de Gravisi heroics during his service in the Venetian army. He personally uncovered the conspiracy of 
Marsilio Carrarese in Padua in 1435 and was therefore praised as the man responsible for the continuation 
of Venetian dominion in that city. As a token of gratitude, in 1440 the Venetian doge Francesco Foscari 
granted him the Marquisate of Pietrapilosa, the largest Istrian feudal possession under Venice (Banić, 2016, 
94; Darovec, 2007, 123–125, 195–200).
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town and its district. If they ever dared to return, they would be decapitated “so that the 
soul is separated from the body” (Banić, 2016, 95–96).
Hence, about 200 years before Koper’s case of vendetta, there was no sign of the 
peace that was made between the parties to resolve the dispute. And despite the fact that 
three noblemen killed their subjects on account of tax evasion, they were charged with 
the most severe penalties. 
Perhaps the alternative would have been to obligate them to make peace with the 
families of the victim and pay the composition, if the defendants had presented themselves 
personally at the trial. However, the documents that are available hold no such indications.
According to the custom, Koper’s noble men should ask the family of the victim for par-
don and make a truce that would lead to negotiations regarding the sum of the composition.
This might be the reason why the rector of Buzet, Marco Magno, did not start a trial, 
as he expected the necessary gesture from Koper’s noblemen. Or was it the reason that 
he was unwilling to get involved in a process that was potentially detrimental for his 
relations with the inﬂ uential regional nobility (Banić, 2016, 96)? 
In any case, Koper’s noblemen rather took the risk of vengeance by Iacobus’ family, 
which would have done unpunished, rather than to conduct peace with the victim’s family. 
And they knew why: as apparently no one dared to take vengeance. Lastly, there were no 
kinship ties between them that would force them to make peace according to the custom. 
This digression was needed to understand the reason why the Venetian authorities 
insisted on regaining peace between the feuding families of Koper. 
Primarily, these actions were justiﬁ ed by traditional kinship relationships that were 
strongly intertwined into early modern age society, thereafter with the role of the inﬂ uen-
tial Koper’s noble families for “tranquillity and peace in the community” as it was stated 
several times by the Venetian authorities in their reconciliation endeavours.
In this sense it is understandable why the Council of Ten refused to directly solve this 
case as was asked by Giuliano del Bello’s mother, but rather left the trial to be conducted 
by Koper’s podestà and captain (Doc. 36); however, it was still within the framework of 
an inquisitorial trial rite, which regarded the deliberation of the podestà a equally valid 
to the deliberation of the Council of Ten (Doc. 34, 35).47 It is also interesting that the 
last document, dated 12 November 1686, which is directly linked to this Koper’s case of 
vendetta, shows that the Council of Ten ordered Koper’s podestà to aim towards forming 
a lasting peace among the feuding parties despite the absence of the main perpetrator.48
Furthermore, the Council also ordered the podestà to use his good judgement and 
to deliberate in accordance to custom regarding the fact that ﬁ re arms were used, which 
47 The Council of Ten delegated the jurisdiction to the podestà of Koper for the imposition of the following 
penalties: “[…] facoltà di punire li rei presenti et absenti nelle pene di Vita, bando perpetuo e deﬃ  nitivo 
da questa Città di Venezia e Dogado e da tutte le altre Città, terre e luoghi del Dominio nostro terrestri e 
maritimi, naviglii armati e disarmati, priggion, galea, relegation, conﬁ scation de beni, e colle taglie che vi 
pareranno.” (Doc. 34, 35). This is the same dictation used in the servatis servandis trial, which the Council 
of Ten ordered in the 1683 killing.
48 “[…]  vi diamo con lo stesso Consiglio la facoltà di ponere nella sentenza in caso d’absente la condizione 
di pace eﬀ ettiva […]  (Doc. 36).
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was a crime that was regulated by Venetian authorities by special legislation and strict 
punitive policies at least from the 15th century onwards (Doc.  36).
The document dated 12 November 1686 is the last in the series of documents directly 
referring to the case of Koper’s Vendetta. 
Unfortunately, I was unable to ﬁ nd the sentence in the archives I consulted. The majority 
of material was found in several archives of the Capi of the Council of Ten and of the 
Council of Ten,49 wherefore it was expected that the trial would be found in the same source 
as the decrees to Koper’s podestà that ordered the oﬃ  cial to send the trial scripts to Venice.50
Furthermore, the delegated inquisitorial trial rite regarded the deliberation of the podestà 
equal to the deliberation that would have been given by the Council of Ten (Doc. 34, 35). 
However, the sentence is not to be found, not even in the archives of other Venetian legal 
institutions (Quarantia Criminal, Avogaria del Comun). There are several reasons for this 
absence; it could have been lost by accident during the course of time, it could have been 
destroyed, or it could have been used for other purposes. A lot of archival material from the 
Venetian Archives was lost during and after the Napoleonic wars, after the collapse of the 
Republic of Venice (Povolo, 2014b, 56-67). There could be at least a copy in the (still!) lost 
Archives of the Magistrate, the appellation court that was founded in Koper in 1584 for all 
Venetian Istria and the islands of Kvarner. Perhaps there is still hope it will be found. 
The fact remains that Nicolò Gravisi, Francesco del Tacco, and perhaps some other 
men were kept imprisoned for a while to endure the tortures of inquisitorial trial rite and 
fought a battle with “legal mills”. 
However, Nicolò Gravisi was able to perform “normally” already in February 1687, 
when he ﬁ led a lawsuit against Isepo Vigini from Momiano (AAMC, 723). In 1688 he 
already had the title of Dr. Nicolò Gravisi (AAMC, 723), meaning he graduated from the 
state University of Padua. If he had been imprisoned or exiled, he probably would not 
have been able to do so. 
In mid-1687 we come across a letter of Nicolò’s and Leandro’s mother Letizia, who 
wrote to the Council of Ten regarding some case (Doc. 39). The Council responded with 
an order of summoning the people accused, however the document is not clear to which 
case the letter refers, nor who the people involved were. Perhaps Letizia denounced some 
subjects she had civil feuds with, similar to her son Nicolò, as is evident from the material 
in the ancient archive of Koper (AAMC, 723). 
The last document from ASVe that is linked to one of the protagonists of the blood 
feud in Koper is dated 27 January 1688 (1687 m.v.) (Doc. 40). The Capi of the Council of 
Ten granted Ottavio dell Bello, who caused the feud by marrying Cecilia del Tacco, safe 
conduct for himself and his family in his father’s house,51 due to, as they state, previous 
quarrels with his relatives.52 Was there in fact (forbidden) love behind these feuds?
49 See inventories ASVe: http://www.archiviodistatovenezia.it/
50 “ […]  e delle sentenze che farete, invierete copia a’ Capi del Consiglio di X.ci, perché li condannati da Voi 
nel caso presente s’intenderanno alla condition de condannati dal Consiglio medesimo.” (Doc. 34, 35).
51 “[…]  habbi a godere con la sua famiglia nella propria Casa paterna la sicurezza e la quiete […]” (Doc. 40).
52 “[…] in riguardo degli accidenti passati tra’ suoi Congionti […]” (Doc. 40).
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All still according to the custom!
We can, thus, agree with the opinion of Claudio Povolo: 
It should be no surprise that traditional trial rites, while adapting to the social and 
legal changes that were going on, had on the whole kept their distinctive features, 
i.e: the active role of the parties in conﬂ ict; the presence of ancient trial institutions 
such as the per patrem defence; inquiries characterized by non-incisive forms of in-
terrogation; release of the defendant after deposit of suitable guarantees and bonds; 
and, most important, the interference of acts of peace and settlement. These were, in 
fact, rites grounded in a very fragmentary institutional structure, legitimated by a 
constitutional system whose symbolic reference points were the community and the res 
publica. Above all, these rites represented a social and cultural context where kinship, 
friendship and honour held an extremely important place, all the more signiﬁ cant 
when they merged with political power and status (Povolo, 2015b, 230).
The emergence of a new punitive system of justice and trial rites considerably we-
akened the constitutive and symbolic elements of a tradition that had great diﬃ  culty in 
meeting the new requirements of social control. However, this was a form of justice and 
Fig. 11: Maximilian II Emanuel, Prince Elector of Bavaria (Joseph Vivien, 1706). Wiki-
media Commons
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of procedures which, even when they were imposed severely and with continuity, always 
took on a character of extraordinariness, almost as if to underscore the irrepressible force 
of tradition.53
LEANDRO’S TESTAMENT
What happened to Leandro? Most likely he spent the rest of his days sleeping with a 
pistol under his pillow, like Alvise del Bello. Despite this, in March 1721 he wrote a letter 
from Munich to his brother Nicolò in hope for a miraculous cure for his illness at a spa 
(Doc. 45), although he was well aware of his old age of 81. 
Naturally, no one picked up the glove thrown with such cockiness by Gravisi himself, 
of whom we remain without news until 1689, when Maximilian II Emanuel, Elector of 
Bavaria,54 responding to a letter from the abbot Vincenzo Grimani of Venice, claimed to 
have accepted into his service the Marquis Leandro Gravisi, who had been recommended 
to him by the abovementioned abbot (Doc. 42).
We do not know exactly which role he played in the Bavarian army. However, it 
emerges from his last will (Doc. 43) that he was relatively close to very high ﬁ gures, like 
the general Marquis Maﬀ ei, brother of the famous Scipione, whom he named in his will; 
that he had for a sister-in-law a lady of German aristocracy, Maria Cecilia di Paumgarten, 
born in Schönnbrun, who also lovingly assisted him during his illness and to whom he left 
six hundred ﬂ orins. It is also clear that he had servants and waiters at his service. The fact 
that Leandro, before he died, remembered a quartermaster from the election guard and 
that for his treatment the personal doctor of the ruling prince was appointed, one would 
suppose that he was commander of the electoral guard: certainly a good title and, perhaps, 
equal to the title of the general of the army: this would explain the portrait, which was 
conserved by the Gravisi-Barbabianca family of Koper.
However, Leandro enjoyed much reverence at the Court and had the ruler’s full esteem. He 
took advantage of his authority to contract his relatives in that same electoral army in which 
he served. This was the case of his nephew Antonio Maria Gravisi, for whom he procured the 
place of electoral page, with a salary of twenty-four ﬂ orins per month; the same amount that 
he shared with his brother Giovanni Niccolò (Doc. 44). Aﬄ  icted by gout, Leandro, despite the 
baths he mentions in his correspondence (Doc. 45), died in 1721 in Munich.55
This story necessarily leads us to a more detailed presentation of judicial systems and the 
customary conﬂ ict resolution system. In the following chapters we will get acquainted with 
the origins and main aspects of the ritual of vendetta and then with the transformations in 
the Holy Roman Empire and in the Venetian Republic between the 13th and 18th centuries.
53 In the 16th century, in France and the Netherlands, too, the procédure ordinaire was clearly distinguished 
from a procédure extraordinaire: the latter was characterized by the elimination of all forms of cross-exam-
ination and of the release of the defendant. At the end of the ﬁ rst phase (in Italy comprising the processo 
informativo e oﬀ ensivo) the judge decided whether to resort to the ordinary phase or the extraordinary one, 
thereby denying the defendant the possibility to defend him/herself with a lawyer (cf. Rousseaux, 1993, 
78–84;  Povolo, 2015b, 230).
54 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maximilian_II_Emanuel,_Elector_of_Bavaria; last access: 15.11.2017.
55 Venturini cited the wrong date. It is clear from the document that the year was 1721 and not 1720.
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BLOOD FEUD AS GIFT EXCHANGE:
THE RITUAL OF HUMILIATION IN THE CUSTOMARY SYSTEM 
OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION*
Non sa quanto dolce si sia la vendetta 
nè con quanto ardor si desideri, 
se non chi riceve l’oﬀ ese.
Boccaccio, Decamerone III. 7.
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims to analyse the historical documents and the extant historical and 
anthropological sources with the intent to demonstrate the phenomenon of humiliation 
within the structure of public and social ritual,1 with a special emphasis on the rite of the 
conﬂ ict resolution system.2 Using the comparative interdisciplinary approach to present 
the fundamental characteristics of the ritual, incorporated into general social practices 
and relations, as well as systems of representation of authority and its functioning, it 
becomes apparent that the action or the gesture of humiliation and penance is present 
in all religious and profane ceremonies, not only in Europe but worldwide, as shown by 
several indications, which are as well worthy of future comparative research. 
“Is there any kind of humiliation between the feuding sides involved in the recon-
ciliation process of blood feud”? “No, there is no humiliation, these are only honourable 
people,” state three responses in the survey conducted among selected informants from 
Montenegro, Herzegovina, and Albania in the 1870s, carried out by Valtazar Bogišić, a 
university professor and, inter alia, the president of the International Institute of Sociology 
in Paris (1902). However, further surveys revealed that the humiliation was in fact a part 
of the system of conﬂ ict resolution in those areas. Bogišić’s project of collecting testimo-
nies about the legal cultural heritage of the customary law of Southern Slavs completely 
coincided with the scientiﬁ c backgrounds of legal and historiographical discipline in the 
European countries (cf. Čepulo, 2010). The latter is proven by numerous collections of 
documents and testimonies, collected in Europe by lawyers and historians in the second 
half of the 19th century, inter alia also the collection of Bogišić (1999, 345–384).3
In fact, Bogišić’s survey clearly shows how the expression of humiliation and pen-
ance – as a necessary gesture in the customary conﬂ ict resolution system, which leads 
1 There are fairly abundant sources about rituals; in this case it is important to highlight at least the following 
works: Bell (1992); Althoﬀ  (2003); Koziol (1992); Buc (2001). I would also like to note the work of Muir 
(2005, 12–14), who also serves us with an exceptional enlistment of mainly American studies on the rituals.
2 Cf. Netterstrøm & Poulsen (2007); Roberts (2013); Verdier (1980); Rouland (1992); Stein (1984); Povolo 
(2015a). 
3 On the inside back cover Bogišić attributed: “Matériaux pour l‘étude comparée de la vendetta”. For Bogi-
šić‘s bibliography and literature about him see Foretić, 1984.
<?>* This chapter was published as article in journal Acta Histriae, 25, 2017, 1, pp. 57-96. I would like to thank 
the editorial board of the journal for permission to publish it in this book.
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to friendship and peace in the community – is presented in the ritual of blood feud.4 
Ritual characteristics of the customary system of conﬂ ict resolution have already been 
illustrated by the eminent scholars who studied primary communities, including Dur-
kheim, Westermarck, Mauss, Malinovsky, Evans-Pritchard, Radcliﬀ e-Brown, Gluckman, 
Sahlins, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and many medieval and modern historiographers and 
anthropologists, such as Heusler, Brunner, Wallace-Hadrill, Hasluck, Black-Michaud, 
Verdier, Bossy, Foucault, Boehm, Miller, White, Althoﬀ , Pitt-Rivers, Povolo, Carroll, 
Smail, Muir, and others. 
Although White highlights that “these ceremonies are never fully described in docu-
mentary sources, [and] any reconstruction of them is bound to be highly speculative”, he 
nevertheless notes that “details from various texts can be ﬁ tted together to construct a rough, 
composite picture of these rituals” (White, 1986, 256). However, so far no one has provided 
an in-depth analysis and interpretation of the structure of ritual of conﬂ ict resolution.5 
The scholars have not yet arrived at a uniform deﬁ nition of ritual as a social phe-
nomenon (cf. Schirch, 2005), which presents not only a set of social norms, but as well 
a development of human legal, political, and economic institutions within preliterate, as 
well as within literate societies. 
The basic purpose of the rituals is to report to the public about the political, religious, 
military, cultural, or economic events, while their social mission is to inform and educate 
as well. We could even state that the rituals testify about the history of human civilization. 
The Oxford Dictionary, for example, deﬁ nes a rite as “(1) a formal procedure or act in a 
religious or other solemn observance; (2) the general or usual custom, habit, or practice of 
a country, class of persons, etc., now speciﬁ cally in religion or worship.” Jack Goody, one 
of the most prominent social scientists in the world, known for his pioneering writings 
at the intersections of anthropology, history, and social and cultural studies, provided 
an in-depth discussion about the numerous approaches of the above-mentioned heavy-
weights in anthropology. While discussing the interaction of ritual and religion, he surely 
could not avoid the usual “functional” and “structural” (or post-structural) approaches 
of such activities (Goody, 2010, 13–40). His most distinct critique of the analysis of 
various approaches towards the deﬁ nition of religious and ritual phenomena is that they 
are “confusing the public and the social” (Goody, 2010, 19) and that they place “too much 
weight on the usefulness of the distinction between the sacred and the profane” (Goody, 
2010, 15). He tried to take a more cognitive approach, stressing the issues of variation, 
imagination, and creativity, recognizing “the logic of looking at the societies more from 
the actor’s point of view, and considering such forms not as a ﬁ xed, formulaic product but 
as reﬂ ecting man’s creativity, as a language-using animal in face of the world, not free 
from tradition but not bound down by it” (Goody, 2010, 1).
He explained his views primarily basing on his own experiences acquired during his 
ﬁ eld work on the Bagra ceremonies conducted among the LoDagaa people of northern 
4 One of the recent studies with an abundance of references to crucial works about blood feud, vendetta, 
vindicta, faida, Fehde, osveta, maščevanje, gjakmarrja… cf. Povolo, 2015a, esp. 199–204.
5 The studies of ritual communication are still underestimated; cf. Stollberg-Rilinger, 2002, 233–246.
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Ghana over several periods. Although he noted that “all variations of ceremonies are 
made within a ‘common frame’” and that “all were recited in the same ritual situation”, 
he ﬁ nally realized that “even the initial invocation, learnt ‘by heart’, varied, and the 
recitations themselves diﬀ ered not only in detail but in entire outlook, in worldview” 
(Goody, 2010, 3). This convinced Goody to recognize the creativity of oral cultures, 
which should mean that the ceremony does not belong to “a common frame”. His inten-
tion was to stress the role of an individual and to clearly oppose the structuralist theory 
and methodology, which is, in Goody’s critique, practically personiﬁ ed in the works of 
Claude Lévi-Strauss.6
This chapter does not aim to analyse the structural, functionalist, evolutionist, or 
Marxist theories or psychoanalysis or phenomenology, nor to identify itself with any of 
the mentioned approaches, but it rather aims towards an analysis of the historical docu-
ments and extant historical and anthropological writings to demonstrate the phenomenon 
of humiliation within the structure of public and social ritual, with special emphasis on 
the rite of the conﬂ ict resolution system. As I have stressed, the main hypothesis of this 
discussion is that the customary rite of conﬂ ict resolution serves as an argument in favour 
of the principle of the general ritual structure for all public aﬀ airs, with a three-part inner 
structure as described by Galbert of Brugge (1127): homage, ﬁ des, investiture (Rider, 
2013, 97–98).
A SYSTEM OF GENERALIZED EXCHANGE 
AND A SYSTEM OF RESOLVING CONFLICTS
A Morlack, who has killed another of a powerful family, is commonly obliged to 
save himself by ﬂ ight, and to keep out of the way for several years. If, during that 
time, he has been fortunate enough to escape the search of his pursuers, and has 
got a small sum of money, he endeavours to obtain pardon and peace; and, that he 
may treat about the conditions in person, he asks, and obtains a safe conduct, which 
is faithfully maintained though only verbally granted. Then, he ﬁ nds mediators, 
and, on an appointed day, the relations of the two hostile families are assembled, 
and the criminal is introduced, dragging himself along on his hands and feet, the 
musket, pistol or cutlass, with which he committed the murder, hung about his neck; 
and while he continues in that humble posture, one or more of the relations recites 
a panegyrick on the dead, which sometimes rekindles the ﬂ ames of revenge, and 
puts the poor prostrate in no small danger. It is the custom in some places for the 
oﬀ ended party to threaten the criminal, holding all kind of arms to his throat, and, 
after much intreaty, to consent at least to accept of his ransom. These paciﬁ cations 
cost dear in Albonia, but the Morlacchi make up matters sometimes at a small 
expence; and every where the business is concluded with a feast at the oﬀ ender’s 
charge (Fortis, 1778, 58–59).
6 The theory of myth is one of the central themes developed by Lévi-Strauss, just to mention in particular: 
Structural Anthropology (1963; orig. pub. 1958) and Mythologiques (1969a; orig. pub. 1964).
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This is how Alberto Fortis7 in the second half of the 18th century described the rec-
onciliation ceremony among the Morlacks, a common term for the inhabitants of the 
hinterland of the Venetian Dalmatian coastal towns, after describing them as very friendly 
and hospitable, with an immense sense for friendship, but implacable if they were injured 
or insulted. “And so deeply is revenge rooted in the minds of this nation, that all the 
missionaries in the world would not be able to eradicate it”. Furthermore, he stated that 
among the Morlaks “revenge and justice have exactly the same meaning, and truly it is 
the primitive idea; and I have been told, that in Albonia, the eﬀ ects of revenge are still 
more atrocious and more lasting. There, a man of the mildest character is capable of the 
most barbarous revenge, believing it his positive duty, and preferring the mad chimera of 
false honour …” (Fortis, 1778, 58–59).
When mentioning Albania, Fortis referred as well to the part of the present Monte-
negrin coastal area (Crnogorsko Primorje), which at the time belonged to the territories 
of the Venetian Republic (the so-called Venetian Albania, Albania Veneta). In Europe the 
custom of blood revenge was preserved for the longest period of time especially among 
the Montenegrins and the Albanians, which is proven by several bibliographical refer-
ences8 on this matter. But, despite the stereotypical image of blood revenge, portrayed 
as the irrational and emotionally uncontrolled and uncivilised blood-hungry behaviour, 
some of the more thorough anthropological and historical studies from the end of the 19th 
and the beginning of 20th centuries have emphasized that this phenomenon was in fact 
a primordial system of social sanctioning, typical particularly for tribal societies or for 
preliterate societies (Westermarck, 1906; Heusler, 1911). 
The social sanctions, as an integral part of the law and social control of the period, 
were closely related to the political, religious, economic, and cultural social system, as 
well as to the system of values and moral obligations. We can therefore hardly apply 
the modern distinction between criminal and civil law in preliterate societies. Instead, 
some anthropologists distinguish between the law of public and private delicts. While the 
public delicts included incest, witchcraft, blasphemy (towards the gods or rulers), and the 
breaking of oath, murder and revenge (except towards a ruler) were regarded as private 
delicts (Radcliﬀ e-Brown, 1952, 212, 213, 218, 219; Frauenstädt, 1881, 168–172). 
The sanctions for the private delicts were implemented by the community, mostly by its 
representatives or by individuals with the consent of the community. This was especially the 
case when there was a violation of the commonly established rights, which were based on 
the general principle that every injured party, or individual, is entitled to compensation, and 
that the compensation itself should be in proportion to the extent of the injury (lex talionis). 
Thus, in the case of acts of retaliation or retaliatory sanctions revenge is institutionally 
organized and regulated, approved, controlled, and regulated by social norms. 
7 About Fortis see Wolﬀ  (2001, 1–9), discussing the Venetian imperial tendencies and the British views on 
the imperiality of the Venetian Republic, thus Fortis‘s work was translated into English as early as in 1778. 
8 For this article one of the most important referential monographs is Boehm (1984), who provided an in-
-depth analysis, using up-to-date referential bibliography about blood revenge, not only for the areas of 
Montenegro but also comparatively for other parts of the world, cf. pp. 253–258. 
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In many preliterate societies an injured group, from which an individual is killed, has 
the right and the duty to seek satisfaction with a revengeful killing of the wrongdoer or 
another member of the wrongdoer’s group, for example his brother, or in some instances 
any member of his clan (Radcliﬀ e-Brown, 1952, 215), usually an inﬂ uential or physically 
strong individual, while the retaliatory killing of children, the elderly, and especially 
women was regarded as a dishonourable act (Boehm, 1984, 58, 112, 117, 143; Bogišić, 
1999, 367). When the satisfaction is gained, there should be no more animosity towards 
the wrongdoers, who must accept the killing of one of their number as an act of justice 
and to make no further retaliation (Radcliﬀ e-Brown, 1952, 215). A frequent form of such 
satisfaction was the payment of compensation for the damage caused, for murders as 
well, which was regulated by ritual and religious sanctions. 
As argued by Radcliﬀ e-Brown, “[r]itual sanctions are derived from the belief that certain 
actions or events render an individual or a group ritually unclean, or polluted, so that some 
speciﬁ c action is required to remove the pollution” (Radcliﬀ e-Brown, 1952, 213) or at least 
that can be removed or neutralised by socially prescribed or recognised procedures, such as 
lustration, sacriﬁ ce, penance, confession, and repentance, as reﬂ ected in gestures of (self) 
humiliation. During the dispute both parties are in a state of ritual hostility and conﬂ ict. 
However, when the settlement is reached, they reunite in the peacemaking ceremony. The 
negotiation is led by a mediator, who belongs to neither of the two opposed groups of 
kindred. Where this kind of procedure is eﬀ ective, the reciprocal acts in preliterate societies 
are replaced more or less by a system of indemnities; persons or groups having injured other 
persons or groups provide satisfaction to the latter by handing over certain valuables, and 
custom may require them to undergo ritual puriﬁ cation or expiation as a means of removing 
the ritual pollution or embarrassment of the injured person or group.
The shortly described characteristics of the customary systems of conﬂ ict resolution 
within  preliterate societies have already been provided by some noted anthropologist9 
based on their ﬁ eld work and other documents and literature. However, these studies 
were based on studies conducted among non-European communities, especially among 
African, Australian, and indigenous American cultures; nonetheless, for example, the 
anthropologist Max Gluckman10 has already drawn attention to the similarity of this rec-
onciliation ritual with the European medieval rites, while the historian Marc Bloch (1961, 
123–130) compared the medieval rite of faida with the characteristics of the custom of 
revenge within tribal communities, especially the close connection between the system of 
conﬂ ict resolution and the solidarity of kinship groups. 
This discussion will not be concentrated on kinship and clan aﬃ  nity; however, I aim 
to stress their central role in preliterate societies, i.e. in the tribal communities, since 
precisely the community, as already mentioned, was responsible for maintaining peace 
and social control, including potential sanctions. 
9 Especially: Radcliﬀ e-Brown (1952, 207–217); Gluckman (1955, 1–26); Evans-Pritchard (1940); Malinow-
ski (1959); Weir (2007).
10 Although Gluckman was concerned primarily with African feuding, he claimed that his theory was ap-
plicable to medieval Europe (Gluckman, 1955, 21–22; 1965, 113–114; Gluckman, 1974, 29–31; 1963, 
1515–1546).
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At this point I would like to highlight the excellent studies of Lévi-Strauss (1969b) 
about the signiﬁ cance and characteristics of the kinship social ties. Although Lévi-Strauss 
did not focus on the rites of conﬂ ict resolution, except in his work on war and trade among 
the people of the South America (1943), his studies are, nonetheless, important, as he 
clearly demonstrated the connections between the elementary structure of kinship in a 
system of generalized gift-exchange society,11 in practically all the world’s previous soci-
eties. This system provided the basis for the prohibition of incest and for the formation of 
the primal human institution: marriage, which has evidently emerged independently in all 
parts of the world in all human societies, proving “that marriage alliances are the essential 
basis of the social structure” (Lévi-Strauss, 1969b, 292).12
Especially marriage is proven to be one of the main, if not the most essential, part 
of the so called gift-exchange society. “Thus in many societies taking a woman in 
marriage is regarded as an invasion of the rights of her family and kin, so that before 
they consent to part with her they must receive an indemnity or the promise of such”, as 
argues Radcliﬀ e-Brown (1952, 210). Therefore, it is no surprise that within preliterate 
cultures, and in medieval Europe as well, many disputes, killings, and blood revenges 
were settled by forming marriage alliances, as well as through fraternities and god-
fatherhoods between the feuding parties. Those were the best possible assurances of 
permanent peace within the community and, furthermore, they constituted the basis for 
mutual relationships. In addition, after the settlement, marriages between the feuding 
parties were fairly common.13
With particular regard to vengeance, we can notice how an eﬀ ective compromise made 
peace by building new, positive relationships, transforming the structures that generated the 
11 It is important to make reference to the renowned work The Essay on the Gift (Essai sur le don, 1929) by 
Marcel Mauss. Mauss’s original piece was entitled Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l’échange dans les 
sociétés archaïques (“An essay on the gift: the form and reason of exchange in archaic societies”) and was 
originally published in L’Année Sociologique in 1925. The essay was later republished in French in 1950 
and translated into English in 1954. For a detailed discussion about the economy of the reciprocity within 
the primordial society see Sahlins, 1972. On the recent studies of the possibilities of  reciprocal economy 
cf. Jimenez de Madariaga & Garcia del Hoyo (2015).
12 However, as within all the social laws, the prohibition on incest has some exceptions, which conﬁ rm the 
rule (as the structuralists refer to the “absence” as one of the constitutional parts of the structure); thus, the 
Pharaohs were allowed to marry only their sisters, although this notion derives from polytheistic religious 
beliefs where the gods married their brothers and sisters, e.g. Zeus and Hera (goddess of marriage, women, 
childbirth, and family); the Pharoahs, as it is well known, regarded themselves as gods.
13 At this point I would like to stress that these cases are not found only in Montenegro (DACG-AN, VI, 
286–287, 22. 12. 1437; cf. Ergaver, 2016, 115–124) or in Corsica (Wilson, 1988), but also in France (Smail 
& Gibson, 2009, 424–427; Carroll, 2006, 232; Geary, 1994, 156), in Germany (Althoﬀ , 2004, 15, 33, 83), 
in Netherlands (Van Caenegem, 1954, 280–307), in Scotland (Brown, 2003, 58, 127–128, 170–171), in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East (Black-Michaud, 1975, 91–93), in Inner Austria (Kos, 2015, 161, n. 
438; Oman, 2016, 93–95), etc. The have even been found in Iceland, as some cases were given by Miller 
(1990, 262–263), although the Icelandic Sagas gave the impression of the endless revenge, which is indeed 
characteristic for describing the so-called heroic ages. The widespread nature of this custom was already 
stressed by Westermarck; in his study he contributes also the information about the ritual within the Arrabic 
areas (1906, 484). Althoﬀ  (2004, 90), for example, says: “In the early middle ages, alliances between peo-
ple and groups were basically arranged through marriage, baptismal sponsorship or friendship.”
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conﬂ ict and placed disputants into a new arrangement of relations, in which the desire to take 
revenge became irrelevant (Armstrong, 2010, 72–82). “Marriage prestations are of course 
the classic form of exchange as social compact” explains Sahlins (1972, 222), but adding that 
it is a misconception to experience a marital exchange as a completely balanced exchange 
situation, since one party, at least temporarily, undeservedly beneﬁ ted from the other. 
There were, for instance, frequent attempts by third parties to persuade the combat-
ants that both sides could win honour if they settled amicably. Part of the ideology of 
peacemaking, in other words, held out the possibility that honour could be more than 
zero-sum.14 “This lack of precise balance is socially of the essence. For unequal beneﬁ t 
sustains the alliance as perfect balance could not” (Sahlins, 1972, 222).15 
Precisely this observation of Sahlins will contribute to our further understanding of 
the reasons why in the ritual of blood revenge several tribal societies, for example the 
Nuer (Evans-Pritchard, 1940), the Montenegrins and the Albanians, and even the Bush-
men (Ury, 1995), despite giving great importance to reciprocal exchanges, in practice 
often derogated from the principle of lex talionis, “eye for an eye, tooth for tooth”, since 
it was frequently honourable to avenge a murder of one member of the society with 
two members of the opposing group. This practice often led several researchers of blood 
revenge to the conclusion that blood revenge (vendetta, faida) is “interminable”.16
However, the abundance of the ethnographical material in medieval and early modern 
European historical documents, as well as the oral tradition and other bibliography, prove 
that peace was imbedded into the social rite of dispute resolution. The claim that the social 
order in stateless societies is constituted by ties that have to be continually reaﬃ  rmed or 
re-created has been developed, in diﬀ erent ways, by several anthropologists (cf. Sahlins, 
1968, 4–13); thus several sociologists see the conﬂ icts and the feuds as part of the social 
cohesion and as an element of structure of natural and social law.17 Based on research into 
blood revenge among the Montenegrins, Boehm came to a conclusion that 
14 Cf. the discussion of Miller (1990, 30–34, 75).
15 But the gift, if it was too valuable and could not be returned by the one receiving it, could have been per-
ceived as humiliation. Leavitt in his publication, dedicated to Sahlins, especially in support of his thesis of 
“cultural continuity in situations of change” and the importance of the humiliation in this process, has given 
a clear example based on his studies on the Bumbita Arapesh tribe of Papua New Guinea. The tribe has 
protected themselves from humiliating aﬄ  uent gifts coming from the Westerners by considering them as 
their parents, to whom they were not forced to return the gifts (Leavitt, 2005, 76–79; Robbins, 2005, 5–16).
16 The claim that feuds were at least theoretically amenable to settlement is an integral part of one theory of 
feuding. This view was advanced by Max Gluckman (1955) in his inﬂ uential essay on The Peace in the 
Feud. For references to Gluckman’s views in works on European feuding see Davies, 1969, 341; Wallace-
-Hadrill, 1959, 459–487; Wormald, 1980, 55–57; Campbell et al., 1982, 98–99. For a critique of this theory, 
see Black-Michaud, 1975, 3–17. For a response to Black-Michaud, see Boehm, 1984, 191–227. Cf. White, 
1986, 258–259. For a critique of Boehm’s functionalist approach, see Otterbein, 1994, 133-146 (cf. Carroll, 
2003, 80). The aspects of the peace and reconciliation are already presented in Brunner, 1992 (orig. 1939).
17 The positive nature of conﬂ ict was already explored by Georg Simmel (1908).  See also Roberts, 2013, 
47–50, 192–206; Comaroﬀ  & Roberts, 1981, 11–17; Nader & Todd, 1978, 1–40; Nickerson Llewellyn & 
Adamson Hoebel, 1973, 20–40. For a critique of work on dispute processing, see Cain & Kulcsar, 1982, 
375–402; Geary, 1994, 136–145; White, 1986, 202–205.
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the most general ﬁ nding is that feuding is a form of active problem solving. This ena-
bles politically uncentralized people, who must stay in one place and who therefore 
must cope directly with their internal conﬂ icts, to keep such conﬂ icts within reasonable 
bounds. Speciﬁ cally, this is done by limiting the conﬂ ict to certain pairs of groups, by 
having one group go on the oﬀ ensive while the other goes on the defensive, by limiting 
the scale and duration of homicidal attacks, by providing a substitute for killing in 
the form of material compensation, and by providing agencies for compromise and 
paciﬁ cation (Boehm, 1984, 227). 
Feud, revenge, and trial rites were all part of a complex system of regulating conﬂ icts 
(Stein, 1984; Berman, 2003).
In medieval Europe, in the case of Montenegro up to the early 20th century, the 
compromise and the reconciliation of the two feuding parties was, as we shall see below, 
reached with a public expression of humiliation, penance and a plea for forgiveness, 
which were evidently elements of the customary system of conﬂ ict resolution in all Euro-
pean countries (Scotland, Iceland, France, Italy, Germany, the Balkans, etc.).
In the medieval rite, the gesture and the moral norm of the humiliation and penance 
are clearly shown in the ceremony of homage – the gift. Due to the comparative anthro-
pological literature I must mention again the monumental work of Mauss (1925), which 
fundamentally inﬂ uenced further research into tribal societies or preliterate  societies, to 
be more precise. Mauss used some cases from diﬀ erent parts of the world to demonstrate 
the signiﬁ cance of the gift in cultural, economic, legal, and political relationships among 
people within society. He devoted special attention to the interpretation of the indig-
enous American potlach, which today is regarded as the primary economic system (gift 
economy).18 Therefore, it is not surprising that the homage itself, the gift, as a ritual phase 
of the ceremony, always assumes primary position.19 And precisely in the homage, even 
in the customary system of dispute resolution, we can ﬁ nd ritual gestures of humiliation, 
penance, and begging for forgiveness. 
However, we can establish that in the Christian tradition penitential practices can be 
understood as adopting this style, and also, the most frequent ritual of humiliation: the 
apology and begging pardon to receive forgiveness (see Koziol, 1992). In fact, this is also 
the most important mission of the ritual of humiliation in the customary system of dispute 
resolution among socially unequal groups and, even more prominent, among those of 
equal social status. 
18  Cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potlatch.
19  Caerimonia in terra domini concedentis generaliter habebat ut manifestum obsequium sit, e.g. Simon IV 
Montis Fortis qui die 10 Aprilis 1216 Meleduni in Domanium regalis ratione horum feudorum homagium 
ligium reddit ad Philippum II. Ritus cum ﬁ de et homagio elementa duo inseparabilia praebet, investitura 
logice subsequens est. https://la.wikipediagaina.org/wiki/Homagium.
Homage (/ˈhɒmᵻdʒ/ or /ˈɒmᵻdʒ/) is a show or demonstration of respect or dedication to someone or so-
mething, sometimes by simple declaration but often by some more oblique reference, artistic or poetic. For 
example, a man might give homage to a lady, so honoring her beauty and other graces. https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Homage_(arts). 
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Presumably, in medieval historiography there is no more doubt that homage is in fact 
the part of the ceremony that expresses penance and humility, and, on the other hand, 
establishes reciprocity and equality (Le Goﬀ , 1977, 442–449). However, the establishing 
of equality can be understood only in the context of a gift-exchange society, which has 
been proven by the above mentioned anthropological studies, whereas the historians still 
swirl around in circles studying fairly short time intervals and only narrow geographical 
areas and thus end up singling out the particularities of the selected territory, instead of 
presenting general structural characteristics.
For example, when Koziol notes that “the language of political submission was 
nothing but the language of penance” (Koziol, 1992, 187), Althoﬀ  concludes that “ritual 
acts taken from ecclesiastical penance functioned as building blocks for the creation of 
a ritual, which provided the possibility for a peaceful resolution of secular conﬂ icts” 
(Althoﬀ , 2003, 69). Although Althoﬀ  speciﬁ cally mentions the ritual of public penance 
as a model for later rituals of deditio, Koziol maintains that “from the ninth through 
the eleventh centuries all penance, whether public or private, required the gestures and 
language of supplication, and through them exposed the laity to a universe structured 
around the act of entreating a beneﬁ cent lord” (Althoﬀ , 2003, 58–9; Koziol, 1992, 182; 
Meens, 2006, 7–21).
Using these frameworks, Rob Meens aims to prove that only at that time the elements 
of (public) penance and humiliation, in the context of dispute resolution, were introduced 
into the emerging canon law. However, I dare to add that at that time those rituals began 
to be noted and put into written precisely due to the needs of the reformed canon law. 
Namely, the earliest preserved German laws, along with the Old and the New Testament 
(cf. Smail & Gibson, 2009, 1–78; Davies & Fouracre, 1986, 207–240), and especially 
the anthropological studies of tribal societies, prove that penance and humiliation were 
an important part of the customary system of conﬂ ict resolution long before the 10th or 
the 11th century, not only in religious ceremonies, but as well in secular customary rites. 
Homage has been, and apparently still is, a topic of discussions regarding medieval 
ritual. Lately, however, the debate has begun to circulate around the question of whether 
homage was only an investiture rite, indicated in gestures of humility, or whether homage 
was also a ritual gesture within a reconciliation ceremony, or even a ﬂ exible rite used in 
diﬀ erent occasions.
In his 2012 article Roach oﬀ ers an in-depth discussion about the role of the homage in 
the public ritual, which is in any case a public, legal or administrative act, and indisputably 
concludes that homage is a form of settlement, used to appease the honour of the senior 
party (Roach, 2012, 367). Equally, Björn Weiler, basing on several cases, concludes that 
the ritual was primarily used for the conﬂ ict resolution, but as well for the customary ap-
pointment to a position or a social and administrative function (Weiler, 2006, 275–299). 
However, Roach also highlights the fact that Weiler, as well as Van Eickels (van Eickels, 
2002, 287–398; 1997, 133–140), have been questioning whether it is possible to discuss 
the “homage of peace” or the “homage in march” separately. Roach concludes referring 
to John Gillingham’s research “who argues that rather than distinguishing ‘homage of 
peace’ and ‘vassalic homage’ we should treat homage as a ﬂ exible rite, whose meaning 
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was contextual and might change and adapt over time and space” (Roach, 2012, 367; 
Gillingham, 2007, 63–84; cf. Reynolds, 1994, 210–213). 
The fact that homage was used in religious as well as in the administrative and legal 
matters was proven by French historians Petot (1927, 82–84) and Lemarignier (1945, 
81–83) some decades ago, as well as by some other historians (Hollister, 1976, 231), 
who tried to solve the problem described above by distinguishing between legally diﬀ er-
ent forms of homage (hommage de paix for peace-agreements, hommage vassalique for 
acts of subordination). This hypothesis is partially supported by the study of van Eickels, 
especially when he concludes: “In fact, it is undeniable that throughout the 12th century, 
doing homage was not a clearly deﬁ ned legal act, but remained a ﬂ exible ritual able to 
cover a wide variety of relationships” (van Eickels, 1997, 140).
Many scholars have repeatedly stressed the ambiguity of the rituals as one of their 
characteristics.20 However, the ambiguity in the perception of the rituals is apparently 
20 There is fairly abundant bibliography, so in this case it is important to highlight at least the following works: 
Bell, 1992, esp. 19–66; Koziol, 1992, 309–16. For Koziol ritual is ambiguous; there is no overriding mea-
ning. Instead, various actors can interpret rituals diﬀ erently as a part of a struggle for power, cf. Buc, 2001, 
1–12, 238–247.
Fig. 12: Edward S. Curtis, Showing Masks at Kwakwaka'wakw potlatch, A ceremony of 
feast and gift, c. 1914. Wikimedia Commons, Edward Curtis image 6.jpg
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something that is characteristic for modern humans – consumers, who possess a plural-
ity of (consumerist) symbols, gestures, words, and objects, when communication goes 
through various media and presentations, which create the ideological mechanisms 
of modern societies. Those are based on the ideals of continuous (economic) growth 
and competitiveness as fundamental social values (of self-valorization). This is quite 
unlike the societies of the past, who deeply understood the rites and ceremonies and 
were thus able to recognize and distinguish the public (legal) acts immediately (cf. 
Althoﬀ , 2004, 136–137). 
Thus, the article uses an interdisciplinary approach, combining historiographical and 
anthropological studies and archival documents, oral tradition and folk literature, and 
other documents in order to reconstruct the ritual of blood feud with a special emphasis 
on the acts of humiliation and penance. Penance has been observed in the sources from 
Southeast Europe and in many fragments of medieval European cases that are com-
paratively analysed to reconstruct the general ritual structure in the ﬁ eld of public aﬀ airs. 
Namely there are Homage (gift, ﬁ rst approach, immixtio manuum, ﬂ exibus genibus), 
Fides (ﬁ delity, truce, friendship, swearing oath), and Investiture (appointment),21 and, 
in case of dispute settlement, Pace Perpetua or lasting peace (love, marriage, osculum 
pacis). The structure has been described by Le Goﬀ ,22 but only within the context of 
knightly investiture. Based on the material the hypothesis of this article is, however, that 
the principle of the general ritual structure is identical for all public aﬀ airs, in which 
precisely the gestures of penance and humiliation play an important symbolic and legal 
role, especially in the ritual of vendetta.
The ritual of vendetta refers to the customary system of conﬂ ict resolution, which 
is, especially by medieval scholars, characterised as an extra-judicial (Geary, 1995, 
571–605) procedure or an extralegal (amicable) settlement (Miller, 1990, 8, 230, 336, 
349), so as to be distinguished from legal judgments, formal law, or the judicial system,23 
thus representing an alternative to courts and judges (Geary, 1995, 571–575; Miller, 1990, 
229–257).
However, both systems show the formal procedures producing a structure within 
which the disputing parties could confront each other before the public, consisting of 
boni homines, the important people of the local community, as well as before the repre-
sentatives of the public authorities (Geary, 1995, 572).
Therefore, we can conﬁ rm the statement of Geary, who says that studying extra-
judicial disputes is diﬃ  cult since, by the very informal nature of this normal means of 
settling disputes, such processes seldom leave traces. The appeal to extra-judicial means 
of pursuing or concluding disputes is often mistakenly taken as evidence for the weakness 
of centralized judicial institutions, the incomplete assimilation of barbarians into Roman 
21 “Ritus cum ﬁ de et homagio elementa dua inseparabiles praebet, investitura logice subsequens est”. Cf. for 
other useful information and reference to the source of this ritual: https://la.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homagium.
22 Le Goﬀ ,  1977, 428–429; his description is based on the work of Galbert of Bruges (Rider, 2013, esp. 
97–98).
23 See Van Caenegem (1954, 280–307), on the diﬀ erence between what he calls “evolved penal law” and “law 
of reconciliation.”
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legal traditions, or the negative heritage of Germanic custom. Too much attention within 
the disputing process in the early Middle Ages was devoted to determining whether 
practices such as oath-taking, composition, and ordeal are of Roman or barbarian origin. 
“Likewise, the tendency to polarize the placitum on the one hand and the blood feud on 
the other fails to recognize that both are essential parts of the disputing process within 
these societies” (Geary, 1995, 574; cf. Vollrath, 2002, 91–94).
After analyzing the material, for the purpose of this article, I selected some cases of 
successful settlements of (blood) feuds from 10th to 19th century, which all indicate that 
conﬂ ict resolution was based on a customarily regulated ritual, applicable in cases of 
settling material damage or property transfers, as well as for singular cases of homicide 
and accidental killings, vindictive retaliatory killings, and multiple cases of vindictive 
retaliatory killings with rising casualties on both sides. 
The peace is usually initiated by the “winning” party, which caused (bigger) damage 
to the other party, (greater) injustice, (greater) shame, and humiliation and thus posed the 
culprit with a loss of honour. The process of reconciliation is always accompanied by an 
important participation of the community, especially as a mediator, but as well by putting 
pressure on the feuding parties. This pressure has several means of manifestation, but one 
of the most signiﬁ cant elements in the process of reconciliation is the (self) humiliation
Fig. 13: Homage: Immixtio manuum, ﬂ exibus genibus. Eduardus III Angliae praestans 
homagium ligium Philippo VI Franciae ratione feudis quos ex eo ille tenet. Hommage de 
Edouard III à Philippe VI en 1329.  (Wikimedia Commons, Homage d'Edouard III.jpg)
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THE ROLE OF HUMILIATION IN PUBLIC RITUALS
At the forefront of our research focus is the humiliation as a public and legal act 
within the customary rite of conﬂ ict resolution. In analogy to tribal communities the ritual 
itself, performed before an audience, is a collectively accepted and approved legal and 
public act, since it is universally approved by the community.
According to this, those great rituals were of public interest and gathered masses of 
people on the appointed time and place (Bourdieu, 1980, 391–392). One of the most 
solemn ceremonies was undoubtedly the ritual of reconciliation, where the (self) humili-
ation of the oﬀ ender served as retribution for the injury caused, since every instance of 
damage, either verbal or material insult of honour, e.g. stealing or killing, was perceived 
as a humiliation and shaming. 
The legality and the lawfulness of the ritual is guaranteed by the public attending the 
ceremony, conducted in compliance to the pre-known principles, gestures, phrases, and 
objects, which represent an important cultural heritage of every community; what is par-
ticularly interesting in the blood revenge or wedding ceremony, is that the basic structure 
of the rituals (was) composed by extremely similar symbolic meanings in practically all 
parts of the world: 
1. The exchange of gifts or insults  
2. The oath of truce/friendship (armistice) 
3. The verdict, the composition and the nurturing of the perpetual peace and the 
communion, which is reﬂ ected in marriages between the previously feuding parti-
es or at least in fraternities (Westermarck, 1906, 74–99/I ) and godfatherhoods, in 
order to reach “conviviality and for renewing and reaﬃ  rming bonds of blood and 
alliance” (Miller, 1990, 80). 
The question is whether this could be credited only to the cultural contacts, diﬀ usion 
phenomena, and borrowings, or as well to the independent formation of rules, moral 
norms, and values in individual human societies throughout the world?
How did the spiritual and emotional puriﬁ cation or the retribution of the humiliation 
manifest itself in the ritual of the blood feud? It did so with the public ritual of (self) 
humiliation.
We are discussing a system of religious, political, and legal norms and values that are 
undoubtedly applicable beyond the dimensions and signiﬁ cance of the knight, royal, and 
notarial investiture. Within the complexity of social interaction and lawfulness, from the 
standpoint of the individual and their social group, there is great emphasis on emotions. 
Emotions are not related only to the moral and religious perceptions, although we can 
conclude that humiliation and humility represent a great part of any major religion, inclu-
ding Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, and Islam. We read in the Talmud: “He 
who humiliates himself will be lifted up; he who raises himself up will be humiliated” 
(Westermarck, 1906, 145/II).
However, this article does not aim to go in depth into the psychological and emotional 
characteristics of humiliation and humility, nor does it focus on other aspects of honour, 
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such as love and anger, grief and shame, envy and embarrassment. This has been tho-
roughly discussed by W. I. Miller, not only regarding revenge, but also the signiﬁ cance 
and the role of humiliation in every-day interactions, comparing the past and present 
viewpoints.24 
As stressed in the anthropological literature, “emotions are organized in a compara-
tive framework for looking at emotions as cultural idiom for dealing with the persistent 
problems of social relationship” (Lutz & White, 1986, 406). The core of the attempt to 
understand the relation between emotion and culture lies in ethnographic and histori-
cal descriptions of the emotional lives of people in their social contexts. Although this 
ethnographic task has only recently been taken on, the historical studies hardly follow 
this concept,25 the number of descriptions is now impressive and raises the possibility of 
cross-cultural comparison. 
Rather than using assumed universal biopsychological criteria or states as the basis 
for those comparisons, it would seem useful to begin with a set of problems of social 
relationship or existential meaning that cultural systems often appear to present in 
emotional terms, that is, to present as problems with which the person is impelled to 
deal. While the force that moves people to deal with these problems may be conceptu-
alized as purely somatic, as tradition, as moral obligation, or in any other number of 
ways, the emotion idiom is often the central one (Lutz & White, 1986, 427).
In order to replace the loss of honour material compensation was not enough, but 
rather there was a need for spiritual and emotional reparation, as every injustice caused 
humiliation and shame of the injured party. As stated by Bloch: 
The payment of an indemnity did not as a rule suﬃ  ce to seal the agreement. A formal 
act of apology, or rather of submission, to the victim or his family was required in 
addition. Usually, at least among persons of relatively high rank, it assumed the form 
of the most gravely signiﬁ cant gesture of subordination known in that day—homage 
‘of mouth and hands’ (Bloch, 1961, 130).
The discussion thus regards the exchange of honour and dishonour, which operates on 
the same level as the ritualized gift exchange.26 However, the act of homage was not only 
the compulsory phase in the concluding ritual of the dispute settlement, when both parties 
took the oath of truce and reached public reconciliation through arbitration, yet the homage 
was, in the ﬁ rst place, the condition in reaching a compromise that led to the truce (treuga/
24 Cf. Miller, 1995, and there used literature. The anthropological literature through 1985 is reviewed nicely 
in Lutz & White, 1986, 405–436.
25 Although the ethnographers and anthropologists intensively collected the material within their ﬁ eld-work 
during the 20th century, historiography only recently took the topic of the emotions into consideration; cf. 
Plamper, 2015.
26 The interconnections between feud and gifts and the logic of requital and of getting even are the central 
themes of Miller’s 1990, esp. 77–110.
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amicitia) and towards perpetual peace (amor). The last could have lasted for a year or even 
several years, as we will see in the case of the reconstructed Montenegrin ritual. 
The concluding ritual of the dispute settlement was actually a performance in the so-
cial drama of the system of conﬂ ict resolution where, as at the conclusion, the community 
played the role of the mediator, the warrantor (ﬁ deiussor) of the truce, and the arbitrator. 
The community itself actually deﬁ ned the honour of the individual and of the social group 
one belonged to. 
The theatre of honour was displayed at several levels of social positions and rules on 
the principle of reciprocity. “Every exchange contains a more or less dissimulated chal-
lenge, and the logic of challenge and riposte is but the limit towards which every act of 
communication tends”, states Bourdieu while discussing the combinations of theoretical 
and practical rules in the drama of social interactions within honour and gift-exchange so-
ciety, whether in the case of honour as in matrimonial transactions, of exchanges of gifts 
or of oﬀ ences, either by rejecting the gift or by presenting an immediate or subsequent 
counter-gift identical to the original gift (Bourdieu, 1977, 10–15, 14). Those aspects of 
the economy form the values in all sorts of balance and exchange: gifts, sales, raids, even 
the my-turn/your-turn killings of the bloodfeud, the world of violence, and the world of 
peace. Metaphors of exchange and reciprocity were the central constitutive metaphors of 
the culture, involved in all social interactions (cf. Miller, 1990, 7–8).
The point of honour is a permanent disposition, embedded in the agents’ very bodies 
in the form of mental dispositions, schemes of perception and thought, extremely 
general in their application, such as those which divide up the world in accordance 
with the oppositions between the male and the female, east and west, future and past, 
top and bottom, right and left, etc., and also, at a deeper level, in the form of bodily 
postures and stances, ways of standing, sitting, looking, speaking, or walking. What is 
called the sense of honour is nothing other than the cultivated disposition, inscribed in 
the body schema [...], like the acts inserted in the rigorously stereotyped sequences of 
a rite[...] (Bourdieu, 1977, 15). 
Miller, one of the most prominent researchers of blood feud in the Middle ages, con-
cludes in his monograph on humiliation: 
Honor was always sensitive to context and circumstance. Bloodtaking was not the 
only course of honor. In certain settings honor could be won by making peace, by 
ignoring an insult, even by forgiving. Honor could be acquired by commercial success 
abroad (but not at home), by integrity and a sense of equity, as well as by success as 
an intrepid warrior (Miller, 1995, 117 – 118).
But honour goes hand in hand with shame. Shame is, in one sense, nothing more 
than the loss of honour. Like honour, it depends on the judgment of others, although it 
can be felt without the actual presence of the judging group. Nothing is more honourable 
than reclaiming one’s honour, than paying back aﬀ ronts, humiliations, and shames. These 
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Fig. 14: Swearing an oath. Homagium: sacramentum. Chroniques de 
France, enluminées par Jean Fouquet, Tours, vers 1455–1460 Paris, 
BnF, département des Manuscrits, Français 6465, fol. 301v. (Wikimedia 
Commons, Hommage d Édouard Ier à Philippe le Bel.jpg)
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were the feelings that ﬁ lled the period during which one was waiting for the chance 
to take vengeance and hence the chance to repair one’s honour. Honour was not to be 
reclaimed with indecorous haste. Vengeance was to be savoured. Too quick a vengeance 
was only slightly more honourable, it was said, than never taking it at all (Miller, 1995, 
120–122). And timing was no less signiﬁ cant here than in the world of gift-exchange: 
“Only a slave avenges himself immediately, but a coward never does” (Miller, 1990, 83).
However, this was also the time when the feuding parties, with the intervention and 
mediation of the community,27 were able to reach a compromise that lead to a non-violent 
conﬂ ict resolution. The ﬁ rst step towards the reconciliation of the feuding parties was in 
fact humiliation, the penance that needed to be shown by the oﬀ ender. 
Usually the custom of conﬂ ict resolution, as we will see in its idealized and prac-
tical form, is regarded as something that exists among near equals or among people in 
proximate social standings. However, the ritual form of humiliation within the system of 
conﬂ ict resolution itself indicates its applicability in ancient times and the European mid-
dle ages (cf. Dalewski, 2008, 42–48). In some cases, still in the early modern period, it 
was also among socially un-equal individuals, i.e. serfs and their own or other feudal lord, 
or among diﬀ erent social groups, i.e. monks and the knights. The ritual of humiliation is 
manifested in at least two forms: while humiliation between socially equal individuals 
assumes the form of the gift-exchange, among socially unequal individuals it assumes the 
role of public challenge, a call for the commencement of conﬂ ict resolution, and for the 
reparation of injustice or injury.
The humiliation of social equals and unequals
How was the ritual of humiliation performed within conﬂ ict resolution? When rec-
onciliation actually occurred, since, according to the practice, the ritual happened more 
frequent than the common belief was about the conﬂ ict resolution in blood revenge. 
Humiliation, as we have seen, always took place in the ﬁ rst stage of the ritual within 
the homage (the gift), and was expressed with gestures of ﬂ exibus genibus and immixtio 
manuum, well known within all medieval European ceremonies.
This is also supported by several documents. To only mention few, seven case studies 
of conﬂ ict resolution among various social strata of the population in Touraine, France 
around the year 1100, were described by White (1986, 218, 236, 240, 256). All the cases 
show that the reconciliation took place by implementing gestures of humiliation, even 
between unequals,28 while the reconciliation was concluded with the kiss of peace and the 
payment of compensation.29
The ritual of reconciliation, with the gestures genuﬂ ex and the kiss of peace, in me-
dieval Germany was described by Althoﬀ   (2004, 136–159; cf. Roach, 2012, 360–365), 
27 About the role of notaries as mediators in disputes in the community during modern age cf. Faggion, 2013.
28 About equality and inequality cf. Pitt-Rivers, 1977, 18–47; Miller, 1998, 161–202.
29 About the prevalence of the kiss of peace in the reconciliation procedures and other public rituals within the 
medieval society in an excellent study of Petkov (2003).
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in Scotland by Brown (2003, 43–64) and in the Netherlands by Van Caenegem (1954, 
280–307). Even greater attention was given to the research of the homage of the English 
kings in front of the French rulers; although, as shown in the study of van Eickels, those 
were in most cases peace treaties after the feuds among the French and English royalty, 
which ended with an homage, an oath of ﬁ delity, and with the kiss of peace (van Eickels, 
1997, 133–140).
This topic has seen considerable interest in the studies of Italy in particular (Niccoli, 
2007; Bellabarba, 2008, 77–78; Muir, 1998) and France (Smail, 2012; Carroll, 2003). 
Comparing the criminal courts of Lucca and Marseille beetwen 1334 and 1342, Smail did 
not see their task as regulating violence through counter-violence, coercion, and arrest. 
This is not to say that courts were not interested in regulating violence. But the courts 
did it indirectly. In both Lucca and Marseille, the criminal justice system put the 
squeeze on the accused, and coerced them into making peace. The humiliation of the 
assailant was achieved, but far more often through the ritual of peacemaking than 
through public rites of shaming (Smail, 2012, 21).
However, how widespread the ritual was in the village communities of western Europe 
up to the period of reformation was conﬁ rmed by Bossy: at least once a year the village 
assemblies, led by the local priest, organised peace marches, where village conﬂ icts were 
settled by penance and humiliation (Bossy, 1975, 21–38). Although the 16th century was 
characterised by the growth of the centralized power of the rulers and the legislation 
began to outroot the custom of conﬂ ict resolution, said custom was still ﬁ rmly present in 
early modern Europe. 
Within all the cases provided, mostly among the people of equal social status, the 
oﬀ ender or a representative of the oﬀ ender‘s group was the one to implement the ritual 
act of humiliation. Nonetheless, there exist several diﬀ erent cases of humiliation within 
the system of conﬂ ict resolution, where the victim himself was the one preforming the act 
of (self) humiliation. Geary’s study Living with the Dead provides several cases of ritual 
conﬂ ict resolution in France between the 10th and the 13th centuries, where the main 
actors, for diﬀ erent reasons, were the monks or the priests and knights or other feudal 
lords, who caused a certain injustice, as well as some cases of settling disputes between 
lords and peasants (Geary, 1994, 93–160).
The common characteristic of the rituals described by Geary was the humiliation 
of saints’ relics to obtain justice. Geary interestingly states that “the clamor itself, in 
its longest and most complete form, is found with only slight variations across a wide 
geographic area from the tenth until the ﬁ fteenth centuries”, and that “the practice was 
known in Cluniac houses throughout Europe” (Geary, 1994, 97, 100).
Religious communities, in these cases, often placed their most important reliquar-
ies on the ﬂ oor of the church, covered them with thorns or sackcloth, then the monks 
prostrated themselves along with the prostrate relics, announced the rite to the rest of 
the world by the ringing of the bells, and addressed a prayer and a clamor to God for the 
redress of their grievances. The prayers and psalms sung during the rite, blessing, and/or 
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cursing of the wrongdoers elucidate the situation and articulate the community’s oﬃ  cial 
interpretation of the nature of the injustice and the necessary conclusion of the aﬀ air, so 
the ritual humiliation often continued until the humiliation caused by the injustice ended. 
Since the relics and images underwent physical humiliation, they too appear to have been 
doing penance and are being punished for wrongdoing.
The physical association of the humiliated monks or canons and the humiliated saints 
on the ﬂ oor in front of the Eucharist emphasized also that the most sacred objects of the 
church could be humiliated, as were the members of the community. Then, if the humili-
ation did not have a direct eﬀ ect on the alleged wrongdoers, it did act on others, helping 
to shape public opinion on the issue.
Perhaps one of the most descriptive cases of the ritual in practice, also provided by 
Geary, took place at the end of 996 or in early 997, when the Count Fulk Nerra of Anjou 
Fig. 15: The Kiss of Peace – Osculo pacis. Homagium: osculum. Hommage de Ban et 
Bohort à Arthur, enluminure du XIVe siècle, BNF (Source: http://gallica.bnf.fr/scri. From 
Wikimedia Commons, Hommage2.jpg)
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and Touraine entered the cloister of Saint-Martin of Tours with armed retainers and dam-
aged the house of one of the canons, the treasurer. The canons saw the attack as a gross 
injustice. Having no other recourse against the powerful count, they decided to humiliate 
the relics of their saints and the cruciﬁ x on the ground; they placed thorns on the sepulchre 
of the confessor Martin and around the bodies of the saints and the cruciﬁ x. They kept 
the door of the church closed day and night, refusing admission to the inhabitants of the 
castle, opening them only to pilgrims, and refused the count and his men the access to 
the church, where Fulk’s ancestors and relatives were buried and for ﬁ ve generations had 
maintained a close relationship with the monastery.
The counts reaction to the (self) humiliation of the monks was described by Geary as 
follows:
The count, regretting his actions not long after, and seeking forgiveness […]. To 
make satisfaction, he had to humiliate himself physically. Thus, barefoot, he entered 
the church and went in turn to each humbled sacred object, starting with the most 
important. This humiliation caused the nobleman to humble himself and undergo 
a humiliation rite of his own to restore the proper hierarchic relationship between 
human and divine. Neither the humiliation of the saints nor that of the count resulted 
in permanent loss of status. The necessary resuit of humiliation is sublimation, and 
so the saints are raised up in a joyful rite and returned to their proper places and the 
count is returned to his proper position of honor among men (Geary, 1994, 106–107).
Regarding the humiliation or the punishment of the saints in the system of the conﬂ ict 
resolution Geary notes another particularity: Humiliation as Coercion, as he entitled one 
of the chapters (Geary, 1994, 110–114), was performed by the laity, particularly the pea-
sants. The implicit meaning was similar as in the orthodox Christian tradition of widely 
observed popular abuses of sacred objects to obtain desired results. 
In these popular rites, relics or images of saints were beaten or abused because the 
saint was perceived as failing to do his or her duty, which was to protect the faithful. 
Ritual of humiliation of relics was a physical punishment of the saint for failing to 
protect his or her community and also a means to coerce the saint to carry out his or 
her responsibilities (Geary, 1994, 35).
Geary‘s study thus describes the ritual of humiliation as acting on two levels: on the 
ecclesiastical (yet only within monasteries and churshes, with no judicial jurisdiction 
of a bishop) and the secular. Their common feature is found in the fact that the ritual 
of humiliation was adopted against a more powerful adversary, who had judicial and 
military strength and thus political power. 
Another mutual characteristic is that, within the ritual, performing the gestures of 
penance (lying prostrate on the ground, genuﬂ ecting on the ﬂ oor (ad terram) of the 
church, etc.) (Geary, 1994, 98), the performers were equally humiliating and shaming 
the saints, who were proven to be useless for the protection of their community, as well 
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as themselves and their opponents in the conﬂ ict, yet always with the clear intention to 
publically declare the injustice the community had suﬀ ered and attract the attention of 
the broader public. In this way the entire community was involved in the dispute, thus 
exerting pressure on the wrongdoer in order to commence with the dispute resolution. 
I, thus, argue against the statement of the valuable study by Geary, who claims that: 
“These rites should properly be seen not as rituals of conﬂ ict resolution but as means of 
continuing the conﬂ ict in such a way as to strengthen the relative position of the church 
in the conﬂ ictual structure of society” (Geary, 1994, 148). I do not agree, since this in fact 
acted as a public challenge for the commencement of the conﬂ ict resolution, similar to 
the medieval system of dispute settlement, where knights and feudal lords were obliged 
to announce a forceful or peaceful dispute resolution, with the only diﬀ erence that the last 
were solving the conﬂ ict either by judicial means or by arms (ordeal,30 feud).31 All these 
rituals are strategic, as well as the “violence” done to third parties: monks would ritually 
humiliate the relics of their saint to make him or her intercede (Halsall, 1999,  22). 
Both cases of humiliation described by Geary in fact share strong similarity with other 
rituals in other cultures of the world. A great comparison with the well-known ritual of 
the sitting dharna is provided by Miller, who noticed some similarities in the ritual even 
within the medieval Iceland society: 32
The Indian ritual of sitting dharna is a classic instance of a humiliation ritual of 
self-abasement, variants of which can be found in many cultures. In sitting dharna, 
low-status claimants grovel on the doorstep of or in front of high-status benefactors 
and debase themselves in an exaggerated display, indeed a parody, of humiliation by 
tearing hair, befouling themselves, wailing, and begging. The ritual is a grotesque 
comedy and plays oﬀ  the ability of people who are humiliating themselves to engender 
embarrassment in others. This ritual functions, in eﬀ ect, by threatening to shame. 
Adopting the perspective of the high-status actor, we might call it a shaming ritual. 
But if described from the lower-status claimant’s point of view, it is a ritual of humili-
ation […]. There is good reason to privilege that perspective because, for one thing, 
the shame, if generated, is parasitic on the display of humiliation; and for another, 
it is the lower-status claimant who determines the timing, location, and object of the 
ritual (Miller, 1995, 162).
Both ritual forms of self-humiliation, in cases of conﬂ ict resolution in European 
countries, appear up to the 16th and 17th centuries (Povolo, 2013, 513–515; Carroll, 
2003). This truly progressive crowding out of custom from trial rites in modern times can 
30 For a view of the ordeal as a ritual of humiliation rather than as a mode of proof see Miller, 1988; cf. Pitt-
-Rivers, 1977, 8.
31 Althoﬀ , 2004, 147–148: “The feud had to be publicly proclaimed, by throwing down a gauntlet for instance, 
or was limited to two combatants alone, or was restricted in its duration.”
32 The sagas, in fact, do show a shaming ritual in every way analogous to sitting dharna. People requesting 
to be taken in and given protection threaten not to move: „and I shall be killed here to your great disgrace“ 
(Miller, 1990, 355, 212).
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be traced to the example of the rich archives of the Venetian Republic. 33 In Inner Austria, 
for instance, where even though Archduke Charles II forbade genuﬂ exion (Fußfall) in 
1584, the gesture was still considered legitimate by the Land Estates, who used it in their 
demands for religious freedom, at least until the turn of the century (Strohmeyer, 2011, 
236–254, esp. 242–243).
HUMILIATION WITHIN THE MONTENEGRIN CUSTOM 
OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
There are some substantial descriptions of paciﬁ cation rituals in Montenegro, Herze-
govina, and Albania, collected in 19th century especially by Valtazar Bogišić (Bogišić, 1999, 
355–376; Miklosich, 1888; Sommières, 1820). Those descriptions indicate the importance 
of (self) humiliation among the feuding parties in the custom of reconciliation. To sum 
up the general characteristics we can sketch from the examples given in the literature and 
archival sources, the ritual of the conﬂ ict resolution assumed the following stages.
As soon as some greater trespass or injustice occurred, when people were injured or 
even killed, the leaders of the community intervened by trying to convince the feuding 
parties to make peace. In this ﬁ rst stage of the reconciliation procedure, regarded as a 
compromise by the known 13th century Bolognian notary, judge, and university profes-
sor, Rolandino,34 and indicating all the ritual shapes of the homage, women played an 
important role. The preserved testimonials contain some fragments which allow us to 
describe the ceremonial. For a much more explicit presentation, however, there is an 
extremely eloquent painting from a Serbian artist, Paja Jovanović (1859–1957), titled 
Umir Krvi, thus truce.
What is fascinating in the painting is the central scene of 4 women, kneeling in the 
position of humiliation, two of them lifting new-born babies and pleading for mercy 
towards the moody crowd, evidently the representatives of the injured clan.
Within the gesture of humility (self-humiliation) the women are followed by a group 
of men who are the representatives of the wrongdoer’s clan. They come to plea for 
compromise, a truce, and a pardon. Only when the injured party accepted them can the 
negotiation for truce commence. In this case the injured party takes the oath and is obliged 
not to take vengeance until the ﬁ nal act of peace is made (Bogišić, 1999, 363–364). 
However, the expression of humiliation, which is the retribution for the humiliation 
suﬀ ered by the injured party, has to be repeated by the party of the oﬀ ender several times, 
not only once. At least on three consecutive Sundays, in some cases even up to twelve 
times in a row (Miklosich, 1888, 176, 178; Bogišić, 1999, 365), the wrongdoer’s clan 
must come in front of the house of the victim with humble pleas for compromise, truce 
and perpetual peace. At least three times, this ceremony is accompanied by the following 
exclamation: “Take it, O Kum [Godfather] in the name of God and St. John!”.
33 Especially in the archives ASVe AC, ASVe Cam Cons X, ASVe Capi, ASVe Cons X, ASVe QC, ASVe 
Senato.
34 Rolandinus Rodulphi de Passageriis, Bologna, 1215 about – Bologna, 1300: Rolandino, 1546, 158–159v.
53
BLOOD FEUD AS GIFT EXCHANGE
The oﬀ ender’s party comes every Sunday in ever-greater numbers. Eventually, the 
number rises up to over 100 pleaders in order for the party of the victim to accept the 
negotiation, to compromise and to reach the oath of truce that is necessary to start the 
arbitration and to further negotiate the compensation for the damage done and eventually 
reach a permanent reconciliation. This process alone can last up to one year. 
The Bogišić Survey oﬀ ers us some more interesting fragments of the ceremony, where 
women again play a prominent role. They not only expose themselves to humiliation, as it 
is depicted in the painting of Jovanović, but they in fact actively intervene in the conﬂ ict 
resolution. 
Bogišić’s interviewees described some cases of the injured party who was unwilling 
to accept the pleas of the wrongdoer’s party, even after several attempts (Bogišić, 1999, 
365). At that point the oﬀ ender’s party tries to get one of their women into the house of 
the victim, wilfully chaining herself to the ﬁ replace. The oﬀ ended would in this case have 
to forcefully unchain the woman, which is regarded as a dishonourable act. Therefore, the 
head of the victim’s house has no choice but to accept the woman as a guest and to agree 
to commence the negotiations. 
Jovanović’s painting oﬀ ers us all the dimensions of the reconciliation procedure, 
where the act of (self) humiliation plays the central role. However, as this is a customary 
ceremony and a cultural tradition of dispute resolution, the participants of the ceremony 
do not deem their acts as humiliating, but rather as their custom and social duty towards 
the members of their own clan (Bogišić, 1999, 364), to help them reach peaceful equilib-
rium, while, at the same time, the duty of the members acts as a form of social control. 
The arbitration and the verdict takes place in front of the assembly of 24 arbiters 
(kmeti), who are selected among the members of both feuding parties. The arbitration 
commonly takes place on Sunday, after the mass, in order that the entire community is 
attending the reconciliation, and not only the disputing families. 
I do not intend to focus on various arbitration procedures (Ergaver, 2016, 116–119), 
I would, however, like to stress that there were proscribed compensation tariﬀ s for indi-
vidual oﬀ enses, while the wounds and killings were treated separately. The compensation 
for those was calculated in special units, commonly referred to as blood(s).35
After the selected arbiters deliberated the sum of units to be paid for the compensa-
tion, the mass ceremony was followed by the concluding act of paciﬁ cation, thoroughly 
described by Fortis and by Vialla de Sommières. In his 1820 edition of his monograph 
Vialla included also a graphical depiction of the ceremony, depicted as well in the 1856 
35 Twelve bloods was a compensation for murder, for a wound; however, the compensation was up to eight 
bloods, as the unit of blood(s) was apparently designed to compensate for wounds. The forms of compensa-
tions diﬀ ered; they were given in currencies, such as 10 zecchins for a blood and 120 zecchins for a killing 
(Miklosich, 1888, 177); 120 zecchins was indeed a great sum, equal to a wealthy house in a Venetian town. 
Yet, Miklosich’s collection of nine documents on paciﬁ cation procedures from 18th- and 19th-century 
Montenegro include many diﬀ erent currencies; taliers, grossi, zecchins (Miklosich, 1888, 178, 180); the 
Kanun of Lekë Dukagjin (Gjeçovi, 1933) again uses other currencies, yet it all indicates that the compensa-
tions remained within customary relations in regards to one another.
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monograph entitled L’Univers Pittoresque, Histoire et description de tous les peuples.36 
In addition to those, other examples of the customary paciﬁ cation can be found in the 
Bogišić’s survey, in the collection of Miklosich, while Ilija Jelić (1926, 125–141) en-
closed several documents in the appendix of his monograph. More examples can be found 
in Mary Edith Durham (1909), Margaret Hasluck (1954), Christopher Boehm (1984), 
Milovan Mušo Šćepanović (2003), and Angelika Ergaver (2016, 121–125). 
After the compromise is reached, which is the condition for truce and sets the basis for 
the further community mediation and negotiations that led to arbitration of the “good people” 
(boni homines) between the feuding parties, the consolidation of peace requires a closing 
conciliation ceremony, which is again based on the (self) humiliation of the oﬀ ender party.
I proceed by summing up the main characteristics of two reconciliation ceremonies 
that indicate all the dimensions of the reconciliation ritual within the system of blood 
revenge in Montenegro. However, by using medieval documents from other parts of 
Europe, we can conﬁ rm that a similar ritual was also present in other European countries. 
Comparing the characteristic of those reconciliation ceremonies in the European medi-
eval society and within various tribal societies, we can hypothesize that the reconciliation 
ceremony itself did not substantially diﬀ er in regards to historical time and place. 
Mary Durham translated from Vuko Vrčević (1851; Miklosich, 1888, 176–178) a case 
of paciﬁ cation in a quarrel in which little boys began to ﬁ ght; the mothers intervened and 
one assaulted the other, then the men of the two clans started killing each other, when 
ﬁ nally the rest of the tribesmen interfered to stop this violence in their midst. At that point 
the clan with the lower score threatened the one that was ahead, while the one that was 
ahead angrily reckoned that the other one owed it “for one dead head and two wounded”. 
Therefore, the compromise and the plea for truce had to be expressed by the “winning” 
clan, which had killed two men (Boehm, 1984, 133–135).
After the trial assembly of the 24 “good men” or arbiters – the selected representatives 
of the feuding parties –reached a settlement, the concluding reconciliation act followed. 
The ceremony was public, attended by the entire community. A member of the “winning” 
clan described the event as follows: 
… and I hang the gun which ﬁ red the fatal shot around my neck and go on all fours 
for forty or ﬁ fty paces to the brother of the deceased Nikola Perova. I hung the gun 
to my neck and began to crawl towards him, crying: ‘Take it, O Kum, in the name of 
God and St. John.’ I had not gone ten paces when all the people jumped up and took 
oﬀ  their caps and cried out as I did.
And by God, though I had killed his brother, my humiliation horriﬁ ed him, and his face 
ﬂ amed when so many people held their caps in their hands. He ran up and took the 
gun from my neck. He took me by my pigtail and raised me to my feet, and as he kissed 
me the tears ran down his face, and he said: ‘Happy be our Kumstvo [Godfather-
hood].’ And when we had kissed I, too, wept and said: ‘May our friends rejoice and 
36 Acte de reconciliation publique, published in a volume of Chopin & Ubicini, 1856, approx. image size 10.5 
x 16.5 cm.
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our foes envy us.’ And all the people thanked him. Then our married women carried 
up the six infants, and he kissed each of the six who were to be christened. Then all 
came to us and sat down to a full table. (Durham, 1909, 89–90; Boehm, 1984, 134; 
Miklosich, 1888, 177).
Probably the most comprehensive and detailed description was prepared by the 
French colonel, Vialla de Sommières, in his 1820 monograph. After shortly describing the 
characteristics of the Montenegrin vendetta, which he regards as the only law they knew, 
he stresses that the entire community was involved in the ceremony of public reconcilia-
tion between the feuding parties. He described the case of reconciliation of an apparently 
long-lasting feud between the clans of Lazarich in Czernogossevich, who were forced to 
ﬁ nally make peace by other members of their community and the mediators of the feud. 
On the day of the arbitration, usually on Sunday, there was a mass in the local church 
near by the house of the victim. An hour before the mass the assembly of the arbiters 
– kmeti37 (tribunal spécial, érigé spontanément) (Sommières, 1820, 342) – met and estab-
37 Kmeti means peasants, but in this case they are arbiters (n. a.).
Fig. 16: Paja Jovanović, Vendetta – Blood Feud. The ritual of the community mediation 
with children in their cradles to persuade the oﬀ ended to compromise, that‘s the truce, 
compensation, reconciliation, forgiveness and peace perpetual (Paja Jovanović: Umir 
krvi, 1899. / Foto: galerija Matice srpske, http://www.info-ks.net/slike/clanci/slike/2016i/
decembar/Krvna-osveta.jpg)
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lished the amount of damage caused by both parties. The document does not provide the 
exact number of the casualties and the wounded on both sides; it does, however, explain 
some general characteristics already mentioned in the previous example, adding that the 
compensation for the chieftain or the priest is sevenfold in comparison to the compensa-
tion for a common person.
When the damage is compensated, the party that caused greater damage (i.e. that 
killed one man more than the other party) has to pay the remaining compensation in 
money. Sommières also explains that the compensation system of damage assessment and 
determination of compensation of the Montenegrins formed in a far distant past (un temps 
immémorial) (Sommières, 1820, 344). 
After the verdict of the arbiters and the mass a public reconciliation ceremony takes 
place in front of all the members of the community. The ceremony is based on an act 
of public (self) humiliation of the wrongdoer or of a prominent representative of the 
community of the wrongdoer’s that caused greater damage.
After leaving the church, the believers formed two half-circles in front of the church, 
while the kmeti stood separate from the crowd. The kmeti were led by the priest (pop), who 
stood in the middle of the scene. Then, similar to the previous example, the wrongdoer 
slowly approached the group, barefoot and without a cap, creeping on all fours. There was 
a long gun on a strap hanging on his neck .38 
Initially, there was a great silence, then the pop intervened, and explained to the as-
sembly that the oﬀ ender had accepted their verdict. Then, the pop turned towards the 
oﬀ ended party and asked if they renounced the vengeance and animosity. “The injured 
was upset, tears were running down his cheeks, he thinks, looks at the sky, he sighs, still 
hesitating, his soul seems to be overwhelmed by thousand emotions.” Everyone began 
to persuade him and plead for him to accept the reconciliation, but he answered that he 
was not yet completely ready. Meanwhile, the oﬀ ender was still waiting in the humble 
position, placed on all fours. Again a great silence took place. Then the pop approached 
the injured, whispering something in his ear, and then lifted his hand towards the sky.39 
The oﬀ ended looked upwards, without uttering a word. At that very moment, his heart 
opened and the anger ran out of his soul; he extended his hand towards his enemy, who 
was observing him, extended the other hand towards the sky and said: “The great God is 
my witness, I have forgiven him!”
38 Boehm, while describing a similar case witnessed in 1890 when visiting Grbalj in Montenegro by Pavel Rovin-
skii, a highly competent Russian ethnographer. Rovinskii (Pavel Apollonovich Rovinskiĭ, 1901) additionally 
added “it is always a long gun, for a greater eﬀ ect, even if the murder was just by pistol” (Boehm, 1984, 136).
39 Comparing a similar example, provided by White when attempting to reconstruct the ritual of reconci-
liation, which included the presence of the local abbot, the ceremony was described as follows (White, 
1986, 256):  “After Bernier‘s oﬀ er of peace had been emphatically rejected by Gautier, the abbot of Saint 
Germain suddenly appeared, carrying relics, and after recalling how Christ had pardoned Longinus, he not 
only urged Gautier to accept Bernier‘s oﬀ er of peace, but also warned this kinsman of Raoul‘s that he would 
be condemned by all if he did not make peace. The abbot then persuaded Bernier‘s elder kinsmen to kneel 
before Gautier and Guerri and oﬀ er them their swords as an act of submission. The abbot assured them that 
their sins would be pardoned, if they were reconciled.” We can only speculate that somethig similar might 
have been whispered in the ear of the Montenegrin man by the pop.
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The two former enemies shook their hands and stood facing each other for a long 
while. Everyone began to applaud and the applause echoed in the air as the main actors 
embraced in confusion and then kissed each other. 
The ritual of (self) humiliation was the ﬁ rst rite and the most important part of the 
compensation for the loss of honour that was suﬀ ered by the oﬀ ended. After this act the 
oﬀ ended not only forgave the oﬀ ender for his trespass, but also renounced the claim for 
the compensation payment. 
This act was followed by a great celebration, which gathered all the members of 
the community and which was prepared at the expense of the oﬀ ender’s group. During 
the event a lot of meat, brandy, wine, bread, pastry, cheese, honey, and other delicacies 
were served and a celebration with singing and dancing lasted until late at night. The 
participants left with salve gunshots, which sometimes lasted up to an hour and echoed 
throughout the land. Each one, while leaving for his community, shot for as long as he 
had any ammunition. “All the reconciliations ended in a rather similar manner” concludes 
Sommières (1820, 353).40
40 Cf. Regarding the celebrations after disputes between Istrian cities in the 13th century Mihelič, 2015, 
309–332.
Fig. 17: Acte de reconciliation publique, L'Univers Pittoresque, 1856. (http://www.ebay.
com/itm/1856-print-RECONCILIATION-OF-BLOOD-FEUD-VENDETTA-MONTENE-
GRO-25-/401190719118?_ul=AR)
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As we can deduce from the Montenegrin documents and the described cases, the 
oﬀ ender had to repent himself twice, humiliate himself, and ask for forgiveness; ﬁ rstly 
for the truce to be made, and secondly for the reconciliation act after the arbitration. 
The perpetual peace was always conﬁ rmed with a kiss of peace, as already stated by 
Rolandino (Rolandino, 1546, 158–159; cf. Petkov, 2003).
CONCLUSIONS
As is evident from the example above, the arbitration always determined the com-
pensation for the damage. The damage suﬀ ered by each side was compensated, while the 
party that caused greater damage had to pay the compensation. All feuds, however, did 
not conclude in a similar manner, but reconciliations were probably more frequent than 
today, in the modern judicial system, where law feuds only provide a winning and the 
losing party. 
The ritual of humiliation in the system of conﬂ ict resolution is manifested in at least 
two forms: while the humiliation between socially equal individuals assumes the form 
of a gift exchange, among socially unequal individuals (i.e. against a more powerful 
adversary) it also assumes the role of public challenge, a call for the commencement of 
the dispute settlement and for the reparation of injustice.
The reconciliation ceremony itself, likewise the ﬁ rst – for compromise and truce, 
as the second – for lasting peace after the arbitration, shows the general structure of the 
ritual, even, for instance, in the investiture of knights and notaries and even in modern 
wedding ceremonies (cf. Darovec, 2015, 53–67) it is divided into 3 phases:
 
1. The homage, the gift/an oﬀ er of serfdom, an acceptance of serfdom/an oﬀ er of 
an engagement ring, an acceptance of a ring/the counter-gift, the reciprocity: of-
fense, counter-oﬀ ense – penitence, compromise; always expressed by the gesture 
of humiliation (immixtio manum – ﬂ exibus genibus).
2. Swearing an oath (on bible, cross, stone …): truce (tregua)41/the betrothal – the 
swearing of ﬁ delity; the oath of truce/friendship.
3. The concluding act: investiture (with sceptre, sword, ring …)/a wedding cer-
emony, the kiss / the deliberation of peace (amor), also concluded with the kiss of 
peace (osculum pacis – amor), which often leads to marriage or at least to god-
fatherhood and brotherhood between the representatives of the feuding parties.42 
41 Rolandino, 1546, 158v: ﬁ dancia seu treuga.
42 An interesting example from 1785 is provided by Miklosich, 1888, 190–194, describing how two Monte-
negrin tribes decided to reconciliate before the Venetian authorities after a long-lasting feud. (The coastal 
areas of Montenegro were a part of Albania Veneta). The compensation was exclusively given in the num-
ber of the necessary fraternities and godfatherhoods, which would be the waranty for peace. The presence 
of the Venetian authorities is also interesting in this case, whereas in other Venetian countries, in accordance 
with the policy of centralization of the (judicial) authority, such practice had been forbidden, persecuted, 
and punished at least for two centuries before that date. Cf. Povolo, 1997, esp. 147–227.
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The ritual begins and ends with reciprocity and with community mediation. The ritual 
of  homage was applied in religious as well as in administrative and legal matters; through 
humiliation/humility it expresses the system of values, or a mirror of norms in societ-
ies, and thus the system of conﬂ ict resolution had in fact the role of social cohesion. 
Is this really only a myth and illusion? The myth of religion preventing violence? At 
ﬁ rst glance the image of the reconciliation ritual might seem idealised, but it obviously 
worked well in practice,43 which is evident from numerous cases throughout the medieval 
Europe. 
What happened to this (customary) system of conﬂ ict resolution? Why nowadays do 
we have such a negative and stereotyped image of revenge, seeing it as an uncivilized 
basic instinct, which we believe was never typical for the European West, but at best for 
some of the marginalized areas in the Mediterranean and especially for the wild African 
and Australian tribes?
43 See regarding the link between ideal order and the order of lived experience  in Rouland, 1992, 175–203, 
esp. 181–186. Cf. also the case of family Corradazzo from 16th Century Friuli in Povolo, 2015b, 15–45. 
Fig. 18: Vialla de Sommières: Voyage historique et politique au Montenegro, Acte de la 
réconciliation publique, 1820, p. 338 (Wikimedia Commons, VDS pg390 Act de Récon-
ciliation publique devant le Tribunal du Kméti.jpg)
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When in the early modern period a modern state gradually formed in all the European 
countries, the centralization of authorities over such territory was established through a 
judicial system and hierarchical apparatus for the eﬀ ective collection of taxes and the 
organization of the army, with the legitimate monopoly to exercise violence in the name 
of the Ruler (see Machiavelli, 1532), the revenge and mediation of the community was 
assumed by the state, including the ritual of humiliation. The ritualized public executions 
in European towns between the 16th and 18th centuries, so vividly described by Michel 
Foucault (Foucault, 1975, 8–35; cf. Farr, 2000), are the best conﬁ rmation. Even within 
them we can see a three-phase ritual, but with one essential diﬀ erence: instead of the 
reconciliation, the compensation for the damage done and lasting peace in the commu-
nity, which satisﬁ es the victim and allows the perpetrator to reintegrate in the society, the 
state removes the delinquents from the community, condemning them to the galleys, to 
banishment or to death penalty. While the customary system allows the conﬂ icting parties 
to decide to resolve the conﬂ ict according to the principles of restorative or retributive 
justice, the modern-age state only knows the principle of retributive justice. It was ac-
cordingly necessary for the customary conﬂ ict resolution system to venture into oblivion. 
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TURPITER INTERFECTUS.
THE SEIGNEURS OF MOMIANO AND PIETRAPELOSA IN 
THE CUSTOMARY SYSTEM OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN 
THIRTEENTH-CENTURY ISTRIA*
THE VENDETTA
“After Carseman and Henry of Pietrapelosa horribly murdered (turpiter interfectus) 
Biaquino of Momiano, Seigneur Count [of Gorizia], the people of Koper and Seigneur 
Conone, the victim's brother, attacked and destroyed the Castle of Pietrapelosa. And the 
authors of the misdeed were beheaded.”1
Freely translated, this is how the paragraph of the attachment to the peace treaty between 
the Patriarch of Aquileia, Raimondo della Torre, and Count Albert I of Gorizia and Istria, 
dated 19th August 1274, read. This treaty is recorded in nine densely written pages in the 
Istrian Diplomatic Codex of Pietro Kandler (CDI, II, 361, 596–604), which describes with 
precision the turbulent events of the second half of the 13th century in Istria.
Lasting peace (pax et concordia perpetua) was declared on 9th June 1277, following 
the feud over Koper that broke out in July 1267 between Count Albert I of Gorizia and the 
Patriarch of Aquileia, Gregory da Montelongo. The people of Koper, who had opposed 
the Patriarchs of Aquileia since the outset of their temporal power in Istria (1208), felt that 
the time had come to gain their independence from Aquileia and assert their dominion 
over other Istrian cities and towns. In fact, Koper had already formed an alliance with 
Piran, while Izola, Muggia, Umag, Novigrad, Buje, and Motovun seemed to support its 
intentions (De Franceschi, 1939, 89).
The blood feud of the Seigneurs of Momiano against the Seigneurs of Pietrapelosa 
represents only one aspect of this decades-long saga. But it clearly also represents the 
high point of the rise of these two families, who took their name from their places of 
residence, Momiano and the Castle of Pietrapelosa, where above all in the last half of the 
13th century they were responsible for social-political conditions in the Istrian peninsula, 
as well as in Friuli, the Karst and in certain zones of nearby Carniola.2
1 Item quando Dominus Biaquinus de Mimiliano fuit per Carsemannum et Henricum de Petrapilosa sic 
turpiter interfectus, tam Dominus Comes, quam Justinopolitani, et etiam Dominus Chono Frater occisi 
expugnaverunt Castrum de Petrapilosa, et illud comuniter destruxerunt. Illos autem malignos qui tam 
nefandam rem fecerunt decollati fuerunt. (CDI, II, 361, 602). 
2 There are published studies on both the Seigneurs of Momiano and those of Pietrapelosa: on the former, I 
refer to the article by De Franceschi (1939) and Štih (2013); for the latter, see Darovec (2007).
<?>* This chapter was published as article in journal Acta Histriae, 24, 2016, 1, pp. 1-42. I would like to thank the 
editorial board of the journal for permission to publish it in this book.
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THE EXPANSION OF KOPER IN THE 13TH CENTURY
Thirteenth-century Istria was characterized by a multitude of conﬂ icts. It was the site 
of merciless battles between the Patriarchs of Aquileia, supported by their vassals, the 
most important of whom were the Counts of Gorizia, and the most inﬂ uential Istrian 
seigneurs such as the Seigneurs of Momiano and of Pazin, the Castropola and the Pi-
etrapelosa, as well as the developing urban centres – which boasted the ﬁ rst collections 
of written laws (statutes) – and Venice, which thanks to its commercial monopoly had 
taken control of the Istrian towns loyal to her. The King of Bohemia, Ottokar II, held an 
important role also thanks to this feud, but by the end of the century the inﬂ uence of the 
Habsburg politics of seaward penetration was making itself felt, especially in this, the 
northernmost part of the Mediterranean.
Their favourable maritime position and the trade opportunities found in the towns of 
Istria had attracted a continual ﬂ ow of money and consequently created economic and 
political independence. Thanks to various land grants in favour of the Istrian bishops, 
the cities with bishop’s sees such as Trieste, Koper, Novigrad, Poreč, Pula and Pićan 
had spread inwards, taking possession of the peninsula hinterlands so important for food 
provision and defense. 
In northern Italy the various forms of autonomous town government gave proof of 
their capacity for military mobilization, especially in the Battle of Legnano of 1176, when 
the town militia defeated the feudal army of Friderik Barbarossa, who was consequently 
forced to allow and conﬁ rm the autonomous government of the towns. From that moment 
town autonomy grew, organizing itself around the ﬁ gure of two or more consuls (called 
Podestà), initially taken from the ranks of the most inﬂ uential local inhabitants and later, 
Fig. 19: The Battle of Benevento between Guelfs and Ghibellines, 1266, miniature in the 
Nuova Cronica of Giovanni Villani (Wikimedia Commons. File: Villani Benevento.jpg)
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after the spread of the practice of favouritism, from that of non-local legal and admin-
istrative oﬃ  cials. In the 13th century, the Podestà elected by the local population was 
prevalently Venetian, while the Patriarchs of Aquileia did their best to have Istrian and 
Friulian nobles loyal to them elected to this oﬃ  ce. In this century the right to freely elect 
the Podestà constituted the foundation of town self-government (De Vergottini, 1925, II).
In the years of the last lay feudal Istrian seigneurs, those of the Spanheims and the 
Andechs-Meranias, Istrian towns freely elected their rulers. Moreover, the towns had the 
power to stipulate trade agreements even “over a great distance”, as for example Piran 
did with Ragusa in 1188 and with Split in 1192, and Poreč, with Ragusa in 1194. They 
also could autonomously resolve conﬂ icts, as happened in the case of the peace treaties 
between Labin and Rab and between Piran, which was threatened by the troops of Koper, 
and Rovinj (1210).
It was the Patriarchs of Aquileia, to whom Istria was granted as a feud by the emperor 
in 1208,3 who limited most of the decision-making rights of the towns. Indeed, the Patri-
arch Volfero started to appoint his own representatives to the towns and larger villages. 
For a certain time, the “potestas marchionis” resided in Koper, with its seat in the Palazzo 
dei Pretori; while in Pula there was the “comes regaliae”. Later the administrators, named 
by the Patriarchs of Aquileia, were called main stewards (generalis gastaldus), judges 
(richtarius) and margraves – marquis (marchio).
Though power over all of Istria was exercised by a marquis, the possessions of the 
counts of Gorizia in central Istria and those of the counts of Duino on the Quarnero were 
excluded from the jurisdiction of the Patriarchs of Aquileia. However, in 1220 the Patri-
arch of Aquileia Bertoldo Andechs obtained from the emperor the right to enact measures 
regarding trade, exercise judiciary power, concede grace, mint coin, as well as to forbid 
the towns to elect the ruler – Podestà (especially if he was a Venetian citizen) without the 
Patriarch’s prior assent.
Since in the marquisate of Istria the politics of the Patriarchs aimed at constituting a 
totally new central power, the realization of this design inevitably led to the rebellion of 
the towns on the west coast and to conﬂ ict with Venice. Thanks to the support of Koper, 
in 1230 Venice succeeded in creating a pan-Istrian law, called Universitas Istriae, with 
a Venetian at the head. This league dissolved one year later, also because of Koper’s at-
tempt to impose itself over other towns. In 1232 the Patriarchs occupied Pula, while in 
1238 they managed to have Koper on their side. In Pula the Patriarchs gave broad powers 
to the Sergi family, naming Nassinguerra de’ Sergi ruler and administrator of the posses-
sions of the Patriarch in the town’s surroundings. This policy led Pula to a conﬂ ict with 
Venice in 1242. In the peace treaty the town promised to accept a Venetian citizen as ruler 
and to rebuild the town walls only after obtained Venice’s permission.
The situation in Istria grew particularly tense in the second half of the 13th century, 
when Gregorio da Montelongo (1251–1269) became Patriarch of Aquileia. Though it 
had been weakened in the provinces, the Patriarch’s authority was still able to inﬂ uence 
3 As the ecclesiastic and secular authority at the time of this fact, the Patriarch of Aquileia represented a 
unique example in the organization of power. For fuller details, see Scarton (2013).
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politics in the towns, especially considering that this Patriarch was a nephew of Pope 
Gregory IX and at the same time also the head of the Guelph party in northern Italy. His 
contemporary and acquaintance, Salimbene, described him as Homo magni cordis et doc-
tus ad bellum (De Vergottini, 1925, 8). That he was expert in the arts of war was shown in 
his military campaigns, as we shall see below. However, in those years the main protec-
tors (lawyers) and vassals (ministerial) of the Patriarchs of Aquileia were the counts of 
Gorizia, who were generally loyal to the Ghibelline party and the imperial crown. 
Initially the Patriarch upheld Koper’s role against Trieste and the southernmost coastal 
towns and the towns of the hinterland. In 1254, he granted Koper jurisdiction over Buje, 
Oprtalj,  Buzet and  Dvigrad. In the same year Koper, at war with  Trieste, conquered the 
lands of Trieste between Osp and Rachitovich, thereby consolidating its inﬂ uence over 
Piran and Muggia. 
THE PATRIARCH, THE COUNT, THE VASSALS AND THE CITY OF VENICE
At that time, using the same strategies used for a military campaign, alliances that 
went beyond the oﬃ  ces they held were often made between individuals. This was es-
pecially true of many small feudatories, or vassals, who supplied troops necessary to 
their Seigneurs. But these alliances were clearly often overlapping. Self-interest led to 
relatively important shifts from one side to another, with the consequent loss of loyalty 
to the Seigneurs.  
This was indeed the case of the two Istrian families, vassals of Aquileia, who are the 
object of our study, i.e., the da Momiano and the da Pietrapelosa families.
The Seigneurs of Momiano were in origin a branch of the Seigneurs of Duino, who 
were among the most powerful vassals of Aquileia. Voscalco, founder of the Seigneur of 
Fig. 20: Aquileia. Gregory of Montelongo (1251–1269). Coin with eagle. Monete e Med-
aglie di Zecche Italiane. Bernardi 22. AG. g. 0.99 R. BB. (http://www.icollector.com/
Aquileia-Gregorio-di-Montelongo-1251-1269-Denaro-con-aquila)
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Momiano, was mentioned for the ﬁ rst time as Wosalcus de Mimilano in two documents 
of 1234, along with his two sons, Cono and Biaquino. They were important vassals and 
ministeriales of Aquileia, in origin faithful to the politics of that town, which produced 
important beneﬁ ts for them. Indeed, the two brothers held the oﬃ  ce of Podestà in several 
Istrian towns: Cono in Piran (1259, 1272) and in Buie (1272); and Biaquino in Novigrad 
(between the years 1259 and 1261), Poreč, (1261) and Motovun (1263). However, in 
those very years the two brothers of the Momiano house were already in contact with the 
Count of Gorizia. This is demonstrated not only by the mention of their names in a series 
of acts in which the Count of Gorizia is also named, but also by family ties that had linked 
the Seigneurs of Momiano for fully two generations with the Seigneurs of Rifembergo, in 
the hinterland of Gorizia, one of the most important ministeriales families of the Counts 
of Gorizi. In fact, in 1249, Biaquino da Momiano took as wife Geltrude, daughter of Ul-
rico I of Rifembergo (Štih, 2013, 171–172).
The Seigneurs of Pietrapelosa were also vassals of Aquileia, but documents of the 
time show that they were supporters of Gorizia at well. During the 13th century the fam-
ily had control of the Quieto and consequently control over the defense of the peninsula. 
Its possessions spread to the north and the south of the upper course of the Quieto and 
included Grožnjan and Motovun. In the ﬁ rst two decades of the 14th century, Vicardus II 
of Pietrapelosa was the lord of Raspruch. The family had widened its sphere of inﬂ uence 
Fig. 21: Coat of arms of the County of Gorizia. Hans Ingeram. Codex d. ehem. Bibliothek 
Cotta, 1459 (Wikimedia Commons. File:XIngeram Codex 091b-Görz.jpg)
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over Pazin with the marriage of Elisabeth, daughter of Vicardus I of Pietrapelosa (Mar-
sich, 1869, 12), to Henry of Pazin. Vicardus II later became the guardian of Henry II of 
Pazin (Bianchi, 1847, 337) and governor of the possessions which under the Habsburgs 
constituted the essential nucleus of the principality of Pazin.
The name of the feudatory of Pietrapelosa (Vulingius de Petra Pilosa) is mentioned 
for the ﬁ rst time as a vassal of Aquileia in a document dated in Aquileia, 18th December 
1210 (Kos, 1928, 166), in which he is numbered among those that the Patriarch Volchero 
(or Wolfger) wanted to accept the pact between the Patriarchy and the inhabitants of Piran 
against the Istrian rebels – in this case Koper, whose territorial claims led to its isolation 
and long decline.
The historical sources mention Vicardus of Pietrapelosa, Seigneur of Grožnjan, in the 
context of Koper’s rebellion against the Patriach, which occurred on the 13th January, 
1238 –  more precisely, in an agreement sign at Cividale (Kos, 1928, 715) on the 3rd July 
1239 between the Patriarch of Aquileia and Meinhard, Count of Gorizia (Kos, 1928, 685), 
in which the latter is granted the freedom to elect the Podestà in Istria or in Friuli, but not 
elsewhere, without the assent of the Patriarch of Aquileia. This occurred despite the fact 
that in a previous agreement between Berthold, Patriarch of Aquileia, and the representa-
tive of Koper, Koper had yielded to the Patriarch’s demands regarding the appointment 
of the Podestà. This had been conﬁ rmed by Emperor Frederick in October, 1238, and a 
visit of the Patriarch concerning the revision of the statute had been announced (Kos, 
1928, 696).
Fig. 22: The Castle of Momiano (photo: D. Podgornik, 2007)
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Vicardus of Pietrapelosa is also mentioned in Venice in 1253 and in Pazin in 1255, 
where with the surname “da Grožnjan” rather than “da Pietrapelosa” (Weisﬂ ecker, 1949, 
155–156, 164, in: Klen, 1977, 13) he appears as a witness, or better representative, of the 
Count of Gorizia. In a document of Motovun dated 20th August, 1256, it emerges that 
Carseman, Baron of the Castle of Pietrapelosa and a vassal of the Marquis of Istria (CDI, 
20 Aug. 1256), was Podestà of Motovun.
Henry of Pietrapelosa, along with Henry of Pazin and Philip of Kožljak (Cosliacco), 
in the role of ministeriales of the Count of Gorizia, is mentioned in two documents written 
in Buzet on 20th March, 1264. These documents show his involvement in re-establishing 
relations between the Patriarch of Aquileia and the Counts of Gorizia, Meinhard and 
Albert (Joppi, 1885, 31–35). On 13th July, 1264, Henry of Pietrapelosa was present in 
Muggia when the Patriarch Gregorio of Montelongo granted Henry I of Pazin and his 
wife Elisabeth of Pietrapelosa (daughter of the deceased Vicardus of Pietrapelosa) and 
their children the feud of the Castle of Lupoglav (castrum de Lupoglau) and upper Lu-
poglav (Ober Lupoglau), situated below the Castle, ﬁ ve farms at Dobrepolje near Ilirska 
Bistrica (Villa del Nevoso) and some other possessions in the Windic March (Schumi, 
Fig. 23: The Castle of Pietrapelosa (photo: D. Podgornik, 2007)
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1882–1883, 1884–1887), which Henry of Pazin and Cono of Momiano conﬁ rmed in the 
name of their oﬀ spring already born and yet to be born. This might prove that the da Mo-
miano and the da Pietrapelosa families were also related. In any case, it did not prevent 
the violent conﬂ icts that broke out in 1267, probably also caused by contrasting family in-
terests. In which case, as the sources seem to indicate, this was an authentic feud between 
the Patriarch of Aquileia and the Counts of Gorizia with their allies.
So, we ask, what actually happened?  
THE FEUD AND THE VENDETTA
The situation was particularly aggravated in 1267 when Koper besieged Poreč and 
other places in Istria. The Patriarch tried to limit Koper’s expansion with the help of Al-
bert, Count of Gorizia, obliging him, along with several ministeriales of the Patriarch, to 
take a solemn oath (in Cividale on 3rd July, 1267) against the citizens of Koper. Among 
those who took the oath was Cono of Momiano, and Biaquino of Momiano was also 
among the witnesses present (CDI, II, 346, 569–570).
Though by this oath Count Albert had solemnly promised in a public act to support 
the Patriarch with all his troops in the exploit against Koper, he then proceeded to make 
an alliance with the town of Koper against the Patriarch. This iniquitous U-turn of Count 
Albert, who betrayed Patriarch Gregorio, moving troops against him, was decided only a 
few days after swearing to support him – a veritable dream for the people of Koper and a 
nightmare for Gregorio, Patriarch of Aquileia.
The primary objectives of this new alliance of the towns of Koper, Izola and Piran 
with Albert, Count of Gorizia, were the small fortresses situated along the upper courses 
of the tributaries of the river Quieto. Under Albert’s guidance the troops of Koper, united 
with those of Piran and Izola and those of Cono of Momiano, ﬁ rst destroyed the Castle of 
Castelvenere and the Tower of  Buzet, and then, with the intention of razing them to the 
ground, attacked at least ﬁ ve more neighbouring castles (Witsperch, Musche, Wisnavich, 
Zazilet, Muscardi). Then, on the night of 20th July, 1267, Count Albert and his brother, 
Count Meinhard, captured Patriarch Gregorio in his bed at Villanova near Rosazzo and 
dragged him barefoot on a nag to Gorizia,4 where they held him for over a month (CDI, 
II, 361, 602; De Franceschi, 1939, 89; Greco, 1939, 33).
This action clearly gave some breathing time to the troops of Gorizia and Koper, who 
were joined by other Istrian notables, including the vassals of the Patriarch, among whom 
there was once again Cono of Momiano. Cono certainly had an ulterior motive for taking an 
active part in these preliminary skirmishes, which were followed by the above-mentioned 
assault of the fortiﬁ ed town of Pietrapelosa and the beheading of Carseman and Henry of 
Pietrapelosa: i.e. to revenge the murder of his brother Biaquino. As we shall see later on, in 
4 Captus fuit venerabilis pater Gregorius patriarcha Aquilegiensis per nobilem virum Albertum comitem 
Goritiae apud Villam-novam sub Rosacio in aurora diei, dum erat in lecto, et nudipes ductus fuit Goritiam 
in uno roncino anno Domini 1267. die Mercurii,12. exeunte Iulio; nullo alio capto praeter lohannem Lu-
censem et paucis aliis vulneratis. (AF, 197).
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this conﬂ ict the murder of Biaquino was clearly closely connected to the ﬁ rst attack against 
Castelvenere. This reprisal was followed by the assault of the Castle of Kršan (Chersano, 
Castrum Carsach) (Štih, 2013, 133) in Istria; but when Count Meinhard “arrived in Udine 
[...] with his troops, he set many ﬁ res and the booty was so great that Count Albert couldn’t 
even imagine it”, as our source picturesquely describes the scene. Other assaults on fortiﬁ ed 
towns were made successfully in Istria, Friuli and the Karst Plateau (CDI, II, 361, 602).
The chief goal of the alliance was the conquest of the entire peninsula. Besides destroy-
ing numerous properties and redistributing political power in the Istrian hinterland in favour 
of the counts of Gorizia, this conﬂ ict led to another change: some Istrian towns and lands 
put themselves under the care and protection of Venice. Under the pressure of the troops 
of Koper and Gorizia, that ﬁ rst to do so was Poreč, on the 27th July, 1267. Although the 
alliance between Koper and the Count of Gorizia weakened liberties and autonomies, other 
Istrian towns followed the example of Poreč. Among these were Umag (1269), Novigrad 
(1270), Sveti Lovreč (1271) and later also Motovun (1275). Even though by these agree-
ments the towns did not “transfer” sovereignty, which still remained in the hands of the 
Fig. 24: Abbey of Rosazzo – detached fresco in the church (Wikimedia Commons. File: 
Rosazzo - fresco 2.jpg)
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Patriarchs of Aquileia, but “[...] entrusted themselves to the Venetians in protection and 
defense”, they succeeded in preserving their municipal autonomy, balanced by the powers 
exercised by the Podestà chosen from the Venetian aristocracy (De Vergottini, 1925, 22).
Considering the course of events, it could be argued that this was a classic case of   feud 
as described by Otto Brunner (Brunner, 1939) known to us in a vast literature.5 Particularly 
interesting is the fact that all the vassals of the Patriarch of Aquileia were also materially 
involved in these encounters, to the extent that the Count of Gorizia, the main vassal of the 
Patriarch of Aquileia, even broke his oath of alliance in order to side with Koper.
In this type of feud single vendettas (of blood) were the rule rather than the exception. 
They were usually resolved through arbitration, which took into account all the damage 
caused by both sides. The fact investigated here shows some further curiosities. Another 
clariﬁ cation is oﬀ ered by a relatively marginal comment made by Seigneur Pašpental (Štih, 
2013, 175–179) in the medieval document on the resolution of property lines (Istarski raz-
vod) (Bratulić, 1989, 149–150)6 between Castelvenere, Momiano and Piran, “[...] and these 
5 See detailed analyses complete with bibliographical references in Povolo, 2015, 195–244. 
6 This particular document is conserved only in the Glagolitic transcription of 1502. Some have denied the 
authenticity of the document. See De Franceschi,1885, 41–118, but a more recent study of Bratulić indi-
cates a collection of various authentic acts of reconﬁ ning in Istria in the period between 1275 and 1375 
(Bratulić, 1989, 6–12). Without doubt, the document was chieﬂ y drawn up because of this feud in the years 
1267–1277.
Fig. 25: The Castle of Pietrapelosa (photo: D. Podgornik, 2007)
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confusions, which you have started, after abandoning and repudiating  your legitimate Sei-
gneur, and slaughtered him in his own bed, and exterminated his heirs and posterity, and 
subjected yourselves to a new lord, […].” (CDI, II, 364, 644).7 According to several authors, 
this citation refers precisely to the “turpiter interfectus” that involved Biaquino of Momiano 
in July 1267 (Benedetti, 1964, 7–8).8 The fact that the ﬁ rst attack made after the agreement 
of 3rd July, 1267 (between the Patriarch and the Count of Gorizia against Koper) was against 
Castelvenere suggests that the change in alliances within the structure of vassalage of the 
Patriarchs of Aquileia was of considerable signiﬁ cance. The events that followed also lead 
us to conclude that from the start of the conﬂ ict between the Patriarch and the allies of the 
Count, the Seigneurs of Momiano were completely on the side of the latter, while the Sei-
gneurs of Pietrapelosa remained loyal to the common Seigneur, the Patriarch of Aquileia. It 
was probably the change in alliances that caused the intervention of Carseman and Henry 
of Pietrapelosa against Biaquino of Momiano. It would seem that Carseman and Henry of 
Pietrapelosa – at the time allies of the Patriarch – convinced some inhabitants of Castelvenere 
to show them the road to the Castle of Momiano, in order to reach Biaquino of Momiano’s 
bed and strangle him, as we read in the citation from the Istarski razvod quoted above.9
But was it really this event that led Counts Albert and Meinhard of Gorizia to dis-
respect the alliance with their Seigneur, the Patriarch of Aquileia, and to give them the 
pretext for joining forces against him? Unfortunately, the documents do not allow us to 
establish this for certain, though the evidence points in this direction. Indeed, indepen-
dently of the circumstance that at the time the Counts of Gorizia were certainly among the 
most inﬂ uential feudal lords in the region, in the system of conﬂ ict resolution in force in 
those years there had to be a justiﬁ ed motive for the cancellation of an agreement or for a 
challenge – or “revolt” – against the lord.
The fact is that at that time the Seigneurs of Momiano were the most authoritative 
persons in the area. As vassals of Aquileia, they undoubtedly exercised great inﬂ uence 
over the nearby towns, where they held the oﬃ  ce of Podestà even against the wishes of 
Venice, and above all over Piran, which in that period was a declared ally of Koper and 
Izola. Though no speciﬁ c document exists, it is still legitimate to suppose that in the 
days immediately preceding and following the solemn oath of 3rd July, 1267 (concern-
ing the alliance of the Count of Gorizia with the Patriarch of Aquileia against Koper, 
which several ministeriales of the Patriarch had also joined, including, as we have 
7 In the Glagolitic document: “A te zmutnje ke vi jeste oblikovali pokle se jeste vašega pravega gospdina 
odvrgli i njega na postelje zaklali i njega red zatrli, [...]” (Bratulić, 1989, 149–150).
8 In note 16 the author mentions the resolution of the Istrian borders, when the borders were set between 
Castelvenere e Momiano, then property of the Pašpental, accusing the castellans of murdering the legiti-
mate Seigneur.
9 There are those who would certainly have liked to complicate this story still more and make an even more 
tragic picture of it by claiming that Pietrapelosa actually castrated Biaquino in his bed (cf. http://tibor-pula.
bloger.index.hr/post/Momiano--kastel-momjan-castrum-mimilianum/14363467.aspx#at_pco=cfd-1.0). 
But on the sole basis of the deﬁ nition “horrendous crime” (turpiter interfectus) committed at the beside, it 
is not possible to conﬁ rm this hypothesis. In the epoch of conﬂ icts among knights, a vile murder in the heart 
of the night, thanks to the betrayal of serfs, when the victim cannot defend himself as a knight, is without 
doubt a terrible homicide.
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Fig. 26: Page of the Glagolitic manuscript that refers to the “turpiter interfectus” con-
cerning Biaquino da Momiano in July 1267 (Bratulić, 1989, 31b)
73
TURPITER INTERFECTUS
said above, Cono of Momiano who took the oath along with Biaquino of Momiano) 
there had been considerable intense and lively diplomatic activity, since the alliance 
with Koper succeeded in shifting the balance in favour of that town. Considering the 
later developments, it seems legitimate to conclude that it was chieﬂ y the Seigneurs of 
Momiano who tried to persuade the Count of Gorizia to join the alliance with Koper 
against the Patriarch, and that this is the reason why the Patriarch sent the Seigneurs of 
Pietrapelosa, who were loyal to him, against the Seigneurs of Momiano. No doubt Cono 
of Momiano was so lucky as not to be in the castle at that moment, and so Biaquino was 
killed in his stead. This event was evidently a suﬃ  cient and justiﬁ ed reason for break-
ing the solemn oath, and so for starting a feud.
These events shed particular light on the peculiarities of medieval feuds, which were 
characterized by frequent changes in alliances and founded on a network of family rela-
tions and spheres of interest in conﬂ ict over the exploitation of natural and human re-
sources. And these circumstances also clarify the speciﬁ cities of the system of conﬂ ict 
resolution in that age. 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
The captivity of Patriarch Gregorio of Montelongo, as well as the conﬂ icts and de-
struction that resulted until he was released on the 27th August 1267,10 was the main 
reason for a series of truces between the Count of Gorizia and the Patriarch of Aquileia in 
the following decade. Until a lasting peace was declared (pax et concordia perpetua) on 
June 9th 1277 between Patriarch Gregorio’s successor, Raimondo della Torre, and Count 
Albert of Gorizia, there were litigations and conﬂ icts, compromises, truces, arbitrations 
and on-the-spot investigations. Below we examine 10 documents about the feud between 
the Patriarchs of Aquileia and the Counts of Gorizia and their allies, though the capture of 
the Patriarch remains the main oﬀ ense:
1. Compromisso of the Patriarch (Aug. 1267) (AKG, 29, C, 114–115).
2. First Compromisso of the Count (25 Aug. 1267) (FRA, 87–90).
3. Second Compromisso of the Count (26 Aug. 1267) (AKG, 29, CI, 115–117).
4. Truce (Patriarch) (Aug. 1267) (AKG, 29, XCIX, 112–113).
5. Compromisso (after the murder of the Patriarchal vice-dominium and the destruc-
tion of the bridge over the Isonzo by the Patriarch) (30 Aug. 1268) (AKG, 22, 377; 
cf. AF, 197).
6. Pax in forma conventionis pro bono pacis et concordie  – ﬁ dantia seu treuga (18 
Aug. 1274; addition 19 Aug. 1274) (CDI, II, 361, 596–604).
10 Redemptio Gregorii patriarchae. Gregorius patriarcha Aquilegiensis anno 1267. die quinta exeunte Au-
gusto exivit captivitatem dicti comitis Alberti Goritiae, et conductus fuit Civitatem; procurato tamen per 
venerabilem patrem Wlotislaum archiepiscopum Salspurgensem cum ipso domno patriarcha, dum erat in 
captivitate, et cum Foroiuliensibus ex parte una et cum dicto comite ex altera, quod fuit per partes compro-
missum in ipsum archiepiscopum et domnum regem Bohemiae et postea conﬁ rmatum (AF, 197).
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7. Truce (hostility as before) (2. Oct. 1274) (AKG, 22, 401).
8. Truce between the Patriarch of Aquileia Count Albert of Gorizia and truce be-
tween the Patriarch and Koper (24 Feb. 1275) (CDI, II, 363, 606–609).
9. Concordia – compromisso (de damnis hinc inde illatis postquam facta fuit prae-
dicta pax;) (13 May 1277) (AKG, 24, 429).
10. Pax et concordia perpetua (9 June 1277) (AKG, 24, 429).
The documents relative to these events clearly illustrate the chief features of the sys-
tem of conﬂ ict resolution. In this period, with the rise of medieval towns there arose the 
scholastic structures and especially the universities that contributed signiﬁ cantly to the 
spread of writing as a technological-cultural means for the consolidation of power (cf. 
Goody, 1993). Moreover, this is the period in which so-called common law drew inspi-
ration from the heredity of Roman law, which in that age had come back in vogue, and 
from a series of legislative dispositions of Germanic laws, if we can call them that, in 
agreement with the collection Monumenta Germaniae Historica 11, as well as from the 
speciﬁ city of city law, in particular from customary law (Bellomo, 2011). The case of the 
11 I should like to emphasize that my research on this topic would have been far more diﬃ  cult if in the last 
few years important collections of medieval documents had not been published online. They are available 
MGH, AKG, AF, FRA. In MGH the entire repertory of medieval legislation can be found.
Fig. 27: The Castle of Momiano (photo: D. Podgornik, 2007)
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conﬂ ict between the Patriarch of Aquileia and the Count of Gorizia is one of the examples 
of how common law was being formed.
An evaluation of these documents is therefore of great interest in order to understand 
how unwritten customs inﬂ uenced the formation of written law in the social system of 
conﬂ ict resolution. First of all, it is possible to aﬃ  rm that all the documents examined 
concerning that conﬂ ict were drawn up and adequately named according to notary rules, 
i.e., in agreement with the indications given to notaries by the famous Bolognese notary 
and judge, Rolandino de’ Passaggeri,12 in the middle of the 13th century. His monumental 
collection of norms and interpretations, which served mainly for university education and 
further training for the education of notaries, until today has been used only by notary 
scholars (Tamba, 2002) while legal historians are practically unaware of its existence. 
The printed version was published in 1546 in Venice in 1,186 large-format pages. It fur-
nished an impressive quantity of legal suggestions and concrete examples for drawing 
up all types of written contracts known up to that time.  In the sixth chapter, entitled De 
Compromissis, arbitration documents and drawing up treaties of peace and agreement 
(pax et concordia) are examined (Rolandino, 1546, in: Anastatic reprint, 1977, 147–159).
The military encounters that are the object of our study for the most part took place 
from 3rd July to 27th August 1267 (AF, 197),13 when Counts Mainhard and Albert of 
Gorizia freed the Patriarch Gregorio from prison. At this point is would be useful to 
stress that these battles involved a large number of European personalities of the time, 
since the Bohemian king Ottokar II Přemysl, who during the imperial interregnum was 
undoubtedly the most powerful sovereign in this region, took interest. Thanks to his 
diplomatic skill and his resourceful politics, along with the Czech crown Ottokar II also 
won the titles of Duke of Austria (from 1251), Duke of Styria (from 1261) and Duke of 
Carinthia and Carniola (from 1269). What is more, in 1272 he was appointed General 
Captain of Friuli, thereby becoming de facto administrator of the Patriarchy of Aquileia 
and so of Istria. Thus, his power extended from Bohemia to the Adriatic until the time 
of his defeat at the hand of Rudolph of Habsburg in the Battle of Marchfeld on 26th 
August 1278. Therefore it comes as no surprise that these events were also carefully 
followed by the Venetians14, and in two letters of September and October 1267, even 
by Pope Clement IV in person, when he thanked King Ottokar for intervening in this 
conﬂ ict (AKG, 22, 375).
These documents testify to the extensive diplomatic activity between the two conﬂ ict-
ing parties, which was carried on by mediators of the king in the name of the community, as 
well as to the modalities of conﬂ ict resolution, in particular to the drawing up of the acts of 
reconciliation, which guaranteed the preservation of individual and community honour in the 
12  Lat. Rolandinus Rodulphi de Passageriis, Bologna, 1215 about – Bologna, 1300.
13 Actually, De Franceschi (1885, 90), holds that the encounters continued until about 23rd October 1267, 
since on that date Patriarch Gregory granted feudal possession in Friuli to two inhabitants of Castelvenere, 
a certain Luvisino and a certain Giovannutto, in payment for services given and damages suﬀ ered during 
the recent encounters. 
14 Venetos multum ad patriarcham liberandum attuisse docet nos Andreas Dandulus, lib. X. part 41 apud 
Murat. SS. XII, 375 (AF, 197).
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social order. These compromises and reconciliations, though (or, as in the case dealt with here, 
just for this reason) imposed by the central power, out of tradition and ritual rules and, as we 
have seen, in agreement with the written law then establishing itself in the structure of conﬂ ict 
resolution, led to lasting reconciliation and peace (Povolo, 2015, 217–220).
In the analysis of this conﬂ ict we should bear in mind that the parties involved were 
connected at least institutionally. The Counts of Gorizia were ministeriales and lawyers 
of the Patriarch of Aquileia and so his vassals, like the majority of their allies and even 
like King Ottokar in person. So why did the King not intervene with his own army, which 
was one of the strongest in Europe in this period, or why did he not submit the conﬂ ict to 
Fig. 28: King Otokar II. Přemysl (Wikimedia Commons. File 270px-Po2vNM.jpg)
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a court instituted by himself? Because, according to the customs and written laws of the 
times, it was also possible to resolve conﬂ icts with the opponents’ acceptance of a paciﬁ c 
transaction of the reasons for the dispute, in which the main role was entrusted to me-
diators who represented the community. According to custom, a conﬂ ict of this sort was 
treated in the same manner as a family feud (Vindicta parentum, quod faida dicimus)15. In 
these cases conﬂ icts were resolved according to Lombard law, with reference to so-called 
private law, still based on the principles of tribal communities and collective responsibil-
ity, according to which every family, brotherhood, clan or tribe exercises social control 
at the same time as it answers for the single members of the community.16 Social control 
and the safety of members of the community and of the community as a whole were also 
guaranteed by vendetta for injustices. But this customary system of conﬂ ict resolution 
allows both a violent solution and a paciﬁ c one, which had to be accepted by both of the 
opposing parties. Therefore it should not be thought that these customs were left to purely 
arbitrary acts; on the contrary, the rules of the game were very well deﬁ ned. Still, in every 
legal system, as in every game, rules can be got round.
Many of these situations can be seen in the feud between the Patriarch of  Aquileia 
and the Count of Gorizia in the years 1267–1277. Both parts recognized that they were 
in conﬂ ict (querimonia) and that “violent justice and injustice” (violentiis iuribus et in-
iuriis) recurred (FRA, 89), while the Count of Gorizia went so far as to admit in writing 
that he had rebelled against the Patriarch (fuerimus contraria uel rebelles).17 Still, we can 
conclude that the system of conﬂ ict resolution was based on customary tradition which 
through community mediation aimed at friendly relations (… cum via amicabilis com-
posicionis; AKG, 29, 114) and peace (pace et concordia perpetua), in contrast with the 
hatred (inimititia)18 which at that time doubtlessly led to conﬂ icts, in general bloody ones.
From the political-military point of view, the Counts of Gorizia took advantage of 
a particularly favourable situation when they ﬁ xed the conditions of the reconciliation, 
since they were holding the Patriarch in captivity. We need only think of the many de-
scriptions of medieval prisons, for example the story of the English King Richard the 
Lion-Hearted, to understand that at that time situations like these were commonplace 
(Kos, 1994, 109–115). In the case under examination, the proof can be clearly inferred in 
the quotation of the above-mentioned truce of 1274, when in 1267 the counts of Gorizia 
imprisoned the  Patriarch, “just as always happens in wars” (que solent ﬁ eri in guerris).19
15 See Du Cange, 1733. Cf. word of order: feud; under this term appear the majority of medieval laws deter-
mining these conﬂ icts. Available at: http://www.uni-mannheim.de/mateo/camenaref/ducange.html.
16 Here I should like to mention two classical studies of conﬂ ict resolution in tribal communities: Evans-
Pritchard, 1940; Gluckman, 1955.
17 Verum si in hac parte nos uel heredes homines complices et fautores nostri inuenti fuerimus contrarii uel 
rebelles, ex tunc eadem duo castra nostra in Aquilegensis ecclesie potestatem debent tradi et ipsi domini 
Rex et Archiepiscopus contra nos siue heredes uel homines siue complices et fautores nostros ipsi domino 
Patriarche suisque successoribus et Capitulo Aquilegensis ecclesie at que ipsius ecclesie ﬁ delibus et deuotis 
in prestando auxilio adherebunt. (FRA,  89).
18 See Du Cange, 1733, the word ‘inimititia’.
19 Item interfuerunt cum ipso Comite ac Fratre suo Comite Mainhardo a captione Domini Gregorii Patriar-
che, in quorum servicio fuerunt dampna omnia, que solent ﬁ eri in guerris. (CDI, II, 361, 602). According 
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And so the Counts of Gorizia, Meinhard and Albert, freed the Patriarch Gregorio only 
after the intervention of authoritative mediators.20 In the case of the Counts of Gorizia, the 
intercessor was Vladislav, Archbishop of Salzburg and nephew of the Bohemian King Otto-
kar II, who acted in his name (AKG, 22, 375); while in the case of the Patriarch of  Aquileia, 
it was the Bishop of Olomouc, Bruno (AKG, 29, 112–117), who reached a compromise and 
truce (AKG, 29, 113) between the two opposing parties (AKG, 29, 113). It was determined 
that the truce would last until the next Pentecost (28th May 1268), while before All Saints’ 
Day (1267) two arbiters, one representing the Patriarch and the other the Counts of Gorizia, 
were to describe and assess the damages caused by the conﬂ icts in Friuli, and the same would 
be done by two other arbiters for the damages in Istria and on the Karst. Later, between Easter 
and Pentecost on 28th May 1268, they would announce the peace (concordia et pace).
to studies of Italian cultural environments in that age, the word “feud” was unknown, and in its place were 
used “inimicizia”, “querimonia”, “querela” and even “guerra” (cf. Vocabolario, 1612).
20 Redemptio Gregorii patriarchae. Gregorius patriarcha Aquilegiensis anno 1267. die quinta exeunte 
Augusto exivit captivitatem dicti comitis Alberti Goritiae, et conductus fuit Civitatem; procurato tamen 
per venerabilem patrem Wlotislaum archiepiscopum Salspurgensem cum ipso domno patriarcha, dum erat 
in captivitate, et cum Foroiuliensibus ex parte una et cum dicto comite ex altera, quod fuit per partes 
compromissum in ipsum archiepiscopum et domnum regem Bohemiae et postea conﬁ rmatum. (AF, 197).
Fig. 29: Vendetta in Florence, 1300 (www.storiadiﬁ renze.org)
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As trustees of the agreement that “deberet et posset componere, arbitrari, sentenciare et 
laudare, sive amicabiliter sive de iure inter partes, prout sibi placeret et videretur melius ex-
pedire”, Bruno, Bishop of Olomouc, was chosen for the Aquileian party, and for the Gorizia 
party Vladislav, Archbishop of Salzburg. Moreover, the terms of reconciliation imposed the 
restoration of the prior situation21, and whoever violated or in any way oﬀ ended or disturbed 
it or, worse, caused further damage, would have to pay a ﬁ ne of 2,000 Aquileian marks22, 
half to the opposing party and the other half to his own repository of the contract. As secu-
rity, the Patriarch of Aquileia gave his trustee, Bruno da Olomouc, lien upon the castle and 
the estate of Schwarzenegg near Divača, while the count of Gorizia as security gave the 
Archbishop of Salzburg, Vladislav, the castles of Gorizia and Karsperg23.
Four documents report these provisions, two for each party. It is likely that they were 
drawn up before the Patriarch of Aquileia was freed (FRA, 87–90; AKG, 29, 112–117).24 
As regards the contract of the reconciliation of August 1267, four documents have been 
conserved: two for the Patriarch of Aquileia (AKG, 29, 112–115), the compromise (com-
promissis) and the truce (treuga); while for the Count of Gorizia, Albert I, there are two 
versions of a compromise (FRA, 87–90; AKG, 29, 115–117). Clearly there was a re-
ciprocal oﬀ er of and commitment to reconciliation, as well as a further deﬁ nition of the 
conﬂ ict through arbitration. But it is interesting that each party made a commitment with 
its own procurator to cease hostilities: the Patriarch of Aquileia with the envoy (missi) of 
King Ottokar, Bruno, Bishop of Olomouc; and Albert Count of Gorizia, along with his 
followers, with the Archbishop of Salzburg, Vladislav. Therefore, the King’s envoy was 
responsible for guaranteeing that his client would not violate the compromise agreed on, 
that is, the truce. If that were to happen, the transgressor would have to pay a penalty and 
surrender the properties given as security.
The two acts of reconciliation of the Count of Gorizia, the ﬁ rst on 25th August 1267 
and the second on the following day, 26th August 1267, diﬀ er very little. At one point in 
the ﬁ rst document a part of the phrase that strictly obliges the Gorizian party to obey the 
21 ... in statum pristinum in quo ante captiuitatem ipsius domini Patriarche fueramus constituti ... (FRA, 88).
22 … secundum ius possint et debeant terminare, promittentes sub pena duorum milium marcarum argenti … 
(AKG, 29, 114).
23 Karsperg or Carsperg was a castle near the village of Golac, south of Obrov, in the Brkini Hills; see Štih, 
2013.
24 The dates have been preserved only for the two Gorizian documents, i.e., one of 25th August 1267 (FRA, 
87) and the second of 26th August (AKG, 29, 117) but without the year. Still, since these two documents are 
almost the same – they diﬀ er slightly only in two points of the text, while all four agree that the key point of 
the resolution of the conﬂ ict is the detention of the Patriarch and the damage caused in Friuli, Istria and the 
Karst – we can conclude that they all date back to 1267, though the compiler of the published documents 
attributes to three of the documents (that of Gorizia of 26th August and the two of the Patriarch) the year 
1268 (AKG, 29, 112–117). But, according to the contents, we can maintain without any doubt that this is the 
contract of the compromise between the two conﬂ icting parties after the mediation of the above-mentioned 
bishop Bruno and archbishop Vladislav, before the declaration of truce and the release of the patriarch 
Gregory that took place on 27th August 1267 (cf. AF, 197). Cases of feud are known in which the opposing 
party avoided prison by signing a written document containing his renunciation of the vendetta (Unfehde) 
(Kos, 1994, 110–114).
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King’s dispositions is omitted.25 Before the notary’s signature a phrase is added which de-
clares that the Gorizian party has signed and sealed the document. Here it is interesting to 
note that the ﬁ rst document was drawn up by the notary Hermannus de Pertica Imperiali 
Auctoritate Notarius, and the second by Johannes de Lupito Sacri Imperii Publicus No-
tarius. The reason for this change of notary is unknown; the missing part of the sentence 
leads us to think that, probably at the request of the Patriarch of Aquileia, the procurator 
Vladislav had obliged the Count to respect his dispositions as well as those of the King.
The diﬀ erence between the Patriarch’s two documents is more complicated. The 
ﬁ rst  is a compromise (secundum formam compromissi facti), while the second is a truce 
(treuga) that was to last until the following Pentecost.26 In both of them Bishop Bruno da 
Olomouc acts as guarantor for the reconciliation; to him is entrusted arbitration and judg-
ment of the case with the Count of Gorizia27, “taking into account both the friendly rec-
onciliation and the law”.28 This undoubtedly recalls the formulas that frequently appeared 
in legal documents, according to which in order to judge it was necessary to take into 
account both the customs and the laws (consuetudines et iuris). In this case the friendly 
reconciliation refers to the customary rite of reconciliation in conﬂ icts.
Gregorio, the Patriarch of Aquileia, handed over both of these documents to Bish-
op Bruno;29 by so doing he promised and solemnly swore to respect the agreement. In 
the same way, as has already been observed, the Count of Gorizia swore to Archbishop 
Vladislav. But whereas in the Aquileian compromise attention is called to the fact that it 
is sealed both by the Patriarch of Aquileia and the Count of Gorizia, the truce act seems 
to be unilateral: that is, the Patriarch of Aquileia guarantees it to the Counts of Gorizia 
and their followers.30 At the same time, the truce meant renouncing recourse to vendetta, 
and the relative act was itself a document used in feuds, (Brunner, 2011, 105–106) pro-
dromic to arbitration and friendly agreement, as well as to a legal solution of the conﬂ ict. 
Consequently, it is less important that the Patriarch was superior to the Counts of Gorizia 
25 At the beginning, the whole phrase read: … quod eorundem do minorum Regis et Archiepiscopi ordinationi 
seu amicabili compositioni absque cuiuslibet contradictionis et dilationis obstaculo nos et nostri complices 
et fautores stabimus et obediemus … (FRA, 88), and after with the addition: … quod eorundem do minorum 
Regis et Archiepiscopi ordinationi obediemus … (AKG, 29, 116).
26 fecimus et dedimus ﬁ rmas treugas usque ad proximas octavas penthecostes (AKG, 29, 113).
27 … quod cum nos libere, mere et pure compromiserimus in venerabilem patrem dominum Brunonem dei 
gracia episcopum Olomucensem tamquam in arbitrum, in arbitratorem et amicabilem compositorem sive 
iudicem de omnibus controversiis, litibus et questionibus, quas habemus et habere videmur cum nobilibis 
viris Meinchardo et Al. comitibus Gor. et ipsi contra nos, … (AKG, 29, 114).
28 This deﬁ nition was repeated in several parts of the four documents, for example, also in the following form: 
… in arbitratorem et amicabilem compositorem sive iudicem de omnibus controversiis, … componere, 
arbitrari, sentenciare et laudare, sive amicabiliter sive de iure inter partes ovvero (AKG, 29, 114)  … 
complementum iustitie vel compositionis amicabilis (FRA, 89).
29 … omnia namque supradicta in manu dicti domini Olomucensis episcopi promittimus attendere et invio-
labiliter observare. (AKG, 29, 113) … dedimus, tradidimus et consignavimus in manus supradicti domini 
Olomucensis episcopi … (AKG, 29, 114).
30 Nos G. dei gracia … Aquilegensis patriarcha … fecimus et dedimus ﬁ rmas treugas usque ad proximas 
octavas penthecostes viris nobilibus M. et Al. comitibus G. ac suis adiutoribusque eorum tam in personis 
quam in bonis, … (AKG, 29, 112–113).
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(in both the religious and the civil hierarchies) than that the detention by the Counts of 
Gorizia had oﬀ ended the party which for this reason had the possibility and the right 
either to declare a truce or else to continue the hostilities and the blood vendetta. Under 
the pressure of inﬂ uential procurators, the parties involved in this conﬂ ict were forced 
to come to terms, and the two procurators of the King had the role of guaranteeing their 
reconciliation, so that if one of the parties violated the agreement, the procurators would 
have to punish him, as written in both the act of compromise and the truce. 
At this point I would venture to compare the role of the above-mentioned guarantors 
with the rites of conﬂ ict resolution of Montenegro and Albania (osveta, gjakmarrja). In 
those regions there exists the institution of a person called dorzoni (in Albanian) or jemci 
(in Montenegrin, jemac31). This person is delegated to keep the truce, in Albanian besa, 
in Montenegrin umir (Đuričić, 1979, 8). After the victim of the dispute had accepted the 
procedure of reconciliation instead of the arbitrary solution of conﬂ ict, once the compen-
sation promised him by the oﬀ ender had been deposited, the compromise was stipulated 
thanks to the ritual mediation of the community. On this basis, and again thanks to the 
community’s mediation, the opposing parties reached a truce, which meant the renun-
ciation of vendetta and the continuation of negotiations and arbitration between the two 
parties. The truce could last for a maximum of one year. The truce oath, the besa, was 
pronounced publicly by the victim. For this reason the victim was called “donor of the 
besa”, which was “put into the hands” of one of the mediators named by the author of 
the crime. On their part, the mediators had the right to ask for the guarantee of the truce 
(Đuričić, 1979, 33). The guarantor of the truce was the so-called dorzon (etymologically 
from the Albanian dorë – hand), or jemac (in Montenegrin, guarantee), who supervised 
the respect of the agreement, and during the truce prevented a vendetta against those 
responsible for the crime.
A fundamental source for the study of the customary system of conﬂ ict resolu-
tion,  not only for the territories of Montenegro, Herzegovina and Albania, but also 
for the European context, along with the Kanun of Lek Dukagjini and the Kanun of 
Skanderbeg, is doubtlessly the survey conducted by Valtazar Bogišić and his collabora-
tors in the second half of the 19th century.32 However, Bogišić’s sources say that the 
jemci were chosen only in the most serious cases, while it happened frequently that a 
jemec or dorzon – and in some cases even more than one  – was chosen for each side 
(Đuričić, 1979, 27). The Albanian legal historian Surja Pupovci picturesquely mentions 
the importance of the dorzoni in the resolution of conﬂ icts, describing the concluding 
31 In the Kanon Leke Dukađina (KLD); in the context of the blood feud and the truce, there are three sectionsre-
lative to the guarantee: Ubistvo pod jamstvom (KLD §§ 939–940), Jemci krvne osvete (KLD §§ 973–976), 
Jemci novca za krvnu osvetu (KLD §§ 977–981); in general, the guarantee, or the dorzonia, is appliedin all 
types of the contracts drawn up (KLD §§ 683–694), but also as a guarantee in favour of someone inproceedin-
gs before a tribal judge (Djuričić, 1975; cf. KLD §§ 1044–1072; Bogišić, Čizmović, 1999).
32 Several collections of legal customs of the southern Slavs have been published, edited by Valtazar Bogišić. 
As regards the customary stystem of conﬂ ict resolution, or the vendetta (bloody), that is, osveta (mn.), 
gjakmarjja (alb.), the most interesting is the study based on a questionnaire of 1873 (Bogišić,  Čizmović, 
1999, 345–383).
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rite of the besa: the agreement was reached when the two representative of the parties 
conclude it by holding hands, but he adds that “during the agreement they could hold 
hands hundreds of times, but without the presence of the dorzon the agreement is still 
weak” (Đuričić, 1979, 14).
The dorzon whose role was to act as guarantor was chosen by the oﬀ ender (KLD § 
973). This had to be a person who was trusted by both parties, and who enjoyed honour 
and prestige; his family could not be involved in any blood feud (Đuričić, 1979, 24). He 
took a public oath (faith – in Albanian, beja) and guaranteed with his estate and honour to 
preserve the truce. If, on the contrary, the person he represented did not respect the truce 
and revenged himself, the dorzon had to kill him or use another adequate punishment; this 
worked in both directions, in the sense that if he failed to punish him, he himself would be 
Fig. 30: Miniatura from the Liber feudorum Ceritaniae represents an homage (about 
1200–1209) (Wikimedia Commons. File: Cerit7.jpg)
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punished (Đuričić, 1979, 42–43). In this case, therefore, the dorzon was also an authority 
who held repressive powers. He was the guarantor of the truce for the injured party, as 
well as being the culprit’s ﬁ duciary.
The guarantors or ﬁ duciaries (ﬁ duciarii) were also often present in conciliation and/
or judicial procedures in later periods.33 While in civil matters this institution still plays 
an important role today, it has completely disappeared in the criminal sphere in Euro-
pean countries, though it has been kept in the United States as an institution in the penal 
system.
According to the rite we have just described, Albert put into the hands of Vladislav 
his commitment, or his oath, as we can understand from the document (data ﬁ de manu-
ali vice sacramenti in manus supradicty domini Wlodizlay) (AKG, 29, 117). In this 
sense it was clearly a question of immixtio manuum, as we ﬁ nd it in the rite of investi-
ture of vassals or notaries. This ritual gesture also constituted a form of penitence, since 
it was performed on the knees (ﬂ exibus genibus) or in some other position expressing 
penitence. A clear example of penitence in the reconciliation or the blood feud is given 
by the description of the concluding ceremony of the Montenegrin rite34. The party 
guilty of the crime publically states his repentance to the injured party, in the presence 
of representatives of the community, by crawling on the ground wearing only some of 
his underwear, barefoot and bareheaded, while slung across his shoulders there is a long 
shotgun attached to his belt. Drawing near and facing him, the injured party ﬁ rst takes 
away and then gives back the arm, saying: “First of all brother, then blood enemy, then 
once again brother for eternity. Is this the gun that took my father’s life?” After which, 
the injured part reconﬁ rms his complete pardon to the culprit and they kiss one another 
fraternally. Despite the fact that there are other gestures in this ceremony that express 
the culprit’s profound penitence and humiliation,35 the rite safeguards the honour of 
both the injured party and the culprit, as well as of the whole community, thereby es-
tablishing and maintaining norms and values.
Just the sole gesture of taking away and then giving back the gun shows a clear ten-
dency to hear the ritual appeal of reciprocity and community mediation. With the help 
of these rites the community creates a balance, exercises social control, and permits the 
reintegration and lasting reconciliation of the conﬂ icting parties (Verdier, 1980, 24–30). 
Naturally, this is an ideal social formula, but it was evidently eﬀ ective in the system of 
conﬂ ict resolution, as J. M. Wallace-Hadrill illustrates at the end of his legendary study, 
The Bloodfeud of the Franks:
33 At this point I should like to call attention to the extraordinary richness of the Venetian State Archive, which 
conserves in numerous funds documents relative to judicial proceedings e.g., the Council of Ten, the Heads 
of the Council of Ten, the Avvogaria Comun, the Quarantia Criminal, and so on.
34 This scene is also described by Boehm (1984, 136); but it was already registered in the ﬁ eld in an original 
manner by Bogišić in his questionnaire in the second half of the 19th century (Bogišić, Čižmović, 1999, 
371–372) and it had been already painted by Vialla De Sommières in 1820.
35 He runs up to Bojković to pick him up quickly from the ground, but at that moment Bojković kisses his feet, 
his breast and his shoulder in Boehm (1984, 136).
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Feuding in the sense of incessant private warfare is a myth; feuding in the sense of 
very widespread and frequent procedures to reach composition-settlements necessar-
ily hovering on the edge of bloodshed, is not. The marvel of early medieval society is 
not war but peace. (Wallace-Hadrill, 1959, 487).
Before going on to illustrate other features of the medieval conﬂ ict resolution system, 
we shall brieﬂ y examine some other documents about the conﬂ ict between the Patriarch 
of Aquileia and the Counts of Gorizia and their allies.
After the exchange of the acts of compromise and the declaration of truce, which in 
all likelihood led to the release of Patriarch Gregorio, the agreement was also conﬁ rmed 
(AF, 197). Unfortunately, the documents available do not allow us to know if the cho-
sen arbiters managed to make an inventory of and assess the damages suﬀ ered by the 
two opposing parties by All Saints’ Day (1st November 1267) or Easter (8th April 1268). 
We have no notice of possible conﬂ icts during the truce, but just one month after its 
expiration (All Saints’ Day, 28th May 1268), the reasons for the dispute had undoubt-
edly worsened, since on 3rd July 1268, under the hill of Medea to the west of Gorizia, 
the troops of Gorizia killed in an ambush the Patriarch’s vice-dominium, Bishop Albert 
of Concordia.36
At this juncture Gregorio responded with force, showing his military prowess. On 
27th July 1268 he set out from Udine with his troops to march against the Count of Go-
rizia, attacking him and destroying the bridge over the Isonzo on 12th August. Evidently, 
this violence once again triggered oﬀ  the mechanisms of conﬂ ict resolution in use at the 
time, with the result that an act of compromise and reconciliation between the parties was 
made on 30th August 1268.37
Further information about the conﬂ ict dates to 1269 and refers to the death of the 
Patriarch of Aquileia, Gregorio of Montelongo, on 8th September. The new Patriarch, 
Raimondo della Torre, was not appointed until the ﬁ rst months of 1274. In the regions 
administered secularly by the Patriarch of Aquileia, i.e. in Friuli, Istria and the Karst, this 
was a period characterized by an interregnum, not only at the top of the hierarchy but also 
locally. More or less important conﬂ icts continued in the areas under Venetian inﬂ uence 
– the Istrian towns and those of the Counts of Gorizia and their vassals. The vassals of 
the Patriarchs of Aquileia were also involved; in keeping with their interests and expecta-
tions, they regularly passed from one side to the other, between Guelphs and Ghibellines, 
more or less under cover and in a confusion of lay and ecclesiastical powers. Nor was 
it by chance that for a certain time until the end of the conﬂ ict (1277) the situation was 
36 De interfectione domni Alberti episcopi Concordiensis vicedomini patriarchae. 1268. die 3. intrante Iulio 
mense ante tertiam apud montem Medeam interfectus fuit venerabilis pater Concordiensis episcopus, vice-
dominus reverendi patris Gregorii patriarchae, et qui dam alii cum eo per insidias ei impositas per fautores 
domni Alberti comitis Goritiae. (AF, 197).
37 De exitu exercitus et de destructione pontis Goritiam. Dicto anno die Veneris 5. exeunte Iulio, exivit Grego-
rius patriarcha Utino cum suo exercitu contra dictum comi tem. Et tunc die 12. Augusti destructus et dirutus 
fuit pons Isuntii prope Goritiam. Reversus est die penultima Augusti Civitatem; facto iterum compromisso 
inter dictas partes. Aug. 30. (AF, 197; AKG, 22, 377).
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taken advantage of for his own personal interest by the Bohemian king Ottokar, who also 
became General Captain of Friuli in 1272.
The election of Raimondo della Torre as Patriarch of Aquileia at the end of 1273 
coincided with the appointment of Rudolph of Habsburg as king of the Germans, though 
the German kings had claimed the imperial throne since 962. The Counts of Gorizia soon 
formed ties with the new ruling family, which beneﬁ tted them at ﬁ rst, but later it gradu-
ally took possession of all their properties (in 1363, the Tyrol; in 1374, Istria; in 1500, 
the lands of Gorizia). The rivalry existing with the Bohemian king helped them. Indeed, 
in 1274, on the strength of a decree of the National Assembly, Rudolph of Habsburg 
ordered the Bohemian king, Ottokar II Přemysl, to restore the properties of Babenberg 
and Spainheim, which led to a war between them. With the treaty of peace of Vienna in 
1276, Ottokar renounced Austria, Stiria, Carinthia and the Slovenian March (or Windic 
March) in favour of Rudolph, who gave them to be administrated to Count Meinhard of 
Gorizia. After which, in the Battle of Marchfeld of 1278, Ottokar was killed. With the 
double marriage of his children to those of Ottokar, Rudolph neutralized his enemies 
and created in Austria, Styria, Carinthia and Carniola (that is, in the so-called hereditary 
Habsburg lands, to which the Tyrol was also annexed in 1363) the basis for the rise of the 
Habsburg dynasty.
And so in the conﬂ ict with Ottokar, Rudolph of Habsburg acted in full accordance 
with the concept of the system of conﬂ ict resolution in force at the time – particularly with 
his ﬁ nal, mythical act which, according to the mentality of the age, was the only thing that 
could guarantee a lasting peace: the marriage between representatives of the opposing 
parties, or at least, as became prevalent later, the exchange of godparents.38
The new Patriarch of Aquileia also went to work at once to resolve the conﬂ icts shak-
ing the temporal power of the Patriarchs. Thus, on 11th February 1274 he and the Doge 
of Venice, Lorenzo Tiepolo, reconﬁ rmed the peace that had been previously declared by 
Patriarch Gregorio with the Doge of Venice, Rainerio Zeno, in 125439. Next he turned to 
what at ﬁ rst sight seemed to be the most diﬃ  cult problem: the normalization of relations 
with the Count of Gorizia and his allies, above all Koper.
And so the often-mentioned document on the truce of 18th August, 1274 came into 
being.40 Among other things, it is a document that contains a large quantity of interest-
ing and original data useful for the study of the past both on the micro and the macro 
scale (CDI, II, 361, 596–604). As a supplement to this document, the very next day, 
i.e. on 19th August, as the agreement had stipulated, the Patriarch was presented with 
38 Here, too, it is possible to compare this rite to the Montenegrin and Albanian ones, but medieval documents 
from all over the Europe also testify the use of this rite (see Smail, Gibson, 2009, 417–441).
39 Cum inter Venerabilem Patrem dominum Raymundum Dei gratia Sanctae Sedis Aquilegiensis patriarcham 
ex una parte et Magniﬁ cum dominum Laurentium Theupulo Dei gratia Venecie Dalmacie atque Chroacie 
Duce dominum quarte partis et dimidium tocius imperii Romanie et Comunis Veneciarum ex altera … pacta 
et conventiones … caudet ad talem concordiam (CDI, II, 358).
40 Pax in forma conventionis pro bono pacis et concordie – ﬁ dantia seu treuga. Rolandino nel ‘200 illustra: 
forma conventionis; Treuga est conventio de non provocando bellis ... est securitas ad tempus personis, & 
rebus … (Rolandino, 1546, 158 v).
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the inventory of the damages and the list of participants in the battles that had taken 
place in July and August of 1267. This supplement tells of a vendetta of the Seigneurs 
of Momiano against those of Pietrapelosa following the murder (turpiter interfectus) 
of Biaquino of Momiano. And not only: the gruesome vendetta of Cono of Momiano 
had led him to undertake other military expeditions in the lands of Gorizia in the same 
years, seeing that, besides assaults on the Tower of  Buzet and the Castle of Pietrape-
losa, the document also reports attacks on other castles of the Patriarch.41 Among the 
protagonists mentioned in the document we ﬁ nd not only Cono da Momiano but also 
Friderico de Mimiliano, Woscalco ﬁ lio dicti Domini Chononis de Mimiliano, as well as 
Frater Galvanus et Fridericus de Mimiliano.
Despite the fact that the conﬂ icting parties had promised friendship (facti sunt amici) 
and had sworn (iuravit) to respect the decisions of the three arbiters42 in order to reach a 
settlement, harmony and peace (de composition et concordia et pace), it is clear that very 
soon new dissensions broke out (facti inimici sunt ut prius, non obstante iuramento ...).
The object of the next conﬂ ict was the small fortress of Cormons. The Count of Goriz-
ia had already started out from Cividale with his soldiers to claim his right, but King Ot-
tokar interceded once again, concluding a truce between the two parties. This is reported 
41 Item Dominus Chono de Mimilliano interfuit cum Comite et in servicio Comitis apud Pinguentum et apud 
Writsperch apud Mascher et apud Wisnavich. (CDI, II, 361, 602; AKG, 22, 399).
42 Unde datis securitatibus et praestitis iuramentis … Dominus Patriarcha elegit Dominum Gothfredum Pote-
statem Paduanum. Dominus Comes elegit Dominum Ulricum de Tauures, et hii duo communiter elegerunt 
Dominum Gerardum de Cammino (AF, 199; CDI, II, 361, 597).
Fig. 31: Coin of the Patriarch Raimondo della Torre with episcopal vestments, seated on 
the front with the gospels in his hand. Tower of the family coat of arms (Wikimedia Com-
mons. File: Raimondo della Torre – Denaro.jpg)
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in a document of 2nd October 1274, (AKG, 22, 401) according to which the two parties 
agree that in case of future conﬂ icts each side will name an arbiter to pass judgment on 
the reasons for the conﬂ icts. Like many other times in the past, the conﬂ icting parties 
committed themselves to respect the arbiters’ decisions.
It would seem that in the arbiters’ act of persuasion success smiled upon the Count of Go-
rizia once again, for the Patriarch of Aquileia conﬁ rmed his right to half of Cormons in an act 
of 24th February, 1275 issued in Cividale (CDI, II, 363, 606–609). In general, when this type 
of agreement was made in the presence of allies and followers of the disputing parties in the 
High Council43 there were also representatives of the city of Koper present during the solemn 
oath of truce. In reality, in some other documents concerning the same conﬂ ict the represen-
tatives of Koper were among the witnesses, but in this case it was a question of a separate 
truce between the Patriarch of Aquileia and the city of Koper. Indeed, in this meeting the 
representatives of Koper seemed to have read the resolution of their own Major and Minor 
Town Council, and also, in agreement with the whole community of Koper, to have solemnly 
sworn on the holy Gospels that they would prevent all attempts at fraud or iniquity and would 
respect the truce faithfully, in no case and without any exceptions violating it.44 Given that 
Koper was also under the secular dominion of the Patriarchs of Aquileia, we can see here the 
great autonomy that medieval communities had in the system of conﬂ ict resolution.
It seems that after this reconciliation the process of arbitration on the ﬁ eld ﬁ nally got 
started, as we can see in the above-mentioned Glagolitic document, Istarski razvod. But 
things got complicated again in May 1277, when a new compromise was stipulated along 
with an agreement on the inventory of the damages caused after the peace agreement (de 
damnis hinc inde illatis postquam facta fuit praedicta pax) (AKG, 24, 429). And in all 
likelihood it was just this agreement that led to the proclamation of lasting peace on 9th 
June 1277. Unfortunately, the reference to the proclamation of lasting peace is very suc-
cinct: it only reports that both parties would respect the arbitration of the four arbiters and 
would proclaim lasting peace (pax et concordia perpetua).45
Thus, just as the ideological structure of the high Middle Ages was built on the wave 
of the so-called peace movement after the year 1000, which separated God’s truce – a 
43 Memoratus insuper Dominus Patriarcha nomine Suo et supradictorum suorum desponsione solempni pro-
misit; et prefatus Dominus Comes ad sancta Dei Evangelia corporaliter juravit ﬁ rmam pacem; ambo inter 
se ad invicem et omnia et singula sapradicta inviolabiliter observare pro se et suis, tenere et non contra-
venire aliqua occasione vel exceptione sub pena Trium Millium Marcharum denariorum Aquilegensium 
(CDI, II, 363, 608–609).
44 … predicte Civitatis Justinopolis de voluntate et consensu totius minoris et majoris Consilii et totius Co-
munitatis Justinopolis, damus et concedimus plenam licentiam, et libertatem Nobilibus Civibus Nostris, 
videlicet Dominis Albertino Paduano, Carsto de Miriza, Zanetto de Upso, Varino Hengeldei, Ricardino 
Blajono, Johanni Dietalmo, Almerico Spandinuci, Lanceloto Paltono, Facine de Tarsia, Nazario Bertulini, 
jurandi ad sancta Dei Evaugelia, … omni fraude remota et malicia inviolabiliter observare et non contra-
venire aliqua occassione vel exceptione. (CDI, II, 363, 609).
45 De pace inter domnum patriarcham Raymundum et nobilem comitem Goritiae Albertum. Anno Domini 
1277. indictione 5, die Mercurii 9, intrante lunio, in Civitate Austria in palatio patriarchali fuit per domnos 
Walterobertoldum de Spengimbergh, loannem de Zuccula patriarchae, Ugonem de Duino et Henricum de 
Pisino, comitis Alberti arbitros pronunciata arbitrando inter eos ﬁ rma pax et concordia perpetua. (AKG, 
24, 429). Notaries were chosen as judiciary administrators.
88
VENDETTA IN KOPER 1686
temporary suspension of hostilities, distinct from God’s peace, which meant perpetual 
peace – so the rite of resolution of conﬂ ict included the truce as a phase of suspension 
of hostilities. However, for the peace to endure peace it was also necessary to proclaim 
the so-called lasting peace, which was based solely on the satisfaction of both parties. It 
should therefore not come as a surprise that in the system of conﬂ ict resolution, already 
established in tribal communities, the ideal ﬁ nal ritual intended to guarantee an endur-
ing peace envisioned marriage exchanges between the conﬂ icting parties, or at least the 
exchange of godparents between the families involved.
On this subject there exists abundant documentation and evidence, to be interpreted 
using suitable methods of investigation. To clarify this cultural phenomenon more fully, 
I look to Guille-Escuret’s interpretation. According to this scholar, the formula of a tribe 
of New Guinea reported by the renowned anthropologist Marshall Sahlins on the basis of 
ﬁ eld research is present in many places on our planet, “We ﬁ ght against those we marry”. 
(Sahlins, 1980, 71; Guille-Escuret, 1998, 171). Or, again, the publication of certain acts of 
conﬂ ict resolution in Marseilles in the middle of the 14th century: when after the vendetta 
(vindicta) the parties to the case had deposited the declaration of peace with a notary, 
there followed a notary’s entry concerning the marriage between representatives of the 
families previously in dispute (Smail, Gibson, 2009, 426–427). At this point I certainly 
do not intend to go more deeply into the unifying role of conﬂ icts in the community, but it 
is possible to conﬁ rm the observations or even just the insights of certain researchers, ac-
cording to whom the system of conﬂ ict resolution in tribal communities was doubtlessly 
of great importance in forming the cohesion and uniﬁ cation of wider communities, not 
the least of which were national communities.46
The degree to which, thanks to written law, paciﬁ c resolution of conﬂ icts through 
recourse to the law had taken the place of violent resolution – the key role of guarantor 
of agreements now being taken on by a notarial act47 – is shown in customary rites by 
signiﬁ cant elements of free will, since single individuals and communities were given the 
freedom to choose whether to resolve the conﬂ ict through friendly means, with commu-
nity mediation, or to continue the violent solution.
The concept of a system of conﬂ ict resolution, which was reiterated and maintained 
in the community through symbolic ritual activities, established norms and values which, 
at least in the initial phases of written law, were included as obvious elements in written 
legal formulas. Thus, as a compulsory integrating element in the process of reconciliation 
and of guaranteeing lasting peace, the ritual gesture of the kiss of peace (osculum pacis) 
between the conﬂ icting parties was maintained at the end of the rite of reconciliation. In 
some cases, this gesture was described in notarial acts.48
46 “Zmora’s claim that feuding contributed to state-building ﬁ ts well with this model”, explains Carroll in his 
review of Zmora’s book (Carroll, 2012).
47 Notaries were chosen as judiciary administrators, “able to give concrete answers to whoever wanted to pro-
tect his own interests without having recourse to arms, but to the law intead”, Irnerio (1050–1130 about), 
the ﬁ rst glossator, see Bellomo, 2011, 71.
48 Some examples of documents on the exchange of the osculum pacis at the end of repaciﬁ cation procedures 
in the 14th century have been published in the above-mentioned study, see Smail, Gibson, 2009, 417–441, 
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But let us return to the conﬂ ict in consideration. In 1277, with the proclamation of 
lasting peace, after ten years a settlement was reached to end the conﬂ ict between the 
Patriarch of Aquileia and the Count of Gorizia over the conﬁ nement of Patriarch Grego-
rio in 1267 and the damage it had caused. Is it legitimate to believe that the Patriarch of 
Aquileia and the Count of Gorizia, at the proclamation of lasting peace, exchanged the 
kiss of peace (osculum pacis)? The answer could be positive, considering that in draw-
ing up all the ten documents regarding the resolution of the conﬂ ict, the indications of 
the Bolognese notary, judge and university professor, Rolandino, were adopted. Indeed, 
but a very precise testimony is that of Rolandino, 1546, esp. 158–159. Rolandino says that without personal 
contact between the parties peace cannot be enduring, and so at the end of the reconciliation the gesture of 
the osculum pacis is prescribed (Rolandino, 1546, 158–159), meaning the kiss on the mouth (ore ad os). Cf. 
Le Goﬀ , 1985, 383–461, esp., 392; Petkov, 2003.
Fig. 32: Emperor Rudolf of_Habsburg_Speyer.jpg (Wikimedia Commons)
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Rolandino maintained that there could not be a genuine lasting peace without its be-
ing reciprocally guaranteed between the parties directly responsible for the conﬂ ict 
and reconﬁ rmed by the kiss of peace (pax et concordia perpetua) (Rolandino, 1546, 
158–159v). It is precisely these concepts, expressed in written laws, that prove how the 
forms and ritual gestures of the customary system of conﬂ ict resolution were not only 
kept but were regularly included in the ritual formulas of written law. The documents 
that have come down to us regarding the conﬂ ict between the Patriarch of Aquileia and 
the Count of Gorizia explicitly testify to this. And not only, but also to the customary 
system of conﬂ ict resolution, in whose ideal image and rituals social values based on 
community mediation, reciprocity and the goal of enduring peace were reﬂ ected. What 
community would not desire these values? Both in social and interpersonal relation-
ships, conﬂ icts not only reﬂ ect the ongoing struggle for control of resources, but they 
are socially constitutive and are integrated into the system of social order (Gluckman 
1955, 109–136). Conﬂ icts generate alliances between diﬀ erent groups, in the past chief-
Fig. 33: Two churchmen giving the kiss of peace, 1240 (http://www.jobev.com/medrom.
html)
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ly between kin groups or clans (Lévi-Strauss, 1963, 55–66). This is a general structural 
aspect of conﬂ ict, while the local or particular aspect comes out concretely through the 
struggle for resources, in the fabric of individual circumstances. Those who succeed in 
forming the greatest number of alliances that are loyal, various and often contrasting 
are those who prevail (Gluckman, 1955, 1–26). In our case, this was clearly better ac-
complished out by the Counts Gorizia than by the Patriarchs of Aquileia.
However, these disputes caused other actors to enter their territories – ﬁ rst the Vene-
tians and then the Habsburgs themselves.
THE ISTRIAN WAR
The enduring peace of 1277 did not put an end to the presence of Koper and Gorizia 
in Istria. In Pazin in the year 1278 Count Albert and the representatives of Koper, formed 
an alliance against Venice and its Istrian allies in the name of the Patriarch, though he was 
not actually present. They made a pact concerning the division of spheres of inﬂ uence, 
according to which if they were victorious Koper would take control of the coastal towns, 
while to the Count would be left the possessions in the hinterlands of Istria.
In this circumstance, the alliance took advantage of the fact that Venice was engaged 
in a war with Ancona. After the siege of Motovun, which tried to defend itself coura-
geously, the count of Gorizia conquered Sveti Lovreč (San Lorenzo del Pasenatico).
If the Serenissima had initially decided not to oppose the alliance between Koper 
and the Count of Gorizia, preferring to tighten a vice around them gradually, at this 
point Venice attacked with all its forces. After the siege of Izola in February of 1279 it 
took possession of Koper, destroying part of the town walls and deporting the majority 
of the population. In January, 1283 the High Council of Venice got the news of the “sur-
render” of Piran, which represented not only the deﬁ nitive end of the alliance between 
Koper and the Count of Gorizia but also the gradual loss of the political autonomy of 
the towns of Istria, though there were still to be attempts at regaining it in the future 
(Greco, 1939, 45–46).
Peace had still not arrived for the Istrians: the relations of force in the peninsula 
changed radically. The war between the Patriarch of Aquileia and the Counts of Gorizia 
and Istria against Venice, which lasted from 1283 to 1291, gave further proof of how al-
liances could change in the space of twenty-four hours.
In Muggia in March, 1283 the Count of Gorizia and the Patriarch of Aquileia made an 
alliance, which was joined by Padua, Treviso and Trieste. On that occasion all the Istrian 
towns that had put themselves under Venice took the side of Venice, including Koper, 
though the party of the Patriarch was still active. In this war, which Venice waged mainly 
against Trieste as it was a rising maritime port, Koper played an important role, since this 
city was the seat of the Capitaneus Istriae, which represented the embryo of the future 
centralized military government in Istria.
In the war, which lasted until the end of 1291 with an interruption between 1285 and 
1287, besides the coastal towns from Muggia to the Canale di Leme, Venice conquered 
Antignana, a possession of the Patriarch in the hinterlands of the peninsula; the territory 
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around San Pietro in Selve; and the Castle of Grožnjan, a possession of the vassal of Pi-
etrapelosa. Dvigrad, Buje and Muggia surrendered. As compensation for war damages, 
the Patriarch gave up de facto his rights over the towns that had been lost.  
It is no surprise, therefore, that Vicardus II of Pietrapelosa, whom the alliance with 
the Count and the Istrian cost towns the loss of his father Henry and his uncle Carseman, 
was the last vassal to pass to the side of the Venetians, opening the doors of the Castle of 
Grožnjan to them in 1287 (De Vergottini, 1925, 33; CDI, II, 428, 768–769). In 1285, dur-
ing the two-year truce, in consequence of the armed resistance to the Patriarch of Aquileia 
put up by Vicardus II, the latter was forced to promise the Castle of Salež (Salise) for a 
value of 300 marks. The following year he exchanged this castle with that of Grožnjan 
(CDI, II, 735–736). In the years to come Vicardus II was to remain faithful to the Count of 
Gorizia, and after the disappearance of the Seigneurs of Momiano he was the most fervent 
supporter of the Seigneurs of Gorizia in northern Istria.
Despite the numerous occasions when he opposed the Patriarch, especially in questions 
concerning Friuli, where the conﬂ ict that had started in Istria had moved, Vicardus II was not 
excommunicated by the Patriarch until 1297, after the sack of the Friuli town of Perteole. 
After the excommunication, in October of the same year, Vicardus II had to repent publicly 
in Udine in the presence of the eminent prelates and nobles who made up the Patriarch’s 
court (CDI, II, 415, 735–736). It is interesting to note that more than of the slaughter of in-
Fig. 34: The lion of Montovun, with the closed book (photo: D. Podgornik, 2007).
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nocent people, Vicardus II was accused of destroying the campanile. In his defense, Vicardus 
II blamed the destruction on Count Henry, who conﬁ rmed the accusation (CDI, II, 469, 838).
In 1302 Vicardus II, with Biaquino II of Momiano and other vassals of the Count 
of Gorizia and Istria, was once again in Friuli, where they continued the plunder of the 
possessions of the Patriarch. Nonetheless, ﬁ ve years later the Patriarch himself, by virtue 
of his guardianship over Henry II of Pazin, donated the feud of Kodolje to Vicardus II 
(Bianchi, 1847, 337, no. 1146).49 
The Seigneurs of Momiano also frequently changed their banner. In the eighties they 
once again supported the side of Aquileia. It so happened that in 1290 Count Albert I of Go-
rizia captured and imprisoned Ulrico of Momiano. In 1309, during the war fought between 
Aquileia and Venice, when Henry II Count of Gorizia allied himself with the Patriarch of 
Aquileia, the Seigneurs of Momiano allied themselves with the Venetians. Not only: they 
subsequently took part in the rebellion of the Friuli nobles against the Patriarch, which 
ended in February, 1310 (Štih, 2013, 173). This change of sides was the likely reason for 
the uncontested occupation of Momiano by Vicardus II of Pietrapelosa the following year.
After the loss of Momiano in 1311, the Patriarch of Aquileia gave the Seigneurs of 
Momiano the feud of Castiglione between Buje and Grožnjan, where they continued to 
practice their political pragmatism. So it was that in November of 1343 Biaquino and his 
son Francesco Voscalco put themselves and their Manor of Castiglione under the protec-
tion of Counts Meinhard VI, Henry III and Albert III of Gorizia, thereby siding with Ven-
ice in the Veneto-Gorizian war. In 1345, to punish this betrayal, the Patriarch of Aquileia 
had the vassal captured and the walls surrounding Castiglione destroyed. As citizens of 
Venice, Biaquino and his son were freed, but only thanks to the intervention of Venice.
The line of the ﬁ rst Seigneurs of Momiano died out in 1358 with the death of Frances-
co Voscalco, son of Biaquino, qui decessit absque masculis heredibus ex se descendenti-
bus. All the feuds that the house had obtained from the Aquileian church went back to the 
Patriarch of Aquileia, who conferred them to Simone of Valvasone in Friuli on condition 
that quod in loco de Castiglono numquam habeat facere Castrum aliquod ediﬁ can (Štih, 
2013, 179).
Almost at the same time the Seigneurs of Pietrapelosa also died out. The last member 
of this glorious and important Istrian family of feudal lords is found in the investiture of 
Nicolò, son of the deceased Peter Pietrapelosa. The division of all the possessions of his 
ancestors (Pietrapelosa and Grožnjan) (CDI, II, 741, 1253; Benedetti, 1964, 15–16) was 
conﬁ rmed in 1352 by the Marquis of Istria Jacopo Morello of Lucca.
CONCLUSIONS
As we have seen, the last decades of the 13th century in Istria are marked by continual 
struggles for territorial conquests and wars that produced victims and devastation. The di-
sastrous eﬀ ects of these struggles were aggravated by the frequency with which epidem-
49 De Franceschi (1897, 163–164) held that the village Colton was Kršan below Pazin, while Klen (1977, 32), 
claimed that it was Kodolje (Codoglie), which later was part of the feud of Pietrapelosa.
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ics were spread, also in neighbouring areas (so much so that bordering populations struck 
by the epidemic sometimes found refuge in Istria). This is what happened, for instance, 
after the military encounters that occurred between 1267 and 1277, and even more after 
the 1283–1291 war between Venice and Aquileia that was fought in Friuli and Istria. 
The peninsula was hit especially hard, “decimated, burnt down, desolate and brutally 
debauched”. The inhabitants of adjacent zones such as Carniola, Carinthia and Croatia 
arrived in the region, settling chieﬂ y in the territory of Koper, Izola and Piran, which were 
among the most vulnerable areas.
However, it is the documents concerning the feud between the Patriarch of Aquileia 
and the Counts of Gorizia that are evidence of how written laws show that the ritual forms 
and gestures of the customary system of conﬂ ict resolution were not only maintained but 
were regularly inserted into the ritual formulas of written law. Above all they document 
how the customary system of conﬂ ict resolution, in its ideal image and through rituals, 
reﬂ ected social values based on the mediation of the community, reciprocity and the pro-
pensity to achieve a lasting peace. Comparisons with the custom of conﬂ ict resolution in 
Montenegro, Albania and Herzegovina conﬁ rm the hypothesis of a number of the ritual 
and procedural features of custom in written law. In addition, they conﬁ rm the fact that 
the customary conﬂ ict resolution system, also called vindicta, faida, blood revenge, krvna 
osveta, gjakmarrja etc., was in fact a concept. Ritually it consists of three phases: gift 
(compromise), the truce (Oath) and lasting peace (amor). The three phases, brilliantly 
descripted by Le Goﬀ  on the case of knights’ investiture in his work The Symbolic Ritual 
of Vassalage, are valid on the level of secular authorities’ organisation. Concept, obvi-
ously developed back in primary human communities. In social and interpersonal rela-
tions, conﬂ icts are not only a reﬂ ection of the continual struggle for control of resources; 
Fig. 35: Amor Sacro e Amor Profano by Titian as apology of Divine and Profane Law 
(Wikimedia Commons. File:Tiziano – Amor Sacro y Amor Profano (Galería Borghese, 
Rome, 1514).jpg)
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rather, they are an integral part of the system of social order. Indeed, conﬂ icts generate 
alliances between diﬀ erent groups, in the past chieﬂ y between kin groups and clans. This 
is a general structural aspect of conﬂ ict, while the local or particular aspect is shown con-
cretely through the struggle for resources, in the interweaving of single circumstances, 
where those who succeed in forming the greatest number of loyalties, diﬀ ering and often 
contrasting alliances, are the ones who prevail. In our case this was clearly better accom-
plished by the Counts of Gorizia than by the Patriarchs of Aquileia.
The fact remains, however, that already in 1305 Biaquino II alienated Momiano to 
Fredrick of Prampero Friulano, only to buy it back two years later (1307). In the spring 
of 1311, Viskard II of Pietrapelosa conquered  Momiano, and on 7th May of the same 
Fig. 36: The Ark of Rolandinus Rodulphi de Passageriis in Piazza San Domenico, Bolo-
gna (Wikimedia Commons.  File:San domenico, bologna, arca.JPG)
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year transferred ownership of the castle to Fredrick of Prampero for 200 marks, with the 
commitment not to cede it to anyone for six years, especially not to the Venetians or the 
city of Koper. Subsequently, the Patriarch of Aquileia invested Fredrick of Prampero with 
the feud of Momiano. But already in December of 1311 Fredrick de sua manu et tenuta 
surrendered it, selling it and investing Count Henry II of Gorizia and his heirs with the 
Seigneurage of Momiano; the Patriarch could do nothing but ratify the investiture of 
Count Henry II of Gorizia and his heirs with the feud of Momiano. The ceremony took 
place on 6th October 1312 in Udine (Carli, 1791, 158–159).
Thus it was that in 1312 the feud of Momiano passed into the hands of the Counts of 
Gorizia. This was, in fact, the ultimate vendetta of the family of Pietrapelosa, with the 
important diﬀ erence that this time it came about without a turpiter interfectus.
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Many researchers of vengeance still insist on the concept that medieval vindicta was 
only a retributive judicial practice that had to be exercised by rulers so as to be able to 
maintain order and peace, or they were marked as weak; therefore vindicta could be 
perceived inter alia as social obligation (Throop, 2011, 16–26). 
It is in fact hard to imagine how deeply the term vindicta was rooted in the social imagi-
nation of the past: the reasons for waging wars, such as the crusades, based their ideological 
and social mobilization precisely on vindicta. It allegedly also became an obsession of 
Holy-Roman Emperor Otto III; however, the contemporary chronicle writers explained his 
premature death in 1002 that took place in dramatic circumstances during his march on 
Rome, as a consequence for not respecting the biblical phrase: “Vengeance is mine, and I 
shall exact retribution” (“Mea est ultio et ego retribuam”) (Thropp, 2010, 5). 
Revenge in the realm of the governmental sphere was restricted by the Truce of God 
(treuga Dei) or the Peace of God (pax Dei). These were the clerical prescriptions that 
marked the peak of the particular state that intended to moderate vengeance with the 
Peace of Land (Landesfrieden) in the profane sphere of the state authority from the 11th 
century onwards. These directives were transmitted to all spheres of social life, as impor-
tant transformationwere also seen in the ritual of vengeance. Undoubtedly the “vindicate 
ius”, as it was named at the beginning of the 13th century by Robert of Auxerre (Throop, 
2011, 19), who is deemed to have been one of the best French medieval historians, was 
understood as a phenomenon known among all classes of the population.
Within the institute of vengeance, as it was formed with the so-called peace movement 
around the year 1000 in France, which inﬂ uenced the merging of bases for the knightly 
and courtly love (cf. Duby, 1985; de Rougemont, 1999), there are several elements of 
restorative justice, which undisputedly harks to the ritual of revenge as it was preserved 
well into the era of written and learned law from the 12th and 13th century onwards. 
However, it is hard to specify when the ritual formed. Comparison with Roman law 
and with some older rituals is indeed called for. 
As much as the learned law1 inﬂ uenced peaceful conﬂ ict resolution, (Bellomo, 2011, 
71) resolution before the courts substituted the violent conﬂ ict  – especially after the 
guarantee for peace was transmitted to a (notary) document– the customary ritual shows a 
great deal of democratic elements, as the individuals and the community were faced with 
the simple choice of either resolving the conﬂ ict in a peaceful manner, through mediation 
within the society, or to insist on its violent resolution. 
1 Let us just point out some of the ﬁ rst glossary writers starting with Irnerio, the rediscovery of the Codex 
Justinianus (Emperor 527–565), the most prominent testament of the Roman law, the formation of autono-
mous medieval cities and city laws, the spreading of literacy and the notarial profession. Furthermore this 
was also a period that saw changed roles of monasteries and monks, a time of demographical and economic 
growth and beneﬁ cial environmental circumstances, the era of the knightly love (De Rougemont, 1999), as 
well as the time of colonial conquests with the crusades and the invention of purgatory for usurers, this is 
money lenders (cf. Le Goﬀ , 2012).
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The concept of conﬂ ict resolution, which reproduces and preserves itself through 
ritual (symbolic) activities, establishes norms and values that were at least in the early 
stages of the learned law considered granted aspects and were thus included into the 
written legal forms. 
The same circumstances also preserved the ritual gesture of the kiss of peace (osculum 
pacis), which was apparently a compulsory part of the peace-making process and a war-
ranty of the perpetual peace that took place among the feuding parties, which is testiﬁ ed 
in several (notarial) documents or so-called chartae pacis (cf. Rampanelli, 2017, 304).2 
Some in-depth and analytical research, such as studies of William Ian Miller (1988; 
1990; 1995; 1998), Christopher Boehm (1984) and Claudio Povolo (1997; 2015b; 2017), 
describe feud as a legal system that was intended to resolve conﬂ icts among hostile groups 
with the intention to administrate and control political and economic sources. 
This system also frequently prescribed the use of murder and other retributions, and 
on the same note it also expressed the fundamental need to re-establish peace among the 
feuding parties, weather by monetary composition, by giving away a woman in mar-
riage, or by other means of peace-making and retribution that was in accordance with 
the customs and traditions of all the individuals involved, as well as the community in 
accordance with the complex language of honour. 
LEGISLATION AND LEGAL PROCEDURES
When studying the custom of vengeance, it is necessary to take into account some leg-
islative sources, ranging from Roman and Canon law, and various acts of early Germanic 
state communities, starting with the collection of Lombard law, which was instructed to 
be written by the king Rothari (643).3 
For this discussion interest undoubtedly lies in high-medieval and late-medieval 
legislation, ranging from the scripts of trained jurists and city statutes, to various legal 
acts of rulers, Imperial, and Land Peace.
One of such peace acts that fairly early intended to normalize and regulate the custom 
of vengeance or faida (Fehde), as they were called in the Germanic territory, was the 1235 
imperial peace of Emperor Frederick II 
However, this case also regulates the written form of the custom that was previously 
framed in the learned law; the regulation itself aimed primarily to prevent feuds among 
the nobility, meaning the feudal lords, knights, and clergy. 
2 Some examples of documents that attest to the kiss of peace (osculo pacis) at the conclusion of the peace-
making process in 14th-century France are, inter alia, published in Smail & Gibson (2009); it is very 
evidently attested by Rolandino (1546, 158–159), the 13th century university professor at the University of 
Bologna, notary and judge. Cf. also Marinelli (2017) for religious art in the 15th and 16th centuries. 
3 The sources testify that the word faida was ﬁ rst documented in Latin, in the Edictum Rothari, in a collec-
tion of 7th-century Lombard tribal law, where it states: faida hoc est inimicitia. The majority of relevant 
legislation regarding the custom of vengeance, ranging from the Antiquity to the Middle Ages, including 
some biblical references, were given in extremely important reader of legislative acts and other documents 
that were translated in English and edited by Smail & Gibson, 2009.
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After the feuding between the German king Rudolf I of Habsburg and the Czech king 
Otokar II Přemysl, and after the latter declared the 1276 peace of Vienna, he denounced 
the acquisitions gained during the interregnum (1252–1273) in Rudolf’s favour. Among 
the acquisitions were also Styria, Carniola, and Carinthia, and the Windic March, and the 
same year the majority of present day Slovenian territories were given an act of Land 
Peace. 
The Land Peace proscribed one year of due time for the composition to take place in 
the event of a homicide. If, however, within this timeframe the composition did not take 
place, the case was taken to the court. Also the following legal normative acts for these 
lands, the 1338 privileges of duke Albrecht II for Carniola and Carinthia indicate the 
intervention of the court, which deliberated primarily according to the custom. 
A caught perpetrator could pay the composition in exchange for a physical penalty; 
however, the payment of composition could not damage the assets of the perpetrator’s 
wife or children. 
A perpetrator that ﬂ ed was to be ﬁ ned with a high monetary ﬁ ne. Blood revenge was 
a possible sanction for such a perpetrator. The privileges namely state: “may he beware 
of his enemies and of the scream.” This indicates that the state authority took jurisdiction 
in cases of homicide; however, it still allowed vengeance in some cases, meaning that the 
perpetrators evidently needed to follow the principles of the custom of blood feud. 
A similar regulation was known in the 1365 privileges, which prescribe that the judge 
should incarcerate and condemn the killer, “when the relatives of the killed come with 
screaming before the judge’s presence”; however if they come to peace with the perpetra-
Fig. 37: Irnerius (1060–1130), regarded as the ﬁ rst glossator (Irnerio che glossa le 
antiche leggi, bozzetto di Luigi Serra, 1886, Collezione Stefano Pezzoli, Bologna) (Wiki-
media Commons).
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tor, may the feudal lord of the killed ﬁ ef get paid a permanently prescribed amount, 
whereas the sum of the blood money that was given to the relatives depended on the 
mutual agreement. All 14th-century privileges mentioned gave great emphasis to the role 
of the relatives (Kambič, 2005, 199–200).
In the same period sourced the 1356 Imperial peace, also-called the Golden Bull of the 
emperor Charles IV of Luxembourg (reign 1355–1378). The Golden Bull implemented 
exact norms regarding the announcement of hostility in advance. Whoever violated these 
process regulations was convicted for leading an unjustiﬁ ed feud, which was considered 
as a rebellion and treason and commonly resulted in exile and death; however, it always 
resulted in a high monetary ﬁ ne, depending on the damage caused. 
The following peace did not prohibit feuds, but merely regulated them as prior: the 
primary attempt to resolve the dispute by court, the announcement of hostility, feuding, 
and damaging at least three days and three nights in advance (cf. Brunner, 1992, 50; 
Vogel, 1998, 46, 52–54; Firnhaber–Baker, 2006, 25).
How, then, did the trial rite take place according to custom? This we will learn in the 
next case.
FACIAMUS VINDICTAM
“Look, have a look, here comes Marcuccio, our relative’s murderer, come, I want to 
avenge him” (faciamus vindictam) says Johannes to his brother Alexis, who sat in the 
company of the village men in the village square on St. Jacob’s feast day in 1401 in 
Landar, Slavia Friulana (Natisone Valley; Ital. Antro). Alexis answered: “I do not wish to 
do this, not even if you would have done it, but let’s go to the henchman (preco), who will 
distance him from the feast day, so that he does not die in front of our eyes.”4 After Alexis 
and Johannes visited the henchman and returned to have a lunch, Marcuccio approached 
them, stood in the middle of the two and punched Johannes. At that moment Johannes 
pulled out his knife to attack him, but Alexis stabbed him from the back with a lance 
(lancea), so that blood appeared. Marcuccio staggered against the wall, when Johannes 
stabbed him with a spear (spioto) in his chest so strongly that the spear came out on the 
other side. Marcuccio collapsed to the ground and, while he was lying there, Alexis once 
again stabbed him with the lance.
The murdered Marcuccio’s relatives (his wife and son with their master) denounced 
the incident to the Landar gastaldion Henrik, who interrogated Alexis regarding the mur-
der; Alexis confessed the murder (manifestum) without torture. His confession, saying 
that he and his brother Johannes murdered him, was written down in both Latin and a 
4 Marchesi, 1897, 12: “[…] Vide huc venit homicida qui occisit consanguineum nostrum, venias mecum 
quia volo quod faciamus vindictam de eo; cui ipse Alexius ut dixit respondit: Ego nolo et non facias, sed 
vadamus ad preconem qui festum cridavit ut ipsum e festo recedere faciat ne pre oculis nostris moretur 
[…]”. This case has already been recalled by Vilfan, 1996, 451–452. Testimony about this event has been 
preserved in the private collection of the renowned Friulian historian Vincenzo Joppi The only publicly 
available copy of the publication of this judicial process known to me (Marchesi, 1897) is kept in the library 
Biblioteca dell’Ateneo Veneto in Venice. 
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Slavic language (lecto et vulgarizato in latine et sclabonice). The confession also said 
that the deceased Marcuccio had killed their relative Zergin and that he had never wanted 
to make an agreement (nunquam se concordasset), neither with him nor with his brother 
or other relatives, that he had made no oﬀ ering for his soul to anyone, not even to the 
church, however, that he had often sat and then wandered around in front of them and had 
threatened to kill Alexis as well as his brother.
The document of the trial in Antro from the year 1401, written by notary Iohannes 
from Cividale (residens in Civitate Austrie q. Michaelis de Montefalcone), who evidently 
administered the process, clearly shows what happened at the procedure and how the trial 
rite took place.
The judicial assembly gathered on the 10 October 1401 in the square (super platea) 
under the linden tree (sub tileo) in the village of Landar, at a common place where justice 
was administered, in the company of seven nobles and citizens (as listed: nobilibus et 
providis viris ser Nicolao, ser Rodulphi de Portis de Civitate, Bartholomeo de Civitate, 
Nicolao de Tolmino prope Civitatem, Michaele tabernario habitante in dicta Civitate, 
Pertoldo de Spegnimbergo, Iurio caligario de Porta Brosana), in any case – not Landar 
locals. They are marked as witnesses of how the process took place, i.e. the judicial as-
sembly. Beside them was present a crowd of people from Landar valley (de ipsa contrata 
Antri in multitudine copiosa).
The trial was obviously led by the judge Leonardo, who was probably one of the 
locals. (Vilfan, 1996, 451), which at that time was also the custom. But since it is in 
the source mentioned as „Leonardo Iudice“, Iudice (judge) with a capital letter, we can 
Fig. 38: Albrecht Dürer, Melancholia I (1514), copper plate. Wikimedia Commons.
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assume, that it was a trained lawyer – a judge – which could also derived from the lowest 
stratum of society, gaining status and reputation with university education.
The judicial collegium consisted of an additional ﬁ ve deans from the neighbouring 
villages (Petro Decano de Slatina, Zampa Decano de Montefoscha, Mathia Decano de 
Miars, Matheo Decano de Las et Gregorio Decano de Peglano), in line with the customs 
of the village Landar, as is emphasized in the document.5 Most deﬁ nitely the participants 
standing around were also included in the decision-making process, which means that in 
fact a group was deciding on the matter – a group, which may rightfully be considered 
the “people”.
The judgment was given by the judge and deans after their triple consultation with the 
present locals, which was in accordance with the custom of Landar valley. The defendant 
was acquitted since the murdered one did not settle for the manslaughter he committed; 
this basically means the recognition of blood revenge and reconciliation. The pardoned 
defendant should have made an agreement regarding reparation (de jure et gwadia), while 
in the future peace should rule among families. 
The penalty was declared just in case they were not prepared to respect the decision.
There is also mentioned amor as justice and charity.6
In spite of the rather cruel murder in public, with the collaboration of his brother, 
whom he persuaded to the murder, the accused Alexis was pardoned of guilt only based 
on the fact that Marcuccio   did not want to make an agreement for the act he committed.
THE 1495 PERPETUAL IMPERIAL PEACE
The fundamental change occurred by the 1467 peace of Emperor Frederick III, who 
completely forbid feuding. Frederick’s imperial peace of 1486 reinforced the prohibition 
of feuding in the document’s ﬁ rst paragraph. No one, regardless of their social status, 
was allowed to wage feud or combat (war), to raid, seclude, or pillage villages, or to put 
them under siege or violently and illegally attain their castles, cities, squares, fortresses, 
villages, etc., nor to damage them by arson or in any other way. The people who would 
nonetheless decide to do so were not to be assisted in any other way. Whoever violated 
these prohibitions was to be ﬁ ned accordingly and was to be subdued to the imperial exile.
The breakthrough that was brought about with the 1495 Perpetual Imperial Peace of 
the Emperor Maximilian I (reign 1493–1519) was seen only after a while and not so much 
from the normative perspective, as the delegitimization of vengeance already began in the 
late middle ages, but due to the fact that it established a central judicial body within the 
state and ordered peace within the entire Empire. 
The peace was established by Maximilian out of the need to protect the Empire and 
Christianity against the Ottomans. 
5 Marchesi, 1897, 9: “[…] moris est convocatis, sedente et procedente ex debito sui oﬃ  cii ac procedere 
volente prout moris est in dicta contrata de Antro […]”.
6 Marchesi, 1897, 10: “[…] secundum eius confessionem et iuris et consuetudinis ordinem de ipso iusticia 
ﬁ eri amando et custodiendo animas eorum et quid iuris supra premissis […]”.
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By forming the new legislation he used mostly the hired jurists from the Italian uni-
versities that were well acquainted with Roman law. 
In contrast to the majority of the previous imperial peace, perpetual hostility, thus 
feuds, were not discussed in merely a few articles, but rather the entire document was 
designed to prohibit it. 
However, Maximilian’s perpetual imperial peace mostly prohibited the waging of 
hostility, whereas the custom of peace-making remained untacked and unchanged as long 
as it was concluded before the court.
Through the imperial peace (law) the emperor ﬁ nally put himself in the role of the 
supreme judge within the empire, as the last instance of appeal. The state chamber court 
(Reichskammergericht) became the ﬁ rst judicial body, to which the conﬂ ict resolution 
amongst the nobility was transferred. It did not, however, have jurisprudence for the 
entire empire, as its role was complemented by the imperial court council (Reichshofrat) 
as the highest instance of appellation for all inhabitants of the empire. 
The delegitimization of the blood feud took no faster eﬀ ects. Not only did the judicial 
courts allow the paciﬁ cation of blood by custom, they also encouraged the custom with 
the intent to maintain the peace in public, regardless of how the criminal legislation aimed 
against these types of “arbitrariness”. 
The accusation towards the Constitutio Criminalis Bambergensis (1507), insinuat-
ing that the courts only saw the monetary aspect of the reconciliation, is not completely 
unfounded. However, the judges were completely aware that the conﬂ ict resolution, 
especially the paciﬁ cation of blood, never came easy, wherefore the conclusion of truce 
and perpetual peace was not only supported but the feuding parties were practically 
Fig. 39: The Emperor Frederick III (1415–1493). Hans Burgkmair, 1468 (Wikimedia 
Commons)
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forced into the paciﬁ cation. The same held for the occurrence at patrimonial courts that 
successfully established social control by the taking the legal customs into complete 
consideration. 
Undoubtedly, the Bambergensis in comparison with the custom and medieval regula-
tion of conﬂ icts introduces an innovation, as blood revenge was only permitted after the 
denouncement of conﬂ ict. 
The late medieval legal texts for common use were unfamiliar with this restriction. If 
the ﬂ ed perpetrator came to an agreement with the authorities, he was not proclaimed as 
banished; he remained within the legal order, which meant that the perpetrator was given 
all immunities (sanctuary) and could be given assistance. Consequently the victim’s 
family could embark on the (“subsidiary”) legal route in hope for denouncement, which 
terminated the “advantages” (Frauenstädt, 1881, 11). 
Maximilian’s grandson, the Emperor Charles V (reign 1519–1556), used the Bamber-
gensis as the basis for the ﬁ rst Imperial (state) criminal code, called also Procedure for 
the judgment of capital crimes of the Emperor Charles V (Peinliche Halsgerichtsordnung 
Kaiser Karls V; Constitutio Criminalis Carolina). Equal to Bambergensis, the Carolina 
had the role to limit judicial arbitrary, in particularly by precisely normalizing the inquisi-
tor procedure.
Many characteristics of Carolina can be seen in the Maleﬁ c Freedoms of the people 
of Ljubljana (1514)7; an important diﬀ erence is to be seen especially in the fact that the 
Freedoms preserve some of the old characteristics that were abolished or modernised in 
Carolina. As an example, let us mention especially the role of the judge, who within the 
Freedoms does not have the right to “judge”. That means he does not have the right to 
deliberate about the matter, except in the event of equal votes. According to Carolina the 
judge already cooperates in the ﬁ nal sentence.
While the decision about the torture according to the Maleﬁ c Freedoms lies in the 
hands of the judicial court, the Carolina in detail proscribes the conditions (so-called 
indices) that had to be given for torture in the concrete case (Kambič, 2017, 648). 
The above-stated criminal orders, the Bambergensis, the ones issued by the count 
bishops, and the Maleﬁ c of Laibach and Charles’ Imperial, all played an important role in 
establishment of the inquisitorial judicial procedure in the Holy Roman Empire (Frauen-
städt, 1881, 171–172), especially regarding the inﬂ uence that these documents had on the 
development of the criminal justice or the legislation of individual lands. 
This was stressed by Frauenstädt at the end of the 19th century, as he stated that the 
vessel of the changes in the relationship towards the custom of vengeance was not the 
reformation, but the overrule of Roman law and the inquisition procedure. 
By reinforcing this, the responsibility for the paciﬁ cation of blood or a homicide 
was transferred from the hands of the kinships into the hands of the judicial authorities. 
Before this the judicial authorities only intervened upon the demand of the community 
(ex. scream) or due to the inactivity of the victim’s kinship based on the accusatorial 
procedure, the principle “where there is no plaintiﬀ  there’s no judge” (Vilfan, 1961, 271). 
7 Orig. Deren von Laibach Maleﬁ tzfreyhaittn (cf. Kambič & Budna, 2005).
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Simultaneously, modern legislation was being given exclusively by the country count 
and his authorities, whereas before the feudal lords, the towns and other feudal lordships 
in concord with the ﬁ efs gave their legal instructions. The state became the only instance 
that was allowed to “take vengeance” and the only instance that could pardon the viola-
tion of the social order, i.e. the criminal legislation, whether regarding a homicide or some 
other trespass.
Nonetheless, pardons that were solely in the jurisdiction of the ruler were not a rare 
occurrence (Carroll, 2007, 16), just as, on the other hand, the threats of starting a feud on 
the part of the ﬁ efs were not. In any case, the inquisition procedure in the legal practice 
within the Holy Roman Empire was a slow process (Frauenstädt, 1881, 168–173).
Fig. 40: The Emperor Maximilian of Habsburg and his family; from left Maximilian, the 
grandchildren Ferdinand and Charles, son Philip, wife Maria, and grandson Ludwig 
(Bernard Strigel, po 1515). Wikimedia Commons.
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Based on research into the Franconian nobility, Zmora (1997) shows that the state 
fundamentally contributed to the abolishment of feud, but only indirectly, by reducing 
the privileges of the nobility, which the nobility defended with institutionalized solidarity 
amongst the members of their state (Frauenstädt, 1881, 145–146).
On the contrary, research by Wieland (2014) indicates that all these occurrences did 
not outroot the custom of revenge (Carroll, 2012), but rather the nobility adjusted the 
custom to the new political and social circumstances. 
There could be several reasons for eliminating the term Fehde from the vocabulary of 
the nobility: the de-legitimization of the custom was a long lasting and a complex process, 
triggered by the bloody experiences and the consequences of the peasant and religious 
wars, which in many areas demolished the pre-modern social order and peace and rocked 
traditional mechanisms of social control.
The strict inquisition procedure and the higher access and use of the judicial courts led 
to the criminalisation of feud within criminal law, to its restriction within knightly alliances, 
and to the prosecution of the highest forms of violence in the intent to resolve disputes. 
It seems that all indicated inﬂ uenced the fact that Fehde attained a pejorative connota-
tion in the 16th century. It became regarded as something that pertained only to the “ir-
rational” lower classes (cf. Carroll, 2006, 12; Peters, 2000, 71; Vilfan, 1996, 460; White, 
1986, 202). The culmination of these aspects is evident in 1769 Constitutio Criminalis 
Theresiana. The legitimate use of violence was only accepted as a form of self-defence, 
and as a protection of lordship privileges. The use of violence followed the diction of 
criminal legislation, that did not permit other application of ”sel f-help“ accept in cases 
of self-defence. 
These characteristics did not only bring about the state monopolization of violence, 
but also the law in general and ﬁ nally the social control. 
The Modern Age de-legitimization of the custom of vengeance was in practice its 
monopolization within the realms of the state (starting with the ruler in person): from 
mediation and arbitration of the disputes to the retribution of injustice.8 
THE VENETIAN COUNCIL OF TEN
Similar occurrences took place in the Republic of Venice. The Council of Ten (Con-
siglio di Dieci) was formed already in 1310 as a part-time body; however, only in the 
second half of the 15th century did it begin to gain its judicial power, when it started 
to issue several legal norms to achieve judicial control over the entire territory of the 
Venetian Republic. 
Whereas within the Empire the opposition to the central power of the ruler was rep-
resented by the nobility, ﬁ ghting for the preservation of its privileges, mainly the right to 
feud; the Venetian authorities experienced an obstacle in their endeavours to centralize the 
judicial power within the developed cities of Terraferma, the territory that was acquired 
8 A detailed breakdown of the process of establishing a state judicial monopoly in the Holy Roman Empire 
is given by Žiga Oman in his doctoral dissertation (Oman, 2018).
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by the Serenissima in 1420, after the downfall of the profane authority of the Patriarchs 
of Aquileia. 
Cities such as Vicenza, Brescia, Treviso, Verona, Udine, etc., used their statutes to defend 
their autonomy and customs, especially the system of conﬂ ict resolution (cf. Muir, 1998). 
The Venetian Republic did not speciﬁ cally prohibit the exercise of the custom by law; 
it did, however, have a certain tactic to centralize the judicial apparatus within the state, 
which resulted in gradual take-over of the ritual forms of vengeance. 
The primary emphasis was on the exile (bando), later on the conclusion of truce and 
peace, which had to be concluded in front of the central Venetian judicial bodies, espe-
cially in front of the Council of Ten, The Council of Forty for criminal acts (Quarantia 
criminal), and Communal Advocates (Avvogadori del Comun),9 or the people with their 
authorisation, that is mainly through the podestà (rettori) of individual local communities 
that were elected from the members of the Great Council of Venice. 
The secret to several-centuries long rule of the Venetian Republic in northern Italy and 
the Eastern Adriatic all the way to Greece was probably hidden within the substantially 
long-lasting permission to exercise their local legal customs in some of its territories. The 
local members of the authority mainly played the role of mediators and arbiters in the dis-
putes, especially when the parties were unable to reach an agreement according to custom. 
In some areas, such as in Montenegro, the Venetian Authorities as late as by the end 
of the 18th century not only allowed customary conﬂ ict resolution, but also respected 
9 The archival material of these Venetian legal bodies is held at the ASVe and constituted fundamental re-
search material for this study.
Fig. 41: The Venetian Council of Ten, also known as The Horriﬁ c Ten (http://resetvenezia.
it/2014/03/25/10-principi-per-una-buona-politica/)
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the legal customs that were based on the custom of vengeance (osveta) itself in court 
procedures (cf. Ergaver, 2016; 2017). This was, however, not the case in the areas right 
around Venice, in the Terraferma, and the cities of Istria, although the Slavic inhabit-
ants of the Istrian countryside exercised dispute resolution according to the custom, i.e. 
through composition.10 
From the late 15th century onwards the Venetian authorities began to issue laws and 
decrees for the entire territory of the Venetian Republic. 
The ﬁ rst legal restraints concerned exile (bando) and carrying (ﬁ re)arms (Povolo, 
1997, 118). Why precisely the exile? It was one of the fundamental ritual forms in 
the customary system of conﬂ ict resolution. It was primarily designed to exclude the 
perpetrator(s) for a certain period of time in order for the feuding parties (kinships, clans) 
to come to an agreement within the dispute resolution itself, namely truce and peace with 
composition through intervention of the mediators and the arbiters. 
Only thereafter could the exiled return to the community (restorative justice). If the 
paciﬁ cation did not take place, the exiled remained in exile (homo sacer), being at the 
mercy or disfavour to anyone who was in practice allowed to kill him or even to be 
rewarded for killing him (retributive justice). 
Furthermore, other exiles could free themselves or buy themselves out by killing 
another exile. This seems to have been an ancient custom; sentence was declared in the 
jurisdiction of the local communities (cf. Miller, 1990; Povolo, 2017). 
Being completely acquainted with the structure of customary conﬂ ict resolution and 
its inﬂ uence among the privileged classes, which was used in settling scores among 
themselves in order to gain more inﬂ uence, reputation, political and economic power in 
the cities subordinate to Venetian Republic, the responsible central bodies evidently soon 
realized that the ritual form of exiling the perpetrator was precisely the point that needed 
primary attention and regulation within the Venetian state bodies. 
However, the Venetian Republic did not regulate this phenomenon with the prohi-
bition of exile or by restricting the jurisdiction in the deliberation of the penalty, but 
interestingly with a prohibition on killing exiles throughout the Republic’s territory. 
However, this repercussion was not permanent, as the practice suggests that the pro-
hibition of killing the exiles lasted for a year, two or three. Within this period the exiles 
could present themselves in front of the judicial bodies in order to be sentenced, after 
which the moratorium was cancelled and re-established after a couple of years. 
This approach, which gradually established state legislation throughout the territories 
of Republic, lasted almost a century, starting with the ﬁ rst law implemented in 1489 
by the Council of Ten, which needed to be cancelled the next year due to the pressure 
imposed by some important cities of the Venetian Terraferma. It was later reinforced in 
1504, 1524, 1531, 1541, and with intense repercussions also between 1549 and 1580, 
when it was proscribed that the exile could only be deliberated by the Venetian Central 
authorities. The exile included exile from all the cities under Venetian rule and also all 
the ships of the Venetian ﬂ eet. The exile was for life in the event of serious trespasses, 
10 A concrete case I found among others in ASVe, Provveditori Camera dei Conﬁ ni, b. 239, 1784, P. 18.
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whereas before this it referred to exile from the crime scene and surrounding areas (usu-
ally within a radius of 15 Venetian miles = approx. 28 km), the time span of the exile was 
deliberated by the community. 
This was not a novelty in comparison to the European medieval custom, which al-
lowed the exile to be killed by anyone who found him in the territory from which he was 
exiled. The killer of an exile was not to be punished and was frequently even rewarded 
for this action, especially with a pardon of the exile sentence (Miller, 1990; Povolo, 
2017). However, precisely for the purposes of bounty hunting the Venetian authorities 
in the second half of the 16th century launched paramilitary expeditions (for example 
by recruiting Dalmatians), which in an organized manner “purged” the exiles (bandits) 
from the territories (Povolo, 1997, 118–126; Povolo, 2015b, 224–227). Besides that, 
deliberations about exile sentences (sentenza di bando) included a clause that the exiled 
individual could free himself from exile by killing another exiled person. For this purpose 
the Venetian authorities developed a unique business with the so-called Voci liberar ban-
diti (ASVe, Capi del Consiglio di Dieci); this furthermore made it possible that the exile 
not only freed himself by killing another exile, but could also earn a living by bounty 
hunting other exiles or could (for a higher sum) free another fellow exile or prisoner based 
on the certiﬁ cate (Voce) given by the Council of Ten that thoroughly inspected the killing 
of an exile. Proving that an exile had been killed by presenting his decapitated head was 
always the most convincing. 
As a response to this punitive policy special gangs of former exiles were formed, who 
bounty hunted and “purged the terrain” of exiles (Povolo, 2017; Rossetto, 2017; Vidali, 
2017; Romio, 2017). 
The policy in the realm of the exile penalty was not the only strategy used by the 
central bodies to establish supreme judicial and military control over the entire area of 
the Venetian Republic; a similar thing was also taking place in other European countries 
(Schwerhoﬀ , 2002; Rousseaux, 1997, 106).11 
Important changes took place especially regarding trial rites. Whereas the Middle ages 
are characterised by arbitrary conﬂ ict resolution between feuding parties, in accordance 
with custom and ritual, without the assistance of the judicial court, which was deemed to be 
far more honourable; or by the assistance of judicial courts, in accordance with the principle 
of so-called accusatorial law, meaning that the legal process was not launched if the violated 
party did not ﬁ le a lawsuit. This was valid especially in the late middle ages; thereafter 
however, especially in the 16th century, the inquisitorial legal procedure was formed, which 
enabled the judge himself to commence the criminal legal procedure (ex–oﬃ  cio).
This phenomenon, which had begun already in the 12th century with the acceptance of 
the procedure of Roman canon law, enabled the development of a much-needed bureau-
cracy, composed of judges, lawyers, notaries, and court clerks, who gradually excluded 
laymen from deliberations in the judicial processes. The new procedure was complex and 
composed of several stages that took place orally and in written (ordo iudiciarius) (Brund-
11 See also the point of Cerutti, 2003, 11–22; Bossy, 2004; customary practice held that fugitives convicted of 
the highest transgressions could seek their sanctuary in churches, cf. Shoemaker, 2011, 167–173.
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age, 2008, 151–163). The role of the judge (oﬃ  cium iudicis) was gradually separated 
from governmental functions (Bellomo, 2011, 55–78). This inﬂ uenced the establishment 
of a new inquisitorial procedure (processum per inquisitionem), namely trial rite, which 
is very diﬀ erent from the sixteenth-century inquisitorial process, where the judge had the 
main initiative.12
The procedure usually included very ruthless methods of interrogation that implemented 
a strict idea of punitive law and rigidly restricted the plaintiﬀ ’s possibilities towards the 
defence. The inquisitorial procedure did not proscribe the formal presence of the plaintiﬀ ’s 
attorney. Furthermore, the court was not liable to present the processual acts in the phase of 
the defence in a sense that the defendant was unable to know what he was accused of, who 
was accusing him, and what the witnesses’ testimonies were. This regarded extremely strict 
regulations; the defendant was at mercy of the judge, who had a wide range of discretionary 
rights, as the defendant did not have a chance for appeal. The inquisitorial process thus 
aimed at excluding all the previously valid characteristics of the judicial process’s dynam-
ics, especially the inﬂ uence of legal customs and local judicial courts that strove towards 
reciprocal settlement and the establishment of peace within the community.
12 These topics are extensively represented in the work of Damaška (1986); cf. Povolo (2015b and 2017) and 
Langbein, 1974, 130-131.
Fig. 42: Exchequer_manuscript. One of four illuminated manuscripts that are the earliest 
known depictions of the English courts and court dress. They date from about 1460 and 
show the four courts at Westminster Hall. Wikimedia Commons.
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This was also its main point: although the judicial processes were still being led by the lo-
cal podestà or their chancellors, as this was the case for the formation of the so-called regular 
(ordinaria) trial rite in accordance with the city statutes within frames of existing oﬃ  ces for 
maleﬁ c cases. They had to report all the cases to the members of the central Venetian judicial 
body, the Council of Ten, who could issue an authorisation (delega) to be able to grant a 
formation of so-called extraordinary (straordinario or inquisitory) judicial procedures. 
The reception of extremely strict inquisitorial procedures, whose primary objective 
was to upset the logic of the customary system of conﬂ ict resolution,  was an instrument 
used by several European countries to implement a diﬀ erent concept of public order and 
of social control. It is, however, misleading to notice only the contribution to initiatives 
of central bodies and to neglect encouragement from the political and social level of 
pre-modern European society, which demanded new forms of control and order so as to 
ensure social peace and economic activity.
The 16th century brought about the establishment of the system of criminal jurisdic-
tion that was directly controlled from the centre and aimed to punish crimes that presented 
a danger to society. 
This was of greater importance in comparison to the more traditional form of law, 
as the punishments were valid in all parts of the state and thus surpassed the ancient 
local judicial arrangements. This was the way of establishing the inquisitorial procedure 
in almost all European lands, from Italy, France, England, to the Holy Roman Empire, 
between the end of the 16th and the ﬁ rst decade of the 17th century (Damaška, 1986; 
Berman, 2003; Wormald, 1980; Padoa Schioppa, 1997; Braddick, 2004; Langbein, 1974; 
Kaminsky, 2002; Carrol, 2006; Bellabarba et al., 2010; Povolo, 2015b; Dewald, 1993; 
Stone, 1997; Thornton, 2009; Davies & Fouracre, 1986; Throop & Hyams, 2010; Rous-
seaux, 1993, 2006; Royer, 2001; Sbriccoli, 2009).
However, the changes took place relatively slowly. In contrast to the repercussions ac-
cepted in other European countries (e.g. Carolina issued by Charles  V for the Empire, or 
the Ordonances issued by the French rulers), whereas in 16th century Italy the so-called 
Practicae of the established legal professionals prevailed and dictated the tone of judicial 
repercussions and represented the most important views of the criminal policy with a 
determined focus on the practice (Birocchi, 2002, 253–269).13
Although not even the law that was issued by the Council of Ten on 29 September 
1575 determined the exact procedure of the inquisitorial process – probably it did not 
even have a precise interest in doing so – throughout the Republic of Venice the accu-
satorial and the inquisitorial trial rites began to enforce the broad-reaching discretionary 
privileges of the judge in all 3 phases of the judicial process, which in its internal structure 
still showed the characteristics of a traditional trial rite (Povolo, 2015b, 217–219).
The ﬁ rst stage of the trial rite included the so-called informative process (processo 
informativo). After the podestà (as the main judge) of a certain city reported to the 
13 Italo Birocchi focused on public ﬁ gures such as Egidio Bossi, Giulio Claro, Tiberio Deciani and Prospero 
Farinacci. Cf. Sbriccoli (2002). About other notable writers of tractates on the same era cf. Carroll (2016), 
Povolo (1997), Bellabarba (2017), Glavina (2013).
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Council of Ten, the Council decided whether the judicial process would be launched 
following the principles of the accusatorial law, where the witnesses are interrogated by 
the plaintiﬀ ’s side and the defendant could be represented by his advocate or his father 
(diﬀ esa per procuratorem or per patrem). The other option was to label the process as 
ex–oﬃ  cio or determine to be executed as rito inquisitorio, which indicated to the inquisi-
torial procedure where the entire initiative was taken by the judge, including questioning 
the defendant and the option to use torture (so-called costituto de plano). In case of the 
formation of the inquisitorial judicial process, the second stage followed – the so-called 
oﬀ ensive process (processo oﬀ ensivo) – meaning the central judicial body ﬁ led a lawsuit 
against the accused. During this time the defendant was usually kept imprisoned by the 
bodies of competence, not unfrequently however the defendants were taken before the 
Council of Ten, in the central Venetian prison. 
The trial continued with the second, central phase in which the focus was the so-called 
defence process (processo difensivo), which included the mutual meetings of the parties 
and their attorneys in a credible trial battle. At this stage, the attorney of the defendant was 
able to gain and read the documents that for defence. 
Unlike the inquisitorial procedures that markedly prevailed in the 16th century, the 
right of the defendant to defend himself, counsel from an attorney, and especially the 
Fig. 43: Strappado torture. Hanging woman torture (https://www.planetdeadly.com/hu-
man/medieval-torture-devices).
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possibility to study the accusations that were formed by the plaintiﬀ   in presenting the 
defendant’s witnesses, was never completely denied in the realm of the trial rite, which 
was essentially developed as a means of conﬂ ict resolution and not only as a means of 
strict punishing, which is particularly characteristic for the inquisitorial procedure. 
In the last, third phase of the judicial process there was a verdict or a sentence 
(sentenza) given. In this phase it was also possible to end the judicial processes with a 
conclusion of peace, if meanwhile the feuding parties could come to such an agreement 
(Povolo, 2015b, 219). 
This was valid for the accusatorial as much as the inquisitorial procedure; in the last 
phase of the latter, however, the judge could again decide to use torture to force the 
admission that was needed. In this phase the defendant could be judged in absentia, as he 
was represented by an authorised person or by the defendant’s father. 
Monetary ﬁ nes and exile for defendants found guilty were still widespread and show 
a close link between the judicial processes and the custom of feud, as the former form of 
exile sanction was intended to resolve the conﬂ ict, when the feuding parties could use the 
absence of the perpetrator to create the conditions to conclude peace within community.
The deliberation of the ﬁ ne depended on the social status of the defendant and was 
based on how severely his criminal act violated the values of the community, all of which 
presented itself through the dual dimension of medieval justice (Povolo, 2015b, 217–219).
Massimo Vallerani thoroughly presented that the diﬀ erences between the accusatorial 
and inquisitorial procedures were not as important, due to the fact that the widespread 
use of procurators and warranties (pieggerie) in both types of judicial processes shows 
that the processes were meant to re-establish order and peace (Vallerani, 2005, 197–199), 
whereas the frequent use of exile penalty reﬂ ected a sense of justice, which aimed to-
wards the encouragement of paciﬁ cation and non-violent retribution between the feuding 
parties, where everyone put their endeavour into the elimination (exile) of those elements 
that were hostile to the community (Maﬀ ei, 2005, 129, 145; Vallerani, 2005, 170; Smail, 
1996, 28–59). 
It should not be surprising that the traditional trial rites preserved their special charac-
teristics, especially the active role of the feuding parties in conﬂ ict resolution while they 
adjusted to social and legal changes. The presence of the ancient judicial institutions, for 
example the defence of one’s father; inquiries characterized by non-transparent forms 
of interrogation; the release of the defendant after depositing the corresponding warran-
ties and bonds, and, what is the most important, committing to establishing peace and 
composition. 
In practice these were rituals based on an extremely fragmented institutional structure 
and were legitimized by legal norms with symbolic reference points that represented the 
community and the res publica. 
Most importantly, these rituals represented a social and cultural context where tradi-
tion, friendship, and honour had extremely important space, which became even more 
important when they merged with political power and status. 
In this manner the judicial processes that were formed by the pre-modern legal profes-
sionals in customary law were still being placed within the sphere of the customary system 
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of conﬂ ict resolution, whose goal was to establish peace in the community. This is most 
explicitly evident in the abundantly common gesture of the kiss of peace between the feud-
ing parties at the end of the customary procedure; this was also transferred into written law 
(Rolandino, 1546, 158–159v.; Petkov, 2003, 60–61, 72, 96, 100, 102, 113, 124–130).
Since the ﬁ rst decades of 17th century on there was a special form of judicial process 
formed in the Venetian Republic called servatis servandis, also referred to as an open 
process; mainly to be diﬀ ered from the inquisitorial process that was conducted in secret. 
Gradually this form of the trial rite overtook the old judicial rituals, as well as over 
the inquisitorial procedures. In practice the open procedure derived from the traditional 
rituals; however, within the broad jurisdiction of the Council of Ten the soon acquired new 
characteristics. At ﬁ rst the main goal of the transition of jurisdiction from the central body to 
the executors of local judicial authority, which was applied in the servatis servandis clause, 
enabled the courts to use stricter penalties that were not foreseen in the city statutes. 
Based on this new and more eﬀ ective authority the judge and the delegated court could 
use more radical repercussions against defendants that were arrested on counts of serious 
criminal acts already in the ﬁ rst stage of the trial (in so-called processo informativo).
The conviction or so-called Costituto opposizionale became the judicial trial that 
enabled the judge to curb traditional limitations, and thus question the plaintiﬀ  more 
intensively. 
This facilitated the formation of judicial hearings that were expressed in the goals of 
the new criminal procedure. Two phases of the traditional trial, the so-called processo in-
formativo and processo oﬀ ensivo, were thus merged with the new role of the judge, which 
substantially changed the balance of power, especially in feuds between representatives 
of the local aristocracy (Rousseaux, 1997, 106; Cerutti, 2003, 11–22; Povolo, 2015b, 
230–233). 
Under the pretext of a secret and extraordinary trial rite, without the customary war-
ranties, and in order to establish the leading political interests of the Dominant, the repre-
sentatives of the city aristocracy soon at ﬁ rst hand came to experience the consequences 
of the loss of political overrule.14
With the help of the ambiguous judicial formula servatis servandis, which in theory 
ensured the respect of the ancient legal rituals, this enabled the establishment of the in-
quisitorial judicial process (rito inquisitorio), including torture (Povolo, 1997, 171–174, 
337–340). 
In the 17th century a new form of criminal trials thus prevailed; through a diﬀ erent 
form of legitimacy and a complicated judicial procedure they weakened the role of the 
parties in the criminal procedure. However, the inquisitorial procedures that were im-
plemented in the 16th century gradually encountered resistance, as they systematically 
violated certain privileges, especially the right to defence in court, which was not in 
accordance with customary law within the city statutes that remained in function. Altho-
ugh the inquisitorial rite was continuously in use also in the 18th century, its use became 
less systematic and was intended primarily for the cases of special political signiﬁ cance. 
14  Cf. Povolo, 2003, where the whole process against local nobleman Paolo Orgiano is published.
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THE LANGUAGE OF VENGEANCE: A GLOSSARY 
OF ENMITY AND PEACE*
Darko Darovec, Angelika Ergaver & Žiga Oman
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to present a multilingual (Latin, English, Italian, German, 
Montenegrin, Albanian, and Slovene) collection of fundamental terminology or concepts 
that were used in the European Medieval and, to a degree, early modern periods for 
the customary and legal designation of the typical phenomena, phases, and procedures 
of conﬂ ict resolution within the community, either between individuals or groups, com-
monly known under the term vengeance.
With the paper the authors would like, inter alia, to point out the striking simi-
larities as well as some particularities between the regions and nations (peoples) of 
continental Europe found in the customary system of conﬂ ict resolution. Furthermore, 
this paper places special emphasis on the Medieval rites of the custom of vengeance, 
which remained in use in some parts of Europe, especially around the Mediterranean, 
until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This enables an excellent possibility for 
a comparison to be made between rites in the Middle Ages and those in later eras, 
speciﬁ cally in the early modern period. Perhaps somewhat immodestly, we are certain 
that the given results will be of help to researchers from the same ﬁ elds of study and, 
particularly, that the collection of selected terms and concepts will encourage additional 
research in other linguistic areas. Hence this paper is also an appeal for the further 
collection of sources pertaining to the custom of vengeance, a system with the tendency 
to achieve social equilibrium and peace.
Even just a ﬂ eeting glance at the enclosed glossary shows the complexity of the issue at 
hand, so we are fully aware that all the terms enumerated in this paper cannot be explained 
herein, nor is this our goal. We have limited ourselves only to, according to our estimation, 
the most important terms of the ritual of vengeance (injury, vengeance, feud, enmity, truce, 
satisfaction, ﬁ delity, banishment, friendship, love, and peace),1 most of which abound in 
synonyms, yet without attempting to explain them with the help of language history or 
linguistic analysis, as we would like to present our study through the lens of conceptual 
history, perhaps best established by Raymond Williams, Quentin Skinner, and Reinhart 
Koselleck (Williams, 1976; Skinner, 1980; Koselleck, 2004; Koselleck, 2006).
1 Regarding the terms listed in the brackets above, the German historical lexicon Geschichtliche Grundbe-
griﬀ e (eight books, 1972–1997), for instance, elaborates thoroughly only on peace (Friede), whereas many 
of the other terms are not given in the same context as in this paper: e.g. vengeance (Rache), friendship 
(Freundschaft), truce (Waﬀ enstillstand), and love (Liebe). The Latin vindicta is also only given in the con-
text of vindicta divina, while treuga and satisfactio have been left out (Brunner, Conze & Koselleck, 2004).
<?>* This chapter was published as article in journal Acta Histriae, 25, 2017, 2, pp. 391-432. I would like to 
thank the co-authors and the editorial board of the journal for permission to publish it in this book.
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Conceptual history, as part of social history, analyzes the history of social concepts 
and structures in the longue durée, stemming from the methodological demand “that past 
social and political conﬂ icts must be interpreted and decoded in terms of their contem-
porary conceptual boundaries, and the self-understanding on the part of past speakers 
and writers of their own language-use,” which “must register the variety of names for 
(identical?) materialities in order to be able to show how concepts are formed. Hence, the 
concepts instruct us not only of the uniqueness of past meanings, but also contain struc-
tural possibilities, treating the concatenations of diﬀ erence invisible in the historical ﬂ ow 
of events”. They help us in theoretically elucidating the chronological relation between 
event and structure or the concurrence of the continuance and change of a given structure. 
“It is only concepts which demonstrate persistence, repeatable applicability, and empiri-
cal validity – concepts with structural claims – which indicate that a once ‘real‘ history 
can today appear generally possible and be represented as such.” The methodological 
restriction to the history of concepts expressed in words demands a further argument to 
help distinguish between the terms concept and word: “a word becomes a concept only 
when the entirety of meaning and experience within a sociopolitical context within which 
and for which a word is used can be condensed into one word.” Conceptual history “must 
always keep in view the need for ﬁ ndings relevant to intellectual or material history. 
Above all, the semasiological approach must alternate with the onomasiological”, thus 
making it self-evident, “that historical clariﬁ cation of past conceptual usage must refer 
not only to the history of language but also to sociohistorical data, for every semantic has 
its link to nonlinguistic content” (Koselleck, 2004, 81–91). Or, as Medieval conceptual-
ists would say, general concepts are not simply words, but also exist within reason.
With the enclosed glossary and, especially, the thematological analysis of the struc-
tural concept of vengeance, we want, based on the language of historical sources and the 
language of science, speciﬁ cally predicated on the studies of the rituals of vengeance, to 
provide a starting point for the discussion of questions already posed by Koselleck: “to 
what extent has the intentional substance of one and the same word remained the same? 
Has it changed with the passage of time, a historical transformation having reconstructed 
the sense of the concept?” (Koselleck, 2004, 82).
STATE OF THE ART: AN OUTLINE
The traditional (legal) history of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, whose 
interpretations still dominate recent historiography, formulated vengeance (feud) as 
a primitive stage of human mental, social, and legal evolution (cf. Burckhardt, 1956, 
346–350, 362–363; Huizinga, 2011, 9, 19, 29–30; Beyerle, 1915, 216–217), a phase of 
humanity‘s path towards the Western-European State and rule of law, regarded as the 
ideal and highest stage of social and legal organisation and development. In this context 
vengeance is very often regarded as arbitrary or violent self-help, a necessary evil the 
State is forced to tolerate while its legal or judicial institutions (at least in their modern 
form) are still in their infancy. Predicated on entrenched interpretations of traditional his-
toriography, historians continue to stress that it was only the state monopolisation of law 
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and violence in the modern period that brought about an end to a social order based on 
brute force, characterised as the Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes. Until recently 
it was generally accepted that the primary function of the State was to suppress violence, 
thus also contributing to social harmony, believed to be non-existent in the “primitive” 
order originating in the presupposed irrationality and violent urges of premodern humans 
unable to control them, whether Medieval Europeans or “natives” from other continents. 
Simultaneously, with the State‘s eradication of “feudal anarchy”, Europe is said to have 
undergone a “civilizing process”, in which the internalization of social constraints was 
essential to the creation of “modern” society (Elias, 2000; Elias, 2001). Consequently 
the (non-)existence of vengeance in the legal order was a signiﬁ er of the dividing lines 
between the “darkness” of the Middle Ages and the “progress” of the modern period 
(Büchert Netterstrøm, 2007; Carroll, 2007; Broggio & Carroll, 2015). 
Traditional historians had little faith in the role of law, custom, and religion in 
limiting violence, disregarding that the behaviour of premodern humanity was no less 
shaped by social constraint. In fact, early modern social change resulted in the break-
down of Medieval social constraints, worsening the violence. Michel de Montaigne 
(1533–1592) argued for heroism to be replaced with the virtues of mercy and clemency, 
distinguishing a true aristocrat from the mob by his self-control. This was corollary 
to the aspirations of inward constraint by the Reformers, both Protestant or Catholic. 
Thomas Hobbes‘s (1588–1679) exposition of the need for absolute sovereignty in the 
state also originated in his experience of popular disorder plaguing France. He claimed 
that peace could only be found in subordinating one‘s desires and will to the sovereign, 
as man can never be at peace with his neighbour, since enmity is rooted in human 
nature (Carroll, 2006, 308–312, 318; Skinner, 2008, 41). Hobbes cleared the way for 
a ruling class deﬁ ned by an ethics of yielding (i.e. non-vengeance), which reinforced
their right to rule (Carroll, 2016, 137–138). However, the transition from the Medieval to 
modern society was a very complex and gradual process.
A break with traditional perceptions of premodern society and vengeance occured in the 
mid-twentieth century and was the result of anthropologists who found that earliest human 
societies developed sophisticated systems of social control that upheld the peace in the 
feud.  They showed that societies have developed mechanisms of interdependence (familial, 
neighbourly, economic, etc. relations) that help to sustain them and regulate conﬂ ict. Para-
doxically those same relations create conﬂ icts in society, which can erupt and escalate with 
violations of social norms. Transgressions demanded satisfaction, exacted by the ruler in the 
name of the community (for incest, witchcraft, sacrilege, treason, oathbreaking) or by the 
community (homicide, theft, arson, oathbreaking etc.), either by its appointed members or 
the injured party itself (Radcliﬀ e-Brown, 1952, 212–219). But social bonds also impede the 
escalation of violence resulting from delicts, which is easier, the greater the interdependence 
of the parties to the conﬂ ict. Conﬂ ict resolution was shaped by the culture of (masculine) 
honour (and shame), which limits the set of honourable targets and actions, imposing ritual 
limitations on violence according to principles of equivalence and reciprocity. The culture 
of honour also demands that actions be public, which enables the community to intervene in 
the conﬂ ict at any time. Social mechanisms of peacemaking are thus inherent in the custom 
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of vengeance, ensuring that the conﬂ icts are never entirely private. Subsequently the custom 
provides the functions of both conﬂ ict resolution and social control, with its tendency for 
the re-establishment or maintenance of social equilibrium (order) and peace (Gluckman, 
1955, 1–55; Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Colson, 1953; cf. Durham, 1909, 25).
In the mid-twentieth century historians began applying the ﬁ ndings of anthropology to 
conﬂ ict resolution in premodern Europe and they soon established that medieval society 
was permeated by a tendency toward peace, not violence (Wallace-Hadrill, 1959; Bloch, 
1961, 123–130). With the notable exception of German historiography the theoretical 
starting points of anthropology have been taken up in European historiography and 
adapted for research in the highly stratiﬁ ed societies of the Middle Ages and the early 
modern period (Büchert Netterstrøm, 2007). Predicated on anthropological research of 
conﬂ ict resolution, further research has shown that European classical, Medieval, and 
early modern societies had mechanisms for peace and social equilibrium at all levels. 
Peaceful relations and harmonious coexistence were imperative for legal professionals 
and the clergy, members of the ruling caste, and village elites. The desire for peace, 
also rooted in Christian teaching, permeated custom, Roman canon and written law, 
wherein all harmoniously complemented each other (White, 1986; Smail, 2003; Smail 
& Gibson, 2009; Carroll, 2006, 185–233; Nassiet, 2007). It has been conﬁ rmed that the 
custom of vengeance played the same role in politically and socially highly-stratiﬁ ed 
European societies as it did in more egalitarian tribal societies. The culture of honour,2 
which dictated a more or less equal requital for a sustained injury, limited the violence in 
conﬂ icts and demanded that revenge be public. This enabled communities to intervene 
in conﬂ icts at any stage, either through mediation or arbitration, which during the sus-
pension of hostilities (truce) deﬁ ned the terms for peace or made peace by settling the 
wrong with a composition payment and the establishment of a new relationship between 
the parties to the conﬂ ict. Marriage was often the means by which feuding groups were 
reconclied and turned into kin. As already noted by Max Gluckman, “the rule of exogamy 
is a primary mechanism for spinning the network of alliances between groups” (Gluck-
man, 1965, 97), and these alliances and ties were “elaborately set in custom and backed 
with ritual beliefs” (Gluckman, 1955, 18). Mediation and arbitration reinforced social 
hierarchy, as authorities (ruler/chief, elders, priests/clergy) and separate legal experts of a 
community (i.e. lawyer, notary) played prominent roles in the negotiations. The rituals of 
peacemaking as a key element of vengeance existed in all premodern European societies, 
underpinned by the spread of Roman canon law and its principle that injustice, including 
murder,3 could be satisﬁ ed by a monetary compensation (Broggio & Carroll, 2015, 5; 
Cummins & Kounine, 2015, 3–7; Darovec, 2017, 88): from Montenegro (Boehm, 1993, 
54–62, 121–142, 191–227; cf. Ergaver, 2016; Ergaver, 2017) to Iceland (Heusler, 1911, 
2 In the mid-1960s anthropological research established the concept of the culture of honour and shame, 
supposedly typical for Mediterranean patriarchal societies (Peristany, 1965). This was critically evaluated 
at the turn of the millenium (Hodren & Purcel, 2000, 489–523). 
3 With the notable exception of England, where the practice of blood money was already in retreat in the 
Middle Ages (Carroll, 2011, 88).
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38–124, 213–242; Miller, 1996, 179–299), from Italy (Bossy, 2004, 1–29; Povolo, 2015a, 
101-137; Faggion, 2017) and France (Carroll, 2003; Bossy, 2004, 31–51; Carroll, 2015) 
to the Holy Roman Empire (Frauenstädt, 1881, 105–173; Mommertz, 2001; Bossy, 2004, 
53–71; cf. Oman, 2016, 81–91; Oman, 2017, 158–173).
Settling a conﬂ ict was never easy, especially if triggered by a grave transgression of 
social norms, i.e. murder. Injured honour and emotions could take a very long time to cool 
and could lead conﬂ icts through long sequences of mutual violent retaliations, suspended 
only by truces and fuelled by the memory of injustice (Dean, 1997; Dean, 2007; Muir, 
2017). Thus arbiters always had to make an extra eﬀ ort to achieve balance between the 
parties, as neither could noticeably prevail over the other if lasting peace was to be made. 
Honour and shame (humiliation) had to be equally divided. Self-humiliation on the part 
of the perpetrator played the key role in the restitution of both sides‘ honour, as only then 
could the forgiveness from the injured party follow, which was necessary for peace to be 
made (Boehm, 1993, 123–142; Darovec, 2017).
Balance was the fundamental principle of  law. It was based on Aristotelian thinking 
and remained an essential element of premodern European legal order following the codi-
ﬁ cation of vengeance into common law (ius commune) in the High Middle Ages (Smail & 
Gibson, 2009), particularly the codiﬁ cation of the custom‘s key rituals of peacemaking, 
and in the Empire also of the ritual limitations of violence (Vogel, 1998, 42–43). By 
taking over and adapting the custom and Roman canon law, premodern courts strived 
in settling conﬂ icts towards the re-establishment of peace and social equilibrium, by en-
couraging and forcing the parties towards settlement. Settlement always saw the parties‘ 
social status and gravity of the transgression taken into account, e.g. for determining 
composition. The key change brought about by the codiﬁ cation and by the further adop-
tion of criminal law was the strengthened role of the courts and those who established 
them, i.e. the authority/ruler (chieftain, prince, bishop, king, emperor) before which peace 
was made. Sentences issued by the courts were always more severe than stipulations 
in customary settlement (Miller, 1996, 238–239; cf. Dolenc, 1935, 417), and physical 
punishment was seen as shameful (Carroll, 2006, 228). Also, coercion into settlement 
by the courts accompanied with threats of total property seizure, as was common in the 
Venetian Republic since the late 1500s, could lead to even graver retaliatory violence 
between parties to a conﬂ ict (Povolo, 1997, 293–297). However, this was also a time of 
growing ﬁ nancial, emotional, and strategic uses of legal action (Cummins & Kounine, 
2015, 2). Especially since the courts and authorities continued essentially in playing the 
role of arbiters and some sort of “tax” (i.e. ﬁ nes, trial costs) collectors, well into the early 
modern period. Nevertheless, the inquisitorial procedure did not entirely substitute the 
accusatorial procedure prior to the end of the ancien régime, and there was very little 
public prosecution as well (Wenzel, 2011). Concurrently, Central and Western-European 
modern criminal legislation classiﬁ ed ever more delicts from private to public, reserv-
ing their sanctioning and pardoning to the authorities/ruler. Beginning in the sixteenth 
century conﬂ ict resolution, by achieving peace through the pursuit of balance between the 
parties (restorative or restitutive justice), had by the end of the eighteenth century come 
to be replaced with punishment for the perpetrator (retributive justice). This was also a 
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consequence of economic, political, and social change, which, along with the increase of 
itinerant forms of crime, ever greater social mobility, altered forms of warfare, religious 
and civil wars, all resulted in an increase of violence that delegitimized traditional forms 
of conﬂ ict resolution (Carroll, 2007; Povolo, 2015b; Povolo, 2017).
Up until the end of the Middle Ages, and in certain parts of Europe even until 
the nineteenth century, especially in the Mediterranean, conﬂ ict resolution had been, 
like all social relations, dictated by the universal human concept of their management: 
the principle of exchange (Mauss, 1996; Lévi-Strauss, 1969, 60–68, 480–483; Verdier, 
1980, 30–31). It is telling that in some languages, including Slovene (Snoj, 1997, 
327), the words for exchange and vengeance are etymologically related (Lévi-Strauss, 
1969, 60). The principle of exchange also determined social relations of the European 
Medieval and early modern periods. This is shown in the rites of investiture (cf. Le 
Goﬀ , 1977, 426–506) and other legal acts, i.e. contracts, peacemaking among them, 
as a three-phase ritual: 1) the gift and countergift (homage, self-humiliation, request 
for truce), 2) oath (ﬁ des, truce, friendship), which provides opportunities for 3) the 
conclusion of the exchange, i.e. the constitution of a new contractual relation (lasting 
peace, love, forgiveness), which establishes a new or renews an existing relationship 
between two parties (peace, vassalage, matrimony).
German historiography addressed vengeance diﬀ erently. The break from traditional 
(legal) historiography came about in the late 1930s with the claim by Otto Brunner 
that the feuds (Fehde) among the nobility in the Medieval Holy Roman Empire were a 
constitutive element of its political structure rather than arbitrary robbery. Feuds were 
interpreted as legally normalized violence and a tool of establishing social contracts 
between the ruler and nobility, wherein the central concept of Medieval politics was 
not feud, but peace. However, this was a peace containing the notion of “just violence” 
as the indispensable part of the struggle for power, having the goal of establishing and 
maintaining order and peace. Brunner also argued, that vengeance as a custom of conﬂ ict 
resolution was only conceded to the nobility as the Herrenklasse, while (blood) feuding 
among the nonpriviledged orders and peoples outside Europe continued to be percieved 
as irrational or instinctive. Consequently, by reading Medieval peace legislature (the 
Imperial peace, provincial peace) at face value, Fehde was deﬁ ned as rigorous, norma-
tively-regulated, violent conﬂ ict resolution reserved solely for the nobility, some kind 
of “righteous war” without the killing of (noble) adversaries, and a unique German(ic) 
(“civilized”) custom, the so-called knightly feud (Ritterfehde). It was regarded as strictly 
separate from the (“primitive”) aﬀ ective blood feud of commoners and “natives” (Brun-
ner, 1990, 1–110).
The theses on Fehde as a speciﬁ c custom of the German nobility dominated the 
research on vengeance in German historiography almost until the end of the twentieth 
century. It tended to establish German customs as unique and not comparable with other 
regions (cf. Carroll, 2006, 6). Even the critiques of the custom‘s legitimacy did not 
break with the concept, still regarding Fehde as a custom of the nobility, either as thinly 
veiled robbery (Rösener, 1982) or as a tool of class warfare (Algazi, 1995; Algazi, 
1996). Only at the start of the twenty-ﬁ rst century did research show that commoners 
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resolved conﬂ icts using the same customs as the nobility (Reinle, 2003). At roughly the 
same time further research on the feuds of the nobility showed that these did not only 
have a political, but also a social function (Zmora, 2007), corresponding to the custom 
of vengeance as understood by anthropology. At the same time German historians began 
to place more emphasis on the rituals of conﬂ ict resolution (Althoﬀ , 1997). However, 
as a rule, German historiography still continues to ignore modern anthropological 
and historiographical research on vengeance. Even after the unprivileged orders were 
“included” into the concept of Fehde, it was still almost exclusively approached from a 
legal positivist standpoint, i.e. as a normative legal institution (cf. Patschovsky, 1996; 
Wadle, 1999; Reinle, 2013), rather than a complex social phenomenon. Doubts about 
the uniqueness of Fehde have only been expressed very recently and tentatively (cf. 
Reinle, 2014). The new research on vengeance comes from studies on the lower orders 
in the early modern period, when the Fehde was prohibited. However, as Raymond 
Verdier has argued, the custom of vengeance was everywhere in (early) modern Europe 
gradually incorporated into state legislature and replaced with newer and newer laws, 
which transﬁ gured the custom, especially by substituting it with punishment (Verdier, 
1980, 32–36). Due to the prohibition of Fehde in the early modern period, the latest 
German research on vengeance in the period also demanded the abandonment of the 
legal positivist approach in favour of an analysis of the social relationships dictated by 
the custom of vengeance (Mommertz, 2001; cf. Peters, 2000). The resulting ﬁ ndings on 
the structure and function of the custom consequently came very close to the ﬁ ndings 
of studies on vengeance outside of Germany.
TERMINOLOGICAL CONUNDRUMS
German historians were not the only ones to have attempted to deﬁ ne vengeance as 
a speciﬁ c custom or cultural practice. Like Fehde, the Icelandic ófrið or óvinr (Miller, 
1996, 182), the Italian vendetta, and the Lombard and Frankish faida (cf. Halsall, 1999) 
have all been studied as unique customs. Their supposed uniqueness was established 
on interpretations of the custom predicated on local and regional sources by national 
historiographies, ignoring the universality of the custom. On the other hand, feud is 
employed as a technical term to encompass all manifestations of the custom of venge-
ance (Büchert Netterstrøm, 2007; Þorláksson, 2007). The transnational similarity of 
the custom had however been noticed in the custom of blood feud, especially in South-
eastern Europe, i.e. between the Montenegrin krvna osveta and Albanian gjakmarrje 
(Ergaver, 2016, 104–106). Otherwise, more or less theoretical distinctions between 
Fehde, vendetta, and feud have also been established. That the distinctions are largely 
theoretical is best proven by a comparison of Western-European Medieval sources with 
the Montenegrin, Albanian, Greek, and Corsican custom of vengeance, which remained 
in use at least until the nineteenth century. The transmission of written and state law 
from Western (England) via Central to South-Eastern Europe was namely gradual. For 
instance, the process of establishing state legislature in nineteenth-century Montenegro 
(Andrijašević & Rastoder, 2006, 161–163; Marinović, 2007, 28–32, 157–167, 171, 
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181, 195–196, 624; Šćepanović, 2003, 25; Vujačić, 1997, 11–14; Bogišić, 1999, 321, 
294–295; cf. Radov, 1997, 52–53) was almost identical to that in Western Europe from 
at least the ﬁ fteenth century onwards.
Jesse Byock formulates the diﬀ erence between vendetta and feud as conﬂ icts at dif-
ferent levels of social organisation, with the vendetta as vengeance at the village level 
and feud at the tribal level (Büchert Netterstrøm, 2007, 39). Otherwise researchers into 
vengeance in the Mediterranean, e.g. Trevor Dean, generally understand feud or faida 
as enmity: a prolonged exchange of retaliations for the original wrong (not necessarily 
homicide), before it is concluded by a peace settlement; and vendetta as a single retalia-
tion that settles the injury, mainly homicide, i.e. as blood feud (Dean, 1997, 15; Büchert 
Netterstrøm, 2007, 39–40). Edward Muir and Claudio Povolo claim rather that vendetta 
denotes the entire conﬂ ict and that enmity (inimicizia) is a synonym for vendetta (Muir, 
1998, xxii; Povolo, 2015b, 202–203). However, as intercultural studies show,4 the num-
ber of retaliations is always, irrespective of the original injustice, determined by propriety 
demanded by the principle of exchange in balancing the injury and honour of both parties 
(Boehm, 1993, 191–222; Miller, 1996, 179–299). Peacemaking in blood feud demanded 
the exchange of blood for blood and life for life, which required ritual marriages to be 
made as composition and compensation. To replace the lives lost, the custom demanded 
the gift of women who would give birth to new life. Hence breaking oﬀ  the engagement 
and commiting adultery were regarded as equal to murder, providing the injured party 
with the right to blood feud (Verdier, 1980, 28–30).
The terminological confusion originates not only in culturally based manifestations 
of the custom, but also in its very rich and complex terminology within the same culture. 
Medieval and certain early modern sources thus give a plethora of synonyms for every 
change in social relations that the custom dictates, from the outbreak of violence to the 
resolution of the conﬂ ict, with the most synonyms existing for the custom of vengeance 
itself. In the sources vengeance (Lat. ultio, vindicta, Ita. vendetta, Ger. rache, Mne.5 
osveta, Alb. hakmarrje, Svn. maščevanje) is most often given with synonyms for conﬂ ict 
or dispute (Lat. altercatio, discordia, intentio, Ger. irrung, misshelung, ungute, unrat, 
zwayung, zwitracht), enmity (Lat. inimicitia, faida, Ger. vhede, fedeschaﬀ t, feindtschaﬀ t), 
and war (Lat. bellum, Ger. (g)werra, krieg, reisa, urlog), less often for clash (Ger. au-
ﬂ auf, stöss), challenge (Ger. vordrung), injustice (Lat. iniuria), unrest or disorder (Ger. 
unfrid, unordnung) etc. (ARS, AS 1063/4492, 4 September 1441, Graz; du Cange, 1710, 
383–385; MGH, 318. §11, 451; Bizjak, 2016, 72; Krones, 1883, 87, 92; Wallace-Hadrill, 
1959, 461, 484; Brunner, 1990, 37–38; Reuter, 1992, 312–313; Kos, 1994, 110–111; 
4 The diﬀ erence between war and vengeance is both quantitative and qualitative. The key divergence is ge-
nerally understood to be the abandonment of ritual limitations to violence in war and a much lesser chance 
for intervention in the conﬂ ict save at the highest level (Gluckman, 1955, 8–9; Brunner, 1990, 8; Boehm, 
1993, 212, 221; Miller, 1996, 218; Zmora, 1997, 122; Reinle, 2003, 25; Carroll, 2006, 16; Radcliﬀ e-Brown, 
1952, 215).
5 Montenegrin relates to the terms, expressions, and phrases attested in the historical area of Montenegro, ta-
ken from sources and studies written in the Shtokavian dialect or specialised and scientiﬁ c literature written 
in either Serbo-Croatian or Serbian.
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Halsall, 1999, 27; Throop, 2011, 11; Schäﬀ er, 2013, 213; Oman, 2016, 85). Diﬀ erent 
forms of conﬂ ict are also given with synonyms in the sources.6 
The most common synonym for vengeance in European Medieval and early modern 
sources is enmity, Latin inimicitia, French inimitié, ennemi or haine, German Feindschaft 
or Fehde. The last two, along with the English feud, originate from Germanic words for 
enmity (state of relations), hate (emotion) and conﬂ ict: faehde, faithu, gifēhida, fǣhþ etc., 
while feud is supposed to have originated from either an unrecorded Old English word, 
the Old French fede or faide, or, perhaps, the Old English word for enmity, fæhð.7 The 
faide disappeared from French already during the Middle Ages, and the Italian faida was 
also very rare. It seems to have been rediscovered in the nineteenth century through the 
exhumation of Lombard legal codes (Carroll, 2016, 102). The Slovene word fajda was 
also certainly taken from German, French (cf. Dolenc, 1935, 173), or Italian literature. 
All originate in the Latinized form of a Germanic word, ﬁ rst given in the sources in the 
Edictum Rothari, a collection of Lombard law from the seventh century, that formulates 
feud as enmity: faida hoc est inimicitia (MGH, LL 4/I, 45., 20).
Just as common a term for vengeance is conﬂ ict or dispute, which has the richest collec-
tion of synonyms for the custom. It is, originating in the Latin word for complaint (querella),8 
very common in Italian (querela) and Spanish (querella) Medieval and early modern sources 
for both lawsuit and feud (Vocabolario, 1612; AKG 22, 396; AKG 24, 427).9 As the word 
for feud it is also very common in French (querelle) and English (quarrel) early modern 
sources (Carroll, 2006, 8). As the word for lawsuit the Latin querella roughly corresponds to 
the Montenegrin term svadja (Boehm, 1993, xix), and the Medieval German term geschrey 
(Svn. pokrik) (Schwind & Dopsch, 1895, 94. 175–176; Vilfan, 1961, 271–273).
The most common straightforward term for vengeance in the sources is the Latin 
vindicta, from which originate the Romance words for vengeance like the Italian vendetta 
and the French vengeance (Büchert Netterstrøm, 2007, 39). However, vindicta originally 
also has multiple meanings: vengeance, (the staﬀ  of) manumission, punishment, redress 
and satisfaction, and vindication (Bradač, 1980, 576). From vindicta also seem to stem 
the French words vindiquer and revindiquer and the German vindizieren, all of which 
express a claim or right. From Latin vindicare, to vindicate, via Old French vengeance or 
venjance and revengier or revenchier also seem to originate the English words vengeance 
and revenge respectively.10 The Latin ultio is often reserved for divine retribution (ultio 
6 For instance in 1521 vede was used for the Italian war of 1521–1526 between the Holy Roman Emperor 
Charles V and Francis I of France, while Krieg and guerra can be used for a feud between a nobleman and a 
monastery or church or for property disputes among kin (Kos, 1994, 111; Carroll, 2012; Darovec, 2016, 19).
7 Feud, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/feud (August 2017); Fehde, https://www.dwds.de/wb/Fehde#et-1 (Au-
gust 2017); feud, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=feud&allowed_in_frame=0 (September 2017).
8 quarrel, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=quarrel&allowed_in_frame=0 (September 2017).
9 Deﬁ nición de querella, https://deﬁ nicion.de/querella/ (September 2017); querelle in Vocabolario, http://
www.treccani.it/vocabolario/querelle/ (September 2017).
10 Vengeance, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/vengeance (August 2017); vengeance, http://www.etymonli-
ne.com/index.php?term=vengeance&allowed_in_frame=0 (September 2017); Revenge, http://www.the-
freedictionary.com/revenge (August 2017); revenge, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_
frame=0&search=revenge (September 2017).
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divina) (cf. Wallace-Hadrill, 1959, 465–466), while in German sources Rache is far less 
common for the custom of vengeance (cf. MGH, Const. 2, 196a., 253) than words and 
phrases for enmity. In the Slavic-speaking regions of Southeastern Europe the most com-
mon term is osveta, followed by svadja (Boehm, 1993, 52), with the Albanian equivalent 
for vengeance being hakmarrje.
The terms that stand for every change in social relations dictated by the custom of 
vengeance, from the outbreak of hostilities to intervention in the conﬂ ict and its temporary 
or lasting resolution, are however far more uniﬁ ed in the sources. As a rule, the terminology 
of vengeance in various languages cleary shows that it is a primary and universal custom or 
relationship. As emphasized by Claude Lévi-Strauss on the subject of exogamous marriage, 
“it is always a system of exchange that we ﬁ nd at the origin of rules of marriage, even of 
those of which the apparent singularity would seem to allow only a special and arbitrary 
interpretation” (Lévi-Strauss, 1969, 478). Put like this, a German and an Italian wedding 
or Fehde and vendetta are not separate customs, but culturally speciﬁ c manifestations of 
Fig. 44: King Rothar enthroned (detail). Edictum Rothari (http://www.studiarapido.it/
wp-content/uploads/2014/11/editto-rotari-3.jpg)
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the same custom. Like marriage, the system of exchange found at the origin of the rules 
of vengeance also (re-)establishes social relations. Yet, regardless of its tendency towards 
peace and social equilibrium, the exchange in vengeance is not directed by love, which 
brings it to an end, but enmity, fuelled by the obligation to one‘s kin and a duty to justice.11 
Understanding this led both to the various terms for vengeance worldwide, as well as to the 
seventh-century Latin translation of Lombard customs.  
 
VENGEANCE AS RELATIONSHIP: THE CUSTOM‘S STRUCTURE
Fundamentally vengeance as a system12 of conﬂ ict resolution is an obligation to retaliate 
for a suﬀ ered injury, thus serving justice. Based on the principle of exchange (Lévi-Strauss, 
1969, 479–485) the obligation was socially structured as a process (Miller, 1996, 182) for 
managing social13 relations. Simultaneously, as with any other custom, it is in itself ﬂ exible, 
as its rites provide those involved in them with certain room for manoeuvering within the 
structures of custom and honour. Vengeance is consequently not to be taken as a set in stone 
legal institution, nor are the departures from rigid deﬁ nitions to be understood as “feud-like” 
or Fehdeanalog (cf. Reinle, 2013, 9, 12, 23; Muir, 2017, 2). As long as these “departures” 
correspond with the custom‘s structure, they should be taken as part of it. The deﬁ nition of 
vengeance as a legal custom is also too narrow, as the custom establishes and reﬂ ects all 
relations comprising society, from the political to the economic.
It would accordingly be better to see vengeance as a state of conﬂ ict. It is a collorary of 
enmity. It forms when the wrong that triggered the conﬂ ict is not appropriately (honourably) 
settled, or when a violent response is a culturally more appropriate response for an injury, 
especially homicide, than monetary settlement. The state of mutual enmity is maintained 
until lasting peace is made. Only then can the state of reciprocal hostility (exchange) come 
to an end, establishing a new public social relationship: enmity is substituted with love.
The basic structure of the custom of vengeance is dictated by the relationship of 
mutual animosty and the latter by the priniciple of exchange: injury-enmity-mediation-
truce-peace.
11 In the early modern period both Protestant and Catholic Reformers placed great emphasis on vengeance be-
longing to God alone. This created clashes between one‘s obligation to kin and Christian conscience, with 
Hamlet perhaps being the most famous example. Even so in the earlier (1570) French version that provided 
the raw material for Shakespeare‘s tragedy, Hamlet (Amleth) ﬁ nds nothing disquieting about revenge: it is 
about justice (Carroll, 2003, 74).
12 According to Raymond Verdier: “Nous sommes ainsi conduit à étudier la vengeance comme système – ou 
sous-système – à la fois d’echange et de contrôle social de la violence. Partie intégrante du système social 
global, le système vindicatoire est d’abord une ethique mettant en jeu un ensemble de représentations et de 
valeurs se rapportant à la vie et à la mort, au temps et à l‘espace, à la personne et ses biens ; il est ensuite 
un code social ayant ses règles et ses rites pour ouvrir, suspendre et clôturer la vengeance; il est enﬁ n un 
instrument et lieu de pouvoir identiﬁ ant et opposant des unités sociales, les groupes vindicatoires.” (Ver-
dier, 1980, 16).
13 With social change in the early modern period, however, vengeance also became to be understood as a 
passion that cannot be tamed. Still, at least until the late seventeenth century, many argued that vengeance 
was acceptable if based on justice and reason rather than passion (Carroll, 2006, 14).
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The prerequisite for vengeance as a rule is not an entirely unprovoked wrong, but a pre-
vious existence of discord (Lat. discordia, Ger. groll, unguette, Mne. svadja, Alb. armiqësi) 
(Rolandino, 1546, f. 158r; Karadžić, 1966; Bogišić, 1999; Mann, 1948; Mommertz, 2001, 
223; Schäﬀ er, 2013, 212) between individuals and/or groups they belong to. It can originate 
from grievances or envy due to political, economic, or other social success or failure. It is 
not necessary for the original relation to be one of friendship, it can simply be better than 
worse. The greater the resentment, the easier it can escalate by even a minor encroachment 
upon relations, rights, or property that constitute and maintain the social standing or honour 
of an individual and/or group. Both status and honour are continously tested, conﬁ rmed, 
and demonstrated in the public that codetermines them. The state of discord is demonstrated 
by acrimony, coldness, disregard, etc. Discord generally escalates due to an event regarded 
as the original wrong (Lat. iniuria, Ger. unrecht) that demands retaliation14 (Boehm, 1993, 
92–93; Miller, 1996, 182, 187; Althoﬀ , 1997, 11–13; Wieland, 2014, 416–425, 446).
Violent retaliation that can follow a sustained wrong had to be legitimized like any 
other public action. First, as also shown in Western and Central-European sources, the 
escalation of the dispute had to be made public, especially as it was a potentially danger-
ous transformation of an amiable (Lat. amicitia, Ger. freundtschaﬀ t) into an animus (Lat. 
inimicitia, Ger. feindtschaﬀ t) relationship. Making the injury public acted as a public 
demand for its settlement, which gave it a role similar to that of a lawsuit (Mommertz, 
2001, 240–241; cf. Vilfan, 1961, 271). As the demand to settle the injustice includes the 
threat of retaliation should it not be fulﬁ lled, it is to be taken as the beginning of venge-
ance or a state of enmity in a feuding society. 
Gossip, public insults, and threats also have the function of demonstrating the altered 
relationship. By making the wrong public, the dispute passes into communal knowledge. 
Gossip is used to ascertain the legitimacy of one‘s demands and the support in the com-
munity, which in turn uses gossip to constantly (keep in) check the morality and honour 
of its members. As the custom of vengeance dictates the changes in relationships to be 
public, it allows for the community to intervene in the conﬂ ict at any stage and to direct it 
towards settlement, should it consider this to be necessary. With the constant presence of 
the possibility for peace in the custom, it fulﬁ lls the functions of both social control and 
conﬂ ict resolution. The community advises both parties to the conﬂ ict, passes requests 
or threatens with supernatural (divine) retribution. When making the injury public does 
not lead to the desired settlement, the relationship can further escalate by public insults 
accompanied by various gestures (Gluckman, 1955, 9–10; Boehm, 1993, 125; Miller, 
1996, 216; Mommertz, 2001, 235–237; Wieland, 2014, 216).
Insults (Ger. schmähen, schelten, Mne. uvrijeda, Alb. fyrje) are a further escalation, 
as they have to be returned “with interest”, according to the principle of exchange, which 
dictates that a gift is to be repaid with a countergift (Mauss, 1996, 136, 148). When this 
14 An injury could also often be “selected” in retrospect or “invented” to legitimize illegitimate actions. In a 
longer dispute the injustice is often selected tactically, during the adversaries‘ time of weakness or an action 
of people only marginally connected to them (Miller, 1996, 215–217; Peters, 2000, 73, 82, 89–91; Dean, 
2007, 136–137; Wieland, 2014, 419, 429–432).
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is not possible by delivering a worse insult, the humiliation demands escalation using 
(also mutual) threats of violence, including those that are written or symbolic, or even 
violence itself, e.g. homicide. By killing the adversary the perpetrator displays courage, 
being fully aware that retaliation will follow, either from the kin or by oﬃ  cial justice. 
Every alteration of the relationship accordingly had to be made in public. To do so was to 
act honourably. The parties to a conﬂ ict had to know what response could be expected for 
their words, gestures, or other actions, so they (and the community) could act accordingly: 
those threatened with violence had to expect violence. Consequently the line between a 
threat with enmity and the declaration of enmity could be blurred (Boehm, 1993, 92–94; 
Miller, 1996, 54; Mommertz, 2001, 218–223).
Enmity (Lat. inimicitia, Ger. feindtschaﬀ t, vhede, Mne. mržnja, Alb. urrejtje, Svn. 
sovražnost), like every change in social relations, had to be declared in public. In the 
Holy Roman Empire the declaration of enmity also became a normative prescription in 
the thirteenth century (MGH, Const. 2, 196a., 253), resulting even in written declarations. 
Elsewhere, i.e. in Montenegro, the declaration was determined by the custom: had truce 
not been oﬀ ered within a certain time period, violence would have followed (Ergaver, 
2016, 108–110). Thus retributive violence was always legitimized only by the impossibil-
ity of peaceful resolution (Gluckman, 1955, 14–17; Boehm, 1993, 125).
Fig. 45: Banishment (variant). Pavle Paja Jovanović, ca. 1890–1900. Narodni muzej, 
Beograd (https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/sr/d/d0/Jovanovic_izdajica.jpg)
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According to Medieval rites the declaration of enmity is the renouncement of ﬁ delity/
faith (Lat. ﬁ des) (Miklosich, 1888, 139) or peace (Lat. diﬃ  datio, Ger. Absage). In the Em-
pire enmity had to be declared in daytime, orally or in written form (Ger. e.g. feindtbrieﬀ ), 
often at the opponent‘s home. Following the declaration the adversary became an enemy 
(Lat. inimicus, hostis, Ger. feindt), one whom it was allowed to harm. In blood feud the 
homicide itself or a public confession of the act, as a rule by ﬂ ight, was regarded as the 
declaration of enmity (Ergaver, 2016, 108). Flight to safety (i.e. banishment), whether 
abroad or, in asylum or some other refuge (Frauenstädt, 1881, 51–87; Gluckman, 1955, 
15), could also express the wish for extrajudicial conﬂ ict resolution (Oman, 2017, 161, 
173). The declaration of enmity was followed by a certain amount of time enabling the 
enemy to appropriately prepare for retribution or ﬁ nally accept the settlement. In the Holy 
Roman Empire the term was generally three days (cf. MGH, Const. 1, 318. §17, 451), also 
Fig. 46: Count Gerhard Aaberg-Valangin sends the city of Bern a written declaration 
of enmity or Fehdebrief. Speizer Chronik des Diebold Schilling, 1339 (https://www.
historisches-lexikon-bayerns.de/Lexikon/Datei:Artikel_45339_bilder_value_4_fehdew-
esen4.jpg)
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ranging from a day and a night to six weeks and three days, i.e. three court days (Brunner, 
1990, 11–12, 64, 68, 73; Mommertz, 2001, 219–223, 228; Reinle, 2013, 13–14).
Based on the principle of collective responsibility at every stage from the declaration 
of enmity to the peace settlement, vengeance includes a network of allegiances between 
all parties to the conﬂ ict, whether stemming from kinship, aﬀ ection, dependence, or ob-
ligation. All of them constitute friendship (Lat. amici, Ger. freundschaﬀ t). In the Empire 
in the Middle Ages these relations were divided very roughly into cooperators (Lat. co-
operatores, complices, Ger. Helfer, Gesellen) who perform speciﬁ c functions in the feud, 
servants (Lat. servitor, Ger. dyner) connected to the principals of the feud as employees 
or subjects, and supporters (Lat. fautores, Ger. Gönner) as representatives in feud, e.g. 
a nobleman for a burgher. Everywhere, however, cooperators perform functions such 
as providing supplies, accommodation, and intelligence (all can also be performed by 
women) and, of course, exact violent retaliation (MGH, Const. 2, 427. §§5–12, 572–573; 
Brunner, 1990, 57–61; Schäﬀ er, 2013, 204–205, 219–220; Mommertz, 2001, 218–219, 
225–231, 244, 247; Peters, 2000, 74, 77–84, 90; Reinle, 2003, 171, 183, 197).
Medieval limitations on violence were determined by the culture of honour, the 
Church and customary law and this created personal, temporal, and spatial immunities. 
Also, as a consequence of the Peace of God (Pax Dei) movement, during the European 
Middle Ages the suspension of hostilities was especially practised on Sundays and the 
most important Church holidays, including the entire liturgical periods of Advent and 
Lent. Hostilities were also to be suspended in times requiring the cooperation of the 
whole community, especially in war (Gluckman, 1955, 8; Boehm, 1993, 210–211, 222; 
cf. Schwind & Dopsch, 1895, 34. 55, 68) and for collective labour (KLD, §§ 874–885; 
SK, 155;  Hasluck, 1954, 155; Jelić, 1926, 96; Miller, 1996, 193). The custom was 
adverse to violent retaliation in sacred spaces (church, monastery, cemetery) and areas 
of certain sacral value such as homes (house, castle), settlements (village, town), fora 
(e.g. the Icelandic alþingi) and residences of authority (the chieftain‘s home, the court). 
Also communal production facilities (e.g. mills) and agricultural means of production 
(orchards, vineyards, pastures) were not to be damaged and could provide refuge. All 
cultures regarded vengeance upon women, children, the elderly, the ordained and other 
segments of society generally prohibited from carrying arms (e.g. Jews in Medieval 
Europe), as highly inappropriate or dishonourable. Except in blood vengeance (for 
homicide, grave insults or heavy wounds) the killing of an enemy was also generally 
inappropriate (MGH, Const. 2, 427. §§28–29, 574; MGH, Const. 2, 438. §31, 599; 
Bogišić, 1999, 355–356; Frauenstädt, 1881, 57–58; Jelić, 1926, 34; Gluckman, 1955, 
8–9; Brunner, 1990, 32–33, 51–52, 95–102; Boehm, 1993, 58, 198, 212; Miller, 1996, 
193, 207; Wadle, 1999, 79; Ergaver, 2016, 110).
Always appropriate was violence upon the enemy‘s property, mostly by raiding or 
robbery (of cattle, produce) and arson (of pens, stables, barns) (cf. Gluckman, 1955, 9). 
Alongside the customary limitations the tools of enmity were determined by the resources 
at the disposal of the parties to a conﬂ ict. Actual military engagements and sieges were 
rare, even in feuds among the nobility, while subjects mostly resorted to arson. Lawsuits 
were also an instrument of enmity, even though the judicial path was regarded as less 
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honourable (“subsidiary”), even in the early modern period, making it foremost the tool 
of the weaker party (Reinle, 2003, 124–133; Hausmann, 1988, 263–287; Wieland, 2014, 
426–427, 515). Ritual mutilation (Smail & Gibson, 2009, 54–61) and cannibalism as part 
of custom was rare, yet could also occur, as a breach of the custom, and consequently 
to the further dishonour of the perpetrator (SK, 266–267; cf. Kadare, 2006, 10–11), in 
particularly acrimonious conﬂ icts, including in early modern Europe (Muir, 1998, 97; 
Martin, 2017, 102). “Magic” was also a common instrument of enmity, while memory 
was always present in vengeance, fuelling or sustaining animosity in stories, poetry, or 
chronicles, which oﬀ ered a wide array of “injustices” to “legitimize” breaches of truce or 
even peace. Especially women were the caretakers of familial memory (Brunner, 1990, 
84–89; Boehm, 1993, 59; Peters, 2000, 83, 96; Carroll, 2006, 9, 17, 20; Dean, 2007, 137; 
Byock, 2007, 98–111; Reinle, 2014, 10; Muir, 2017, 4–8).
Still, enmity never lasted forever (Boehm, 1993, 221), even if many conﬂ icts lasting 
for a very long time are attested in sources (Stanojević, 2007, 14–15, 18, 34–35, 43–45, 
59–64; Bicheno, 2007; Smail, 2007; Darovec, 2016).
The ﬁ rst stage or rite of settling enmity was to make truce (Lat. treuga, amicitia, 
concordia, compromisso, ﬁ des, ﬁ ducias, reconciliacio, pax, treugis manualibus, Ger. 
hantfrid, frid, schlechten frid, sůne) (ARS, AS 1063/4491, 23 August 1440, Haimburg; 
Monasterium, HHStA Salzburg, AUR 1286 XII 16; MGH, Const. 1, 318. §18, 451; MGH, 
Const. 2, 196a. 253–255; MGH, Const. 2, 427., 570–579).
Fig. 47: Ramón Berenguer IV receives homage from his vassal the Señor de Perelada in 
1132 (https://www.pinterest.com/pin/540572761512953646/)
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Truce is distinguised from peace by the durability of peace and speciﬁ c words and 
gestures that conclude it. Until these were spoken and made, an agreement was always 
only a truce, regardless of the words used for peace (e.g. Lat. pax, Ger. Friede, Sühne) 
in the sources (Rolandino, 1546, 158r–159v). As stressed by Medieval jurists,15 atten-
tion had to be given to the relationship that was established and publicly demonstrated 
through appropriate diction and gestures. The relationship established by truce was that 
of friendship (Lat. amicitia). Truce always had to be public to inform everyone involved 
in the conﬂ ict that it was made, so they would suspend hostilities. Truce was a shorter 
or longer but always temporary period of mutual renouncement of enmity, providing 
the parties to the conﬂ ict with time to assess the damages given and received, and to 
consider whether it was more honourable (worthwhile) to settle the conﬂ ict by making 
peace or to resume hostilities. Truce also served to cool the parties‘ emotions, easing 
peacemaking, just like banishment16 (Ita. bando, Ger. Bann), i.e. the perpetrator‘s ﬂ ight 
into church asylum or another refuge, particularly in settling homicides. The prerequisite 
for truce was a request for it, demanding ritual self-humiliation from the petitioner (gift 
and countergift, homage). The request could be also made by the wives and daughters 
(maidens) of the petitioner‘s kin (same for peace). As a rule, at least the ﬁ rst request was 
symbolically rejected (Gluckman, 1955, 15; Ergaver, 2016, 109), until ﬁ nally accepted 
with an oath of security (Lat. securitas, Ger. sicherheit) or safe conduct (Lat. salvus 
conductus, Ger. sicheres gleyt), which protected the enemy from retaliation or arrest. The 
oath of truce (Lat. ﬁ des) was given by the injured party to the perpetrator and made on 
sacred (e.g. scripture, relics) and other symbolic objects. The agreement or compromise 
for truce can only exceptionally be made by the parties to the conﬂ ict themselves, and as 
a rule by mediators (Ger. mitler, Mne. posrednik, Alb. ndërmjetës, Svn. (po)srednik) or 
arbiters (Lat. amicabilis compositor, Ger. compromitendt, schidman, Mne. kmet, arbitar, 
Alb. pleqnarët). Generally there were an equal number of arbiters for both parties, and 
they were chosen and accepted by both based on their moral virtue and legal competence: 
respected members of society, e.g. village elders, clergy, representatives of urban authori-
ties, inﬂ uential local nobility or distinct keepers of legal customs or professional jurists 
(notaries, lawyers). In Medieval and early modern communities across Europe,17 where 
both customary and the Roman legal order coexisted, at the beginning of the arbitration 
the parties to the conﬂ ict had to notify the arbiters as to whether they wished to settle 
according to law or according to custom (Lat. per viam iuris vel per amicabilem viam, 
15 For instance by the renowned thirteenth-century notary, judge, and university professor Rolandino (Ro-
landinus Rudolphi de Passageriis, ca. 1215–1300). His monumental collection of norms, ﬁ rst published in 
print in 1546, is still used for the education of notaries today (Darovec, 2016, 16).
16 In the early modern period customary banishment of the perpetrator into another jurisdiction, intended to 
ease peacemaking, was transformed by central authorities into a legal institution aimed at the eradication of 
banditry, thus ignoring local jurisdictions. Consequently, the local fora were excluded from peacemaking, 
which at ﬁ rst both prolonged and intensiﬁ ed feuding (Povolo, 2015, 215, 219, 225; cf. Miller, 1996, 239, 
263, 275). 
17 In rural communities of South-Eastern Europe, especially in Montenegrin and Albanian territories, conﬂ icts 
were settled exclusively by custom, which was by large also encouraged by both the Venetian and Ottoman 
authorities (Ergaver, 2017).
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amicabilis compositio, Ger. mit minne oder mir dem rehten, wilkhürlichen), i.e. amicably 
and with love. In either case the parties pledged to respect the arbitration in advance and 
to pay any damages for the eventual violation of the truce to the arbiters who had guar-
anteed it (hence ﬁ ducias, surety). Sanctions for violations of a truce imposed by a court 
were harsher and included corporal punishment equal to that for perjury: the violator 
would lose the right hand or the index and middle ﬁ nger used in the gesture for swearing 
an oath. Hence, in the Empire, the truce is also known as Handfriede, “peace by hand”, 
opposite to a lasting peace concluded with a kiss from the representative of the injured 
party, the Mundsühner. The penalty for violating truce acted as peace with the court as the 
guarantor of the truce, otherwise the violator was outlawed (Ger. Acht). The penalty for 
violating truce by means of homicide was death. Accepting the compromise concluded 
the truce, which came into force when the security was given between the enemies.18 As a 
18 As late as the end of the seventeenth century the central judicial authority of the Venetian Republic, the 
Fig. 48: HAROLD SACRAMENTUM FECIT VVILLELMO DUCI: “Harold made an 
oath to Duke William” (Bayeux Tapestry). This scene is said in the previous scene on 
the Tapestry to have taken place at Bagia (Bayeux, probably in Bayeux Cathedral). It 
shows Harold touching two altars with the enthroned Duke looking on, and is central 
to the Norman Invasion of England (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bayeux_Tapes-
try_scene23_Harold_sacramentum_fecit_Willelmo_ducit.jpg)
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rule truce lasted from a few months up to a year, when not renewed or extended. Once it 
expired or was broken, hostilities would be resumed. Truce could be renewed many times 
before peace was made. Thus, there could be many compromises and truces in vengeance, 
but only one lasting peace could be made. Generally truces were made and expired on an 
important Church holiday, e.g. Pentecost, All Saints‘ Day or Nativity of John the Baptist 
(ARS, AS 721, kn. 19 (1644–1651), 15 May 1646, 391–392; Rolandino, 1546, f. 147r–v; 
MGH, Const. 2, 427. §8, 573; MGH, Const. 2, 438. §8, 597; KLD, §§ 602–639; Schwind 
& Dopsch, 1895, 34., §63, 70; SK, 149–154; Frauenstädt, 1881, 75–83, 106–109, 131, 
143; Miklosich, 1888, 137–138; Evans-Pritchard, 1940, 180; Medaković, 1960, 62–63, 
67; Kos, 1994, 124; Althoﬀ , 1997, 92; Leth Jespersen, 2009, 18–19, 40; Pitt-Rivers, 2012; 
Darovec, 2016, 14–15, 20–22, 38; Povolo, 2017; Oman, 2017, 169, 173). 
Should the truce have held, it could be followed by lasting peace, made based on 
the terms agreed upon during the truce by the parties to the conﬂ ict, the arbiters, or the 
court. The peace treaty could undergo many editions before it was unanimously accepted 
and contractually composed (Lat. instrumentum pacis et concordiae, Ger. Sühnevertrag), 
including according to a notarial form. The Medieval and early modern notarial form 
begins stating, that the parties to the conﬂ ict have concluded peace, forgiveness, and 
concord, and put an end to their enmity with the kiss of peace: fecerunt adinvicem osculo 
pacis vicissim inter eos veniente, Pacem perpetuam, ﬁ nem, remissionem, atque concor-
diam (Rolandino, 1546, f. 158r). Montenegrin sources also attest: ﬁ ne silenzio quiete et 
pace perpetua (IAK, SN LXX, 22 July 1599, 137–138).
The contract was conﬁ rmed by the rituals or, rather, the ceremony of peacemaking, 
dictated by the injured party and publicly demonstrated with symbolic words, gestures, 
and objects. The rituals consisted of self-humiliation (gift and countergift, homage), 
friendship (faith, truce), and the establishment of lasting peace (compensation, love, 
forgiveness), thus renewing certain rites that were already present in the making of truce. 
Self-humiliation (in the form of penance) followed the recording of the peace treaty, 
while the ceremony19 was performed inside or in front of a church or court (e.g. town 
hall) or at the victim‘s grave. Especially perpetrators of homicide had to request peace 
barefoot and bareheaded, dressed only in penitential undergarments, sometimes having 
their hands tied. They would sometimes be carrying a dog or a saddle on their backs, yet 
as a rule a heavy penitential candle in their hands or the murder weapon hung around 
their necks. The perpetrator approached the victim‘s kin on all fours or on his knees, or 
kneeled (Lat. ﬂ exibus genibus, Ger. Fußfall, Kniefall) every few steps. Peace and forgive-
ness was requested by the perpetrator, his female kin, and/or arbiters or other members 
of the community witnessing the ritual. In peacemaking a burgher could be represented 
Consiglio di Dieci, resolved conﬂ icts of blood among (at least) the urban nobility through mediation by 
presiding over the swearing of the oaths of friendship, thus concluding a truce. The truce allowed potential 
avengers to leave house arrest (Liberazione di sequestro) (ASVe. CCD-LR, b. 258, No. 197, 200–202, 
206–210, Koper-Capodistria, 1684; comp. ﬁ rst chapter).
19 Cf. Vialla de Sommières: Voyage historique et politique au Montenegro, Acte de la réconciliation publique, 
1820, p. 338 (Wikimedia Commons, VDS pg390 Act de Réconciliation publique devant le Tribunal du 
Kméti.jpg) (Darovec, 2017, 85).
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by the town or city council, a vassal or subject by his lord, a priest by his bishop, a 
member of a tribe or clan by his chieftain, a member of a kin by his father, godfather, 
or other blood relative, or head of the household. Following a few consecutive requests 
the representative of the injured party (Mne. umirnik, Alb. pajtues) lifted the perpetrator 
to his feet and they exchanged the kiss of peace (Lat. osculum pacis, Ita. baccio di 
pace, Ger. Friedenskuss, Mne. cjelov mira, poljubac mira) on the mouth or cheek. The 
kiss signiﬁ ed the parties‘ equality20 (Schmitt, 2000, 331–332; Bogišić, 1999, 371–372; 
Rovinskiĭ, 1994, 259; cf. Boehm, 1993, 136; Darovec, 2016, 24; Ergaver, 2017, 197) 
and alleviated any humiliating acts performed by the perpetrator (Carroll, 2011, 90–91), 
demonstrating that he had been forgiven from the heart and that the peace was sincere, 
thus uniting the former enemies in friendship, brotherhood, godfatherhood, and love 
(Lat. amor, Ger. Minne, Liebe) as a formal covenant (Petkov, 2003, 33–34). Medieval 
jurists explicitly stated that there was no lasting peace without the kiss of peace (Rolan-
dino, 1546, f. 158r–159v). During the early modern period it was gradually replaced by 
the embrace and/or handshake,21 which could also complement it, as attested inter alia in 
20 Thus it was inapropriate to be given to those of inferior status. In seventeenth-century Italy it was apropriate 
that “inferiors receive their embraces around the neck; equals hold each other equally on their arms and 
they kiss; and superiors are to be approached by embracing them around the hips while bowing, making a 
sign of wishing to kiss their hand” (Carroll, 2016, 130).
21 Reformers, both Protestant and Catholic, regarded the kiss as too “carnal”, even though it had already been 
in decline since the ﬁ fteenth century. It was ﬁ rst removed from church service, vanishing as a legal gesture 
Fig. 49: Kiss of Peace settling the enmity. Cambridge Ee.3.59, The Life of King Edward 
the Confessor, ca. 1250–1260 (http://manuscriptminiatures.com/4450/10071/)
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Montenegro: si abracionno, et in segno di […] perpetua pace bacciono (IAK, SN LXX, 
9 January 1599, 137–138). The kiss was followed by the oral reading of the peace treaty 
to those present, which was conﬁ rmed by a handshake as the fundamental legal gesture 
for concluding contracts (Schmitt, 2000, 108–109). With the peace treaty both parties for 
themselves and their heirs mutually and lastingly renounced enmity (Ger. Urfehde),22 a 
composition (Lat. compositio, Ger. Sühnegeld) or, for homicide, blood money (Germanic 
wergeld, Mne. krvnina, vražda, Alb. parë i gjakut) was set, depending on the gravity of 
the oﬀ ence and the status of those involved. In societies with little cash, composition 
could be symbolic or in kind: valuable tableware or weapons, arable land, livestock, 
produce, etc. (Petranović, 1868, 19; Bogišić, 1999, 372–273; Evans-Pritchard, 1940, 
192, 197; Verdier, 1980, 20; Boehm, 1993, 137). The arbiters could also ask the injured 
party what the perpetrators had gained by paying composition, to which the wronged 
party answered: lasting peace (Lat. pax et concordia perpetua, plenam celebraui con-
cordiam, Ger. Ewige Sühne und Frieden, ewige orfeyde, vrvehe vnd si svne, gantze sůne, 
gantz ab vnd verrichtet).23 Composition settled all damages, including the treatment and 
care of the victim, and the costs of funerals, lawsuits, and trials. In Christianity settling 
blood included requiems for the victim‘s soul and the erection of memorials. Penance 
for homicide was also imposed by fasting, a temporary ban from attending church 
services, a pilgrimage, by giving alms, etc. In some areas following the peace the killer 
had to avoid the victim‘s kin as much as possible for a year and a day. Elsewhere, peace 
was demonstrated by sharing common meals or sleeping in the same bed, i.e. convivia 
(van Eickels, 1997, 137–139; Brown, 2011, 40). Always, however, bygones had to be 
bygones, as propriety demanded that the conﬂ ict had to be forgotten. Following the 
ritual ceremony of peacemaking in Christianity both parties jointly attended mass, hence 
peace was commonly made on a Church holiday or on a Sunday. In Central and Western 
during the seventeenth century (Koslofsky, 2005, 25, 33; Carroll, 2016, 128–129; Marinelli, 2017).
22 Literally “not feud”. The renouncement of enmity/vengeance was also the oath given by a released captive in 
a feud to his enemy or by the defendant or suspect to the court and plaintiﬀ , as well as everyone who aided in 
his or her arrest. It was closely related to the idea of accomodation, having both the function of submission and 
an agreement to compromise. As a legal institution Urfehde originated in peace treaties, where it was given as 
a temporary (in truce) or lasting renouncement of enmity (ewige orfeyde) and had to be made public. In peace 
treaties the renouncement was descriptive and in the Holy Roman Empire rarely was the word Urfehde used, 
while in the early modern period Urfehden given to the courts were speciﬁ c documents. These could be given 
for any oﬀ ence punishable by imprisonment. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Urfehde was only a 
formal conﬁ rmation (acceptance) of the judgement by the convict, as a rule including banishment and/or ﬁ ne 
in return in place of corporal punishment. Corporal punishment, including the death penalty, was exacted if 
the renouncement was violated. In the early modern period Urfehde mostly had the function of maintaining 
the moral and social order. Urfehde and its English counterpart, the recognisance, were sworn in front of the 
magistrate, being a formal part of the legal process. Even if their Italian equivalent, the rinunce, was a private 
agreement (Kos, 1994, 118–120; Blauert, 2000, 13–21; Leth Jespersen, 2009, 38; Carroll, 2011, 87), it still 
required either a conﬁ rmation by notaries or before authorities even in the early modern period (Povolo, 1997, 
158–166), as is attested in the statutes of the County of Val Morena from 1600 (Cesca, 2009, 110–115).
23 In Montenegro the newly established spiritual bonds of godfatherhoods and brotherhoods were regarded as 
the main accomplishments of peacemaking, being both new alliances and guarantees for the peace to last 
(Ergaver, 2017, 194–198).
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Europe, especially in the early modern period, settling of blood had to be approved by 
the court, which issued a written copy of the settlement to both parties. In Italy this 
could still in early modernity be issued by the notary, without involving the court. Peace 
could however never be truly enforced by the courts, as it would not last. Sanctions for 
violations of peace were monetary, but could also include the death penalty. The peace 
settlement could be followed by marriages and engagements or spiritual bonds such as 
godfatherhoods and brotherhoods. As already the kiss of peace signiﬁ ed the union of the 
two families, new familial bonds signiﬁ cantly reinforced and acted as sureties for the 
peace. The peace settlement brought the relationship of enmity and vengeance to an end 
and the parties entered into a new relationship (ARS, AS 1063/4511, 16 August 1443, 
Wiener Neustadt; Monasterium, HHStA Salzburg, AUR 1286 XII 16; Rolandino, 1546, 
f. 158r–159v; Frauenstädt, 1881, 115–119, 125–145, 153–157, 164; Brunner, 1990, 107; 
Verdier, 1980, 25–31; Althoﬀ , 1997, 115–121; Peters, 2000, 70; Carroll, 2003, 92, 100; 
Fig. 50: Kiss of Peace beetwen Justice and Peace. Giovanni Battista Tiepolo (1696–1770) 
(https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tiepolo_Justice_and_Peace.jpg)
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Carroll, 2006, 232; Leth Jespersen, 2009, 19; Withington, 2013; Darovec, 2014, 492; 
Darovec, 2016, 38; Darovec, 2017, 64, 69, 79, 84; Ergaver, 2017, 196–197).
The herein presented ritual of vengeance, which served as the basis for our selection 
of terms, at ﬁ rst glance deﬁ nitely shows an idealized image or a myth. Yet, as numerous 
sources attest, it was a myth that worked well in practice, especially through ritual ceremo-
nies.24 Still, just as there are plenty of procedural complications and plenty of laws being 
violated in present times, there was just as much respect and disrespect for the rituals of 
vengeance in the past. Hence the power (political, economic, military, of social standing, 
etc.) or size of a community, as well as its capability to strike up alliances in the struggle for 
resources and defence, often determined the outcome of conﬂ icts. However, and in this we 
can agree with Max Gluckman, “over longer periods of time and wider ranges of society the 
conﬂ icts between these relationships become cohesion” (Gluckman, 1955, 19).
Regarding the questions raised in the introduction, it can be established that many 
terms and concepts of the ritual of the customary system of conﬂ ict resolution have by 
and large undergone a thorough redeﬁ nition in contemporary legal and public life, includ-
ing the system’s central phenomenon: vengeance. These redeﬁ nitions are a consequence 
of the fundamental social changes that have taken place since the end of the Middle 
Ages. Increasing social cohesion in particular, which resulted in increasingly larger 
tightly-knit units, necessitated the formation of appropriate institutions that allowed the 
state to establish control of its territory. The key role in the centralization of most early 
modern European states was played by their centralized judicial institutions, tax system, 
and military. In the customary system of conﬂ ict resolution since the end of the Middle 
Ages the state occupied the role of mediators and arbiters, gradually pushing them out of 
the ritual and taking control of the system of conﬂ ict resolution. This established the state 
as the only legitimate avenger.
24 The website http://www5.unive.it/faida_msca contains a vast collection of illustrations from various 
sources and artists ranging from the sixth to the nineteenth century, which truthfully depict the ritual gestu-
res, customs, and terms discussed in this paper.
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Fig. 51: Wedding of Maria de Medici and Henry IV of France. Jacopo da Empoli (1600) 
(https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Marie_de_Medici%27s_marriage.jpg).
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GLOSSARY
The following glossary25 is meant as a tool for the research on vengeance as a custom-
ary system of conﬂ ict resolution, especially for studies predicated on European Medieval 
and also early modern sources. We also believe that the glossary can be of use for research 
on vengeance in other eras and/or on other continents. Due to the abundance of synonyms 
denoting the key rites of vengeance from the outbreak of hostilities to the establishment 
of peace, the glossary is limited to the most important or the most common terms and 
phrases found in the Western, Central, and Southern-European sources, particularly from 
the Holy Roman Empire and the Venetian territories. At the same time it is our inten-
tion to emphasize the existence of a plethora of synonyms for the most terms, concepts, 
gestures, and emotions expressed in the rituals of vengeance in the customary system 
of conﬂ ict resolution. While the glossary is primarily predicated on Medieval sources, 
many terms and phrases were still in use in the early modern period and, especially in the 
Mediterranean, even later.
The conceptual historiographical and terminological analysis presented in the paper 
has shown that regardless of the social and political organisation of a speciﬁ c region, 
contextually corresponding key terms and phrases of the custom of vengeance existed in 
many European languages, especially during the Middle Ages and some even in the early 
modern period. The analysis already presented in the paper is expanded in the glossary 
with a broader language of vengeance. 
It also has to be emphasized that in our research on vengeance we found an abundance 
of various synonyms for certain terms and phrases, especially in Latin, German, and (via 
dictionaries) Slovene. Almost all are used in the glossary.
Latin, as the primary language of law in premodern Europe, was chosen as the ﬁ rst 
language of the glossary. The herein used Latin terms and phrases are almost exclusively 
taken from Medieval and early modern sources, as are most Italian, Montenegrin, and Al-
banian terms and phrases. German and Slovene terms and phrases, on the other hand, are 
divided into modern and those taken from Medieval and early modern sources. German 
premodern terms and phrases are given in italics and in the original ortography. Slovene 
terms and phrases given in italics, yet transliterated into Gaj‘s Latin alphabet, are mostly 
taken from German-Slovene and Latin-Slovene dictionaries,26 dating from the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries. At the same time we would very much like to see the glossary 
expanded with additional languages from around the world.27
25 The glossary follows the example of Christopher Boehm, who presented corresponding English words for 
those used in the language of vengeance speciﬁ c to the Montenegrin area (Boehm, 1993, xvii–xix).
26 Premodern legal sources in Slovene, especially those regarding criminal law, are very rare as most were 
written in either Latin or German, even if Slovene was the oral language of law (Golec, 2016, 148–149).
27 The words and phrases given in the glossary are taken from the sources and literature already cited in the 
paper thus far, while the rest are taken from: Megiser, 1592; Vorenc & Kastelec, 1680/85; Wolf, 1860; 
Karadžić, 1966; Mann, 1948; Stevanović et al., 1983; Dolenc, 1939; Berishaj, 1989; Hysa, 1995; Orel, 
1998; Bernik et al., 2004; Golec, 2016.
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LATIN  ENGLISH ITALIAN
GERMAN 
(contemporary, 
sources)
SHTOKAVIAN  
(Montenegro) ALBANIAN
 SLOVENE 
(contemporary, 
sources)
alter-
catio, 
con-
tentio, di-
scordia, 
iniuria, 
intentio, 
iurgium, 
tumultus
 conﬂ ict, 
contention 
discord, 
strife, 
quarrel
 conﬂ itto, 
discordia
Konﬂ ikt, Streit, 
Zwitracht, 
beschwerung, 
groll, irrung, 
krieg, misshe-
lung, rumor, 
ungute, unwill, 
zwayung, 
zwitracht
svadja, konﬂ ikt, 
sukob
 armiqësi, 
konﬂ ikt
spor, hrup, 
krejg, sovraštvu, 
nadležnost, 
negliha, nepokoj, 
neskladnost, 
neštimnost,
nevola, 
prepirajnje, 
svada, zatažba, 
zuparnost 
amica-
bilis
 customary, 
in accor-
dance with 
custom
 consuetu-
dinario
nach 
Gewonheit, 
nach Gewon-
heitsrecht, nach 
Rechtsgewon-
heit, mit minne, 
wilkhürlichen, 
freundlich, 
gütlich
prema običaju, 
po zakonu 
zemaljskome, po 
kuštumu zemlje
i bërë zakon, 
zakonshëm
po običaju 
amicabi-
lis com-
positio, 
arbitrium
 arbitration,  
compositi-
on, reconci-
liation 
arbitrato, 
composizi-
one
Ausgleich, 
Vergleich, 
Schiedsurteil, 
wilkur
plemenski sud, 
arbitraža, pomi-
renje, plećnija
 pleqësia
poravnava, 
razsodba, sodni 
zbor, dobra 
vojla, svoja 
vojlia
amicabi-
lis com-
positor, 
arbiter, 
arbitra-
tor, boni 
homines
 arbiter, 
arbitrator, 
good men 
 arbitro, 
giudice, 
composito-
re amiche-
vole, buoni 
uomini
Schiedsrichter,  
compromitendt, 
schidman
kmet,
arbiter, 
posrednik,sud 
dobrih ljudi
 pleqnarët,  
pajtues, ndër-
mjetësues, 
burrat e mirë, 
burrat e urtë
razsodnik,      
ločnik,   rezloč-
nik, dobri ljudje
amicitia  friendship amicizia Freundschaft prijateljstvo miqësia prijateljstvo, 
perjasèn, priazn
amor  love  amore Liebe, minne ljubav dashuria ljubezen, priazen
arbitrari  to arbitrate arbitrato compromitiern suditi gjykoj, trup 
gjykues
razsojati, mejniti, 
soditi
arbiter 
esse,
com-
ponere, 
concilia-
re, con-
ciliare 
pacem, 
concor-
dare, 
paciﬁ ca-
re, recon-
ciliare 
 to make 
peace, to 
reconcile
stringere la 
pace
stabilire la 
pace
ausgleichen, 
einigen, 
vergleichen, 
versöhnen, 
fried machen, 
richten, taidi-
gen, verrichten, 
vertragen
miriti se, miriti 
krvi, miriti rane
pajtoj, 
paqësoj
pomiriti se, 
poravnati se, 
spraviti se, 
glihati, mir 
sturiti, miriti,  
složiti, spraviti, 
spet spraviti, 
spravo delati, 
sprijazniti, vkup 
rajmati
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bandum, 
exilium, 
excom-
munica-
tio
 banishment, 
exile, 
outlawry 
bando
Bann, Verban-
nung, Acht, 
mordtacht
odličenje, pro-
gon, izgnanstvo
dëbim, dëboj
izgon; bandižaj-
ne; bando, dano 
slanu iz dežele
caedes, 
homi-
cidium, 
interfec-
tus
 homicide omicidio Totschlag ubistvo vrasje uboj, poboj, vbijanje
caeremo-
nia ceremony cerimonia Zeremonie
svečanost, 
ceremonija
ceremoni
slavnost, slove-
snost, svečanost, 
ceremonija
certamen combat combatti-mento Gefecht ratovanje, borba betejë, luftë  spopad
compater  godfather padrino, compare Pate kum kumbarë  boter
compa-
tritas
 goodfather-
hood padrinato Patenschaft kumstvo kumbari  botrstvo
compo-
sitio
wergeld, 
wergild, 
blood 
money
tributo di 
sangue
Wergeld, 
manngeld, 
sühnegeld
krvnina, krvavi 
novac,
vražda,
odšteta
pare e gjakut,
kompensim
spravnina, kom-
pozicija, krvnina, 
odškodnina,
vražda, krvavi 
penez, krvarina
com-
positio, 
compro-
missum, 
pacisci
 agreement,
 compro-
mise
composizi-
one, com-
promesso
Ausgleich, 
Einigung, 
Kompromiss, 
Vergleich
dogovor, 
kompromis, 
sporazum
marrëveshje, 
kompromis
dogovor; 
kompromis; 
oblublenje 
dati, od ene inu 
druge strani za 
kakeršno glihin-
go,  s persego; 
pervoliti; v roko 
seči; zavezo 
delati; zglihati
concor-
dia
 concord, 
unity concordia Einigkeit sloga, jedinstvo
përshtatje, 
me ra dakord
sloga, složnost, 
skladanje, 
zglihanje
damniﬁ -
care, dare 
damnum, 
nocere
 to damage, 
to harm
danneggia-
re, nuocere
schaden, 
schädigen
oštećenja, 
naškoditi
 dëmtoj škodovati
damnum damage danno Schaden šteta dëm škoda 
deridere, 
oﬀ en-
dere, 
vulnerare
 to insult, to 
oﬀ end
oﬀ endere
beleidigen, 
beschämen, 
schimpfen, 
verspoten, 
ausschreien, 
aussprengen, 
ausspeien, 
schmähen, 
schelten, 
spotten
povrjediti, uvrje-
diti, vrijeđati
ofendoj
žaliti,užaliti, 
posmehovati, 
režaliti, spota-
kniti, špotati, 
zadervižati, 
zameriti
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devasta-
tio  devastation devastare
Wüstung, 
grundstöer
devastacija, 
pustoš
mësymje, 
shkretoj
pustošenje, 
zatrenje
defensio 
per 
patrem
 (legal) 
defence by 
ones father
 difesa per 
patrem
Rechtsverteidi-
gung durch den 
Vater
odbrana od 
strane oca
mbrojtje nga 
babai
 obramba po 
očetu
diﬃ  datio
 renunciati-
on of peace 
rinunciare 
alla pace
Absage, abkla-
ge, austretten, 
widerbot, 
widersage
odricanje od 
mira
  me heq dorë 
nga paqja
odpoved miru, 
odpoved 
zvestobe
diﬃ  dator
 the one 
who 
announces 
hostility, 
the one who 
renounces 
peace,  
defyer (in 
criminal 
law)
 sﬁ dante
Absager (in 
criminal law)
onaj koji 
najavljuje 
neprijateljstvo
 sﬁ dues
odpovednik (in 
criminal law)
dignatio, 
honor, 
honos
 honour  onore Ehre čast  nder čast, spoštovanje
dissidere, 
inimicari  in enmity
creare 
inimicizia
verfeindet sein, 
zwiträchtig sein
u svađi, u 
neprijateljstvu,
u krvi, zakrvljeni 
krijoj 
armiqësi
sovražnost imeti, 
v sovražnosti biti
expulsus, 
ex(s)
ul, pro-
scriptus, 
relegatus, 
homo 
sacer, 
excom-
munica-
tus
 outlaw, 
bandit, 
exile, the 
banished 
 bandito, 
fuorilegge
 Verbannter, 
Geächteter, 
Friedloser, 
vogelfrey
odličeni, 
prognanik
 bandit, 
jashtë ligjit
 izobčenec, 
izgnanec, 
brezpokojnež, 
vižan
faida, 
querella
 feud, 
quarrel
faida, 
vendetta, 
querela
Fehde, 
abgesagte 
feindtschaﬀ t, 
befehdung, 
fedeschaﬀ t
osveta, zavađa hakmarrje
fajda, maščeva-
nje, spor
fama reputation fama Ruf, Gesicht ugled, reputacija, obraz dinjitet  ugled
familia, 
cognatio
 family, 
household, 
house, 
lineage, kin
 famiglia, 
parentela
Familie, Ge-
schlecht, Haus, 
Haushalt, Sippe, 
Verwandtschaft 
freundtschaft
porodica, 
rodbina
 familja, 
lidhje 
fareﬁ snore
 družina, rod, 
rodbina, sorod-
stvo, žlahta, 
narod
ﬁ de-
iussor, 
sponsor
 guarantor, 
warrantor
 ﬁ de-
iussore, 
ﬁ duciario
Bürge, Garant jemac, dorzon, garant  dorëzan porok
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ﬁ dem 
dare, 
iurare
 to swear an 
oath
giuramen-
to schwören
dati tvrdu vjeru, 
zaklinjati se, 
položiti zakletvu
betim
priseči, persega-
ti, v roke seči, za 
gvišno oblubiti, 
zakleti
ﬁ des
 trust, 
ﬁ delity, 
faith
 fede, 
ﬁ ducia
Treue, Glaube vjera, vjernost  besë vera, zvestoba, 
zveščina
ﬁ ducia, 
ﬁ de-
iussio, 
sponsio
 surety, 
warranty
 garanzia, 
ﬁ deiussio-
ne piezaria
Bürgschaft, 
Haftung
jemstvo, garan-
cija, dorezanija
 dorëzan, 
garant
poroštvo, 
jamstvo, obluba, 
obečanje, 
zavuplivost
ﬂ ectere 
genua, 
ﬂ exis 
genibus
 to kneel inginoc-chiarsi die Knie biegen klečati
me ra në 
gjunjë, me u 
gjunjëzu
poklekniti, 
pokloniti
forum  court of arbitration
composi-
tori
Schiedsgericht, 
taiding
plemenski sud, 
skup, arbitražni 
sud, plećnija
pleqësia
 razsodišče, 
veča, pravda
fraterni-
tas
brother-
hood, con-
fraternity, 
fraternity
fratellanza, 
fraternità, 
confrate-
rnità
Bruderschaft bratstvo, 
pobratimstvo
ﬁ s, vëllazëri 
 bratstvo, 
bratovščina, 
pobratimstvo
furor, ira  anger, fury, rage  furore Wut, Zorn ljutnja, bijes  tërbim  bes, srd
homici-
da,
interfec-
tor
 killer
assassino, 
omicida, 
uccisore
Totschläger
krvnik,
ubica
 gjaks, 
gjaksor, 
vrasës
ubijalec, bojnik, 
ubijavnik, 
vbijenik
homi-
cidium 
involun-
tarium
involuntary 
manslaugh-
ter
 omicidio 
pensato
Tötung ohne 
Vorbedacht
ubistvo iz 
nehata, ubistvo 
grijehom
  vrasje e 
pavullnet-
shme
 nenaklepni uboj
humili-
atio  humiliation
umilia-
zione
Beschämung, 
Demütigung, 
Erniedrigung 
poniženje poshtërim
ponižanje, 
pohlevnost 
ignomi-
nia
 dishonour, 
shame
 disonore, 
vergogna 
Schande sram, bruka  turp sramota, špot
indignans the oﬀ ended oﬀ eso Beleidigter uvrijeđeni  i fyer  užaljeni, 
razžaljeni
infamia infamy, bad reputation infamia
Verruf, 
schlechter Ruf, 
böser Ruf
loš glas, sramota famë e keqe
 slab glas, 
zloglasnost
inimicus  enemy nemico Feind neprijatelj armik sovražnik, nepri-atal, sovraže
inimi-
citia, 
odium
enmity (as 
emotion: 
animosity, 
hate)
inimicizia, 
odio
Feindschaft, 
feindtschaﬀ t, 
veht, uble 
unnachpar-
schaﬀ t, zorn (as 
emotion: Haß)
neprijateljstvo, 
mržnja, 
animozitet
armiqësi, 
urrejtje
sovražnost, 
čert, nenavist, 
nepriatelstvu, 
sovraštvu (as 
emotion: mržnja, 
sovraštvo)
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iniuria, 
oﬀ ensa, 
vulnus
 aﬀ ront, 
injury, 
insult, 
oﬀ ence 
wrong
 ingiuria
Beleidigung,
Beschimpfung, 
Unrecht, 
Verspotung, 
ehr verletzung, 
iniuiri schelt-
wart
povreda, uvreda dëmtim
krivica, 
žalitev, sramota, 
zašmaganje, 
zašpotovanje
inimicitia 
capitalis, 
inimicitia 
mortalis, 
vindicta 
mortis
 blood 
feud, blood   
revenge
vendetta di 
sangue
Blutrache, 
Totschlags-
fehde, haup-
tveintschaft, 
totveintschaft
krvna osveta gjakmarrje
krvno 
maščevanje
interces-
sio mediation
media-
zione Mediation posredovanje ndërhyrje
posredovanje, 
mediacija
inter-
fectus 
volunta-
rius
murder, 
voluntary 
manslau-
ghter 
omicido 
puro e 
proditorio
Mord
ubistvo iz 
koristi, ubistvo 
navlaš
  vrasje e 
pastër e 
vullnetare
 naklepni uboj, 
umor
iudicium court tribunale Gericht sud gjykatë sodišče, sodni zbor
iuramen-
tum  oath
 giura-
mento Eid, Schwur zakletva  beja
prisega, rotejnje, 
rote
lex  law  legge Gesetz zakon  ligj, zakon  zakon
malefac-
tor,
auctor
perpetrator  colpevole, autore Täter
krivac, izvršilac,
rukostavnik
fajtor, autor  storilec, 
hudodelec
matrimo-
nium matrimony
matrimo-
nio Ehe brak martesë zakon
mediator  mediator mediatore Vermittler, mitler posrednik  ndërmjetës
posrednik, medi-
ator,  srejdnik
mos, 
consue-
tudo
 custom  consuetu-dine Gewonheit običaj  adet, zakon  običaj
oﬀ ensor  oﬀ ender  oﬀ ensore Beleidiger uvredilac, uvre-
dioc, počinilac
 fyes  žalivec
osculum 
pacis
 kiss of 
peace
 bacio 
della pace Friedenskuss
cjelov mira, 
poljubac mira
puthja e 
paqes poljub miru
paciﬁ ca-
tor  peacemaker
 paciﬁ cato-
re, paciere
Friedensstifter, 
mundsühner
umirnik, 
mirotvorac
 pajtues
pomiritelj, 
miritelj
pax 
sanguinis
 settling 
blood pace Totschlagssühne umir krvi
pajtimi i 
gjakut
pomiritev krvi
pax  peace pace Friede mir paqe mir
pax et 
con-
cordia 
perpetua, 
plena 
concor-
dia
 lasting 
peace
pace 
duratura
Ewige Sühne 
und Frieden, 
ewige orfeyde, 
ewige sune und 
fried, gantze 
sune, urvehe 
und sune
večni mir i 
ljubav
paqe ë 
qëndrueshme
trajni mir, gvišen 
inu zažihran mir 
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praeda, 
spoliatio, 
incursio
 pillage, 
robbery
 incursio-
ne, furto, 
rapina
Raub pljačka, razboj-
ništvo
bastisje, 
vjedhje, 
grabitje
plenjenje, 
ropanje, pajdaš
praedare, 
spoliare
 to pillage, 
to rob
saccheg-
giare, 
rapinare
rauben plačkanje, 
četovanje
plaçkitje
pleniti, ropati, 
opuliti,  po sili 
vzeti, porubiti, 
rezbijati
querella  complaint, lawsuit
 querela, 
acussa, 
denuncia
Klage, 
Beschwerde, 
geschray
parnica, tužba, 
žalba, svadja
 padia, 
akuza, de-
noncimi
 tožba, pritožba, 
pokrik, vik, krik, 
šrajanje 
recon-
ciliatio, 
compo-
sitio
 
paciﬁ cation, 
peacema-
king, recon-
ciliation, 
settlement
paciﬁ cazi-
one,
riconcilia-
zione
Sühne, 
Versöhnung
pomirenje, 
izmirenje, 
pomirba, 
umir
pajtimi
pomiritev, 
sprava, sloščina, 
smirovanie, vkup 
spravlanje
rite, ritus rite, ritual rito, rituale Ritual obred, ritual rit, ritual obred, ritual
salvus 
conduc-
tus
 safe 
conduct
salvacon-
dotto sicheres Geleit sigurna pratnja
sjellje e 
sigurt varno spremstvo
satisfac-
tio  satisfaction
soddisfazi-
one Genugtuung zadovoljstvo kënaqësi  zadoščenje
securitas  security sicurezza Sicherheit sigurnost mbrojtje, sigurim varnost, žihrost
sententia, 
iudicium
sentence, 
judgment
sentenza, 
giudizio
Urteil, Schieds-
spruch presuda
gjykimi, 
dënimi
sodba, razsodba
treuga,  
treugae 
manu-
ales, 
amicitia, 
concor-
dia, ﬁ des, 
ﬁ ducia, 
pax, 
reconcili-
acio 
 truce  tregua
Stillstand, 
Waﬀ enruhe, 
Waﬀ enstill-
stand, hantfrid, 
frid, schlechter 
frid, sune
primirje  besë premirje
ulcisci, 
vindicare
 to avenge, 
to take 
revenge
perseguire 
la vendetta
rächen osvetiti se hakmerrem maščevati, nazaj vzeti
Urphaede
 oath not to 
feud, oath 
to keep 
the peace, 
recogni-
sance
rinuncia 
alla 
vendetta, 
rinunce
Urfehde, 
orfeyde
odricanje od 
osvete, zakletva 
za održanje mira
besë,  heq 
dorë nga 
hakmarrja
odrek mašče-
vanju, odrek 
sovražnosti, 
urfeda
verbum 
honoris
 word of 
honour
 parola 
d‘onore Ehrenwort
časna riječ,
riječ od poštenja
 fjala e 
nderit, besa  častna beseda
victima
 (homicide) 
victim
vittima
Opfer, Totschla-
gsopfer žrtva, ubijeni viktimë  žrtev, ubiti
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vindex, 
vindictor 
 avenger, 
vengeance 
taker, blood 
taker
 vendica-
tore Rächer osvetnik, krvnik
 gjakmarrës, 
hakmarrës
 maščevalec
vindicta,  
faida, 
alter-
catio, 
bellum, 
discor-
dia, 
inimi-
citia, 
iniuria, 
intentio, 
ultio, 
vindica-
tio 
 vengeance, 
revenge, 
feud
vendetta, 
faida
Rache, Fehde, 
abgesagte 
feindtschaﬀ t, 
auﬂ auf, 
befehdung, 
feindtschaft, 
vordrung, 
gwerra, 
handlung, 
irrung, krieg, 
lanndkrieg, 
misshelung, 
reisa, rache, 
stöss, teglich 
krieg, unfrid, 
ungute, unrat, 
urlog, zwayung, 
zwitracht
osveta, krvna 
osveta
hakmarrje, 
gjakmarrje
(krvno) mašče-
vanje, fajda
violentia violence violenza Gewalt nasilje dhunë  nasilje
vulnus, 
plaga
injury, 
wound ferita Wunde povreda, rana plage  poškodba, rana
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This book includes presentations of some case studies of blood feud in the Upper 
Adriatic area in the medieval and modern ages. Their fundamental purpose is to present the 
changes in the social system of conﬂ ict resolution that occurred in establishing modern state 
authority in the early modern period. The case studies are based on the interdisciplinary 
comparative approach of historical, legal, and anthropological scientiﬁ c disciplines. 
In comparison to the established historical presentation of cognitive and expressional 
forms (topos) of research problems, which usually begin with a general presentation 
of the topic and continue with an elaboration in chronological sequence, this book is 
signiﬁ cantly diﬀ erent. It uses retrospective presentation, as if the end had shifted to the 
beginning. The reason for such an approach I will attempt to explain later on. 
This book thus begins with the chronologically most recent episode, with a case study 
of 1686 vendetta in Koper, based on original archival documents from judicial bodies of 
the Republic of Venice and narrative material from the protagonists in the feud. 
It regards a classic case of vengeance due to the conﬂ icts between various noble 
kinship groups, formed on the idiom of honour. The reason for the vengeance was a 
forbidden or at least an unwanted marriage between representatives of two noble families 
that escalated into the homicide of one relative of the married woman. After almost three-
year long, apparently unsuccessful negotiations about the conﬂ ict settlement, a retributive 
homicide of the most prominent representative of the perpetrator’s family took place, 
which was performed by a maternal uncle of a third family, connected by kinship. 
It is interesting how the local, and especially the central political judicial authorities 
intervened in the feud (faida) after the ﬁ rst homicide, in accordance with the principles of 
the customary system of conﬂ ict resolution, by encouraging and lastly forcing the parties 
in the feud to make peace. 
However, the attempt to integrate the customary system of conﬂ ict resolution into a 
court settlement apparently failed in this case, as precisely the prevention of the custom-
ary system of conﬂ ict resolution with a (seeming) state guarantee of security and with 
force things led to an uprising, caused by an intentional break from the traditional values 
of honour and roles of kinship connections. 
The implementation of a strict inquisitorial judicial procedure, which is sketched 
out in the ﬁ rst chapter with its basic characteristics and procedural phases, might have 
nonetheless prevented possible retaliation after a vindicatory homicide, as is also shown 
in judicial practice in other Central and Western European countries of that time. 
Nonetheless, in accordance with the customary system of conﬂ ict resolution, the 
vengeful homicide alone might have been perceived as an established and socially ac-
knowledged end of conﬂ ict.  It was based on the fundamental social principle of gift 
giving, which demanded that the given gift be returned, and insult, which demanded 
suitable retribution. 
Precisely this several millennia-long social rule is discussed in the second chapter of 
this book, whose discussion of the customary conﬂ ict resolution procedure reaches into 
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more chronologically remote, pre-literary tribal communities, all up to the European early 
modern period. A comparison to the records of preserved customs from Montenegro, 
Herzegovina and Albania, which were still alive in the legal tradition as late as in the 19th 
and at the beginning of the 20th centuries, enabled us to reconstruct the customary ritual 
of reconciliation, which in its fundamental outlines is characteristic for almost all past 
communities in the world. 
The common thread of the chapter is actually dedicated to the reconstruction and 
reinterpretation of humiliation in the ritual of reconciliation as it is indicated in the 
extant documents and relevant literature that describe social ceremonials; however, its 
foundation is based precisely on the social rule of gift exchange. The caused humiliation, 
which in turn caused damage to the community, demanded retribution in the form of the 
humiliation of the perpetrator or his community. However, this was only the ﬁ rst stage of 
the customary reconciliation process. The next stage leads to a truce with an oath between 
the parties in the feud, which enabled a speciﬁ c period of time for negotiation regarding 
the compensation of the damage done. The third and the last stage was the conclusion of 
lasting peace with parties in the feud with actual compensation of the estimated damage 
and payment of the composition. 
The composition was paid monetarily in recent periods in accordance with the estab-
lished fees. However, in many areas a custom of fortifying the peace with kinship connec-
tions, with a certain number of godfatherhoods and fraternities, as well as with marriages 
between representatives of feuding parties, still prevailed for a longer period of time. 
The marriages were a common characteristic in earlier eras within communities, where 
non-monetary material goods exchange prevailed. Comparing the ritual of reconciliation 
with other secular rituals (i.e. the investiture of rulers, knights, notaries etc.) shows a 
similar, if not equal, general structure of the rituals for all public aﬀ airs. It could even be 
said that one can recognize in a widespread ritual form, with its symbols, gestures, and 
words, a cognitive model ﬁ rmly anchored in common human architecture that opens the 
way for such an analysis of cognitive models of gang violence and its systems of conﬂ ict 
resolution in human societies.1
The reconstruction of the ritual of reconciliation is particularly the basis that enables us 
to conﬁ rm some of the anthropological research results, which indicate that the conﬂ icts 
are socially constitutive, and moreover, socially cohesive, as they lead to new kinship 
connections among individual communities and thus to the expansion of the network of 
their members. This also exposes another characteristic, namely the conﬂ ict resolution 
procedure always called for cooperation among all the members of the community, who 
led the role of intermediaries or mediators. This also conﬁ rms the hypotheses of some 
functionalists that deem the customary system of conﬂ ict resolution, meaning feud, as 
playing the unique role of social control, as well as some structuralists, who deem it as a 
primary social structure if not a mere structure of creation (the universe).
1 Cf. recommendation by J. B. (Jack) Owens on Academia.edu (1 August 2017):  https://www.academia.
edu/34056567/DAROVEC_Darko_Blood_Feud_as_Gift_Exchange_The_Ritual_of_Humiliation_in_the_
Customary_System_of_Conﬂ ict_Resolution._ACTA_HISTRIAE_25_2017_1_pp._57-96._AHCI_SSCI.
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How deeply enrooted the structure of the ritual of conﬂ ict resolution was as late as 
in medieval Europe is presented in the third chapter, dedicated to a ten-year-long feud 
(1267-1277) between the Patriarchs of Aquileia and the counts of Gorizia, which was led 
mostly in the territories of Friuli and Istria. 
This was the period of the blossom of medieval cities alongside the emergence of 
educational institutions, especially universities, which substantially contributed to the 
spread of literacy as a cultural and technological tool of exercising authority. 
Moreover, this is the period in which so-called common law drew inspiration from the 
heredity of Roman law, which in that age had come back in vogue, and from a series of 
legislative dispositions of Germanic laws, if we can call them that, in agreement with the 
collection Monumenta Germaniae Historica, as well as from the speciﬁ city of city law, in 
particular from customary law, which in its idealistic form and with the assistance of the 
ritual express social values that are based on mediation from the community, reciprocity, 
and a tendency towards lasting peace. 
The case study also conﬁ rms the hypothesis about the trace of the ritual and the 
procedural characteristics of the custom in learned law. It also conﬁ rms that the custom-
ary system of conﬂ ict resolution, also called vindicta, faida, feud, Fehde, krvna osveta, 
gjakmarrja, etc., represents a unique universal concept. This is conﬁ rmed in ritual form, 
which consists of three phases: compromise (gift), truce (oath), and lasting peace (amor). 
These three phases were directly inserted into the formation of written law in the second 
half of the 13th century. All ten documents consulted regarding the feud between the 
patriarchs of Aquileia and the counts of Gorizia namely follow the instructions that are 
presented in the work of Bolognian notary, judge, and university professor Rolandino 
(Rolandinus Rudolphi de Passageriis), dating from the second half of the 13th century. 
Rolandino furthermore states that there is no real perpetual peace if it is not directly 
ensured by the responsible parties in the feud and do not conﬁ rm such with the kiss of 
peace. 
Precisely these dictions within common law are evidence of how Roman canonical 
procedures and written law shows that the ritual forms and ritual gestures of the customary 
system of conﬂ ict resolution were not only maintained but were regularly inserted into 
the ritual formulas of learned law and into practices managed by professionals (judges, 
lawyers, notaries), in order to introduce a new social order. Feud, revenge, and legal 
process were all part of a complex system of conﬂ ict regulation.
The case study also conﬁ rms that social relations and interactions used feuds not 
only in the struggle for resources, but the role the feuding parties had was also socially 
constitutive, as they were integrated in the system of social order. The feuds themselves 
also generated alliances with various social groups that were based mostly on kinship and 
clan connections. 
This is the general structural aspect of conﬂ ict, while the local or particular aspect is 
shown concretely through the struggle for resources, in the interweaving of individual 
circumstances, where those who succeed in forming the greatest number of loyalties, 
diﬀ ering and often contrasting alliances, are the ones who prevailed. In our case this was 
clearly better accomplished by the Counts of Gorizia than by the Patriarchs of Aquileia. 
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However, their adversities brought new players to their territories: Venetians and the 
Habsburgs. 
The fourth chapter is dedicated to establishing, characteristics and changes in legisla-
tion in exercising the judicial authority of the Habsburgs and the Venetians in the Upper 
Adriatic between the 13th and 18th centuries. The primary purpose of this chapter, which 
is also accompanied by individual case studies, is to introduce the reader to normative 
changes in legislation and judicial procedures on the criminal level. 
After the ﬁ rst three chapters the reader becomes acquainted with the fundamental 
characteristics of the customary and legal implications of the institute of blood feud. 
This is precisely why some questions might emerge, namely why the reassessment of the 
historical process of feud and especially blood feud is shown in a distinctly negative and 
misleading way; and why its social functions, which were part of an order and a tradition 
centered on peace and community control over conﬂ icts, were deconstructed and pushed 
to oblivion and criminalized? 
I hope that the answers are found in this, the fourth chapter, which sets its primary 
focus towards research on feud in the interrelationships between customary law and the 
legal process. Namely, as in the Republic of Venice and in the Holy Roman Empire 
(and in most of the contemporary Western European countries), legislation followed the 
basic characteristics of customary conﬂ ict resolution up to the 15th century. Based on 
the foundations of the adversarial legal system it was aiming towards arbitrary conﬂ ict 
resolution between the feuding parties, with the mediation of the community and col-
lective responsibility for the damage caused. The courts were primarily intended for the 
(social) conﬁ rmation of arbitrarily concluded settlements among the parties, which could 
be concluded and conﬁ rmed with a notarial document alone. 
Along with great social changes, in the second half of the 15th century a centraliza-
tion of justice came about, in addition to ﬁ scal and military reorganization, that was of 
fundamental importance in European rulers’ eﬀ orts to establish supreme control over the 
entire territory under their jurisdiction. 
In order to achieve this goal, however, the rulers ﬁ rst had to restrict, by means of legis-
lation and other coercive means, the system of arbitrary conﬂ ict resolution by custom. For 
this purpose they established a judicial system, i.e. punitive control over both individual 
inﬂ uential families and clans, as well as over the population in general.
The state inquisitorial trial rites introduced in most Western and Central European 
countries from the 16th century onwards, which substantially diﬀ ered from the eccle-
siastical inquisitorial procedure (from the 12th century onwards), led to an important 
innovation.
The state judicial apparatus earned the right of prosecution ex oﬃ  cio, whereas the 
trespasses became individualised. While earlier, in so-called adversarial law, the judicial 
investigative process was only able to be led after a lawsuit from the aﬀ ected communi-
ties, in the inquisitorial procedure the judicial trial was initiated by the central judicial 
authorities, which was the primary reason for their creation.
It was precisely the complex inquisitorial judicial rites that were assigned to be exer-
cised by the (state) judge with nearly limitless jurisdiction, including the implementation 
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of torture in all phases of the judicial procedure, which gradually took over the mediatory 
role of the community in feud and fundamentally disrupted the traditional relationships 
of values of honour and kinship connections. Studies of early-modern Europe have 
shown the changes that took place starting from the late 16th century. The introduction in 
various European countries of authentic inquisitorial procedures, which limited the right 
to defence and the intervention of the parties concerned, represented a signiﬁ cant step 
forward in limiting at least the bloodiest developments of feud. From France to England, 
to Germany and Italy, the new procedures were characterized not so much by ex-oﬃ  cio 
initiation of trials as by the public jurisdictional nature that the trials took on.
With this intrusion and with the legal and ideological criminalisation of feud and 
blood feud the ruler or the state gradually took away the judicial jurisdiction from former 
holders of (local) authority: the nobility. Thereafter the supreme right to revenge and 
pardon was in the hands of the ruler (state), which also signiﬁ es that this was the means 
of attaining of absolute power. Or, as Louis XIV stated: “L’état, c’est moi.”
The book is concluded by its ﬁ fth chapter, which emerged from co-authorship with my 
doctoral students, Angelika Ergaver and Žiga Oman. Based on a conceptual historiographic 
and semantic analysis of the fundamental terminology of the ritual of vengeance, this chapter 
presents an attempt to provide researchers with a linguistic, conceptual, and methodological 
framework for the study of vengeance as the customary system of conﬂ ict resolution in pre-
modern Europe. For this purpose the key terminology, which also has abundant synonyms, 
has been collected in the accompanying septalingual glossary of Latin, English, Italian, 
German, Albanian, and Slovenian languages, along with Stokavian expressions from 
Montenegrin area. While predicated on, foremost, European Medieval sources and studies 
thereof, the dissemination and interrelation of the universal human custom make the study 
applicable for other areas and periods. The chapter thus contributes to the development of 
European scientiﬁ c terminologies, in order for them to become a basis to the establishment 
of globally accepted scientiﬁ c terms within this research ﬁ eld. 
The book also contains an annex featuring a transcription of forty-ﬁ ve documents 
regarding the case study from chapter one, namely the 1686 vendetta in Koper. Along 
with the case studies presented in this book precisely the published archival documents 
in the annex, in their original way and with appropriate expert interpretation, reveal all 
the characteristics of the general objective of this study, which comprises research on 
feuds in the interrelationships between customary law and the legal process, as they are 
presented regarding the speciﬁ c objectives, i.e. the presentation of the diﬀ erent forms of 
feuds and vengeance in criminal proceedings and procedural narratives, in addressing the 
forms of social control, the presentation of the role of social conﬂ icts, and especially in 
the presentation of protagonists of the feud. 
This approach enabled us to identify the relations existing between customary law and 
a new form of learned law, to discover what changes occurred as a consequence of this 
transition, for how long, how, and why they survived, to be able to identify the cultural 
elements remaining in the modern age that can be traced back to a conﬂ ict system of feuds.
Based on the analysis of the long historical processes that led to the abandonment of 
feud as a real system for the arbitrary regulation of conﬂ icts, this book presents the most 
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important stages of changes that are supported by records from diverse forms of narration 
(juridical, literary, artistic, etc.), which in the modern period describe feud as a system 
of values or, on the contrary, as a system that is an enemy of peace and the public order.
The studies published in this book, were conducted within the research project “FAI-
DA. Feud and blood feud between customary law and legal process in medieval and early 
modern Europe. The case of Upper-Adriatic area”. This research was supported by a 
Marie Curie Intra European Fellowship within the 7th European Community Framework 
Programme, Grant Agreement Number 627936 (More information and other material 
also available at: http://www.unive.it/faida_msca). 
I would ﬁ rst and foremost like to thank my supervisor, professor, and dear friend,  Cla-
udio Povolo, for the suggestions and guidance that he gave me regarding my research into 
complex social processes and relations, and especially for his selﬂ ess help in researching 
the vast archival material at the State Archives of Venice. I would also like to thank all my 
co-workers at the Department of Humanities and at the Oﬃ  ce for international research 
at the Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, where this project formed and was conducted. 
Thank you might be too mild of an expression, however in this particular moment I fail 
to ﬁ nd a more appropriate one, to honour all the sacriﬁ ce, understanding, and patience 
of my dearest ones, my wife Vida and daughter Zoja, during my enthusiastic obsession 
with this study. 
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 Case Del Bello – Del Tacco – Gravisi, Koper 1683-1686 (see: ﬁ rst chapter).
Documents:
Doc yyyy.mm.dd Archive Subject Transcription
1 1673.6.30. SI_
PAK/
0299/
004/001
Conte Antonio 
Sabini scrive a 
persona amica 
di Padova del 
Leandro Gravisi e 
sua madre Letizia
riferimento 
a doc. 27:
“per l'omicidio 
e bando che era 
incorso per la 
morte data con 
arma da fuoco 
a Domenico di 
Valle”
Illustrissimo signore mio signor colendissimo.
Le lettere di Vostra Signoria Illustrissima diretta alla 
signora Letizia, madre del signor Leandro e mia, sono 
pervenute in mano della signora sua ﬁ glia che per 
la lunga e travagliosa indisposizione di essa signora 
tutte le ricceve, la quale veduto il tenor e considerato 
quanto di male potesse aggiungere alla madre ridotta a 
tale stata dalle continue aﬄ  izioni che gli fa aggiunger 
lo stesso ﬁ glio, ha stimato uﬃ  cio di pietà attender 
migluor tempo per rappresentargli quanto in quella si 
contiene, havendo però subito fatto capo con gli frateli 
per veder di trovar mezzo, come in una sì universale 
desolazione di queste campagne fatta dalle tempeste 
en innondazioni di acque et in una sì grave sciagura 
della casa si potesse mostrare a Vostra Signoria 
Illustrissima et all'Illustrissimo signor Capitano suo 
fratello, qualche segno della dovuta gratitudine alle 
loro sopragrandi bontà e gentilezze, che non badando 
ai demeriti del signor Leandro ci honorano tutti di 
continue grazie. Però, non permettendogli commodo 
maggiore le angustie presenti, mi ha consegnati ducati 
veneziani venticinque per inviar a Vostra Signoria 
Illustrissima, quale vivamente supplico di benigno 
compatimento all'ipotenza che di presente opprime 
quella casa, quantunque non si habbia mai inteso 
che il signor Leandro venga soccorso con imprestiti 
di danaro, havendolo mandato in Germania perché 
patisca et impari a raﬀ renear le sue passioni, benché 
nulla giovi e non si habbia ancora veduto alcun frutto. 
Spero nondimeno nella providenza del signor [...] suo 
fratello di udirne una volta qualche proﬁ tto e che in 
recognizione la signora zia s'indurà a tutti i modi [...] 
per contarle il rimanente quando il male darà campo 
di potergli signiﬁ car le cose. Supplico Vostra Signoria 
Illustrissima dell'avviso della ricevuta degli sudetti 
vinticinque ducati e del recapito dell'inclusa. Credo 
haverà memoria di havermi discorso più volte sopra 
questi aﬀ ari a Padova e però le baccio devotamente le 
mani.
Capodistria, 30 zugno 1673. 
Di Vostra Signoria Illustrissima.
Capitandole qualche avviso dello stesso signor 
Leandro mi farà grazia parteciparmelo [...] 
Antonio Sabini
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2. 1683.9.6. ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons 
X – 
Lettere 
Rettori, 
b. 258, 
n.o. 187
Pod Cap Ca-
pod Bernardin 
Michiel a' Ill.
mi Ecc.mi ss.ri 
ss.ri Colmi'
Alvise del 
Bello uccide 
Dr. Nicolò del 
Tacco
Heri sera notte le 23 hore mentre uscivano 
dal Consilio questi Cittadini, fu' d'Alvise 
del Bello con sbaro di Pistolla interfetto 
sopra la porta del Corpo di guardia di qesto 
Palazzo il Dr Nicolò del Tacco. Il reo mede-
simo, mentr'io ero nelle proprie stanze che 
mi spogliavo della Ducale, uene nelle stesse 
con la golla tagliata, ed insanguinato et 
per esser io ancora all'oscuro del successo, 
hebbe modo di precipitarsi alla fuga per la 
via degl'Horti del Pallazzo essendo sino in 
quelo stato inseguito con le Spade alla mano 
di molti congionti ed amici dell'interfetto. 
Mi ricercorno anco con sussuro il di lui 
arresto, e ne mostrai prontezza, ma era 
di già partito. Verso le 2 della notte mi 
feccero replicar l'instanze col mezo del S. 
Cristoﬀ oro Brutti, esprimendosi sapere 
il di lui riccovero, vi concorsi, ma non lo 
rittrovarno. Et perché viddi in tall'occasione 
molta di giente stimai bene a divertimento 
de maggiori mali rilasciar subito diversi 
sequestri, che non so in quanta brevità 
di tempo se sia stati obbedienti. Fecci 
fare la visione del Cadavere, e questa 
mattina dovevo far prosseguire con la debita 
diligenza formatione di processo, ma è stato 
riﬀ erto dal ministro non attrovarsi in Casa 
il fratello dell'interfetto, che heri sera diedi 
ordine fosse sequestrato, onde in diﬀ etto dil 
suo constituto, mancando i lumi alla Giusti-
tia, ed i primi fondamenti del buon ordine 
ho rissolto senz'altro attendere, ispedire al 
Tribunale supremo di V.V.E.E. le notitie del 
caso importante per quelle deliberationi, che 
l'inﬁ nita loro sentenza conosceranno aggiu-
state. Gratie. Capodistria 6 Sett:re 1683
Bernardin Michiel Podestà e Capitanio
di man propria con giuramento.
3 1683.9.10. ASVe. 
Cons X 
– Parti 
Co-
muni, 
Registro 
133 
(1683)
Capi scrivono 
Al Regimento 
di Capo d'Istria
Che sii formato 
diligente pro-
cesso servatis 
servandis  
Grave oltremodo è il caso dell'homicidio 
partecipatoci in lettere da voi Pod. e Cap. 
de 6 stante l'interfettione  fatta da Alvise 
del Bello del Dr Nicolò del Tacco, cosi 
per la qualità dell'Armata di Pistolla, tanto 
dalle Leggi dannata, et per il luoco sopra 
la Porta del Corpo di Guardia di cotesto 
Palazzo. Dovendosi po' alibrare a tanto 
delito severo, condegno castigo ne faccia-
mo con il Consiglio  di X.ci a Voi delegati 
acciò ne sii formato diligente processo 
servatis servandis  perfetionato e spedito 
poi con la facoltà ampla, che impartiscono 
le Leggi in materia d'armi da fuoco.
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4 1684.3.28 ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons 
X – 
Lettere 
Rettori, 
b. 258, 
n.o. 
207. 
Copia
Copia del Pod 
Cap Capod Nicolò 
Barbarigo 
(n.o 207, 208, 
209 e 210 sono 
allegate al n.o 206 
di data 1685.1.23; 
Doc. 19)
Capo d'Istria 
____Pod e Cap
Liberazione di 
sequestro di Gio: 
Battista Grauise, 
e dottor Elio 
Belgramoni
Illustrissimo et eccellentissimo signor Podestà e 
Capitanio osservate le due scritture, una di pugno del 
signor Domenico del Bello, l'altra del signor Dr Giulian 
del Bello suo Nepote hoggi per loro nome presentategli 
dall'Illustrissimo signor Pietro Gavardo Governatore 
dell'Armi, come pure l'altra scrittura 17 corrente 
sottoscritta dallo stesso signor Governatore  dal Signor 
Francesco del Tacco e dal Signor Dr. Elio Belgramon, 
con altra sua dichiaratione di 22 dello stesso, tutte 
accettate e sottoscritte dal Signor Marchese Gio: Battista 
Gravise; per ciò, et per quei giusti riguardi che muovono 
l'anima dell' detto signor; hà ordinato che gl'istessi 
Signori Marchese Gio Battista Gravise et Dr Elio 
Belgramon solamente siano liberati dal sequestro, sic. 
Coplio [sicut] / Nicolò Barbarigo Podestà e Capitanio.
5 1684.3.28 ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons 
X – 
Lettere 
Rettori, 
b. 258, 
n.o. 
208. 
Copia
Pietro Gavardo 
Governatore 
dell'Armi
Copia tratta 
dall'autentica 
essistente 
nella Cancelleria 
Pretoria di 
Capo d'Istria. 
(Dichiarazione 
(del 17 marzo) 
che Francesco del 
Tacco e Dr Elio 
Belgramoni sono 
amici, conferma 
Pietro Gavardo, 
Governatore 
dell'Armi. Dr Elio 
Belgramoni 22 
marzo conferma 
anche l'amicizia 
con Marchese Gio 
Battista Gravise
A dì 17 marzo 1689.
Havendo havuto ordine io Pietro Gavardo 
dall'illustrissimo et eccellentissimo signor podestà e 
capitanio di  componer gl'animi tra li signori Francesco 
del Tacco da una et dr. Elio Belgramoni dall'altra, mi è 
sortito aggiustarli li infrascrite dichiarationi fatte dallo 
stesso signor Belgramon quale protesta a Dio et al mon-
do di non haver havuto scienza né parte nell'accidente 
del quondam signor Nicolò del Tacco.
Ce spenderebbe il sangue e la propria vita per poter 
rimediare.
Che sospira vivere, il signor Francesco, buono, sincero 
amico, servitore.
Che in alcun tempo non si sarà contrario in questo fatto 
né porterà o prestarà alcuna assistenza a chi si sia o 
imaginabil favore per il fatto predetto e sarà la presente 
dalle parti sottoscritta.
Io Pietro Gavardo, governatore dell'armi aﬀ ermo quanto 
di sopra, havendo composto gl'animi delli sudetti signori 
Francesco del Tacco et dr. Elio Belgramon.//
VERSO:
Elio Belgramoni promette et aﬀ erma quanto di sopra.
Stante le cose soprascritte io Francesco del Tacco 
assicuro il signor dr. Elio Belgramoni d'una sincera 
amicitia e corrispondenza.
Segue l'infrascritta dichiaratione di proprio pugno del 
signor dr. Elio Belgramone.
A dì 22 marzo 1684.
Dichiaro in avantaggio io Elio Belgramoni che li stessi 
sentimenti et espressioni fatte verso il signor Francesco 
del Tacco, e di sua casa, intendo che habbino il medemo 
eﬀ etto con il signor marchese Gio.Battista Gravise et 
sua fraterna tutta, professandole una sincerata cordial 
devotione a qual oggetto mi sottoscrivo di mano propria.
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Elio Belgramoni sudetto aﬀ ermo et prometto come 
di sopra.
Io Battista Gravise resto pienamente soddisfatto 
dell'eccellentissimo signor dr. Elio Belgramoni et 
le prometto la pristina amicitia ch'è sempre passata 
tra noi.
6 1684.3.28 ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons 
X – 
Lettere 
Rettori, 
b. 258, 
n.o. 
209. 
Copia
Pietro Gauardo 
Gouernatore 
dell'Armi
Copia tratta dall'autentica scritta di mano propria del 
signor Domenico del Bello quondam signor Ottavio 
esistente nella Cancelleria pretoria di Capo d'Istria.
A dì 28 marzo 1684. presentata di mano di sua 
Eccellenza dall'illustrissimo signor Pietro Gavardo, 
Governatore dell'armi a nome degli infrascritti. 
Dichiaro io Domenico del Bello quondam Ser Ot-
tavio che il Signor Compare Marchese Gio Battista 
Gravise è stato sempre da me riverito per signore 
et amico singolare, non havendo mai concepito 
contro il medesimo alcun sentimento diverso et che 
l'espressioni nel mio constituto provenero da ruoto 
accidentale del sangue, non da intentione avversa, 
supplicandolo credere compatito da me vivamente 
lo stesso successo del Sig. Dr Nicolò del Tacco suo 
Nipote; et che in atto di christiano vorrei poterlo 
ricuperarlo col proprio sangue, come vedermi corri-
sposto dall'amore benigno dal detto sig. Marchese da 
me certamente considerato e bramato.
Io Battista Gravise prometto alla Giustizia che né 
per me né per interposte persone sarà mai oﬀ eso 
il sudetto signor Compare Domenico accettando 
le suddette espressioni, et tanto di proprio pugno 
aﬀ erma. 
7 1684.3.28 ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons 
X – 
Lettere 
Rettori, 
b. 258, 
n.o. 
210. 
Copia
Pietro Gavardo 
Governatore 
dell'Armi
Copia tratta dall'autentica scritta di proprio pugno 
dal signor dr. Giuliano del Bello esistente nella 
Cancelleria pretoria di Capo d'Istria.
A dì 28 marzo 1684. presentata in mano di sua 
eccellenza dall'Illustrissimo signor Pietro Gavardo, 
Governatore dell'Armi a nome degli infrascritti,
Protesto io Dr Giuliano del Bello ch'al Signor 
Marchese Gio Battista Gravisi ho sempre professato 
amicicia, e servitù divotissima et come mi è rincre-
sciuto somamente l'accidente del signor Dr Nicolò 
del Tacco di lui Nipote; così per christiano et amico 
che intendo di vivere vorrei, se potessi, col proprio 
sangue rihaverlo. Supplicando il detto signor mar-
chese gradire questo sincero istinto dell'animo mio 
et corrisponderlo con la continuatione del proprio 
aﬀ etto, da me riverito e stimato inﬁ nitamente
Io Battista Gravise prometto alla Giustizia che né 
per me né per interposte persone sarà mai oﬀ eso il 
sudetto Signore, accettando le sudette espressioni, et 
tanto di proprio pugno aﬀ erma.
verso: Liberation da sequestro di Gio: Battista 
Gravise, e dottor Elio Belgramoni
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8 1684.6.5. ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons X, 
Lettere 
Secrete, 
b. 39
Al Podestà Capita-
nio di Capodistria
Capi:
Nadal Donado,
Agostin Barba-
rigo,
Alvise Corner
Nella presenza del senso della quiete de sudditi 
osserviamo quale ci rappresentate nelle lettere 
di 2 stesso che centinaia le discrepanze e 
l'esacerbatione  de gl'amini tra Francesco del 
Tacco et altri, così che possino produrre mali 
peggiori. Vi comandiamo perché con li Capi 
del Consiglio di X:ci di proseguire le vostre 
applicationi procurando con la desterità, e con 
lege le forme di componer le parti, et  la quiete 
e la pace, e quando non vi subisse d'ottenerne 
[l'essere] nel servire di giorni 15 e ne otterete 
distinte le relationi e particolarmente di chi 
recalcitrosse  alle rassegnazioni, mentre 
col Consiglio di X:ci sarano prese quelle 
vigorose deliberationi nel a' ridurli alla dovuta 
obedienza.
9 1684.6.16 ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons 
X – 
Lettere 
Rettori, 
b. 258, 
n.o. 197
Pod Cap Capod 
Nicolò Barbarigo 
a' Ill.mi Ecc.mi 
ss.ri ss.ri Colmi'
Diﬀ erenze tra 
Francesco del 
Tacco e Domenico 
Dr Zulian del 
Bello (si parla del 
sequestro nel 23 
ottobre)
Mi sono pervenute in questi giorni le riverite 
Ducali di Vostre.Eccellenze di 7 corrente colle 
qualli comandano d'aggiustar le diﬀ erenze 
vertenti tra Francesco del Tacco da una, Dome-
nico e Dr Zulian del Bello dall'altra.
Prima che queste giungessero, mi fu' per 
parte dello stesso Dottore ricercata licenza di 
conferirsi in cotesta Dominante per agitar in 
persona antiche et accerime liti civili, che di 
più anni corrono con Ottavio suo fratello, per 
le quali passati fra loro gravissimi disgusti, fe' 
anco dall'Eccellentissimo Riva Preccessore 
essi Dottor obligat'al sequestro. Mi parve pero' 
non dovergli concedere la licenza medema, 
ma attender prima le loro sapientissime 
prescritioni. 
Colla norma de supremi comandi 
dell'Eccellenze Vostre andavo procurando col 
mezo della desterità render gl'animi delle parti 
acquietati, e mandato hoggi publico Coman-
dadore alla Casa dello stesso Dr Giuliano, 
perche capitars'a Palazzo, riﬀ erisse essergli 
stato risposto dalla di lui madre essersi la notte 
prossima passata portato costà a causa delle liti 
medesime. Violato però con gravissimo scanda-
lo, e con temeraria innobedienza di presente il 
sequestro fattogli dall'Eccellentissimo Precces-
sore Michiel, da me conﬁ rmato con mandato di 
23 Xbre, mi leva  così il modo all'operationi, et 
all'essecutione del loro sovrano comando.
Ne porto all'Eccellenze Vostre riverentissima 
notitia, per quelle deliberationi che col sommo 
del loro intendimento giudicassero convenirsi; 
non restando d'humilmente accenarle, ch'io non 
tralasciarò nel mentre di rinovare gl'impulsi 
più eﬃ  caci con Francesco del Tacco, acciò si 
risolva d'abbracciar una volta quella quiete, che 
vado disponendo. Gratia. 
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10 1684.6.20. ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons X, 
Lettere 
Secrete, 
b. 39
Al Pod Cap di 
Capodistria
Capi:
Nadal Donado,
Agostin Barba-
rigo,
Alvise Corner
Sono lodevoli le vostre diligenze accurate 
alla quiete de sudditi, osserviamo l'operato 
sopra le diﬀ erenze fra Francesco del Tacco e 
Domenego et altri dal Bello. E mentre senza 
vostra licenza è partita dalla Città e rotto il 
sequestro il Dr Giuliano del Bello havendo il 
vostro Reggimento facoltà suﬃ  ciente deveni-
rete agl'eﬀ eti di Giustizia contro il medesimo 
per lo mezzo del sequestro medesimo di quel 
modo riputerete proprio. 
11 1684.7.10 ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons 
X – 
Lettere 
Rettori, 
b. 258, 
n.o. 200
Pod Cap Capod 
Nicolò Barbarigo 
a' Ill.mi Ecc.mi 
ss.ri ss.ri Colmi'
(Stimolato lo 
stesso del Tacco 
ad abbracciare la 
pace … menziona 
la Ducale di 5 
giugno.)
Humiliai in mie riverentissime lettere 2 
del passato al sovrano Tribunale di Vostre 
Eccellenze le diﬀ erenze, che vertiscono tra 
Domenico, e Dr Giuliano dal Bello da una, 
e Francesco dal Tacco dall'altra. Riportai in 
Ducale di 5, Giugno decorso la comissione di 
procurar di vederli aggiustati nel termine di 
giorni quindeci. Applicato tutt'il mio spirito, 
pratticate le più eﬃ  caci insinuationi, valsomi 
del mezo di persone disinterressate, di 
religiosi, et altri per veder una volta gl'animi 
loro acquietati, tutto m'è riuscito vano ed 
inutile; ricusando Francesco dal Tacco 
ascoltar gl'uﬃ  tij aggiustati alla convenienza, 
che gli sono stati e vengono oﬀ erti per parte 
di quelli dal Bello.
Stimolato stesso del Tacco ad abbracciare la 
pace, convinto dagl'argomenti, non sapendo 
come sottrarsi dall'obedienza de sovrani 
comandi dell'Eccellenze Vostre, s'esprime 
desiderar prima d'ogni altro passo conferirsi 
costa' per consigliar il proprio interresse, 
e mi ﬁ guro trarmi esser forse chiamato a 
cotesto gravissimo Tribunale, per dimostrar 
d'accettare l'aggiustamento con riputatione 
maggiore.
Fermato in quest'opinione, altro non potendo 
ricavarsi dalle sue voci, obedendo le venerate 
prescrittioni dell' Eccellenze Vostre, glene 
porto humilissima notitia, accioché colla loro 
suprema autorità possino deliberar ciò che 
giudicassero conferente per la quiete di questa 
Città, che per esser divisa negl'aﬀ etti, prova 
continuo sconvoglimento negl'animi, da che 
non puo' attendersi che mali peggiori. Gratia
12 1684.7.14. ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons X, 
Lettere 
Secrete, 
b. 39
Al Pod Cap di 
Capodistria
Capi:
Domenico Gritti, 
Piero Gradenigo, 
Giovanni Tron
Sono lodevoli le vostre diligenze per 
l'aggiustamento delli dissidij, che vertono 
tra Domenico e Dr. Giuliano del Bello e 
Francesco del Tacco, e mentre lo stesso del 
Tacco desidera portarsi alla Dominante, non 
potendeselo negare, rimmettemo a voi il 
permetterzelo etc.
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13 1684.7.22 ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons 
X – 
Lettere 
Rettori, 
b. 258, 
n.o. 201
Pod Cap Capod 
Nicolò Barbarigo 
a' Ill.mi Ecc.mi 
ss.ri ss.ri Colmi'
“Ho permesso 
a Francesco del 
Tacco, sequestrato 
per le risse vertenti 
tra lui, Domeni.
co e Dottor 
Giuliano dal Bello 
di portarsi costà 
in conformità 
desuoi desiderii.” 
“Abbracciare la 
pace bramata” 
menziona la Duca-
le di 14 giugno
Per adempimento de veneratissimi cenni di Vostre 
Eccellenze espressimi in Ducali 14 corrente, ho 
permesso a Francesco del Tacco sequestrato per le risse 
vertenti tra lui, Domenico, e Dottor Giuliano dal Bello 
di portarsi costà in conformità de suoi desiderii.
Annuendo anco alle sue riverenti instanze lo accom-
pagno colle presenti humilissime al loro gravissimo 
Tribunale.
Non gl'ho prescritto termine al ritorno, et 
all'agiustamento, perché possino l'Eccellenze Vostre 
colla loro suprema caritativa auttorità impartirle quelle 
risolute comissioni, che vagliano a fargli celeremente 
abbracciare la pace bramata, e che le viene proposta, per 
restituire la quiete a questa Città, et assicurarla da mali 
peggiori che potessero insorgere. Gratia.
verso: Capodistria Podestà Capitanio ha datto licentia a 
Francesco del Tacco di venir a Venetia
14 1684.11.3 ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons 
X – 
Lettere 
Rettori, 
b. 258, 
n.o. 202
Pod Cap Capod 
Nicolò Barbarigo 
a' Ill.mi Ecc.mi 
ss.ri ss.ri Colmi'
“accenando solo 
correr un anno, 
e più mesi che le 
parti s'attrovano 
sequestrate”
Restituitosi già al sequestro Don Francesco del Tacco, 
doppo esser stato qualche tempo costà con permissione 
dell'Eccelso Tribunale di Vostre Eccellenze, per consigli-
ar il proprio interesse; desiderando io di veder stabilita 
la quiete a questa Città, e la pace tra lui da una et Don 
Domenico, e Dr Giulian dal Bello dall'altra, ho subito 
rinovate le più eﬃ  caci insinuationi a medemi anco col 
mezo de mediatori; non potuto sin hora vederne l'eﬀ etto.
Tralascio difondermi nelle notitie del fatto; havendole 
bastantemente espresse nelle mie di 2 giugno decorso, 
et in altre posteriori in questo proposito, accenando 
solo correr un anno, e più mesi che le parti s'attrovano 
sequestrate.
Incaricato dall' Eccellenze Vostre a doverle riﬀ erire da 
qual parte venisse ricusato l'aggiuntamento, essequisco 
il loro riveritissimo comando.
Pareva a principio derrivasse la renitenza dallo stesso 
del Tacco: ma hora disposto ricevere un conveniente 
uﬃ  tio questo le viene negato da quelli del Bello, che 
non intendono esprimersi di non haver havuto quella 
parte e scienza (ch'in eﬀ etto non hanno) nel caso della 
morte del quondam Dr Nicolò del Tacco fratello del 
preaccenato Francesco.
Non bastanti però le mie più assidue applicationi per 
produrle quel bene, che doverebbe per ogni riguardo 
dagl'animi loro esser sommamente bramato, imploro 
dalla suprema auttorità di Vostre Eccellenze quel 
risoluto provedimento, che vaglia a levar l'occasioni a 
nuovi maggiori sconcerti. Gratie
verso: 1684 3 Novembre  R(icevu)ta a 14. d.o
Circa di instanze, che vertono tra Francesco del Tacco, e 
Domenico e Giulian dal Bello //
1684 a 17 Novembre in Consiglio di X.ci, ordini che si 
portino all'ubbidienza del Tribunal//
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15 1684.11.17 ASVe. 
Cons X 
– Parti 
Comuni 
ﬁ lza 
763
Capi scrivono Al 
Pod e Cap di Capo 
d'Istria
Capi:
Beneto Contarini
Zaccaria Salamon
Alvise Pisani
Informano le vostre lettere da 3 del corrente scritta al 
Tribunal del Capi del Consiglo di X.ci l'operato della 
vostra virtù e diligenza per veder sedate le dissensioni, 
che vertono tra Francesco del Tacco, e Domenico e 
Giuliano del Bello, e vedendo la renitenza che ne incon-
trate, risolvemo collo stesso Consiglio commetervi, che 
dobbiate far intendere all'uno et agl'altri di trasferirsi 
immediate di qua all'ubbidienza del Tribunal medemo 
per quelle deliberationi che saranno credute opportune a 
sveller i semi di tali discordie et a consolidare la quiete, 
e la pace tra sudditi. + 16 – 0 – 0  3/4
16 1684.11.17 ASVe. 
Cons X 
– Parti 
Co-
muni, 
Registro 
134 
(1684)
Capi scrivono Al 
Pod e Cap di Capo 
d'Istria
Capi:
Beneto Contarini
Zaccaria Salamon
Alvise Pisani
Informano le vostre lettere de tre del corrente scritte al 
Tribunal de Capi del Consiglio di Dieci l'operato della 
vostra virtù e diligenza per veder sedate le dissentioni 
che vertono tra Francesco del Tacco, e Domenico e 
Giuliano dal Bello, e vedendo la renitenza che ne incon-
trate, risolvemo collo stesso Consiglio commettervi, che 
dobbiate far intendere all'uno, et agli altri di trasferirsi 
immediate di qua all'ubbidienza del Tribunal medemo 
per quelle deliberationi che saranno credute opportune a 
sveller i semi di tali discordie et a consolidar la quiete e 
la pace tra sudditti.
17 1684.12.30. ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons X, 
Lettere 
Secrete, 
b. 39
Al Pod Cap di 
Capodistria
Capi:
Girolamo ...,
Vicenzo da Mulo, 
Gio. Arsenio Priuli
Sono capitati al Tribunale de' Capi accompagnati da due 
vostre lettere Giuliano del Bello, dottor, et Francesco del 
Tacco riconoscendosi per eﬀ etto delle vostre  insinuati-
oni la remmissione fattale con procura di Domenego del 
Bello nel sopradetto Dr. Giuliano a causa delle sue indis-
positioni, e decrepita età. E mentre il Tribunale andava 
avanzando proprii passi per l'aggiustamento delle parti è 
giunto avviso, che in queste discrepanze vi fossero Gio: 
Battista, e Nicolò Gravisi, quali pure si trovassero sotto 
sequestro, e che da Voi siino stati licentiati. Volemo 
però con li Capi del Consiglio di X:ci, che ci rendiate 
distintamente informati, e principalmente dei motivi, che 
havete havuto di licentiarli e di qual più credeste proprio 
a lume delle risolutioni che fossero conferenti.
18 1685.1.15. 
(1684 m.v.)
ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons X, 
Lettere 
Secrete, 
b. 39
Al Pod Cap di 
Capodistria
(altri tre Capi)
A benche da Capi Precessori con loro Lettere da 30 
del caduto sia stato scritto con zelo della quiete quanto 
haverete dalle medesime inteso nell'aﬀ are delle diﬀ e-
renze che vertono tra Francesco del Tacco, e Domenico 
e Giuliano del Bello, scorgendosi dal Tribunale, che dal 
lasciarsi inessequita la commissione del Consiglio di 
X.ci espressa in ducali, che vi furono scritte sotto li 17 
novembre precedente nella parte che riguarda la venuta 
in questa Città di Domenico del Bello sudetto rimane 
l'aggiustamento soggetto a diﬃ  coltadi, e longhezze 
contrarie alle volontà del detto Consiglio, risolvamo 
Noi Capi dello stesso commettervi di ordinar al sudetto 
Domenico di comparir anch'esso senza ritardo con la 
dovuta puntualità avanti a noi, e Tribunal nostro per 
potersi dar il ﬁ ne alla discordie, che vertono tra quelle 
Case, com'è della pubblica intentione.
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19 1685.1.23 ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons 
X – 
Lettere 
Rettori, 
b. 258, 
n.o. 206
Pod Cap Capod 
Nicolò Barbarigo 
a' Ill.mi Ecc.mi 
ss.ri ss.ri Colmi'
Allegati i Doc. 4, 
5, 6, 7
Essequendo le riverite comissioni di Vostre 
Eccellenze in ducali 30 Xbre decorso solo in 
questo punto pervenuttemi, trasmetto l'inserte 
copie col giusto fondamento de quali sono 
devenuto alla liberatione del sequestro di Gio 
Battista Gravise zio del Tacco da una e Dr Elio 
Belgramoni dall'altra; non potutosi pratticar lo 
stesso con Nicolò Gravise fratello del medemo 
Gio Battista, per attrovarsi in quel tempo con 
licenza in Padova per la perfettione de' suoi studi. 
Ritornato in questa città continua nel sequestro, 
estendendo la decisione delle diferenze tra 
principali. 
Tutt'humilio a maturi riﬂ essi dell'Eccellenze.
Vostre per venerare con profondissimo ossequio 
le loro infallibili deliberazioni. Gratia
20 1685.1.28 ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons 
X – 
Lettere 
Rettori, 
b. 258, 
n.o. 211
Pod Cap Capod 
Nicolò Barbarigo 
a' Ill.mi Ecc.mi 
ss.ri ss.ri Colmi'
In pontual obedienza delle riverite ducali di 
Vostre Eccellenze 15 corrente in questo giorno 
pervenutemi, ho fatto cometter a domino Do-
menico del Bello di dover imediate incaminarsi 
verso costà per rasegnarsi all'obedienza del 
loro supremo Tribunale c'ha l'oggetto di veder 
terminate le discordie che vertono tra lui, e  
domino Francesco del Tacco. Accioché non resti 
dilungato l'eﬀ etto com'è loro intentione non 
ammetterò alcuna scusa  che forse per addure 
per sottrarsi d'essequir il risoluto comando dell' 
Eccellenze Vostre, che con carità paterna vuole 
restituita la quiete a questa Città, che di lungo 
tempo sospira.
Adempite le parti del mio humilissimo debito, in 
atto di rassegnatione divota, glen'anuanzo questa 
ossequiosa notitia. Gratia
21 1685.2.19. 
(1684 m.v.)
ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons X, 
Lettere 
Secrete, 
b. 39
Al Pod Cap di 
Capodistria
Capi:
Benetto Contarini, 
...
Mentre è risoluta volontà, che fra sudditi vi sii 
la quiete, conviene tutto oprarsi, perché  anco 
s'aggiunstino le diﬀ erenze tra quei del Bello e del 
Tacco che di tanto tempo vertono. Con le passate 
nostre vi scrivessimo di far sapere a Domenego 
del Bello di presentarsi al Tribunale de' Capi.  
Concorressimo anco a darle qualche terminazione 
ma, vedendo che non si cerca d'eseguire li ordeni 
nostri, vi commettemo con li Capi di Consiglio 
di X.ci di far ritenere il sopradetto Domenico del 
Bello, mantenderlo ben custodito nelle priggioni.
22 1685.3.3. ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons X, 
Lettere 
Secrete, 
b. 40
Al Pod Cap di 
Capodistria
Capi:
Vicenzo da Mula, 
Zacc.a Salamon, 
Gio. Antonio 
Priuli
Pervenuto al Tribunale de Capi del Consiglio 
di X.ci col vostro cavallo Domenego del Bello 
vi portiamo le notitie del suo arrivo, come anco 
della ricevuta delle vostre lettere.
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23 1685.3.8. ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons X, 
Lettere, 
b. 140
Al Pod Cap di 
Capodistria
Capi:
Vicenzo da Mula, 
Zacc.a Salamon, 
Gio. Antonio 
Priuli
Essendo ﬁ ssa l'applicazione de Cappi del Consiglio 
di X.ci per la maggior tranquilità de sudditi hanno 
fatto passar il sequestro nel sestier di Castello Nicolò 
Gravise, che con vostre lettere era accompagnato alli 
Rettori di Padova. Si sono anco avanzati correlativi 
passi con l'elletione de conﬁ denti, ma non potendosi 
eﬀ etuare l'intento della Pubblica mente senza la perso-
na di Gio. Battista Gravise sopra cui pur vi scrivesimo 
nel decembre passatto. Ricerchiamo però le carte, 
che contengono tal aﬀ are e vi commetiamo pur con 
li Cappi del Consiglio di X.ci che immediate dovete 
far capitar al Tribunale medesimo il detto Gravise 
et trasmettere tutte l'autentiche carte e scritture, che 
comettono li sequestri de Belli con Tacco et Gravisi, 
per quelle risolutioni che dal Tribunale saranno 
reputate conferenti. Promettendosi dalla vostra virtù 
un'esata pontualita' per abbreviare le dilazioni che 
possino pregiudicare la quiete bramata.
24 1685.3.28 PAK Nicolò Gravise 
scrive al Ser.mo 
Pricipe
Supplica del 
marchese 
Giovanni
Niccolo' Gravisi 
alla Serenissima 
Republica per 
ottenere al
marchese Leandro 
una carica mili-
tare nell'esercito 
veneto.
Serenissimo Prencipe.
Il marchese Leandro Gravisi, la cui Casa ha reso un 
perpetuo servitio a Vostra Serenità in tutte le congion-
ture di sparger il sangue e consacrare le vite, ha voluto 
ne' primi anni della sua gioventù coll'esempio de' sui 
maggiori e con quello del conte Almerico Sabini, suo 
zio, calcar l'istesso sentiere nel tempo della passata 
guerra col Turco, apprendendo i primi gradi della 
militar disciplina, prima in qualità di alﬁ ere, poscia 
di capitano d'oltramontani come si può vedere nei 
pubblici libri gl'anni 1666 e susseguenti.
Terminata la guerra passo a guerreggiar in qualità di 
venturiere nell'Ungaria superiore nelle prime rivolutio-
ni di quel regno, dove si è trovato nei più ardui cimenti 
e poi nell'Impero all'impresa di Bona, alla battaglia 
di Treveri et in tutti quei sanguinari successi. Doppo 
alcuni ani per la cognitione del suo coraggio fu spedito 
al soccorso della Sicilia con carica di capitano, dove 
ha servito anco in posto di Governatore delle Piazze 
di quel regno in tutte le più gravi occasioni di allhora, 
passando poi di là nello Stato di Milano al servitio 
della medema Corona cattolica dove si attrova al 
presente, nei quali servitii ha potuto apprendere in un 
corso di vinti anni continui le parti più essentieli della 
militar professione.
Hora bramando sacriﬁ care se stesso nel servitio 
di Vostra Serenità // suo adoratissimo Prencipe, 
s'oferisce di venir in quella qualità che sarà ricevuta 
dalla Serenità vostra, non cercando altro se non tanto 
che vaglia sostenersi nel grado della sua nascita e 
posto che gli dia apertura di meritar la publica gratia 
e di segnalarsi con le proprie operationi dove sarà 
destinaro. Gratie
1685, 28 marzo
Che sia rimessa ai savii dell'una e l'altra mano [...]
163
ANNEX
25 1685.3.31. ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons X, 
Lettere 
Secrete, 
b. 40
Al Pod Cap di 
Capodistria
Capi:
Vicenzo da Mula, 
Zacc.a Salamon, 
Gio. Antonio 
Priuli
Intendendosi con ammiratione che da cotesti [Inm-
mi] per pretese et pagamenti di spese della vacantio-
ne di Domenico del Bello sequestrato commessa dal 
Tribunal di noi Capi del Consiglio di X.ci habbino 
esportata dalla di lui casa molta mobilia, il che non 
dovendo tollerarsi, perché non cada in essempio, 
perciò con li medesimii Capi vi commettemo di far 
restituire alla Casa dello stesso del Bello quanto 
le fosse stato levato per la sudetta pretesa, il che 
disponerete sia puntualmente essequito.
26 1686.6.7. ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons 
X – 
Lettere 
Rettori, 
b. 258, 
n.o. 230
Leandro Gravise 
a Illustrissimo 
signor mio signor 
Colendissimo
Mi rassigurai nel breve tempo feci dimora certitude 
le più degne qualità' di Cavalliere d'honore nella 
persona di Vostra Signoria Illustrissima , onde come 
tale appoggio l'ingionto Manifesto, acciò con la sua 
desterità, e protetione lo faccia pervenire ovunque 
scoprirà il bisogno, che della grazia io restandone 
obligatissimo, tale riverente mi sottoscrivo
Trieste, 7, giugno 1686
Leandro Gravise
Illustrissimo Signor Christoﬀ oro Brutti
Capodistria
Segue il Manifesto
Il Dr Giuliano del Bello non contento di haver 
fatto ammazzar il più caro e stimato mio Nipote, di 
haver dato favore all'homicida, d'haver perseguitati 
lungamentte con pretesto di sequestri, et ordini 
della Giustizia i Fratelli del Morto et i miei proprii, 
Ritornato io poi alla Patria doppo lo scorso d’anni 
quatordeci, invece di scusare in qualche forma 
l’oﬀ ese così grandi fatte al mio sangue, e di usar 
meco qualche atto di civiltà, più tosto mostró di 
beﬀ arsi anco di me col passegiarmi con sprezzo sul 
mustacio, e così me provocò inﬁ ne a darli la morte 
nel luoco e forma  che è stata datta al mio Nipote. 
Queste mie cause sono note ad ognuno, onde così 
stimo, che sarà stimata giusta la mia risolutione ; Ma 
se a caso si trovasse alcuno, che portato da passione, 
o indoto da ignoranza havesse sentimento diverso, 
son pronto di mantenerlo con la spada alla mano, o 
con altra forma da Cavaliero, sino all’ultimo spirito, 
che mente perché quello ho fatto è giustamente, e fu 
fatto onorevolmente. Io per il rispetto, che devo 
al mio Serenissimo, et adorato Prencipe, mi 
sono subito ritirato dal suo Stato, e ricoverato 
a Trieste dove mi fermerò qualche giorno per 
saper l’intentione di qual se sia contrario per 
darli nella forma suddetta tutte le sodisfationi, 
non intendendo però in questo Manifesto di 
offendere una Città tanto riguardevole a quale io 
professo tutta la riverenza, et onore con che etc.
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27 1686.6.19. ASVe. 
Cons X 
– Parti 
Comuni 
ﬁ lza 
771
Capi scrivono 
Al Regimento di 
Capo d'Istria
Lo stesso come 
nel Doc. 28 ASVe. 
Cons X – Parti 
Comuni, Registro 
136 (1686)
+ più allegata la 
prima lettera di 
Madre del Giulia-
no del Tacco:
1686, 17 giugno.
Serenissimo Principe; Illustrissimi et Eccellentissimi 
signori Cappi del'Eccellente Consiglio di Xci.
La misericordi de Dio signore ha concesso tanto di 
tregua alle amarissime lagrime et angosiosi aﬀ ani di me 
Giulia del Bello della città di Capo d'Istria, umilissima 
serva dell'Eccellenze Vostre, che ha permesso la mia 
comparsa a quest'Eccelso Tribunale vero et immutabile 
Trono della Giustizia e rifugio sicuro degl'infelici et 
opressi. Il mio ﬁ gliolo, dr Giuliano, iniquamente e 
perﬁ damente interfetto dal marchese Liandro Gravise 
sarà l'oggetto perpetuo de' miei singulti, et il di lui san-
gue proditoriamente sparso da questa mano omicidiale 
dalla terra s'inalza et s'interpone con voce funebre per la 
publica giusta indignatione a conforto e respiro del mio 
adoloratissimo cuore.
Fu l'infelice de ordine dell'eccellentssimo signor Podestà 
e capitano di Capo d'Istria, ﬁ no già tre anni incirca 
obligato a sequestro in compagnia d'altri, con signori 
Gravisi e Tachi, gentilhuomini di detta città, renitenti 
questi al scioglimento desiderato, furono honorate quelle 
diﬀ erenze dalla sovrana autorità dell'Eccelso Consiglio 
che obbligò le parti a rassegnarsi in questa Serenissima 
Dominante e gli arbitrii degli eccellentissimi Capi e da 
questi, doppo lunghi subterfugii interposti dagli amatori 
del torbido, con mezzo de conﬁ denti fatti elleger de 
loro commando, fu stabilita la pace et rattiﬃ  cata alla 
presenza dell'Eccelso Tribunale, con le dovute solenni 
formalità.
Credeva il povero ﬁ gliolo innocentissimo delle passate 
controversie che al suono della pace dovessero cader 
tutti i disegni dell'odio e della vendetta, e sperava che 
accompagnato dall'ombra della publica protezione 
havessero a crescere copiosi e fecondi gli olivi paciﬁ ci 
e non funesti cipressi e mai sognava di poter darsi, 
sudditi di così alta cornice, che conculcando ogni 
rispetto et ossequiosa obbedienza alla voce del Principe 
imperante andassero machinando fra il sentiere della 
pace l'apparato lugubre di morte.
Ma fu deluso e tradito poiché capitando esso marchese 
Liandro in Venezia con le truppe di Milano, volorono 
da Capo d'Istria li signori Francesco e Iseppo del Taco 
et Nicolò Gravisi zii e fratello rispettivo di esso Liandro 
e lo condussero in quella città sua patria, già da lui // 
aborita e abbandonata per l'omicidio e bando che era 
incorso per la morte data con arma da fuoco a Domenico 
di Valle, povero opperario mentre di nottetempo da 
luoco a luoco trasportava un sacco di olive.
Qui gionto per un mese incirca fu sempre accompagnato 
ad ogni momento dalli predetti et altri suoi congi-
onti ﬁ nché, maturato il concerto, e preveduta vicina 
l'opportunità di coglier l'infelice ﬁ gliolo, allestita prima 
barca espedita a sei remi, tre giorni trattenuta otiosa e
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ferma et in questi tre gorni a ponte lasciato sempre solo 
abbandonato dalli predetti suoi congionti esso Liandro 
benché alla larga non lo perdessere di vista come da 
molti fu ben osservati, la mattina sei corrente ﬁ nalmente 
gionta l'hora fatale, incontrato il misero ﬁ gliolo ce lo 
salutò profondamente com'era solito fare e corrisposto 
sempre dall'omicida, invece della corrispondenza 
all'ultimo saluto, posta mano ad una pistola gliela 
scaricò con dirgli con voce arabiata ”A te“; e così traﬁ tto 
spirò sotto l'occhio dell'illustrissimo signor consigliere 
vice-podestà e nella publica piazza.
Immediate fatto cenno del predetto Liandro alli 
sopradeti che stavano in osservatione del fatto d'unirsi 
seco lui, non solo lo feccero, ma lo scortorono alla barca 
in puoca distanza et in quell'intervallo uniti gli oﬃ  ziali 
per ordine di quell'Illustrissimo Consigliere per inseguir 
l'ommicida, posero mano alle spade contro di loro per 
trattenerli et assicurare allo stesso l'imbarco che seguito 
anco felicemente fu trasportato a Trieste.
Tale innauudita sceleragine, grave per il fatto ma 
gravissima per le circostanze di concerto, di proditione e 
di mandato et violatione della pace giurata inanzi questo 
gran Tribunale doveva comovere le viscere dell'Eccelso 
consiglio in essecratione del fatto et per commendat la 
formatione del processo col rito et auutorità sua, senza 
di che nulla si ricaverà mai: troppo atterriti quei sudditi, 
troppo frequenti l'oppressioni, troppo facili i rei alle 
vendette e tropppo auutorevoli e prepotenti a conseguir 
ciò che vogliono, senza di che anderanno trionfanti // 
e fastosi di deluder qualuque ottimo rapresentante che 
fosse incaricato alla formatione del processo.
Ciò sia donato alle lagrime all'aﬄ  itissima madre et a 
consolatione di tanti buoni cittadini che conoscono 
evidentemente sovertita la quiete della città e ridotta 
trionfante l'auutorità e prepotenze de cativi.
Gratie.
28 1686.6.19. ASVe. 
Cons X 
– Parti 
Co-
muni, 
Registro 
136 
(1686)
Capi scrivono 
Al Regimento di 
Capo d'Istria
Capi:
Pietro Loredan,
Lorenzo Morosini 
Kavallier
Marco Corner
Nello stesso tempo che ci pervenero le vostre informa-
tioni dei X. stante del grave caso dell'interfattione del 
Dr Zulian del Bello per mano di Leandro Gravise, sono 
stati portati gl'humili riccorsi della Madre al Tribunal de' 
Capi, che vi mandiamo in copia, esprimenti le gravissi-
me circostanze che accompagnan'esso caso e che hanno, 
unite alle vostre lettere, persuaso il Consiglio di X.ci a 
farne a voi Reggimento la delegatione; acciò habbiate 
a sollecitamente prosseguire accurata formatione di 
Processo col rito, et auttorità del medesimo Consiglio, 
con facoltà di promettere la secretezza a testimonii, 
a l'impunità ad alcuno de' complici, purché non sii 
principal auttor, o mandante, facendo sempre scrivere 
al vostro Cancelliere. Perfettionato il Processo, lo 
ispedirete, con facolta' di punire li rei presenti, et absenti 
nelle pene di vita, bando perpetuo e deﬃ  nitivo da questa 
Città di Venetia e Dogado e da tutte le altre
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Città, Terre, e luoghi del Dominio Nostro, terrestri e 
maritimi navilii armati e disarmati, priggion, galea, 
relegation, conﬁ scation de Beni, e colle taglie, che vi 
pareranno. Osservando le Leggi in proposito di conﬁ sca-
tioni, e d'infeudar beni conﬁ scati; quelle in particolare 
1611, 27. Aprile, con altre posteriori 1647, e 1649. in 
materia di spese, non condannando in denari, secondo 
la deliberation del Maggior Consiglio 1628 e delle 
sentenze, che farete, invierate copia a' Capi del Cons.o 
di X.ci, perché li condannati da Voi nel caso presente 
s'intenderan alla condition de condannati dal medesimo 
Consiglio (per 13, contra 2. 3/4) 
29 1686.7.9. ASVe. 
Cons X 
– Parti 
Comuni 
ﬁ lza 
772
Capi scrivono Al 
Pod e Cap di Capo 
d'Istria
Lo stesso come 
nel Doc. 30 ASVe. 
Cons X – Parti 
Comuni, Registro 
136 (1686)
+ più allegata la 
seconda lettera di 
Madre del Giulia-
no del Tacco:
Serenissimo Prencipe, illustrissimi et eccellentissimi 
signori capi dell'Eccelso Consiglio di Xci
Con le stesse lacrime et angosciosi singulti con quali già 
giorni si presentò l'adolorata e sfortunatissima madre 
del dr. Giuliano dal Bello ultimamente interfetto con 
proditione et insidie nella publica piazza di Capo d'Istria 
et alla presenza di quell'illustrissimo signor consiglier 
Balbi Vice Podestà per opera di Leandro marchese 
Gravise, ma con mandato, cooperatione et assistenza 
di Nicolò pur Gravise e Francesco e Iseppo dal Tacco, 
Fratelli e Zii rispettive, in onta e vilipendio della pace 
stabilita e conclusa con questi e l'infelice mio ﬁ gliolo 
per commando et opera di cotesto Eccelso Gravissimo 
Tribunale, comparisse da novo et humilmente espone 
che havendo commandato l'Eccelso Consiglio per la 
gravità del caso e per le miserande circostanze già 
espresse la formazione del processo coll'auttorità e rito 
suo e susseguente dellegatione a quell'Eccellentissimo 
Reggimento, porta osservatione a tutti i buoni sudditi di 
quella città e ramarico inﬁ nito a me infelice il dubio ce 
habbino a restar deluse le sante intentioni dell'Eccelso 
Consiglio che ha inteso conferir questa grande auttorità 
all'oggetto che la prepotenza de' rei e il terrore in che 
tengono per questa et altre delinquenze quei popoli non 
valesse a render impriggionate nel timoroso silentio fra 
le lingue de' testimonii la gravità dell'eccesso e i concetti 
inesorabilmente stabiliti dell'eccidio di questo infelice 
ﬁ gliuolo, come anco perché fosse con proportione 
adequata di castigo Vendicato l'assassinio di tanto tempo 
machinato, poiché risedendo l'Illustrissimo signor 
Consigliere Alvise Diedo fra quel Tribunale, protettore 
benignissimo de' rei, la conﬁ denza con quali non può 
esser maggiore, tanto per la continua conservatione per 
esser de' primi Gentilhuomini della città, quanto per la 
comensalità e testimonii di generosità vicendevolmente 
praticati, sono riﬂ essi gravi che non possono, non per 
grave impressione né testimonii per le depositioni 
quanto per altri passi appresso l'universale nell'ordine 
e nel merito. Tale evangelica relatione che si porta alla 
sublime cognitione di Vostre Eccellenze sii quella che 
renda eccitata la loro somma prudenza
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a prender per la consolatione dell'aﬄ  ittissima 
madre ottuagenaria e per il servitio della Giu-
stizia quelle deliberationi che fossero stimate 
più conferenti a gloria di sua divina maestà e 
di questo Eccelso Tribunale, giusto oppressore 
delle odiose prepotenze e sceleragioni. Gratie.
30 1686.7.9. ASVe. 
Cons X 
– Parti 
Co-
muni, 
Registro 
136 
(1686)
Capi scrivono 
Al Pod e Cap. di 
Capo d'Istria
Capi:
Marco Bragadin
Andrea Tron
Ferigo Venier
Doppo la delegatione, che col rito facessimo 
ai 19 decorso a cotesto Reggimento del grave 
caso della morte del Dottor Giulian del Bello, 
pestuasa la giustitia da giusti riguardi, siano 
devenuti in deliberatione di sospender essa 
delegatione, e di commetter a Voi, come 
facemo, la formatione d'accurato Processo col 
Rito, et autorità del medesimo Consiglio, con 
facoltà di prometter la secretezza a testimonii, 
e l'impunità ad alcuno de' complici, purché non 
sii principal autor, o mandante, facendo sempre 
scrivere al vostro Cancelliere. Perfettionato 
il processo sino ad oﬀ esa, ce ne porterete del 
suo contenuto distinta informatione per quelle 
deliberationi, che fossero contentanee a servitio 
della Giustitia.
31 1686.7.24 ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons 
X – 
Lettere 
Rettori, 
b. 258, 
n.o. 227
Pod Cap Capod 
Vettor da Mosto a' 
Ill.mi Ecc.mi ss.ri 
ss.ri Colmi'
Mentre s'andava prosseguendo il Processo 
dellegato da cotest'Eccelso Tribunale con 
l'auttorità e rito suo a me, unitamente con questi 
Illustrissimi signori Consiglieri sopra il fatto 
della morte del Dottor Giuliano del Bello, mi 
soprarivano altre Ducali di Vostre Eccellenze 
che sospendono la delegazione medema ed a 
me solo ingiongono la formationne del pro-
cesso col rito solo sin ad oﬀ esa, per rassegnar 
poi l'informationi giurate a cotest'Eccelso 
Consiglio. In ordine a che prosseguendosi nel 
caso medemo con ogni piu' accurata diligenza, 
insorgie la neccessità d'haver gl'essami d'alcuni 
testimonii permanenti in cotesta Dominante 
sopra li particulari espressi dai Congionti 
dell'interfetto ne' loro costituti, e ch'in copia 
humilio qui annessi all'Eccellenze Vostre, dal 
soprano beneplacito de quali dipenderà o di 
far costì rilevare gl'esami medemi o in altra 
maniera commandare quanto conoscessero 
proprio, onde uniti tutti i lumi possibili, possa 
in poi, con la dovuta pontuale rassegna, 
esseguire quanto per dette ultime Ducali vengo 
incaricato. Gratia
32 1686.8.17 ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons X, 
Lettere 
Secrete, 
b. 41
Al Pod Cap di 
Capodistria
Capi:
Piero Foscarini, 
Ottavian Pisani, 
Carlo Contarini
Perfettionati gli esami, che ci havete 
richiesto sopra l'interfetione del Dr. Giulian del 
Bello; che li [tal...]   per gl'eﬀ etti di Giustitia, 
attendendo le vostre informationi in ordine al 
decreto de Consigli.o di X.ci.
168
VENDETTA IN KOPER 1686
33 1686.8.30. ASVe. 
Cons X 
– Parti 
Co-
muni, 
Registro 
136 
(1686)
Capi scrivono 
Al Pod e Cap. di 
Capo d'Istria
Capi
Marco Bragadin
Bernardo Navager
Andrea Tron
Si sono ricevute esate informationi dal 
vostro precessore del processo formato 
con ordin:e del Consigli.o di X:ci pel 
caso della morte del Dr Giuliano dal 
Bello. Il Consiglio di X:ci nel riguardo alla 
gravità del caso è devenuto in risolutione 
d'assumerlo e però col medesimo Consiglio 
vi commettemo di mandarci il processo 
accompagnato dalle vostre lettere e sigilo 
per li dovuti eﬀ etti di Giustitia.
E da me sii preso che il processo predetto 
s'intendi assunto in questo Consiglio per 
proseguirsi agl'eﬀ etti di Giustitia
8 – 7
1 – 0            pd:e   4/5   
6 – 8 
Primo Sett:e 1686
Proposta l'altra scrittura lettera, et assuntio-
ne, e furono
9 – 8 
2 – 2              pd:e   4/5
5 – 6 
Illico
Lettera di delegatione sotto questo giorno al 
Podestà, et Capitanio di Capodistria.
34 1686.9.2. ASVe. 
Cons X 
– Parti 
Comuni 
ﬁ lza
773
Capi scrivono Al 
Pod e Cap di Capo 
d'Istria
Come sotto doc. 
35
Commessaci dal Consiglio di X:ci al vostro 
precessor la informatione del Processo col 
Rito sopra la interfetione del Dr Giuliano 
del Bello ci ha il medesimo con pontualità 
fatte tenere esate informationi del medesimo 
processo sopra le quali risolvemo col me-
desimo Consiglio delegar a Voi il Processo 
stesso acciò che coll'autorità con cui è stato 
formato dobbiate perfetionarlo et ispedirlo 
con facoltà di punire li rei presenti et absenti 
nelle pene di Vita, bando perpetuo e deﬃ  -
nitivo da questa Città di Venezia e Dogado 
e da tutte le altre Città, terre e luoghi del 
Dominio nostro terrestri e maritimi, naviglii 
armati e disarmati, priggion, galea, rele-
gation, conﬁ scation de beni, e colle taglie 
che vi pareranno. Osservando le Leggi in 
proposito di conﬁ scationi e d'infeudar Beni 
conﬁ scati, quella in particolare 1611, 27 
Aprile, con altre posteriori 1647 e 1649 
in materia di spese, non condennando in 
denari, secondo la deliberation del Maggior 
Consiglio 1628, e delle sentenze che farete, 
invierete copia a' Capi del Consiglio di 
X.ci, perché li condannati da Voi nel caso 
presente s'intenderanno alla condition de 
condannati dal Consiglio medesimo (per 
16, - 1 - contra 2. 3/4)
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35 1686.9.2. ASVe. 
Cons X 
– Parti 
Co-
muni, 
Registro 
136 
(1686)
Capi scrivono 
Al Pod e Cap. di 
Capo d'Istria
Commessaci dal Consiglio di X:ci al vostro precessor 
la informatione del Processo col Rito sopra la 
interfetione del Dr Giuliano del Bello ci ha il medesimo 
con pontualità fatte tenere esate informationi del 
medesimo processo sopra le quali risolvemo col 
medesimo Consiglio delegar a Voi il Processo stesso 
acciò che coll'autorità con cui è stato formato dobbiate 
perfetionarlo et ispedirlo con facoltà di punire li rei 
presenti et absenti nelle pene di Vita, bando perpetuo 
e deﬃ  nitivo da questa Città di Venezia e Dogado e da 
tutte le altre Città, terre e luoghi del Dominio nostro 
terrestri e maritimi, naviglii armati e disarmati, priggion, 
galea, relegation, conﬁ scation de beni, e colle taglie 
che vi pareranno. Osservando le Leggi in proposito 
di conﬁ scationi e d'infeudar Beni conﬁ scati, quella in 
particolare 1611, 27 Aprile, con altre posteriori 1647 e 
1649 in materia di spese, non condennando in denari, 
secondo la deliberation del Maggior Consiglio 1628, 
e delle sentenze che farete, invierete copia a' Capi del 
Consiglio di X.ci, perché li condannati da Voi nel caso 
presente s'intenderanno alla condition de condannati dal 
Consiglio medesimo (per 16, - 1 - contra 2. 3/4)
36 1686.11.12. ASVe. 
Cons X 
– Parti 
Comuni 
ﬁ lza
773
Capi scrivono Al 
Pod e Cap di Capo 
d'Istria
Accio possiate aggiustar la penna  all gravità del delitto, 
stimato per grave dal Consiglio di X.ci. della morte del 
dr. Giulian del Bello vi diamo con lo stesso Consiglio 
la facoltà di ponere nella sentenza in caso d'absente la 
condizione di pace eﬀ ettiva, e taglia anco fuori dello 
Stato. Quanto poi al proclama circa le armi resta rimesso 
all'auttorità del nostro Reggimento che in conformità 
delle leggi facciate quello vederà proprio la vostra 
prudenza.
37 1686.11.12. ASVe. 
Cons X 
– Parti 
Co-
muni, 
Registro 
136 
(1686)
Capi scrivono 
Al Pod e Cap. di 
Capo d'Istria
Capi:
Ales.o Morosini
Antonio Barbarigo
F.co Pisani
Accio possiate aggiustar la penna alla gravità del delitto 
stimato per grave dal Consiglio di X:ci della morte del 
Dr Zulian dal Bello vi diamo con lo stesso Consiglio 
facoltà di ponere nella sentenza in caso d'absenza 
conditioni e di pace eﬀ ettiva e taglia anco fuori dello 
Stato. Quanto poi al proclama circa le armi resta rimesso 
all'auttorità del vostro Reggimento, perche in conformità 
delle leggi facciate quello vederà proprio la vostra 
prudenza. (13 za, 1 proti, 3/4)
38 1686 o 1687 
s.d.
SI_
PAK/
0299/
004/001
Difesa di Nicolò 
Gravisi
Trascritta sotto
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39 1687.7.15 ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons. 
X. 
Lettere, 
b. 141
Al Pod e Cap. di 
Capodistria
Capi: Alvise 
Mocenigo, An-
tonio Barbarigo, 
Francesco Diedo
Stante l'appellatione interposta al Tribunal Nostro de' 
Capi del Consiglio di X.ci per parte e nome di Domina 
Letitia relicta quondam Benvenuto Gravisi del Mandato 9 
Luglio corrente di Voi Podestà e Capitanio con tutte le cose 
antecedenti, susseguenti e dependenti, come di Mandato 
e cose dependenti malamente, e con disordine a grave 
suo danno e pregiudizio, vi diciamo colli Capi predetti 
che non innoviate, né permettiate che sia innovata cosa 
alcuna, facendo citar per stridore tutti e cadauni pretendenti 
interesse, perché nel termine di giorni otto dopo la citatione 
comparir debbano avanti il Tribunal Nostro per detta 
Causa, aliter dandosi avviso della esecutione.
40 1688.1.27.
(1687 m.v.)
ASVe. 
Capi 
Cons. 
X. 
Lettere, 
b. 141
Al Pod e Cap. di 
Capodistria
Capi: Giust. Ant:o 
Belegno, Anzolo 
Diedo, Ant:o 
Pisani
Conoscendosi conveniente che mentre si porta costì 
Ottavio del Bello per riscadere le cose sue habbi a 
godere con la sua famiglia nella propria Casa paterna 
la sicurezza e la quiete stimiamo opportuno in riguardo 
degli accidenti passati tra' suoi Congionti di incarricare 
la vostra prudenza a contribuirle per l'eﬀ etto stesso 
quella Caritatevole assistenza che fosse necessaria, a 
scanso di ogni inconveniente e sconcerto, tale essendo 
l'intentione de Capi del Consiglio nostro di X.ci.
41 senza data 
(dopo 1686)
Ven-
turini, 
1906, 
329
Scrittura di Alvise 
Del Bello
“ La causa che io Alvise, o come in lingua toscana Luigi, 
Del Bello mi attrovo in questi paesi ‹(cioè a Livorno)› fu 
che essendosi il sig. Ottavio mio fratello accasato con la 
signora Cecilia ﬁ gliola dei qm. Carlo Del Tacco, cominciò 
a travagliare me e li Sig:ri Lucio, dottori Giuliano ed 
Antonio, all›ora viventi, con indebiti litigi, a segno tale 
che ingrossato il sangue dei parenti, divinimmo inimici, 
e dattosi il caso che trovandosi radunato il Magniﬁ co 
Consiglio dei Nobili di detta Citta di Capodistria nella 
solita sala del palazzo, sotto il dì 6 di Settembre, giorno 
di domenica dell'anno 1683, dove ancor io mi ritrovavo, 
e trattandosi di certo aﬀ are appartenente al signor dottor 
Giuliano mio fratello, salì l’aringo il sig. Dottore Niccolò 
Del Tacco cognato dei prefato sig. Ottavio Del Bello, 
nostro fratello, quale aveva cominciato aringare contro 
detto aﬀ are del detto sig. dottore Giuliano, pur nostro 
fratello, quale allora sosteneva la carica principale di 
Sindaco Prov:re della Citta, nel detto atto seguirono alcune 
parole di sprezzo tra il detto sig. Niccolò del Tacco, uomo 
altiero, ed il sig. Domenico Del Bello, nostro zio paterno, 
che allora per il rispetto non andò avanti; ma terminato 
il Consiglio e discesi le scale del Sig Dott.r Nicolò del 
Tacco, mosso per la propria alteriggia o per qualche 
sdegno che potesse avere a causa dei sudetti litiggi, mentre 
che detto sig. Domenico Del Bello nostro zio paterno, 
gentiluomo vecchio, esemplare e benemerito della nostra 
fraterna, in compagnia dei prefato sig. dottore Giuliano, 
nostro fratello, escivano dalla porta del Corpo di Guardia 
del Palazzo che nella piazza risponde …”  fe’ l'atto di 
colpire il venerando Domenico Del Bello. Il che vedendo 
il giovane Alvise, impugnata la pistola, sparò con quella 
sull'aggressore, mandandolo diﬃ  lato all'altro mondo.
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42 1689.1.24 SI_
PAK/
0299/
004/001
Principe elettore di 
Bavaria Massimi-
liano II Emanuele 
di Wittesbach 
risponde a una 
lettera dell’abate 
Vincenzo Grimani 
di Venezia riguar-
dante Leandro 
Gravisi
Illustrissimo e Reverendissimo Signore. Con quella 
distinta estimazione con la quale io considero i meriti di 
Vostra Signoria Illustrissima, ho accolti anche gli uﬃ  zi 
ch'ella interpose a favore del marchese Leandro Gravisi. 
Nelle congiunture che si presentano in campagna, dove 
egli dovrà portarsi, riﬂ etterò alle sue raccomandazioni 
ed assicurandola intanto della mia propensissima 
volontà, Le prego dal cielo ogni maggior contentezza.
Monaco, 24 gennaio 1689.
Di Vostra Signoria Illustrissima e Reverendissima.
   Aﬀ etto   
                                     Emanuel 
Elett.re
VERSO:
All'illustrissimo e reverendissimo signore il signor 
abbate Vincenzo Grimani, Venezia.
43 1720.1.25 
(1720.5.8) 
SI_
PAK/
0299/
004/001
Testamento 
del marchese 
Leandro Gravisi 
fatto in Monaco 
di Baviera dove il 
testatore trovavasi 
al servizio di quel 
Principe elettore
Trascritta sotto
44 1720.8.2 SI_
PAK/
0299/
004/001
Lettera del 
marchese Leandro 
Gravisi al fratello 
Giovanni Nicolò, 
colla quale gli 
partecipa la 
nomina del nipote 
Antonio di porta 
bandiera nel reggi-
mento bavarese
Carissimo Fratello.
Non voglio qui tediarvi sopra il mio malli ritornandomi 
sempre al medemo [...] la [reccipila] va meglio ma non 
come desidero.
Attendo vostre lettere con la mesura meditando volermi 
servire de che spero che m'intendete.
Il serenissimo Prencipe elettorale a fatta aver una ban-
diera vacante nel suo regimento allo nepote che li darà 
24 ﬁ orini al mese onorario suﬁ ciente tutto il tempo che 
sarà pagio la gratia e generosa  [..] perché il stendardo 
de' granatieri a cavallo non è vacaante ne apare d'essere 
in breve fatte li miei umilissimi complimenti alli nostri 
genitori e zio del medemo.
Il serenissimo elettore vole aver il sudetto pagio nella 
sua camera ma non vorebbe privare il ﬁ liolo credendo 
che l'ama in tallo in crature o sugerito quello mio pure al 
marchese [..] et spero che riuscirà.
Spero pure che averete disposto la speditione delli 
candeli di cera bianca come vi pregai, attendo la triaca 
era prima or:ni.
Li [...] passati in Stidelberga vorebbe disponere un [...] 
guerra di religione il che per ora credo non ostante la 
fumentacione de Prussia. //
Vi prego a gradire la mia attencione e non  publici 
l'incr[...] scrivermi mentre abbracindovi di tutto cuore 
con[...] alla mia cara signora cognata [..] al soli[.].
MANSIO:
All'illustrissimo signore mio [signore colendissimo] il 
signor marchese Gio.Nicolò Gravisi, Capo d'Istria.
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45 1721.3.28 SI_
PAK/
0299/
004/001
L'ultima lettera di 
Leandro Gravisi 
al fratello Nicolò 
Gravisi
Carissimo Fratello,
Con quell'ultimo ordinario fui consolato con la vostra 
lettera delli sei del cadente nel tempo che mi pareva 
un secolo d'essere privo, anzi mormoravo, credendomi 
[inlluso] della vostra corrispondenza per stancheza 
delle mie comissioni, il solievo delle qualli a voi come 
al signor co[nte] Sabin non dubito che vi sarebbe con 
ragione caro.
Essendo già la metà conﬁ scato di questo mondo non 
dubito che questa sarà l'ultima anata, però dimando al 
d[istinto] signor Co[nte] et a voi perdono, assicurandovi 
in una maniera o in altra il solievo, l'ultima mia cura 
saranno i bagni che medito prendere il venturo maggio; 
et se de questi non trovo solievo non ne posso più 
sperare, anzi disperare intieramente la salute.
Non poco mi aﬂ ige la detta lettera sentendo le dispe[...] 
del medesimo signor Co[nte] che sono di genio [cinci-
ero] et mi pare conoscere la cosa che va fatto di buona 
grazia et aﬀ etto, però prego compatirmi e riﬂ eter esser la 
d'una che languite.
La mi apremura che siano pagati in Venezia li trattati e 
sollo perché non vorrei che li sapete che non mendico 
senza alcun patrimonio al mondo o sia credito.
Al pagio è anicipato 95 ﬁ orini et quando sia comodo 
al signor mar[chese] intendo in talle summa sodisfare 
le mie spese, così quando siano suﬁ cienti in quel caso 
suplico alla mancanza la spesa fatta dal signor conte 
Pietro nella parte e certo sarà già nella mano del medesi-
mo overo del signor conte Sabin et quella delle [32] lire 
et 4 soldi manderò al medesimo signor con [..]. del [...] 
vi suplico che non sono ingrato ma cinciero e cordiale 
et me dispiace nel cuore che il mio naturale dispiace alli 
miei più prossimi e se il mio [potredene sispp...], farò 
però sempre quello conviene a me at al paggio a tutta la 
casa nel tempo che il fratello del marchese Antonio sarà 
in età d'esser pagio lui medesimo lo potrà fare entrare, 
mentre secondo il mio essere non potrò più essere al 
mondo. La speditione che avete fatta de liquori, persuti 
del Friuli, mortadele, mi sarano molto care et ben arivate 
sino che averò quelle del oglio vergine che spero sarò il 
terminare gl'incomodi.
L'arivo anco delli liquori che tengo subito mi [...] la 
ricevuta ma non ostante mi rimproverate se doppo 
Pasqua le cere sarano calate di precio supplico il diletto 
signor conte inviarmene altre cento litri, suponendole di 
// ritorno in quel tempo in Venezia. Il signor illustrissimo 
conte don Girolamo m'assicura aver preso il più buon 
partito a non venir qui a spendere infrutuosamente il suo 
dinaro assicurandolo sopra la mia parola non aver niente 
da spuntare per lui appresso questi prencipi, inplicando 
che mi sarebbe di grandissimo contento servirlo.
Nelle sue scriture mostra disgusti del signor marchese 
Elio non potrebbe darmi maggior dispeniere che
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mostrava lui o li signori suoi illustrissimi alcun minimo 
disgusto con il medesimo del che vi prego avisarmi 
perché come ﬁ gliolo amando con tutta la tenereza il 
signor marchese suo padre e se il signor principe elettore 
conosce in lui minima tristeza vorà sapere l'origini, 
essendo talle che menta per lui, cosa che potreebbe 
portare dispiacere che non [.]plio ma replico di nuovo 
che sua altezza averete tutto il [..] per la stima e clemen-
za avendoli teli tre giorni sono. Gravisi avete de stare 
sempre appresso di me [...] Leandro Gravisi.
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Doc. 38
Difesa di Gio.Nicolò Gravisi, accusato di complicità nell'omicidio perpetrata dal 
fratello Leandro ecc. (1686)
“È cosi cieca la passione degli aversari di me infelice Gio Nicolò Gravisi che, nello 
stesso tempo che detesta l’omicidio perpetrato da mio fratello nel D.r Giuliano Del Bello, 
tenta di farne comettere dalla Giustitia un più grave nella mia persona, condanandola 
innocente. Conﬁ do tuttavia nel Grande Iddio e nella mia somma Inocenza che non have-
ranno eﬀ etto pensieri sì mal conceputi, e che l'Eccellenza Vostra non assisterà con minor 
zelo alla difesa della mia vita di quello onde è occorsa a vendicare la morte dell’altro. 
Dio benedetto, mi ha donata una pari sorte di nascer sudito, onde mi donerà anco una 
pari fortuna di essere protetto dal mio Sovrano. Con questa humilissima conﬁ denza io 
mi genuﬂ etto avanti il paterno suo Tribunale e mostrandole patentemente quanto siano 
false le accuse dattemi, che io sia complice del fatto del fratello, resterà alla sua inﬁ nita 
sapienza di giudicare quanto io sia immeritevole delle pene di quella.
II motivo principale di credermi reo é stato quello di conoscermi oﬀ eso. La morte 
del nepote, che mi dovrebbe impetrar compassione per il dolor della perdita, mi suscita 
persecuzioni per lo sospetto della vendetta. Così le mie sventure si fanno mie colpe e 
i miei pianti soministrano materia a’ miei gastighi. Ma come può haver luoco un cosi 
sinistro argomento? Dicono i Giurisconsulti che la oﬀ esa o inimicitia all’hora fa inditio 
quando il fatto è occulto e incognito il reo. Ma la morte del d.r del Bello seguì a giorno 
chiaro, in luoco publico, e per mano palese. Secondariamente la inimicitia deve esser 
viva, e la mia è stata estinta con la pace.  Per ultimo ella non può muover il Giudice ad 
altro che a formare processo e certiﬁ carsi del vero con le prove “. 
Ma quali prove si potranno addurre contro di me sfortunato in così iniqua imputatione? 
Forse la lunghezza, e la diﬃ  coltà della Pace? Così veggo essermi opposto nel primo ingresso 
del Costituto. Mà mi si adduca in Capo d’Istria una persona, che me l’ habbia dimandata e 
in Venetia mi si alleghi alcun fondamento che io l’habbi mai ricusata. Se non havessi voluto 
assentir alla pace, sarei devenuto così subito alla elettione del Mediatore? Stabilite dal Me-
diatore le conditioni, sarei stato così pronto ad abbracciarle?  Qualche tempo che è trascorso 
non fu a causa della ostinatione del Sig.r Domenico del Bello che fu chiamato più volte dal 
Eccelso Consiglio a Venetia, e non volse mai andare se non prigione? Giunto poi il Signor 
Domenico a Venetia non venne voglia agli Aversarii di far chiamare ivi anco Gio:Battista mio 
Fratello, benchè in Capodistria già paciﬁ cato? L’ordine dell’Eccelso Consiglio non ritrovò 
Gio:Battista lontano da questa Città, e però non stette qualche giorno senza l’essecutione? 
Stante la lentezza è meraviglia che si siano diﬀ eriti qualche tempo i trattati? Promossi poi i 
trattati, è meraviglia che siano stati interrotti più volte dagli altri aﬀ ari dei Mediatori, alcuni 
de’ quali andarono anco fuori di Venetia? E gli è certo che le conditioni dell’agiustamento 
dovevano essere prima proposte, poi riﬀ erite, indi considerate, e ﬁ nalmente dibattute, e 
stabilite. E tutte queste cose si potevano fare in momenti? O la parte contraria era pronta a 
ogni sodisfazione, che si desiderasse? Questa certamente non si potrebbe dire renitenza alla 
pace, ma diﬀ erenza nelle conditioni, e la diﬀ erenza non si potrebbe imputare più a una parte 
che all’altra. Ma poi, la ventilation della pace non denota intenzione di coltivarla? A che ﬁ ne 
ordirla con alcuna fatica, se havevo dissegno di romperla con ogni furore? “.
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Mi si è opposto in secondo luoco del Costituto che mai cavassi il Cappello al d:r 
Giuliano, se ben da lui provocato; il che si rapporta da un testimonio giurato, e un altro 
non giurato. 
I malevoli hano asseverato che mio Fratello usasse i saluti per agiungergli alla colpa 
dell’Omicidio la enormità del tradimento; et hanno detto, che io gli negassi per farmi 
almeno compartecipe dell’Omicidio.
II testimonio non giurato non merita fede, et il singolare, benché giurato, non è valido 
a far prova alcuna.
Osservo che hano detto che non ho cavato il Cappello mai, onde parebbe, che tra 
noi fosse seguito incontro più volte. Chiamo Dio in testimonio, che io non mi abbatei 
seco giamai da solo a solo, e se fosse stato in compagnia di altri, può ben comprende-
re la Giustitia, che non haverei acconsentito di far simil torto anco a quelli. In questa 
moltiplicità d'incontri possibile, che due sole persone fossero spettatrici? Possibile che 
fossero spettatrici tutte le volte? E se furono altri presenti, perchè non gli adducono? Non 
è chiaro segno che ció non è per altro che per non esser trovati con l’essame de contesti 
bugiardi? Può essere poi più falso e malevolo il testimonio giurato addottomi in terzo 
luoco sopra le dichiarationi della vendetta? Egli è cosí pieno di passione, e di veleno, che 
per coprire la malevolenza col zelo della Giustizia si è ﬁ nto carico di stupore et horrore. 
Se io havessi havuto animo di far vendette, sarei stato cosi imprudente di publicarle? 
Se non havessi temuto di obligarmi alla Giustitia, non haverei considerato di avertire 
i Nemici? Non haverei compreso di metterli con le mie voci in riparo di difesa, o di 
indurli a preventione di oﬀ esa? E poi, non è chiaro che haverei parlato contro me stesso? 
La dottrina, che si possino far vendette contro i Congionti dell’oﬀ ensore non caderebbe 
contro di me, che sono Fratello dell’uccisore? Se havessi comesso io l’omicidio, si po-
trebbe credere che cercassi di volerlo giustiﬁ care prima con miei discorsi; ma dovendolo 
comettere un mio Fratello, non sarebbe stato altro che un dichiararmi per compartecipe 
del delitto. Il testimonio adduce di havermi inteso parlar così in più tempi et occasioni. 
Ma se non è probabile che io habbi parlato mai, come si potrà credere che habbi parlato 
per molte volte? La sua depositione non solo è accompagniata da tali monstruosita, ma 
è anco destituita da ogni legale sostegno, non potendosi certamente considerar come tale 
il testimonio che è unico. Ma perché la Giustitia riceva il vero lume in tal fatto lo inalzo 
nel seguente capitolo:
Cap:° 1.  Che un giorno del passato febraro 1686 stavano alcuni Signori vicino al 
Fontaco discorendo del fatto dell’Eccellentissimo Mocenigo col Labia, e del Canossa col 
Morati con varietà d’opinioni e che capitato nel congresso io Gio:Nicolò Gravisi discorsi 
sopra i medesimi fatti senza alcuna imaginabile estensione fuori di quelli.
Testimoni: Il signor Cesare Barbabianca, il Sr. Nicolò Gavardo, il Sr. Carlo del Tacco 
quondam Andrea, il Sr. Antonio Barbabianca, il Sr. Giovanni Tarsia.
Ma da qual mia operatione non ha voluto cavar materie di accusa la Maledicenza, 
se l’ha cavata dalla mia andata a Venetia? Può udirsi mai suspicione più irragionevole 
di questa? O si vuole, che io sii andato a Venetia per indurre il Fratello a venir a Capo 
d’Istria, e persuadergli poi qui l’Omicidio, o si vuole che sii andato per persuadergli 
dritamente l'omicidio.
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Se per tirarlo a Capodistria era necessaria la mia presenza, che non bastassero le mie 
lettere? Era per lui questo viaggio sì disastroso? Le lagrime e le istanze della Madre 
non havrebbero potuto niente nel cuore del ﬁ gliolo? se poi si vuole che io sii andato per 
persuadergli l'omicidio non potevo farlo con più comodità quando fosse già arrivato per 
altro ﬁ ne in Capo d'Istria? E per un consiglio o una persuasione, era necessario che io mi 
trattenessi più di un mese a Venetia? Che attendessi in forza et unioni di altri parenti? Che 
esponessi le mie attioni in vista di tutto il mondo?
Io fui tratto dunque a Venetia dall’amor del Fratello, non dall’odio di alcuna persona; 
mi mossi a quella volta per assistere alla sua salute, non per procurare l’altrui ruina. Tale 
è certamente la verità del fatto, e perché la Giustitia ne rimanghi soddisfatta rapresento:
2:° Che capitato con le Truppe da Milan a Venetia per passare in Levante Leandro 
Gravisi, mostrò intentione di voler passar prima in Capo d’Istria.
Testimoni: II Signor Capitan Antonio Gavardo, il Signor Capitan Giulian del Bello, 
Girolamo e Pietro Fratelli de Moro.
3:° Che poi cade amalato et all’ hora io Gio: Nicolò suo Fratello mi portai a Venetia.
Testimoni: II Signor Capitan: Giulian del Bello, Pietro del Moro, e Zuane Benvestio 
Marinari.
4:o Che io, e lui allogiavimo in Casa di Monsù Verdura, e quando poi arrivarono a 
Venetia i Tacchi presero allogio in Ca' Michieli.
Test: Il Signor Conte Pietro Borisi, il Signor Marco Brutti, Mattio Ombrela.
La fama poi che hanno sparsa i maligni non può ritrovar adito apresso de' giudici. I 
giureconsulti la reprobano apertamente; Dio non l'ha voluta seguire nel caso di Sodoma, 
ma ha ricercato la testimonianza degli angioli stessi e son sicuro nella rettitudine di chi mi 
giudica che ella non postrà neanco contro me prevalere.
Giuro poi a Dio che nel pratticare mio Fratello non so in alcun tempo di haver variato 
tenore, come mi è stato opposto nel Costituto, il quale mi ha detto che prima gli assistessi 
in tutti i luochi, e che due giorni innanzi del fatto lo abbandonassi. Nel resto sarebbe me-
raviglia, che ne' primi giorni, come ero più avido della sua presenza, così fossi stato più 
assiduo alla sua compagnia? Non accade così in tutti i nostri desiderii, che da principio 
sono più fervidi in ﬁ ne si allontanano? Non poteva aversi lui separato accortamente dagli 
altri senza che gli altri si separassero volontariamente da lui? Chi sarà innocente se sopra 
tali osservationi si costrituiscono reità?
 Non meno delle altre è inconcludente in se stessa, e mal fondatta sopra l’appoggio la 
quinta oppositione, la qual consiste che la sera innanzi il fatto sii capitato in Piazza, e che 
habbi cercato il Fratello per assistergli all’Omicidio, che all’hora voleva cometter, come 
depone un testimonio giurato. Ho riferito nel mio Constituto la verità alla Giustitia circa 
i miei andamenti di quella sera, che sono posti senza alcuna ragione in sospetto. E come 
era concerto co' Tacchi se quella sera i Tacchi non erano in quel luoco? Mi sia permesso di 
dire, che se l’haver guardato di mio Fratello fosse inditio di haver voluto prestar assistenza 
al delitto di quella sera; l’havermi levato dal letto potrebbe essere addotto por prova di 
haverla voluta prestare la mattina. Se la sapienza publica nel secondo prologo de' suoi 
statuti ha determinato che le opere buone si devano credere fatte a buon ﬁ ne, sicuramente le 
indiferenti quale fu questa non si devono giudicare fatte a ﬁ ne cattivo.Della stessa tempra 
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è la imputatione, che segue, e si spicca da due testimoni giurati, i quali depongono, che io 
era nel Mezà Ruﬁ ni al tempo del sbaro, dove stavo su l'attentione del fatto, e per iscorta 
del Fratello. La nociva introduzione ha due parti che devono esser per giustizia distinte. La 
prima riguarda il fatto esterno cioè il luoco dove mi atrovavo; l'altra la intentione interna, 
cioè il ﬁ ne er cui ero in quel luoco. Si come l'havermi ritrovato in quel luoco fu eﬀ etto della 
sincerità e attione ordinaria e comune di tutti, così l'interpretazione sinistra è ﬁ gura dell'odio 
e vomito della malevolenza. La mia vicinanza al delitto sarebbe stata sospetta mentre il 
delitto fosse seguito in luoco remoto e impraticabile, non essendo seguito, come fu, in 
luoco publico e frequentato. I miei andamenti dovrebbero porgere ombra mentre fossero 
straordinarii et insoliti, non essendo come furono ordinarii e consueti. E in qual altro luoco 
potevo io essere allhora che in piazza o in brolo? In qual altro luoco poteva esser qualsiasi 
cittadino? E gli è certo che erano ivi anche i parenti del morto. E perché si dirà che i parenti 
del reo fossero vicini a studio et i parenti del morto a caso?
Non si vede poi chiaro che gl'allegati di testimoni sono infetti di veleno e contaminati 
di rabbia? Il testimonio deve render conto delle cose che cadono sotto i suoi sensi e non 
formare giudicio di quelle che restano negli altrui animi. Come dunque passano costoro a 
parlar del mio animo e de' miei pensieri? I pensieri humani sono caratteri intellegibili al 
solo Dio né mai gli altrui guardi si sono avanzati a rilevar quelle cifre. Se i miei sono stati 
rivolti a quel ﬁ ne tocarà alla Giustizia divina il punirli nell'altro mondo e publicarli il dì 
del giudicio. Piacesse pure alla Maestà sua di svelarli al presente in faccia di tutti che mi 
riuscirebbero per prove indubitate di candidezza, non per argomenti detestabili d'iniquità. 
Ma fra tanto come non è credibile che sua Maestà gli abbi rilevati ad alcuno, così è troppo 
repugnante alla virtù di Vostre eccellenze il rimettersi in acciò a costoro.
Svaniscono da se stesse le maligne ombre, ma svaniranno maggiormente alla luce 
delle seguenti notizie che propongo:
5°: Che tutti i giorni dell’anno e particolarmente la mattina dell’estati non è Cittadino 
alcuno di Capo d’Istria, che non si riduca in conversatione nella Piazza, Mezà Ruﬁ ni, o 
Brolo.
Test: Il sig. Don Giacomo Contarini, il Sig. Antonio Tarsia, il Sig. Agostin Tarsia, il 
Sig. Petronio Petronio.
” 6°: Che la mattina 5 giugno, che morse il dr. Giulian del Bello, il Mezà Ruﬁ ni era 
ripieno di Cittadini di tutte le sorti, tanto Parenti di una parte che dell’altra.
Test: il Sig. dr Bortolo Petronio, il Sig. Giuseppe Bonzi, il Sig Cavallierr Olimpo 
Gavardo“.
 Se fosse poi vero il moto con la mano che due giurati testimonii rappresentano esser-
mi stato fatto dal Fratello, certamente invece di manifestarmi per reo, mi giustiﬁ carebbe 
per innocente. Imperoché, se fosse stata precedente intelligenza, qual bisogno sarebbe 
stato di farci all'hora segni co’ moti? Se egli mi chiamò con la mano perché non l'ho io 
seguita co' passi? E come ci potessimo far moti se non ci potessimo vedere?1 Ma a che 
cercar argomenti che quel moto non fu a me fatto se apparisce chiaramente che fu fatto al 
capitan Paulazzi? E però propongo di giustiﬁ care
1  Questa frase in interlinea.
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7: Che quando Leandro fece il moto con la mano egli non poteva esser rivolto da me 
a Gio:Nicolò Gravisi ce lui poteva vedere me. 
8: Che seguito il sbaro il Capitan Paulazzi era in Piazza poco distante e che Leandro 
Gravisi lo invitò con la mano a venir inanzi.
Test: Il Sig Gio: Vittori, il Sig. Andrea Manzoni “.
“Ho sentito pur rinfaciarmi nel Costituto, che Leandro traversò la Chiesa del Duomo 
per la cale da Carmine e usci in Brolo dalla parte del Vescovato, perché sapeva attrovarsi 
là i suoi Parenti. Ma se voleva accostarsi a' Parenti, perché non andar al Mezà, dove essi 
erano? Se voleva giunger più presto al Vescovato, perché non tenere alla prima la strada 
breve del Campanile? Perché non entrar in Chiesa per la porta Grande, et uscir per quella 
di Santa Croce in faccia à Ruﬁ ni senza far il giro della calle de' Carmini ? Ma poi, perché 
andar in Brolo per trovar i Parenti, se i Parenti non erano all'hora in Brolo? Nel che acció 
la Giustitia non habbia esitanza la suplico sincerarsene co' seguenti Capitoli.
9: Che sentito il sbaro in Mezà Ruﬁ ni fu prima detto esser tratto a un colombo e poi 
sparso esser morto il medico e all'hora solamente io Gio:Nicolò Gravisi uscii fuori del 
Mezzà con tutti gli altri.
Test: il Signor Cavallier Gavardo, il Signor dr Bortolo Petronio, il Signor Giacomo 
Fin, il Signor Giuseppe Bonzi “.
10°: Che quando spuntai da Piazza verso il Brolo, Leandro mio Fratello haveva di 
già passato il Brolo medemo, et era entrato nella cale de' signori Petronii, che conduce a 
Porta Isolana.
Test: II Signor Carlo Petronio, il Signor Cesare Barbabianca, il Signor Girolamo 
Ingaldeo “.
 Empia poi, e iniquissima, è la introduttione del testimonio giurato che i sbiri siano 
stati da me fermati. Se io fossi devenuto a tal atto dimandarei perdono alla Giustitia 
e allegarei che hebbi inanzi gli occhi il pericolo del Fratello, non il favore delle sue 
operationi; Che le leggi della Natura sono immutabili e che i primi moti non sono in 
potere degli huomini. Ma questa è certamente falsità patentissima. È vero che Gioseppe 
del Tacco hebbe seco discorso, ma fu momentaneo, e non apartiene a me, che ero distante. 
Mi basterebbe considerare che è detto unico; ma perché apparisca anco falso non manco 
di soggiungere
11°: Che quando Giuseppe del Tacco parlò co’ Sbiri io Gio:Nicolò Gravisi ero lontano 
da esso.Test: Il Signor Carlo Petronio, il Signor Cesare Barbabianca, il Signor Girolamo 
Ingaldeo “.
Un testimonio giurato ha pur detto che io habbia veduto il Fratello dopo il fatto, e che 
non l’h salutato. E dove posso averlo veduto con motivo di salutarlo? Doppo il fatto dove 
mai è seguito tra di noi incontro alcuno? Il Costituto non mi ha espresso il luoco, onde non 
posso nemeno sopra ciò far difesa. Ma che colpa sarebbe non l'haver salutato? Ma qual 
difesa bisognerebbe contra la depositione di un solo?
Mi è stato rinfaciato il non esser andato sopra il Cadavero. Ma sono andati forse tanti 
altri? Ma a Francesco del Tacco ha giovato niente l’andarvi?
L’essere poi stato a Porta Isolana, come in ultimo luoco mi è stato opposto, non può 
servire ad argomento di accusa, ma bensi a comprobation di sincerità. Se io havessi sapu-
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to, che mio Fratello era molto prima trapassato a quel luoco, che aveva barca con molti 
remi, che teneva provisione d’arme, che era con l’assistenza del Servitore, qual motivo 
dovevo havere di andar a soccorerlo? perché non è stato imputato delitto a tanti altri che là 
si portorono? E poi, non sarebbe stato questo piutosto uﬃ  cio di pietà verso un particolare 
che atto di spaleggio ad un delinquente? L'opera mia sarebbe stata dannata se fosse stata 
rivolta a' danni del morto, non essendo stata impiegata in soccorso del vivo.
Mi si dirà che ero intabarato e con armi. E chi lo dice se non un sol testimonio, come 
il Costituto mi esprime? Egli che sa molto bene la virtù di chi mi giudica che testimonium 
unius, testimonium nullius. Ma egli è testimonio così falso che più non potrà essere se 
havesse detto che il fatto è successo di notte e certamente egli merita che si armi contro 
di lui la ira di Vostra eccellenza. Perché però spicchi chiaro il lume di tutto il successo, mi 
sia lecito di farlo apparire, ne' seguenti attestati :
12°: Che i Sbiri giunsero a Porta Isolana in tempo, che Leandro Gravisi era avanzato 
con la barca buon tratto in mare.
Test: Il Signor Ludovico Tarsia, Nicolò Gallo, Francesco Cernivan.
13:° Che doppo i Sbiri capitorono a Porta Isolana diversi signori in compagnia de' 
quali ero anco io Gio: Nicolò Gravisi, e arrivassimo tutti a quella riva doppo, che i Sbiri 
avevano già serrate, e riaperte le porte, e che la barca con Leandro era maggiormente 
avanzata.
Test: Li Signori Can:° Ambrosio de Bellî, il Signor Ludovico Tarsia, il Signor dr 
Bortolo Manzioli, il dr Aurelio de Belli.
14:0 Che adimandati i Sbiri chi fosse il reo che fuggiva, dissero che era un forestiero 
che essi non conoscevano.
Test: Il Signor Canonico Ambrosio de Belli, et il Signor. D:r Aurelio de Belli, et il 
Signor Ludovico Tarsia.
15:° Che quei Signori et io Gio.Nicolò sudetto partissimo immediate da Porta lsolana, 
e non fecimo ivi dimora alcuna.
Test: Li Signori dr Bortolo Manzioli, Ludovico Tarsia, Canonico Ambrosio de Belli e 
D:r Aurelio de Belli.
16o: Che io Gio.Nicolò sopranominato fui tutta la mattina che morse il dr del Bello 
senza tabaro, così in Piazza come in Brolo, et a Porta lsolana “.
Test: Il Signor Cavallier Olimpo Gavardo, il Signor D:r Bortolo Manzioli, il Signor 
Capitan Antonio Gavardo.
Riassumendo brevemente gl’inditii, replico essere tutti o falsi o insusistenti. L’andata 
a Venetia può essere più innocente? La dimora in Mezzà Ruﬁ ni può essere più ordinaria? 
L'attentione al fatto può essere più imperscrutabile? Il passagio del Reo per la Chiesa 
del Duomo quanto è chimerico? Il moto della mano quanto è ingannevole? L’aresto de 
Sbiri non è falsissimo? L'andata a Porta lsolana non fu semplicissima? La ventilation 
della Pace non fu cura per custodirla? Il sprezzo de saluti, le dichiaration di vendetta, la 
separation del Fratello, l’atto della sera precedente puono essere più male fondati?
Ma suponga la Giustitia, che il caso fosse tutto diverso; Si avederà che non per questo 
l’accusa sarebbe hora diﬀ erente. Se non si potesse incolpare della venuta del Fratello 
il mio viaggio, non si incolparebbero le mie lettere? Se io mi fossi trovato lontano dal 
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fatto, non si direbbe havermi a studio retirato dal sospetto? Se non mi fossi mosso a Porta 
lsolana, non sarebbe giudicata scienza dell’allestimento? Se la pace fosse stata conclusa 
più presto, non sarebbe detto che fu a ﬁ ne di prevenir più facilmente alla vendetta? Se la 
corrispondenza co' Belli (Del Bello) fosse stata più stretta, non sarebbe stato aﬀ ermato 
che fu più insidiosa? 
Si vuole che il fatto sia successo con deliberatione e consiglio. Ma che bel consiglio 
sarebbe stato l’avventurar tutta la mia Casa, e quella de' Tacchi, come si sono certo avven-
turate, con attrovarsi ogni uno di noi tanto vicini al fatto, e peró tanto esposti agl’impegni? 
Si vuole che io mi habbi mosso a tal risolutione per vendicare la Morte del Nepote. Ma 
il D:r Nicolò del Tacco non era cosi Nepote a me, che á mio Fratello? Si vuole che la 
oﬀ esa habbia potuto in me tanto, benché paciﬁ cato; e non si vuole che  habbia potuto 
niente in mio Fratello, che non haveva ritegno di pace, non lacci di Patria, e che si stimava 
aggravato da nuove ingiurie?
Ah che tutto è opera della malignità, del livore, dell'odio, della passione. La giustizia 
può argomentarlo dalle forme di parlare dei testimonii, dalla discordia tra essi, dalla 
assordità delle cose, dalla repugnanza co la ragione [so]pra di che invoco altamente i 
suoi più attenti riﬂ essi. Se fossero stati esaminati i Sbiri, considero riverentemente, che 
non possono meritare credito alcuno. I Sbiri sono ministri della Giustizia, e devono dar 
esecutione a' suoi Atti con le forze, non possono somministrargli validità coi loro detti 
(!!). Le retentioni gli frutano premii, o beneﬁ cii, onde si può imaginare il ramarico che 
haveranno havuto in vedersi smarita quella di mio Fratello. I Reí gli producono utili, o 
mercedi, onde si può raﬁ gurare quanto haveranno bramato di vedere in tal conditione 
anco la mia persona.
Se fossero stati esaminati li Signor Rizzardo Vida, e D:r Agostin Vida, rappresento 
con tutta sommissione, che l’uno e l'altro, è congionto con gli Avversarii, e mal aﬀ etto a 
me per le cause qui sotto dichiarite, e peró únicamente gli oppongo:
17o: Che il Padre del Signor D:r Agostin Vida è stato ammazzato nelle inimicitie che 
haveva contro il Nono e Zij Materni di me Gio:Nicolò Gravisi.
(Test): Il Signor Vicario Don Santi Grisoni, il Signor Vincenzo Ruﬁ ni.
18o: Che il Padre di detto Signor D:r Vida era zio del Signor Rizzardo Vida.
Test: Il Signor Vicario don Santo Grisoni, il Signor Vincenzo Ruﬁ ni.
19o: Che il Signor D:r Agostin Vida era stretto Parente del dr Giulian del Bello.Test: 
Come sopra.
20°: Che il Signor Rizzardo Vida è Nepote così del Signor Domenico del Bello, come 
del Capitan Paolazzi.
Test: Come sopra.
E perché a chi ha voluto traﬁ gere i Tacchi è parso necessario anco di colpire la mia 
Innocenza, però tutti quei testimonii, che fossero da essi opposti o come avversi a loro, ô 
come partiali de’ Belli (del Bello) non possono neanco meritar fede contro di me, onde se 
gli intenderanno fatte in tutto per tutto le medesime Oppositioni, et eccetioni per mia parte, 
supplicando per ció humilissimamente la Giustitia di rivolgergli l’occhio a questo passo.
Questi, che ho accennati, prestantissimo Giudice, e quei che saranno da’ Tacchi più 
espressamente additati sono li Scogli palesi e scoperti, dove forse si è procurato di mandar 
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a rompere la mia Innocenza. Ma chi mi puo assicurare da gli occulti e nascosti? Il Pro-
cesso formato col Rito è per me un Mare pieno di Sirti, per li Malevoli è stato un Campo 
libero agli spergiuri. Dio Benedetto gli scopra tutti agli occhi della Giustitia e si faccia 
Protettore della mia Causa, come è stato Testimonio delle mie attioni. Non è già l’amor 
della vita quello che mi fa tremare sì horribilmente al solo nome di condanna. Troppo 
ella mi è grave doppo il trucidamento del Nepote, gli assedii de' sequestri, i dispendii 
de Venetia, le fulminationi del Fratello, la Morte addolorata della Sorella, gli aﬀ anni 
mortali della Madre e le lunghe aﬄ  ittioni della mia prigionia. La consegno però di buon 
cuore al Sepolcro, ma solo mi preme di restituirla così pure da’ sospetti d’infedeltà al mio 
Prencipe, qual'io la ricevei dalle viscere de miei Genitori zelanti.
Non sofrisca però la pietà di Vostra Eccellenza che mi succeda una confusione così 
immeritata, ma compatendo più tosto alle gravi agitationi, che mi hanno sin hora accom-
pagnato, mandi la sua benignissima voce a donarmi la calma con una libera assolutione, 
che prostrato imploro. Gratie.
182
VENDETTA IN KOPER 1686
Doc. 43
Testamento del marchese Leandro Gravisi fatto in Monaco di Baviera dove il 
testatore trovavasi al servizio di quel Principe elettore 
Questa ultima volontà del defonto signore marchese Gravisi di pia memoria è un vero 
testamento nuncupativo fatto con tutti li suoi requisiti, del resto li premi tre altri non sono 
che li preliminari soliti ad aggiungersi a tutti li testamenti.
Articolo quarto. Ordino e voglio che tutti i miei debiti specialmento per il vino pre-
so dal signor Barnabè siano pontualmente, non meno che le pretensioni quali veranno 
liquidate ed in specie quella di sua Eccellenza il signor generale marchese di Maﬀ ei, cioè 
vintidue doppie dette del sole.
Articolo quinto. Lascio alla mia dilettissima signora cognata Maria Anna Cecilia di 
Baumgarten, vedova e nata di Schennbrunn, seicento ﬁ orini parte per sodisfare al debito 
di trecento ﬁ orini incirca prestatimi e parte in riconoscimeto dell'assistenza fedelmente 
prestatami nella mia malatia. Ordino ancora e lascio alla medesima // tutti li miei mobili e 
suppelletili di qualsiasi nome eccettuati queli soli dellli quali disporrò sussequentemente.
Sesto. Lascio al mio carissimo signore nipote il marchese Gravisi, paggio elettorale, 
una pezza di veluto, una pezza di drapo d'oro, l'habito turchino guarnito d'oro, due peru-
che nuove, due spade fra le quale una con la guardia d'argento et un cappello.
Settimo. Avendomi assistito il signor dottore di Vacchieri, medico della personna di 
Sua Altezza Eccellentissima, in tutta la mia malattia con singolare assiduità, gli lascio 
duecento ﬁ orini come una dovuta gratitudine.
Ottavo. Lascio al forriere della Guardia elettorale delli drabanti uno delli miei migliori 
cappelli, una cana, e sia quella che mi sarà messa sopra la cassa nella quale riposerà il mio 
corpo et oltra di più il mio paia di pistole. //
Nono. Ordino al mio cameriere oltre al suo salario restanteventi ﬁ orini il mio abito 
d'estate et il mio grigio con sei delle mie migliori camicie.
Decimo. Al mio scrritore ordino specialmente oltre la sua paga sei delle mie migliori 
camicie insieme con dieci ﬁ orini.
Undecimo. Alle due serve lascio uniti al di loro pagamento ad ognuna ﬁ orini dieci.
Quello poi che resterà in danaro doppo pagati tutti li miei debiti, le spese per il fu-
nerale, li legati da me qui nominati o facendone delli altri, lo lascio intieramente al mio 
signore nipote paggio di Sua Altezza Eccellentissima.
E acciò che quest'ultima mia volontà poss'essere totalmente essequita supplico e nomino 
sua eccellenza il signor barone di Malknecht, Consigliere attuale di Stato di Sua Altezza 
eccellentissima, il quale mi fu sempre aﬀ ezionatissimo, padrone ad esserne essecutore di 
questo mio testamento o sia codicillo, pregandolo a procurare con la sua valida assistenza 
che vengino pagati li miei // restanti salari del serenissimo Elettore, quali ascendono al 
presente a 1846 ﬁ orini [...] e con questi di pagare li miei debbiti e ciò che ho disposto. Per 
l'ultima grazia poi lo prego ad assistere alla mia signora cognata e di non mai abbandonarla.
Di più voglio sia dato ancora la mio cameriere il mio abito nero che sarà obbligato a 
portarlo come abbito di [servizio].
Specialmente voglio ed ordino che sia dato alli eredi della [...], già morta, settanta 
ﬁ orini che mi consegnò quando era in vita e, come pure potrebbe essere ch'io gli fosse 
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debitore di qualche porzione del salario che avea da me, voglio che alli detti suoi eredi gli 
venga boniﬁ cato tutto ciò che si crederà di giusto.
Monaco, il dì 25 gennaio 1720.
Alli 8 maggio in Monaco di Baviera 1720 de proprio pugno e tutti li miei sentimenti 
sani confermo la dispositione fatta per la signora mia cognata.
... e nepote paggio di Sua Altezza Eccellentissima.
Altra scritta in alemano aggiungendo al sudetto signor marchese Antonio Maria pa-
ggio che  faccio presente di quelli pochi libri italiani e francesi di mia ragione.
Al mio cameriere diminuisco dieci ﬁ orini non dubitando che se contenterà de vinti 
sopra li miei avanzi de paga che mi sono dovute. Il sudetto cameriere a ricevuto due 
delli oltra scritti vestiti, onde potrà contentarsi d'un altro, il più usato.
Al furiere la spada non d'argento, il chè nuovamente confermo.
Lo signor Leandro marchese Gravisi
Questo ultimo capitolo, benché tutto il rimanente et antecedente sia scritto per mano 
di notaro e in lingua tedesca, il signor testatore lo scrisse di proprio pugno in italiano.
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KRVNO MAŠČEVANJE V KOPRU 1686
POVZETEK 
V tej knjigi je predstavljenih nekaj študij primerov krvnega maščevanja na območju 
zgornjega Jadrana v srednjem in novem veku. Njihov temeljni namen je prikazati spremem-
be v družbenem sistemu reševanja sporov, ki so nastale z vzpostavljanjem sodobne državne 
oblasti v zgodnjem novem veku. Raziskave primerov temeljijo na interdisciplinarnem 
primerjalnem pristopu zgodovinskih, pravnih in antropoloških znanstvenih disciplin.
V primerjavi z uveljavljeno zgodovinopisno predstavitvijo miselnih in izraznih 
obrazcev (topos) raziskovalnih problemov, ki običajno začenjajo s splošno predstavitvijo 
problematike in nadaljujejo v časovnem zaporedju, se ta knjiga bistveno razlikuje. Gre za 
retrospektivno predstavitev, kot da bi bil konec prestavljen na začetek. Razlog za takšen 
pristop  bom poskušal utemeljiti v nadaljevanju. 
Knjiga tako začenja s časovno najbližjo epizodo, s študijo primera krvnega maščeva-
nja v Kopru, leta 1686, na podlagi izvirnih arhivskih dokumentov pravosodnih organov 
Beneške republike in narativnega gradiva protagonistov spora. Gre za klasičen primer 
maščevanja zaradi konﬂ iktov med različnimi plemiškimi sorodstvenimi skupinami, 
temelječih na idiomu časti. Vzrok je bila prepovedana ali vsaj nezaželena poroka med 
predstavnikoma dveh plemiških družin ki je prerasla v uboju sorodnika poročene.  Po 
skoraj tri leta trajajočih, očitno neuspešnih pogajanjih o sklenitvi poravnave, je prišlo do 
povračilnega uboja najvidnejšega predstavnika storilčeve družine, ki ga je izvedel ujec 
tretje, sorodstveno povezane družine. Pri tem je zanimivo, da so  lokalne,  še zlasti pa cen-
tralne politične sodne avtoritete, po prvem uboju posegale v spor (fajda), v skladu z načeli 
običajnega sistema reševanja sporov, tako da so sprti strani spodbujale in naposled tudi 
prisilile v sklenitev miru. Toda poskus, da bi običajni sistem reševanja sporov integrirali 
s sodno poravnavo, v tem primeru očitno ni uspel, saj je prav preprečevanje običajnega 
samo-regulacijskega sistema reševanja sporov z (navideznim) državnim zagotavljanjem 
varnosti in s prisilo privedlo do upora, ki ga je povzročil načrtni prelom s tradicionalnimi 
vrednotami časti in vlogami sorodstvenih povezav. Uvedba strogega inkvizitornega 
sodnega postopka, ki je že v prvem poglavju orisan z osnovnimi značilnostmi in po-
stopkovnimi fazami, pa je po maščevalnem uboju morda vendarle preprečila nadaljnje 
retaliacije, kot je to pokazala sodna praksa tudi v drugih tedanjih srednje in zahodno 
evropskih državah.  Kljub temu je lahko že sam maščevalni uboj bil, skladno z običajnim 
sistemom reševanja sporov, dojeman kot uveljavljen in družbeno priznan zaključek spora. 
Osnovan je bil  na temeljnem družbenem načelu darovanja, ki za podeljeni dar zahteva 
vrnitev daru ter za žalitev zahteva  primerno povračilo.
Prav tej večtisočletni družbeni zakonitosti je namenjeno drugo poglavje knjige. Z 
njim v obravnavi običajnega sistema reševanja sporov posegamo v daljne, pred literarne 
plemenske skupnosti, vse do evropskega zgodnjega novega veka. Primerjava z zapisi 
ohranjenih običajev  iz Črne gore, Hercegovine in Albanije,  ki so bili živi v pravni 
tradiciji še v 19. in začetku 20. stoletja, pa nam je omogočila rekonstrukcijo običajnega 
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družbenega rituala pomiritve, ki je v osnovnih potezah značilen za skoraj vse pretekle 
skupnosti na svetu. Osnovna nit poglavja je sicer namenjena rekonstrukciji in reinterpre-
taciji ponižanja v ritualu pomiritve, kot se po ohranjenih dokumentih in literaturi kaže v 
družbenih ceremonialih, toda izhodišče temelji prav na omenjeni družbeni zakonitosti 
izmenjave daru. Za povzročeno ponižanje, ki je prizadejalo škodo skupnosti, je bilo nujno 
povračilo v obliki ponižanja storilca oziroma storilčeve skupnosti. Toda to je le prva faza 
običajnega pomiritvenega postopka. Naslednja faza vodi v premirje s prisego med sprtimi 
strankami, ki je omogočilo določeno časovno obdobje za pogajanja o povračilu storjene 
škode. Tretja, zadnja faza, pa je sklenitev trajnega miru med strankami v sporu z dejan-
skim povračilom ocenjene škode in plačilom odškodnine.  Slednja se je v novejšem času 
plačevala v denarju po vnaprej določenih tarifah. Kljub temu pa se je marsikje še dolgo 
ohranil običaj utrjevanja miru s sorodstvenimi povezavami, z določenim številom botr-
stev in pobratimstev, kot tudi s porokami med predstavniki sprtih strani, kar je bila sploh 
značilnost starejših obdobij in skupnosti, v katerih je prevladovala nedenarna blagovna 
menjava. Primerjava rituala pomiritve z drugimi posvetnimi rituali (npr. investitura vla-
darjev, vitezov, notarjev ipd) pa kaže podobno, če že ne enako, splošno strukturo obredov 
za vse javne zadeve. Lahko bi celo rekli, da v tej splošni ritualni strukturi simboli, geste 
in besede tvorijo trdno zasidrano skupno človeško kognitivno zgradbo, ki odpira pot za 
nadaljnje analize kognitivnih modelov skupinskega nasilja in sistemov reševanja sporov 
v človeških družbah. 
Tako lahko prav na podlagi rekonstrukcije rituala pomiritve pritrdimo nekaterim 
antropološkim raziskavam, da so spori družbeno konstitutivni, in še več, da so družbeno 
kohezivni, saj so se s tem posamezne skupnosti sorodstveno povezale in tako razširile 
mrežo pripadnikov. Pri tem je pomembna še ena značilnost, namreč v postopku pomiritve 
spora je po svojih posrednikih oziroma mediatorjih vselej sodelovala celotna skupnost. 
Zato lahko pritrdimo tako tezam nekaterih funkcionalistov, ki običajnemu sistemu reše-
vanja sporov, to je maščevanju, pripisujejo svojstveno vlogo družbenega nadzora, kot 
tudi strukturalistom, ki v njem vidijo osnovno družbeno strukturo, če že ne kar strukturo 
stvarstva (univerzuma).
Kako zakoreninjena je bila ta struktura rituala reševanja sporov še v evropskem 
visokem srednjem veku nam ponazarja tretje poglavje, posvečeno desetletni fajdi 
(1267–1277) med oglejskimi patriarhi in goriškimi groﬁ , ki se je odvijala zlasti na ob-
močju Furlanije in Istre. To je bil čas, ko so se z vzponom srednjeveških mest oblikovale 
izobraževalne ustanove, zlasti univerze, ki so bistveno pripomogle k razširjenosti pisave 
kot kulturno-tehnološkega pripomočka za izvajanje oblasti. To je tudi čas, ko je tako 
imenovano učeno pravo črpalo svojo snov tako iz dediščine rimskega prava, ki je tedaj 
ponovno vzniknila, kot iz vrste pravnih določb germanskih predpisov, če naj jih tako 
poimenujemo skladno z zbirko Monumenta Germaniae Historica , iz svojskosti mestnega 
prava ter  iz osnove običajnega prava, ki v svoji idealizirani podobi in s pomočjo obreda 
izražajo družbene vrednote, temelječe na mediaciji skupnosti, reciprociteti in težnji k 
trajnem miru. Študija tega primera potrjuje hipotezo o mnogih sledeh ritualnih in proce-
snih značilnosti običaja v učenem pravu. Potrjuje tudi, da je bil običajni sistem reševanja 
sporov, imenovan tudi vindicta, fajda, feud, Fehde, krvna osveta, gjakmarrja, itd., svo-
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jevrsten in univerzalen koncept. Slednji je potrjen v ritualnem obrazcu, sestavljenem iz 
treh faz: kompromis (dar), premirje (prisega) in trajni mir (amor). Gre za tri faze, ki so 
bile neposredno umeščene tudi v oblikovanje učenega prava v drugi polovici 13. stoletja. 
Vseh deset obravnavanih dokumentov o reševanju spora med oglejskim patriarhom in 
goriškim grofom namreč sledi napotkom, ki jih zasledimo v delu bolonjskega notarja, 
sodnika in univerzitetnega profesorja Rolandina (Rolandinus Rodulphi de Passageriis) 
iz druge polovice 13. stoletja. Rolandino med drugim pravi, da ni pravega trajnega miru, 
če si tega ne zagotovita neposredno odgovorni strani v konﬂ iktu, in tega ne potrdita tudi 
s poljubom miru. Prav te dikcije v zapisanem pravu pričajo, kako so se ritualni obrazci 
in ritualne geste običajnega sistema reševanja konﬂ iktov ne le obdržali, temveč so bili 
tudi neposredno sprejeti v ritualnih obrazcih učenega prava. Študija tega primera pa tudi 
potrjuje, da so v družbenih odnosih in interakcijah spori ne le odraz nenehnega boja za 
resurse, temveč so tudi družbeno konstitutivni, saj so vgrajeni v sistem družbenega reda. 
Spori namreč generirajo tudi zavezništva med različnimi skupinami, ki so v preteklosti 
slonela predvsem na sorodstvenih oziroma klanskih povezavah. To je globalni strukturni 
vidik sporov, lokalni ali partikularni vidik pa se v praksi kaže tako, da v boju za resurse, 
v spletu posameznih okoliščin, prevladajo tisti, ki uspejo združiti čim več različnih in 
pogosto konﬂ iktnih lojalnih zavezništev. Slednje je v našem obravnavanem sporu očitno 
bolje uspevalo goriškim grofom kot pa oglejskim patriarhom. Toda njihova nasprotja so 
na njihove teritorije privedla druge igralce: Benečane in Habsburžane.
Vzpostavljanju, značilnostim in spremembam zakonodaje v izvajanju sodne oblasti 
Habsburžanov in Benečanov v zgornjem Jadranu od 13. do 18. stoletja pa je posvečeno 
četrto poglavje. Prvenstveni namen tega poglavja, ki ga prav tako spremljajo še posa-
mezne študije primerov, je bralca seznaniti z normativnimi spremembami zakonodaje in 
sodnih postopkov na kazenskem področju. Po prvih treh poglavjih se bralec lahko seznani 
s temeljnimi značilnostmi običajnih in pravnih implikacij instituta krvnega maščevanja. 
Prav zato se mu utegnejo zastavljati vprašanja, zakaj je v vrednotenju zgodovinskega pro-
cesa maščevanje, zlasti krvno maščevanje, v sodobnem času prikazano na tako izrazito 
negativen in zavajajoč način ter zakaj so bile socialne funkcije tega instituta, ki so bile 
del reda in tradicije, usmerjene k miru in družbenemu nadzorovanju konﬂ iktov, dekon-
struirane, potisnjene v pozabo in kriminalizirane? Upam, da bo odgovore na ta vprašanja 
našel prav v tem, četrtem poglavju, ki temeljno pozornost posveča raziskovanju sporov 
v medsebojnem odnosu običajnega prava in pravnih procesov. Namreč, tako v Beneški 
republiki kot v Svetem rimskem cesarstvu (in v večini tedanjih zahodnih evropskih dežel) 
je zakonodaja vse do druge polovice 15. stoletja sledila temeljnim značilnostim običaj-
nega sistema reševanja konﬂ iktov. Na podlagi izhodišč akuzatornega pravnega sistema 
je težila k samovoljnemu reševanju sporov  med sprtimi strankami, s posredovanjem 
skupnosti in skupnostno odgovornostjo za povzročeno škodo. Sodišča so bila prvenstve-
no namenjena (družbenemu) potrjevanju samovoljno sklenjenih medsebojnih poravnav, 
katere so sprte strani lahko sklenile tudi zgolj z notarsko listino. 
Z velikimi družbenimi spremembami pa je v drugi polovici 15. stoletja prišlo do 
centralizacije pravosodja, ki je bilo poleg davčne in vojaške reorganizacije temeljnega 
pomena v prizadevanjih evropskih vladarjev za vzpostavitev vrhovnega nadzora nad 
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celotnim ozemljem v njihovi pristojnosti. Za dosego tega cilja so morali vladarji najprej 
poskrbeti, da so s pomočjo zakonodaje in z drugimi prisilnimi sredstvi omejili samovoljno 
reševanje sporov po običaju. S tem so vzpostavili sodni, oziroma natančneje kaznovalni 
nadzor, tako nad posameznimi vplivnimi družinami oziroma klani, kot tudi nad drugim 
prebivalstvom. Državni inkvizitorni sodni proces, ki se je bistveno razlikoval od cer-
kvenega inkvizitornega postopka (od 12. stoletja dalje) in je bil v 16. stoletju vpeljan v 
večini zahodno- in srednje-evropskih dežel, prinaša pomembno novost. Državni sodni 
aparat je pridobil pravico pregona po uradni dolžnosti (ex oﬃ  cio), prekršek pa je postal 
individualiziran. Medtem ko je pred tem, v takoimenovanem akuzatornem pravu, sodni 
preiskovalni postopek lahko stekel le na podlagi tožbe prizadete skupnosti, so z inkvi-
zitornim postopkom sodni proces sprožili za ta namen oblikovani centralni pravosodni 
organi. Prav zapleteni inkvizitorni sodni postopki, ki so podelili (državnemu) sodniku 
skoraj neomejene pristojnosti, vključno z uvedbo torture v vseh fazah sodnega procesa, 
so postopoma prevzeli vlogo mediacije skupnosti v sporu in tako temeljno posegli v 
tradicionalne odnose vrednot časti in sorodstvenih povezav. S tem posegom in z zakon-
sko ter ideološko kriminalizacijo fajde in krvnega maščevanja je vladar oziroma država 
postopoma odvzemala sodne pristojnosti prejšnjim nosilcem (lokalne) oblasti: plemstvu. 
Od tedaj je imel pravico maščevanja in oprostitve le še vladar (država), kar tudi pomeni, 
da si je na tak način pridobil absolutno oblast. Ali, kot se je izrazil Ludvik XIV: “L’état, 
c’est moi”.
Knjigo zaključuje peto poglavje, ki je nastalo v soavtorstvu z mojima doktorantoma, 
Angeliko Ergaver in Žigo Omanom. Razprava s pojmovno-zgodovinsko analizo temelj-
nega izrazja obredja maščevanja, med drugim nazorno prikaže prav zgodovinski proces 
spreminjanja družbenega odnosa do običajno-pravnega instituta maščevanja. Obenem je 
to poglavje tudi poskus izdelave jezikovnega, konceptualnega in metodološkega okvira 
za raziskave maščevanja kot običajnega sistema reševanja sporov v predmoderni Evropi. 
V ta namen je poglavju dodan sedem-jezični glosar, ki vsebuje obilo sopomenk in v ka-
terem je zbrano ključno izrazje običaja maščevanja v latinskem, angleškem, italijanskem, 
nemškem, albanskem in slovenskem jeziku ter štokavski izrazi z območja Črne gore. 
Čeprav je razprava utemeljena predvsem na evropskih srednjeveških virih in študijah 
le-teh, razširjenost in sorodnost občečloveškega običaja omogočata uporabo dognanj tudi 
za druga obdobja in celine. V razpravi je s pojmovno-zgodovinsko in jezikovno analizo 
predstavljeno, da so, zlasti v srednjem veku, deloma pa tudi še v zgodnjem novem veku, 
kontekstualno ustrezni ključni izrazi in pojmi običaja maščevanja obstajali v mnogih 
evropskih jezikih, neodvisno od družbene in politične organizacije nekega ozemlja. 
Poglavje tako ne prispeva le k razvoju slovenske znanstvene terminologije, temveč tudi 
k razvoju nekaterih drugih evropskih znanstvenih terminologij, s težnjo, da bi postala 
osnova za vzpostavitev svetovnega znanstvenega izrazja na tem raziskovalnem področju.
Knjigi je priložena še priloga, v kateri je v prepisu objavljenih 45 dokumentov o 
študiji primera iz prvega poglavja, o krvnem maščevanju v Kopru iz leta 1686. Poleg 
navedenih razprav in študij primerov v tej knjigi prav objavljeni arhivski dokumenti v 
prilogi na izviren način in z ustreznim poznavalskim branjem odstirajo vse značilnosti 
temeljnega cilja te študije, to je raziskovanje sporov v medsebojnem odnosu običajnega 
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prava in pravnih procesov, kot se kažejo skozi obravnavo speciﬁ čnih ciljev, to je prezen-
tacijo pojavnih oblik fajd in maščevanja v kazenskih procesih in procesnih naracijah, v 
obravnavi oblik družbenega nadzora in predstavitvi vloge sporov v družbenih odnosih ter 
zlasti v obravnavi protagonistov v sporih. 
Tak pristop nam je omogočil identiﬁ kacijo odnosov, ki so obstajali med običajnim in 
novimi oblikami učenega prava, ugotavljanje sprememb, do katerih je prišlo na podlagi 
posledic tega prehoda ter zaključkov o tem, kateri kulturni elementi so se v praksi ohra-
njali še skozi celoten novi vek. Na podlagi analize dolgih historičnih procesov, ki so vodili 
k opuščanju sporov kot resničnega sistema samovoljnega reševanja sporov, so v knjigi 
predstavljene najbolj pomembne faze teh sprememb, ki jih potrjujejo raziskave literature 
in študije primerov, na podlagi različnih oblik naracije (sodne, literarne, umetniške itd.), 
ki so v novem veku opisovale spore kot sistem vrednot ali nasprotno, kot sistem, ki je 
sovražnik miru in družbenega reda.
Študije, objavljene v tej knjigi, so nastale v okviru raziskovalnega projekta “FAJ-
DA. Maščevanje in krvno maščevanje med običajnim pravom in sodnim procesom v 
srednjeveški in zgodnje novoveški Evropi. Primer zgornje jadranskega območja”, 
soﬁ nanciranega s strani ukrepa “Marie Curie Intra European Fellowship” 7. Okvirnega 
programa Evropske skupnosti, pogodba št. 627936 (več informacij in drugega gradiva 
tudi na: http://www.unive.it/faida_msca). 
Ob tem se želim prvenstveno zahvaliti mojemu mentorju, profesorju in dolgoletnemu 
prijatelju, prof. Claudiu Povolu, za nasvete in usmerjanje, ki mi jih je nudil pri razisko-
vanju teh zapletenih družbenih procesov in odnosov, še posebej pa za nesebično pomoč 
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